Sommaire

En couverture : Abraham Salm, *Gezicht op de weg tussen Buitenzorg en Preanger*, 1869, lithographie par Johan Conrad Greive coloriée à la main, 26,5 x 36,3 cm, Rijksmuseum (Gift of H.G. Körnicke, Bonn), Amsterdam, RP-P-1975-210. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.418803).

MOHAMMAD ALI FADILLAH *

Pinggiran Selatan Kota Banten: Investigasi Arkeologi Situs Lawang Abang

Pengenalan

Artikel ini dimaksudkan untuk sedikit mengalihkan perhatian, dari sudut pandang ekonomi politik, ke isu lain dalam kajian sejarah Banten. Pandangan beberapa sejarawan yang telah menggarisbawahi pentingnya religiusitas Islam dalam konstruksi Kesultanan Banten memberanikan saya untuk mengungkapkan peristiwa sejarah dengan lanskap sosial-keagamaan dari data arkeologi di luar situs Banten Lama. Terinspirasi oleh Michael Feener dan Michael Laffan yang mengungkapkan pengaruh Timur Tengah dalam visi keagamaan kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Asia Tenggara,[1] dan merujuk pada gagasan Freek Combijn berkenaan dengan awal berdirinya Kesultanan Banten,[2] unit kekuasaan politik di pesisir utara Jawa Barat itu tampaknya tidak dapat dilepaskan dari perkembangan Islam di jalur maritim Indonesia. Salah satu pengaruh itu telah diungkapkan oleh Johan Talens melalui aspek ritual dalam melegetimasi kekuasaan politik pada masa surutnya.[3] Keterikatan antara politik dan agama tersebut memberikan kerangka dasar untuk melakukan

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1. Fenner & Laffan 2005: 204-05.

2. Combijn 1989: 1-20.

3. Inagurasi Sultan Zain al-Abidin (1690-1733) bertempat di Masjid Agung Banten, sebelah barat Keraton Banten (Talens 1993: 335-36).

investigasi arkeologi di situs Lawang Abang yang kami yakini terkait dengan perkembangan Islam di kota Banten.

Namun, kami menyadari betapa sulitnya mendapatkan data yang memadai mengingat sebagian besar penelitian arkeologi terkonsentrasi di pusat kota.[4] Oleh karena itu banyak tempat di daerah hulu kekurangan informasi untuk memahami isu sosial-keagamaan dalam konteks pemerintahan Banten. Untuk menggali informasi tersebut, kajian Claude Guillot tentang struktur kota Banten,[5] dan juga Claudine Salmon,[6] yang mengungkap keberadaan komunitas Tionghoa di luar pusat kota, sangat berguna dalam menemukan jejak peristiwa dari periode kemakmuran Banten.[7]

Dalam wacana sejarah maritim kita dapat membenarkan teori umum bahwa peningkatan perdagangan lintas samudera sangat mempengaruhi kebangkitan kota-kota pesisir di kepulauan. Dalam kasus Banten terdapat gejala bahwa ketegangan politik kerap menimbulkan konflik *vis-à-vis* elit bangsawan dan pedagang.[8] Situasi itu tampaknya tidak ideal bagi integritas masyarakat sipil. Oleh karenanya wajar jika masyarakat urban membutuhkan tempat khusus untuk meredam ketegangan sosial melalui relaksasi di sekitar Danau Tasikardi, pinggiran selatan Banten.[9] Namun, semangat religius para elite bangsawan, khususnya pada masa pemerintahan Abu'l-Mafakhir Mahmud Abdul Qadir (1624-1651), menuntut keandalan ilmu agama, baik sebagai acuan normatif maupun sebagai penguat spiritualitas dalam kehidupan pluralistik.[10]

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4 Dari 1976 hingga 2000-an, penelitian difokuskan pada kompleks Banten Lama (Mundardjito, Ambary & Djafar 1978; Ueda et al. 2016). Satu-satunya studi di bagian hulu dilakukan di Banten Girang, ibukota pra-Islam Banten (Guillot, Nurhakim & Wibisono 1996).

5. Guillot 1989: 119-51.

6. Salmon 1995: 41-64.

7. Ideologi Islam menginspirasi para ulama dan pejuang di Banten dalam momentum revolusi sosial menghadapi pemerintah kolonial Belanda hingga menjelang kemerdekaan Indonesia (Bruinessen 1995: 165-99; Ensering 1995: 148-51).

8. Kontestasi elit bangsawan (*santana*) dan pedagang di pusat komersial Banten melahirkan perang saudara, seperti yang dikenang oleh kronik *Sajarah Banten* dengan istilah *pailir* (Guillot 1992: 57-72; cf. Rantoandro 1995: 25-39).

9. Tasikardi sebenarnya merupakan waduk buatan seperti danau di luar kota. Air dari beberapa sungai ditampung dan dialirkan melalui fasilitas penyaringan ke keraton (Mundardjito, Ambary & Djafar 1978; Guillot 1989: 129-30).

10. Para sejarawan mencirikan pluralitas penduduk kota pelabuhan Asia Tenggara sebagai kosmopolitan (Reid 1988: 114-123; Wade 2009: 221-65). Untuk kasus Banten lihat Guillot (1989: 120). Luasnya komunikasi Banten dengan dunia luar juga dibuktikan dengan korespondensi antar negara. Misalnya, Sultan Abu'l Mufakhir dan putranya Abu'l Ma'ali Ahmad (Pangeran Anom) menulis surat kepada Raja Inggris, Charles I untuk mengintensifkan hubungan dagang dengan Banten (Gallop 2003: 418; Pudjiastuti 2007).

Investigasi arkeologi di daerah pinggiran selatan kota Banten adalah upaya untuk memahami fenomena 'pinggiran' yang terkait dengan fase perkembangan Banten. Informasi lisan dari masyarakat sekitar telah membantu kami untuk mendapatkan data awal. Mengingat pentingnya gejala arkeologi yang diperkirakan berasal dari abad XVII, pada tahun 2019 kami mengunjungi tempat yang oleh masyarakat setempat disebut Lawang Abang.[11] Penyelidikan dilanjutkan pada Februari 2020 dengan tujuan untuk memetakan keberadaan situs yang dicurigai sebagai kompleks pemakaman kuna serta tinggalan permukaan lainnya.

Penelitian selanjutnya dilakukan pada Mei 2022 bersama peneliti dan mahasiswa Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, dibantu oleh staf teknis Balai Pelestarian Cagar Budaya (BPCB).[12] Pengamatan permukaan difokuskan untuk mengidentifikasi struktur batu bata dan karang, serta mendokumentasikan kompleks makam kuna.

Kekunaan Lawang Abang

Lawang Abang adalah kawasan persawahan yang luas; sekitar 3 km dari situs Banten Lama dan 6.5 km dari kota modern Serang (Peta 1). Lokasi Lawang Abang berada di tepi barat Sungai Ci-Banten, sebelah hulu Kasunyatan dimana terdapat makam lama warga Tionghoa,[13] dan Masjid Kuna Kasunyatan di seberangnya,[14] tidak jauh dari makam Maulana Yusuf.[15] Atribut kuna lain yang berdekatan dengan Lawang Abang adalah Kenari, tempat peristirahatan terakhir Sultan Banten IV, Abu'l Mafakhir Mahmud Abdul Qadir dan Putra Mahkota, Abu'l Ma'ali Ahmad.[16]

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11. Secara administratif, situs ini berada di Kampung Kenari, Kelurahan Kasunyatan, Kasemen, Kota Serang. Istilah 'Lawang Abang' diambil dari gapura makam yang dicat warna merah. Lawang Abang dalam bahasa Jawa berarti 'pintu merah'. Pers. Komunikasi dengan Tubagus Nashrudin, Pengurus Pemakaman Lawang Abang (4 Desember 2020).

12. BPCB berkantor di Serang dengan wilayah kerja Provinsi Jawa Barat, Jakarta, Banten dan Lampung.

13. Makam kuno Tionghoa ditemukan pada musim penelitian Banten Girang pada tahun 1991. Lihat Salmon 1995: 50-59.

14. Kajian arsitektur masjid Kasunyatan, lihat Saefullah 2018.

15. Maulana Yusuf (1570-1580) dimakamkan di Kasunyatan, merupakan pusat ziarah terpenting kedua setelah kompleks makam di Masjid Agung Banten Lama. Cf. Guillot & Chambert-Loir 1995: 249-50.

16. Guillot, Ambary & Dumarçay 1990: 67. Kompleks makam Kenari adalah salah satu destinasi ziarah penting di luar Banten Lama.



Peta 1 – Lokasi penelitian situs Abang, Kampung Kenari, Kelurahan Kasunyatan, Kecamatan Kasemen, Kota Serang, Provinsi Banten.

Dari Kenari terdapat akses darat langsung menuju Tasikardi ke arah barat laut,[17] sehingga posisi Lawang Abang terhubung ke dua tempat tersebut. Dari Lawang Abang, melalui jalur sungai atau jalan kuna *marga agung*,[18] tersedia akses menuju Kasunyatan, sedangkan ke arah barat, orang dapat berjalan kaki mencapai Kenari. Sementara agak jauh ke selatan adalah Kelapadua, sebuah pemukiman dan kawasan budidaya tebu yang dibuka oleh orang Tionghoa pada abad XVII; yang menurut Guillot, Nurhakim dan Lombard-Salmon, berasal dari zaman Abu'l Mafakhir.[19]

17. Michrob 1987: 131-32.

18. Kronik *Sajarah Banten*, pupuh XLIV-XLVIII (Djajadiningrat 1982) menyebut jalan ini *marga agung* (jalan besar) sepanjang Sungai Ci-Banten sampai ke hulu sungai (Banten Girang). Masyarakat setempat masih mengingatnya sebagai 'Jalan Sultan' (Guillot 1995: 117, note 81).

19. Guillot, Nurhakim & Lombard-Salmon 1990: 139-41.

Gbr. 1 – Pintu gerbang klasik di kompleks makam Abu'l Mafakhir di Kampung Kenari, Kelurahan Kasunyatan, Serang.

Setelah mempelajari beberapa laporan penelitian arkeologi terdahulu, kami tidak memperoleh informasi apapun mengenai situs Lawang Abang,[20] kecuali sisa-sisa makam China di Kasunyatan dan Kelapadua, dan makam Sultan Abu'l Mafakhir, yang mudah dikenali dari gerbang Jawa klasiknya di Kenari (Gbr. 1).[21] Investigasi di situs Lawang Abang antara 21 dan 26 Mei 2022 menemukan beberapa jejak arkeologis lebih bersifat religius daripada tempat hunian biasa. Dari semua jejak itu, terdapat beberapa pecahan kecil keramik dan gerabah yang tidak signifikan dibandingkan dengan kompleks situs Banten Lama dan Banten Girang.[22] Namun kami masih menyangsikan kelangkaan itu, karena situs merupakan lahan persawahan yang memungkinkan artefak teraduk dan terpendam di lapisan bawah lahan basah.

20. Menurut informasi dari Juliadi, arkeolog dari BPCB Banten, hingga saat ini belum ada penelitian yang difokuskan pada situs Lawang Abang dan karenanya belum terdaftar sebagai cagar budaya. Kom. Personal, 20 Mei 2022.

21. Kenari atau Kanari (*Canarium indicum L.*) adalah nama sebuah pohon atau buah, sangat jarang sekarang, didedikasikan untuk gelar Sultan Kenari. Michrob 1987: 104; Guillot, Ambary & Dumarçay 1990: 67, Photo 12.

22. Penggalian enam belas lubang di tiga lokasi mencatat sejumlah besar artefak yang terdiri dari 16.686 pecahan gerabah lokal dan 3.109 pecahan keramik impor (Mundardjito, Ambary & Djafar 1978: 62-77). Temuan keramik dan gerabah yang relatif sama diperoleh selama ekskavasi di Banten Girang, dengan kronologi yang berbeda, didominasi pecahan keramik China dari abad XIII-XIV (Dupoizat & Harkantiningsih 1996: 142-171).



Peta 2 – Foto udara situs Lawang Abang, Kenari dan lokasi survey (Doc. BPCB Banten 2022)

Situs Lawang Abang berisi reruntuhan dinding dan fondasi bata dan karang serta puluhan makam tidak dikenal, bahkan, sebagian besar makam tidak terpelihara sebagaimana mestinya. Satu-satunya kompleks pemakaman kuna yang terlindung berada di sektor LA-1, sekitar 50 m dari sungai (Peta 2). Dari seluruh area observasi ditemukan empat unit sisa bangunan, tiga di antaranya merupakan bangunan bata dan terakhir dari susunan karang. Keempat unsur bangunan tersebut terletak di lahan kering di antara persawahan beririgasi.

Struktur bata dan karang

Struktur bata pertama (SB-1) berada di sektor LA-2, sekitar 100 meter dari sektor LA-1, berupa dinding bata yang membentuk bidang segi empat.[23] Di bagian dalam dinding ada bekas plester dari campuran pasir dan karang. Menurut penanggung jawab kompleks pemakaman sektor LA-1, struktur

23. Denah ruang berdinding bata berukuran: 14,4 x 13,5 m.



Gbr. 2 – Denah Struktur SB-1 (Sektor LA-2) dan SB-2 (Sektor LA-3) di situs Lawang Abang, Kampung Kenari.

ini pernah difungsikan sebagai 'pesantren'.[24] Dinding bata di sebelah timur menunjukkan kondisi agak lengkap dan keempat sudutnya berbentuk *bastion* (Gbr. 2, kiri). Titik tertinggi tembok bata mencapai 191,5 cm (sudut) dan 111 cm (dinding) dengan ketebalan dinding rata-rata 43 cm. Tampilan konstruksi bata sama dengan bangunan gerbang makam Kenari dimana profil atas dan sudut-sudutnya didesain mengikuti konstruksi bata pasangan rebah.[25] Dari runtuhan yang ditemukan, dinding itu hanya menyediakan satu pintu di sisi selatan (Gbr. 3, bawah).[26] Pada sisi lain terdapat ceruk persegi empat mengerucut ke atas (Gbr. 3, atas).[27]

24. Mungkin yang dimaksud semacam sekolah tradisional untuk pengajaran agama (Kom. personal dengan Nashrudin, 26 Mei 2022).

25. Dimensi bata bervariasi: panjang: 29-31 cm, lebar: 19-23 cm dan tebal rata-rata 4,5 cm. Dengan bahan dan ukuran yang relatif sama dengan gapura di kompleks Kenari, kemungkinan dibuat dengan cara yang sama. Untuk mendapatkan data yang valid diperlukan uji laboratorium.

26. Dengan lebar 78 cm tampaknya hanya bisa memuat satu orang. Posisi pintu menunjukkan bangunan menghadap ke selatan, akses langsung ke Sungai Ci-Banten.

27. Ceruk berukuran panjang dasar 43 cm dan tinggi 52 cm, menyediakan ruang selebar 22 cm pada dinding. Biasanya ceruk dimanfaatkan untuk menyimpan lampu minyak. Di Masjid Kenari ceruk semacam ini dimanfaatkan untuk menyimpan buku agama. Komunikasi pers. dengan Ikhsan Maulana, 19 Oktober 2022, juru pelihara kompleks makam Kenari.

Gbr. 3 – Ceruk pada dinding bagian dalam (atas) dan pintu masuk (bawah) pada Struktur SB-1 di Sektor LA-2.

Struktur bata kedua (SB-2) terletak di sektor LA-3, sekitar 200 meter di timur laut LA-2 (Peta 2). Menurut warga setempat, bangunan bata ini merupakan sisa bangunan 'masjid' sebelum dipindahkan ke lokasi baru di sekitar kompleks makam Abu'l-Mafakhir. Bagian atas struktur SB-2 ditumbuhi semak belukar dan tidak terdapat pohon besar seperti pada sektor LA-1 dan LA-2. Struktur ini, nyatanya, merupakan bagian dari dinding yang menyediakan ruang terbuka; sekarang hanya terdapat tumpukan bata. Di dalam dinding ditemukan sebuah lubang yang ditandai dengan susunan bata melingkar di atasnya (Gbr. 2, kanan).[28]

28. Diameter sumur 1,10 m. Kedalaman tidak diketahui, diperlukan pengukuran detil untuk memastikan sumber air bagi aktivitas ibadah.

Gbr. 4 – Dinding selatan struktur SB-2 Sektor LA-3 (kiri). Dinding timur Struktur. SB-3 Sektor LA-3 (kanan).

Dilihat dari strukturnya, runtuhan bata tersebut membentuk denah persegi panjang yang berorientasi timur-barat. Semua tembok sudah tertimbun longsoran tanah dan sebagian lagi runtuh, kecuali dinding selatan yang masih berdiri dalam posisi miring (Gbr. 4, atas). Konstruksi bata dirancang sebagai dinding yang memisahkan interior dari lahan persawahan. Di antara runtuhan yang masih bisa diidentifikasi, dinding bata menutupi area yang memungkinkan tersedianya bangunan dan fasilitas pendukung. Untuk menemukan pintu masuk, kami mengalami kesulitan. Petunjuk kecil terdapat di sisi barat berupa

Gbr. 5 – Dinding dari karang (Struktur SC-1) sektor LA-4, Lawang Abang

dinding bata yang sedikit menonjol. Atribut ini mengingatkan kita pada bagian penting dari suatu masjid yang disebut *mihrab*. Jika perkiraan ini tidak salah, maka pintu masuknya ada di sisi timur yang sudah runtuh.

Bangunan bata ketiga (SB-3) berada di sektor LA-3, dekat jalan pintas antara Kasunyatan dan Tasikardi. Sebagian besar lahan telah menjadi sawah dan hanya tersisa tumpukan bata. Lahan di atas SB-3 sebagian besar berupa semak belukar dan tidak ditemukan pohon besar. Dinding bata yang memanjang utara-selatan dengan tinggi antara 50 sampai 75 cm tampaknya merupakan penyangga (Gbr. 4 bawah).

Struktur karang (SC-1) ditemukan di sektor LA-4. Membujur utara-selatan, posisi struktur sejajar dengan sungai. Struktur ini membentuk tembok sepanjang lebih dari 200 meter, yang bagian selatan diratakan untuk persawahan dengan ketinggian rata-rata 50 hingga 60 cm (Gbr. 5). Struktur tersebut memisahkan sawah dari lahan kering yang ditumbuhi beberapa pohon besar. Dari tampilan fisiknya, struktur SC-1 merupakan sisa tembok mengarah ke sungai yang dipisahkan oleh jalur darat *marga agung*, yang sebagian besar sudah rusak akibat perluasan areal persawahan dengan menggunakan traktor.

Makam Kuna di Sektor LA-1.

Pada sektor LA-1 ditemukan dua kompleks pekuburan lama, yaitu sebuah berada di dalam dinding bata dan lainnya berada di tempat terbuka (**Peta 3**). Kompleks makam dalam dinding ditumbuhi beberapa pohon kenari, yang akarnya telah mengubah tata letak jirat atau *kijing* (pembatas makam) dan sebagian besar tanda kubur tidak dapat dikenali.[29]

29. Penyebab kerusakan belum diketahui secara pasti, kemungkinan disebabkan oleh



Peta 3 – Denah kompleks makam dalam dinding di Sektor LA-1, situs Lawang Abang, Kenari.

Terlindung oleh dinding bata, kompleks makam memiliki gerbang di sisi selatan. Sebagian besar tanda kubur di kompleks ini dalam keadaan rusak atau patah pada bagian puncak (mahkota), kepala dan bahu. Beberapa diantaranya terbelah pada bagian badan atas, menyisakan bagian badan bawah dengan dasar terpendam atau terbelit akar pohon. Dari seluruh makam yang ada, hanya satu yang memiliki tanda kubur ganda, yaitu di sisi utara dan selatan, lainnya hanya memiliki satu tanda kubur di sebelah utara (kepala).

Sesuai data yang diperoleh pada saat investigasi, ditemukan enam puluh dua batu nisan sebagai tanda kubur. Dari jumlah itu, enam belas buah

batang atau dahan pohon kenari yang jauh dari ketinggian sekitar 7 hingga 10 meter.

menunjukkan ciri khas Batu Aceh (Tabel 1).[30] Bahan baku nisan terbuat dari batu pasir berwarna abu-abu dan abu-abu kekuningan. Perbedaan bentuk nisan tampak ditunjukkan oleh dimensinya dan varian gaya.

No.	Kode Nisan	Posisi Nisan	Bentuk	Tinggi (cm)	Lebar (cm)	Tebal / Diameter (cm)	Jirat	Daerah Asal
Dalam Dinding								
1.	I.1.u I.2.s	Utara	Pipih	49	26	8	Karang	Aceh
2.		Selatan	Pipih	36	25	8,5		
3.	II.3	Utara	Kerucut	57	-	D. 22-20	Bata	
4.	II.5	Utara	Pipih	79	38	13,5	Karang	
5.	II.7	Utara	Pipih	88	36	14	Karang	
6.	II.8	Utara	Kerucut	63	-	D. 22-14	Bata	
7.	III.4	Utara	Pipih	30	21	10	Bata	
8.	III.5	Utara	Pipih	75	27	11,5	Karang	
9.	III.7	Utara	Pipih	46	19	11,5	Karang	
10	III.10	Utara	Pipih	30	21	9,8	Bata	
11	IV.1	Utara	Pipih	22,5	24	10	Bata	
12	IV.2	Utara	Pipih	21	12,5	11,5	Bata	
13	IV.3	Utara	Pipih	74	36	12	Bawah akar	
14	V.4	Utara	Pipih	62	40	14	Bata	
15	VI.7	Utara	Kerucut	51	-	D. 18-21,5	Karang	
16	VII.9	Utara	Pipih	65	29,5	18	Bata	
Luar Dinding								
17.	H.1	Utara	Pipih	57,5	26,5	15	Bata	Jawa Timur ?
18.	H.2	Utara	Pipih	59,5	31	14	Bata	
19.	H.3	Utara	Kerucut	39,5	-	D. 10-15	Bata	Banten?

Tabel 1 – Batu Nisan Impor di Sektor LA-1

Berdasarkan penggolongan bentuk dasar di Indonesia dan Semenanjung Malaysia, batu nisan dalam dinding terdiri dari dua jenis, yaitu pipih (papan) dan kerucut terbalik oktagonal.[31] Bentuk pipih yang diperkenalkan sebagai tipe H,[32] kenyataannya memiliki perbedaan gaya pada detil tertentu. Karakter khas

30. Batu nisan impor itu dikenal dengan nama 'Batu Aceh' untuk kategori umum (Yatim 1988). Penelitian dua dekade terakhir menghasilkan banyak ragam dan sebaran luas di Asia Tenggara (Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 1999; Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004; cf. Lambourn 2008: 263).

31. Terdokumentasi lima bentuk dasar, yaitu: pipih (papan), segi empat sama (balok), kerucut terbalik segi delapan, segi delapan bahu segi empat dan kerucut polos. Lihat Perret 2000: 590; Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 34; Perret 2007: 316.

32. Yatim 1988: 69; Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 36.



Gbr. 6 – Batu nisan Aceh dari kelompok H dalam dinding sektor LA-1, situs Lawang Abang.

jenis ini dapat dikenali dari atribut sepasang 'tanduk' atau 'sayap' pada kedua bahu yang menopang kepala nisan. Ambary menyebut jenis batu Aceh ini dengan istilah *Bucrane-ailé* sebagai ciri umum Batu Aceh abad XVII-XIX.[33] Namun penggolongan itu belum efektif manakala menghadapi varian batu Aceh 'bertanduk' atau 'bersayap' di wilayah sebaran yang luas. Oleh karena itu, dengan menerapkan indikator anatomik (kaki/dasar, badan, bahu, kepala) dari A hingga Q dengan varian gaya masing-masing sebagaimana diusulkan Perret,[34] diketahui jenis batu nisan H sebanyak 13 buah terdiri dari H1 dan H2.

Pada umumnya bentuk dasar H persegi empat yang memiliki panel berongga, badan bawah memiliki relief cupingan-berganda, badan atas berisi panil diukir tulisan 'disamarkan', dengan bagian kepala dibentuk dari bakal buah yang dilapisi jalinan sulur berlengkung-ganda, yang pucuknya berbentuk stilasi bunga. Perbedaan antara varian H1 dan H2 sangat tipis. Bentuk H2 pada bagian bahu dibentuk dari lengkung sulur meruncing seolah menunjukkan

33. Ambary 1984: 346-347. Jenis batu yang memiliki variasi ini dikenali dari bentuk umumnya berupa pola tanduk (atau sayap). Memang, tidak semua memiliki tanda ini, sehingga ada varian lain yang dibagi menjadi beberapa subtipe, seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh model tipologi yang bahkan mencantumkan tanggal relatif. Prototipe *bucrane-ailé* termasuk dalam kategori tipe C dan N (Yatim 1988: 47, Gbr. 4; Lambourn 2008: 266); H1 dan H2 (Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 40).

34. Perret 2000: 590-92.

LA-1/II.8 LA-1/II.3 LA-1/VI.7

Gbr. 7 – Tiga batu nisan jenis kerucut terbalik segi delapan di Sektor LA-1, Lawang Abang.

pucuk kelopak daun yang mendukung bagian kepala di atasnya. Kekhasan H2 juga tampak pada garis vertikal pada relief dari bagian bawah dan atas badan.[35]

Dalam kelompok H ditemukan sembilan buah tergolong H1, enam buah utuhan dan lainnya berupa fragmen (patah sebagian), yang diberi nomor kode: I.1.u, I.2.s, II.7, III.5, III.7, III.10, IV.1, IV.3, dan VII.9 (Tabel 1, Gbr. 7). Sedangkan batu nisan teridentifikasi H2, sepengetahuan kami, hanya empat buah, yaitu: II.5, III.4, IV2, dan V.4, namun III.4 dan V.4 masih meragukan karena hanya fragmen kepala dan puncak (Tabel 1, Gbr. 6).

Kelompok nisan kedua dalam dinding berbentuk kerucut terbalik oktagonal. Jenis ini sering dianggap berpola silindrik, namun akan lebih rinci menyebutnya kerucut terbalik segi delapan. Pengenal utama jenis ini berupa bentuk kerucut dengan bagian atas terpotong dan berpenampang segi delapan. Bagian dasar berbentuk batur segi empat dengan panel pada keempat sisi menopang bagian bawah badan bersegi delapan dengan motif lengkung-berlipat (*polylobed*) pada delapan sisi. Bagian badan atas membentuk bahu yang menopang kepala berupa ukiran kelopak teratai dengan kuncup bunga di puncak. Hasil identifikasi menunjukkan jenis nisan terdiri dari L dan M sebanyak tiga buah: sebuah jenis L dan dua lainnya dapat dimasukkan ke dalam jenis M (Gbr. 7).[36]

35. Perret & Kamarudin 2004: 36.

36. Kami tidak menemukan batu nisan dengan prasasti, semua dihiasi dengan pola

LA-1/II.1 LA-1/II.2 LA-1/II.3

Gbr. 8 – Dua batu nisan bergaya Jawa Timur dan satu batu nisan kurang dikenal (paling kanan) di Sektor LA-1.

Di luar batu Aceh, sebagian besar batu nisan memiliki bentuk biasa, yang asal usulnya tidak dapat diidentifikasi. Batu nisan biasa ini tampaknya buatan lokal, yang pada umumnya berbentuk segi lima, dengan atau tanpa hiasan.[37] Semua material batuan terbuat dari batu padas abu-abu yang mudah rapuh. Nama-nama orang yang dimakamkan di sana tidak diketahui, mengesankan makam telah ditinggalkan dalam waktu cukup lama karena suatu alasan.

Dari keenam belas batu Aceh, yang bisa dikenali ditunjukan oleh makam bertanda kubur jenis H1 (Tabel 1. No I.1u & I.2s) tetapi itupun hanya gelarnya: Ki Patih Purbajati dan istrinya.[38] Makam pasangan itu dalam keadaan terawat dan lengkap dengan fondasi tiga tingkat dari susunan batu karang berukir.[39] Tampak pada denah, makamnya di deret pertama, sementara yang lain berjajar ke selatan hingga delapan deret asimetris. Makam dengan Batu Aceh terdapat pada deretan I sampai VII (Peta 3). Posisi keenam belas Batu Aceh tidak menunjukkan urutan tertentu dalam konteksnya dengan batu nisan non-Aceh.[40]

Demikian pula dengan makam di luar tembok, posisinya tidak menunjukkan aturan tertentu. Kebanyakan tanda kubur berupa batu nisan pentagonal, dua makam diantaranya tampak agak kuna, yang memiliki batu nisan berhias relief floral, mengingatkan pada langgam Jawa dengan desain *gunongan* dan *simbar*

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geometris yang dikombinasikan dengan pola lengkung-berganda pada bagian dasar. Cf. Perret, Ab. Kamarudin & Kalus 2003: 36.

37. Batu nisan lokal dikatakan berasal dari waktu lebih belakang (Ambary 1984: 364-65).

38. Kom. pribadi dengan Hasan (45), juru kunci situs LA. Disebut Ki Patih Purbajati tanpa nama diri.

39. Susunan jirat bertingkat dari karang berukir digunakan pada makam di ruang khusus kompleks Masjid Agung Banten Lama.

40. Untuk keperluan dokumentasi, keenam belas nisan ditandai dengan nomor khusus. Posisinya membentuk barisan seperti barisan shalat berjamaah di masjid.

Gbr. 9 – Dua batu nisan Aceh dari tipe H1 di Sektor LA-2.

(relief lengkung pada sudut) mengarah ke bagian atas badan. Dalam tradisi seni klasik di Indonesia desain *typique* itu disebut *tumpal* di bagian depan dan belakang serta di kedua sisi, didukung oleh motif bunga pada keempat sudut dasarnya. Ragam hias ini mengingatkan pada stilasi *kala-makara* dalam tradisi arsitektur klasik Jawa-Hindu (Tabel 1, Gbr. 8, LA-1/H.1 dan LA-1/H.2).[41]

Perlu dicatat di sini bahwa ada juga makam menggunakan 'maesan' kerucut terbalik segi delapan (Tabel 1 No. 19, Gbr. 8/LA-1/H-3), namun tampak berbeda dengan sejenisnya dari kelompok batu Aceh L atau M. Batu nisan seperti itu ternyata ditemukan di daerah Serpong, Tangerang Selatan, di perbatasan Banten dan Jakarta.[42]

41. *Kala-makara* adalah ornamen figuratif mitologis yang dimaksudkan untuk mengingatkan pada elemen waktu dalam kehidupan manusia, dengan bentuk dasar segitiga dan diukir secara simetris. Cf. Ambary 1984: 354; Damais 1995: 320-27, Photo 13, 14, 15. Dalam tradisi seni ukir Bali, motif itu masuk kategori *kekarangan* biasa menghias bagian sudut pintu atau tiang bangunan (Fadillah 1992: 108-10).

42. Menurut tradisi lisan, makam Raden Wetan Muhammad Atif di kompleks Keramat Tajug, Serpong, Tangerang Selatan, dipercaya sebagai salah seorang putra Sultan Ageng. https://tangerangonline.id/2016/04/06/keramat-tajug-di-serpong-makam-putra-sultan-banten. Diakses 8 Juni 2022.

Makam Kuna di Sektor LA-2

Kompleks pemakaman terletak di sebelah barat Sektor LA-1 (Peta 2), dalam keadaan terbengkalai di antara pepohonan tinggi (kenari dan lainnya). Sebagian besar penanda kubur melesak ke dalam tanah. Di sektor LA-2, ada tiga lokasi yang menunjukkan makam kuna.

Di lokasi pertama, terdapat makam yang mempunyai ciri umum batu Aceh dengan kecenderungan jenis H1 di atas jirat dari bata yang sudah rusak. Bagian dasar batu nisan terkubur dalam tanah, bagian pinggang rusak (Gbr. 9, LA-2/A.1).[43]

Di lokasi kedua ditemukan nisan berkarakter batu Aceh. Makam ini, meskipun rusak oleh akar pohon besar, masih meninggalkan batu nisan utuhan dikelilingi oleh jirat yang terbuat dari panel karang berukir.[44] Dari ciri khususnya, batu Aceh ini tampak menunjukkan jenis H1 (Gbr. 9, A.2), dengan ukiran sulur dari lengkung-berganda (*polylobed*). Kedua batu Aceh ini memiliki ukuran kecil, dengan tinggi kurang dari 60 cm dibandingkan dengan kebanyakan jenis H di Sektor LA-1 (Tabel 2).

No.	Kode Nisan	Posisi Nisan	Bentuk	Tinggi (cm)	Lebar (cm)	Tebal/ Diameter (cm)	Jirat	Daerah Asal
1.	A.1	Selatan	Pipih	57,5	26,5	15	Karang	Aceh
2.	A.2	Utara	Pipih	56	28	10,5	Karang	
3.	A.3	Utara	Pipih	48	28	9,5	Bata	Aceh
4.	A.4	Selatan	Pipih	43	29,5	7	Bata	
5.	A.5	Selatan	Pipih	32	20,5	7,5	Bata	

Tabel 2 – Batu Nisan Impor di Sektor LA-2

Di lokasi ketiga terdapat enam makam di sebelah barat daya dari lokasi kedua. Pemakaman berada di tanah yang ditinggikan sekitar 1,65 m, Di atas permukaan tanah tampak hamburan batu bata, yang kemungkinan besar merupakan longsoran jirat dari makam di atas. Dari enam makam yang tampaknya sudah tidak terawat, ada tiga makam bernisan batu Aceh. Terbuat dari batu pasir abu-abu, nisan pada ketiga makam menampilkan pola pentagonal tidak sama sisi.

Bentuk badan lurus dari atas atau agak mengecil ke bawah, nisan memperlihatkan bagian kepala yang dibentuk dari dua lengkugan yang puncaknya rata. Ketiga nisan dibentuk dari lempeng batu yang telah dihaluskan. Dalam penggolongan batu Aceh, nisan ini masuk dalam kelompok besar A,

43. Pada badan bawah nisan tampak ada bekas tali plastik, biasanya untuk mengikat ternak menjelang ritual kurban (*nadzar*) di areal pemakaman.

44. Material karang dibuat persegi panjang (P. 52,5 cm, L. 28 cm dan tebal 21 cm), dipasang sesuai ukuran makam membujur utara-selatan.

Gbr. 10 – Batu Nsan Aceh tipe A2 di Sektor LA-2.

namun dari ciri khususnya, merujuk pada varian A2, yang pada umumnya bagian badan polos. Hiasan tampak pada bagian dasar persegi empat dikombinasikan dengan profil lengkung menunjang bagian bawah badan.[45] Namun ada satu nisan diantara ketiganya dihiasi dengan relief bulatan, seperti ditemukan di kompleks makam Kasunyatan (Gbr 10/A.3 & Gbr. 13/KST2-A2).[46]

Merujuk pada klasifikasi Yatim dan Perret,[47] hasil identifikasi tipologis menemukan dua puluh satu buah nisan yang teridentifikasi sebagai batu Aceh. Dari jumlah dan variasinya, batu Aceh tersebut terdiri dari:

– 3 buah nisan jenis A2, berada pada pemakaman lokasi ketiga di Sektor LA-2.
– 12 buah nisan jenis H1, terdiri dari sepuluh buah berada di Sektor LA-1 dan dua buah di Sektor LA-2.
– 3 buah nisan tipe H2, berada pada pemakaman dalam dinding di Sektor LA-1.
– 1 buah nisan jenis L, berada pada pemakaman dalam dinding di Sektor LA-1.
– 2 buah nisan jenis M, berada pada pemakaman dalam dinding di Sektor LA-1.

45. Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 34.

46. Jenis A2, selain di Aceh sendiri, tersebar di Semenanjung Malaysia dan Indonesia. Lihat Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 1999: 373-75, 478-79; Perret, Surachman & Kalus 2004: 354-56, 358, 366, 370, 390.

47. Yatim 1988; Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 40-41; Lambourn 2008: 267.

Dari semua batu nisan, bentuk dasar pipih (H dan A) dan kerucut (L dan M) dalam variannya tergolong kelompok batu Aceh dominan. Klasifikasi lima jenis batu Aceh di Lawang Abang didasarkan pada ciri-ciri khusus setiap kelompok nisan yang menunjukan persamaan dan perbedaan visual. Jumlah dan jenis batu Aceh yang terdokumentasi dalam survey tidak mewakili populasi, karena mungkin saja ada beberapa nisan yang sudah terpendam atau dipindah-tempatkan sebagai dampak perluasan sawah.

Adapun tanda kubur non-Batu Aceh, meskipun dalam jumlah yang tidak signifikan, kami tidak dapat mengabaikan keberadaan makam ini. Melihat ciri khasnya, nisan kubur diduga 'lokal' bisa saja didatangkan dari luar Banten, misalnya dari Jawa Timur, khususnya dalam kelompok tipe Demak-Troloyo,[48] dengan atau tanpa simbol *Matahari Majapahit*.[49] Secara khusus, batu nisan non-Aceh memiliki pola dasar pentagonal dengan relief stilasi *kala-makara* pada bagian badan dan dasar nisan. Analogi terhadap bentuk khas Jawa Timur tampak pada motif *tumpal* yang diukir pada dua batu nisan di sektor LA-1; dengan sendirinya menjadi pembeda dari motif 'bebawang' dalam tradisi seni batu Aceh.[50]

Kekhususan Batu Aceh

Berdasarkan bukti-bukti arkeologi hasil investigasi awal, situs LA merupakan salah satu tempat yang mendukung fungsi pinggiran kota. Sisa dinding bata dan karang di sektor LA-2, LA-3 dan LA-4 perlu dilihat sebagai jejak struktur bernilai historis. Menyadari belum ditemukan bukti pendukung untuk bentang waktu okupasi,[51] tinggalan tersebut membolehkan kita mengaitkan LA dengan situs terdekat: Kenari (KRN) dan Kasunyatan (KST). Beberapa sumber tekstual mengisyaratkan ketiga tempat itu, termasuk Tasikardi, sebagai ruang terkendali di lahan pertanian padi, setidaknya berhubungan dengan aktivitas yang disebut *pupungkuran* dalam fase kemakmuran Banten.[52]

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48. Ambary 1984: 345-46.

49. 'Matahari Majapahit' terjemahan kata Jawa: *Srengéngé Majapahit*. Damais 1995: 228-29, 316-20, foto I, III, IV, VI.

50. Motif 'bebawang' atau menyerupai bonggol bawang untuk mengidentifikasi motif khas batu Aceh. Lihat Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004: 58.

51. Belum ditemukan satupun batu Aceh memuat prasasti dan material lain yang menyumbang data pertanggalan, kecuali kalimat tauhid pada sebuah batu nisan di KST-2.

52. Fase kemakmuran hanya berlangsung kurang dari dua ratus tahun antara paruh kedua abad XVI dan akhir abad XVII, puncaknya pada sekitar tahun 1678. Guillot 1989: 119.

Gbr. 11 – Jenis batu Aceh yang umum di kompleks makam Masjid Agung Banten Lama.

Dalam konteks ruang, tinggalan batu nisan impor menjadi kunci pembuka mendapatkan gambaran landskap pinggiran selatan. Hasil penelitian batu Aceh di Nusantara dan Semenanjung Malaysia menunjukkan kecenderungan konsentrasi batu Aceh di sekitar pusat kota dan digunakan oleh kalangan 'berkelas'.[53] Fenomena itu menimbulkan dua pertanyaan penting. Pertama berkaitan dengan keberadaan batu Aceh di wilayah belakang suatu kota, dan kedua bertumpu pada aliran energi dan material, dari satu tempat ke tempat lain.

Bahwa dari tujuh belas kelompok batu Aceh seperti telah dikaji secara sistematis (A - Q), seluruh atau sebagiannya secara imperatif terwakili di kota Banten.[54] Pada situs LA hanya ditemukan tiga kelompok besar, dari pipih dan kerucut, yaitu A2, H1 dan H2, L dan M. Mengingat Banten merupakan salah satu kota pelabuhan yang terhubung dengan kota lain di jalur Selat Melaka, timbul asumsi bahwa Banten juga merupakan daerah sebaran batu Aceh seperti halnya pesisir timur dan barat Sumatra, Kedah, Pahang, Melaka, dan Johor.[55] Dua pertanyaan di atas menghendaki investigasi diperluas ke kompleks makam di Banten Lama (BL), Kasunyatan (KST), dan sudah tentu Kenari (KNR). Dengan asumsi bahwa BL adalah pusat redistribusi batu Aceh, maka jenis A2, H1, H2, L, dan M di LA sangat mungkin hadir di ketiga situs tersebut.

Observasi langsung ke situs pembanding menunjukkan bahwa semua jenis batu Aceh di LA juga digunakan di BL, KST dan KNR. Dari jumlah dan jenisnya, BL adalah etalase lengkap H1 dan H2 dan dalam porsi kecil A2, L dan M (Gbr. 11). Demikian pula dengan KNR dan KST, tanda kubur jenis

53. Cf. Perret 2007: 319-20; Lambourn 2008: 280.

54. Batu Aceh merupakan tanda kubur dominan di lingkungan Kesultanan Banten, termasuk wilayah kekuasaannya di Jayakarta (Jakarta). Cf. Ambary 1988: 156-62; Inagurasi 2017: 43-44.

55. Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004; Perret, Surachman & Kalus 2015: 480-81.

Gbr. 12 – Penanda kubur dari jenis langka di BL, KST2, KST1 dan KNR.

itu cukup dominan, hanya saja kebanyakan tidak dikenal. Tafsir sementara adalah semua jenis batu Aceh yang digunakan di LA tersedia di situs BL, tetapi sebaliknya tidak semua jenis di BL ditemukan di LA, dan pinggiran lain seperti KST dan KNR. Dengan analogi itu, keberadaan jenis lain akan menunjukkan kekhususan.

Kekhususan pertama disumbang oleh sebuah nisan, kendati bukan satu-satunya, bisa dibilang 'unik', yaitu tanda kubur Maulana Hasanuddin (1552-1570), penguasa pertama Banten. Dimakamkan dalam ruang khusus di kompleks Masjid Agung, nisan merujuk tipe G (Gbr. 12/A).[56] Satu kembarannya ditemukan di halaman terbuka; seperti batu nisan lainnya, seluruh permukaan batu nisan telah dicat warna putih dan bagian bawah badan terpendam ke dalam lantai keramik. Namun yang menarik perhatian, jenis G juga ditemukan pada kompleks makam Kasunyatan (KST2) di Pakalangan (lihat Peta 1). Makam ini berada di tempat khusus untuk kunjungan ziarah. Bagian dasar telah dicat warna putih, namun masih tampak bentuk utuh (Gbr. 12/B), menandai makam Maulana Yusuf, penguasa kedua Banten (1570-1580).[57]

56. Contoh jenis G pada makam Sultan Muzafarshah di Teluk Bakung, Perak (Ambary 1984: 420, Foto 35 & 36) juga di Tanjung Belading dan Johor Lama, Negeri Johor (Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 1999: 401/TBEL1 & 459/JOLA1; Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004: 325, 338, 398). Di Aceh sendiri, jenis G terdapat di kompleks makam Meurah I dan Meurah II (Oetomo 2016: 139/Gbr. 5/b).

57. Nisan kubur Maulana Yusuf di KST2 berukuran: tinggi 81 cm, lebar 24 cm, tebal 14 cm. Berdasarkan ciri spesifiknya, nisan ini dari jenis G; menjadi koreksi terhadap identifikasi sebelumnya. Cf. Ambary 1984: 418, Foto 25.

Gbr. 13 – Tanda kubur Sultan Abu'l Mafakhir Abdul Qadir (kiri) dan Abu'l Ma'ali Ahmad (kanan) di kompleks makam Kenari.

Dalam pengelompokan umum, jenis G tidak memiliki varian. Pengenal utama adalah bentuk vertikal lurus sedikit mengecil ke bawah. Dengan dasar persegi panjang, jenis G memiliki satu atau lebih panel bertingkat. Bagian bawah badan dihiasi dengan relief motif *multi-lobus* (cuping-berganda). Bagian badan atas terdapat panel-panel berongga berisi tulisan disamarkan. Kepala nisan dibentuk dari dua susun lengkung-berganda simetris menopang puncak berbentuk segitiga.[58]

Kekhususan kedua ditemukan pada kompleks makam KST1, berupa batu nisan E1. Terbuat dari batu pasir abu-abu kekuningan, permukaan dipahat halus, adalah tanda kubur Kiyai Dukuh yang digelari Pangeran Kasunyatan:[59]

58. Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 35-36.

59. Kronik *S.B.* (pupuh XXII) menceritakan Maulana Muhammad adalah raja yang melanjutkan kebijakan ayahnya, Maulana Yusuf, dalam bidang agama dengan

seorang ulama asal Timur Tengah pada masa Maulana Muhammad, penguasa ketiga Banten (1580-1596).[60]

Batu nisan ini dicirikan oleh bentuk pipih dengan bagian badan melebar dari bawah ke atas membentuk bahu yang melengkung ke bawah. Bagian dasar persegi panjang dihiasi panel berongga. Badan bagian bawah berupa relief cupingan-berganda dikombinasikan dengan jalinan sulur dan 'bebawang'. Dari bagian bawah hingga atas badan tampak bingkai dengan kaligrafi tersamar sebanyak tiga baris bertingkat. Bagian kepala dihiasi dengan panel berongga menopang puncak yang rata. Berdasarkan ciri fisiknya, batu nisan dari jenis E1 (Gbr. 12/C).[61] Makam ini ditempatkan pada bangunan khusus di halaman utara Masjid Kasunyatan (KST1). Bentuk sederhananya terdapat di KST2 (Gbr. 14/ KST2-E1). Dalam ruang tersebut terdapat sejumlah batu Aceh dari varian lain, terbanyak dari jenis H1 dan dalam porsi kecil dari jenis A2 dan M.

Kekhususan ketiga ditemukan pada kompleks makam KNR, salah satu lokasi ziarah penting diarahkan pada makam Abu'l Mafakhir yang berjuluk 'Sultan Kenari' dan Abu'l Ma'ali Ahmad (Gbr. 12/D & Gbr. 13). Berpedoman pada tipologi standar tampaknya tanda kubur utama di KNR, jika tidak masuk ke dalam jenis J, kemungkinan dari jenis K. Tergolong ke dalam kategori bentuk dasar 'balok' (segi empat sama) menjadi pembeda tegas terhadap bentuk dasar 'papan'.

Secara fisik jenis J dan K dapat dikenali dari dasar persegi empat dengan panel berongga pada keempat sisi. Bagian badan, ukiran sudah memudar (aus), masih tampak relief lengkung-berganda. Badan atas dihiasi relief tulisan disamarkan. Keunikan jenis ini tampak pada badan bagian atas menopang bahu dimana keempat sudutnya berukir pasangan lengkung mengarah ke bagian dalam, mengesankan pada formasi kepala diapit sepasang tanduk atau sayap (*bucrane-ailé*); mengingatkan pada batu Aceh dari jenis D dan H. Namun dengan bagian kepala berupa bulatan bertingkat dan puncak yang tinggi, tanda kubur ini kelihatan lebih sesuai dengan jenis J daripada K.[62]

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mewakafkan kitab-kitab Islam kepada gurunya, Kiyai Dukuh atau Pangeran Kasunyatan.

60. *S.B.* (pupuh XXV) menyebutkan Maulana Muhammad gugur saat ekspansi ke Sumatra Selatan, gelar sesudah kematiannya *Pangeran Seda ing Rana*.

61. Batu nisan ini berukuran tinggi 69 cm, lebar bahu 27 cm, lebar dasar 24 cm dan tebal 16 cm. Contoh jenis E1 terdapat di kompleks makam Ulu Sungai Che Omar, Negeri Johor (Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 1999: 247-48/ULU10, 254/ULU18, 256-57/ULU21; Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004: 378). Jenis E1 di kompleks makam Meurah I dan II, Aceh Besar (Oetomo 2016: 139, Gbr. 5/a).

62. Batu nisan kembar menandai kubur Abu'l Mafakhir dan Abu'l Ma'ali berukuran tinggi 70 cm, lebar badan 15 cm, lebar bahu 28 cm. Dari ciri khususnya condong ke jenis J (Ambary, 1984; 419, Foto 27). Bandingkan dengan nisan sejenis di kompleks makam Condong, Pekan, Negeri Pahang, Malaysia (Ambary 1984: 429, Foto 26 dan 29; Perret 2007: 328, Fig 8). Hampir sama dengan jenis J, juga terdapat di kompleks makam Meurah I dan II, Aceh Besar (Oetomo 2016: 139, Gbr. 5/f).

Sepengetahuan kami, jenis J selain berada di kompleks makam KNR, juga ditemukan di KST2 termasuk juga jenis K (Gbr. 14/KST2-J & KAST2-K). Dibandingkan dengan sejenisnya di tempat lain, khususnya di Pahang atau tempat lain yang telah terdokumentasi,[63] terdapat perbedaan mencolok pada bagian kepala dan puncaknya yang polos dan tinggi meruncing di bagian puncak. Sangat mungkin, sebelum ada penemuan lain, tanda kubur J dipergunakan khusus untuk Abu'l Mafakhir (1624-1651) bersama putra mahkota, Abu'l Ma'ali Ahmad (1647-1651), sedangkan jenis J tidak ditemukan di KST2.

Pendekatan tipologis di atas menunjukkan adanya dua kelompok batu nisan dari unit budaya berbeda pada situs yang sama. Secara kronologis belum dapat dipastikan, apakah nisan kubur berasal dari periode yang sama atau berasal dari waktu yang berbeda.[64] Namun dominasi batu Aceh di LA; juga di BL, KST1 dan KST2, dan KNR, tampaknya semua batu Aceh di Banten berasal dari BL sebagai pusat redistribusi regional.[65] Menimbang luas sebarannya di Sumatra, Semenanjung Malaysia, Kalimantan, dan Sulawesi, juga sejauh Nusa Tenggara (Peta 4),[66] tidak diragukan batu Aceh di Banten merupakan barang impor, tetapi tidak diketahui apakah didatangkan langsung dari Aceh ataukah melalui pelabuhan lain, seperti Melaka dan Johor;[67] yang terakhir ini merupakan negeri paling kaya akan batu Aceh; di mana terdapat hampir semua tipe yang pernah teridentifikasi di Semenanjung Malaysia.[68]

63. Rinci jenis J dan K di Semenanjung Malaysia, lihat Perret, Kamarudin & Kalus 2004: 68, 305/BTPNG 5, 326/MALAU3, 359/CDG3 & CDG4.

64. Kesenjangan antara pemakaman dan pemasangan nisan ditemukan pada kasus Malik al-Shaleh di Aceh utara, di sini prasasti menjadi kesaksian utama (Lambourn 2004: 212-213; Lambourn 2008: 266).

65. Batu Aceh dari jenis H1 juga ditemukan pada makam seorang kerabat kesultanan, Ratu Alus Juminten di Pandeglang, 23 km di selatan Serang (Wibisono 2013: 118, foto 2).

66. Ambary 1984: 340.

67. Merunut *Shun Fêng Hsiang Sung*, naskah perjalanan maritim Tiongkok berasal dari tahun 1500-an, terdapat dua jalur pelayaran menuju Banten. Pertama melalui Selat Melaka, antara Pulau Aur (utara Johor) dan Banten melewati Pulau Lingga, Pulau Mapor, Palembang, Bangka, Seputih, Tulangbawang, Sekampung menyeberang Selat Sunda. Jalur kedua melalui pesisir barat Sumatra, singgah di Barus, dilanjutkan ke *Pariaman*, menyeberang Selat Sunda untuk sampai di Banten (Mills 1979: 77-78, Peta 'Main Routes Described in the *Shun Fêng Hsiang Sung*', h. 73).

68. Perret 2000: 603, Perret & Kamarudin 2003: 42-43. Maka selain barang keramik, batu Aceh menjadi komoditas penting di Asia Tenggara (Lambourn, 281-82).

Gbr. 14 – Varian batu Aceh di situs Kasunyatan 2, Pakalangan, Kasemen.

Pupungkuran, pinggiran selatan kota

Tinjauan tipologis di atas menunjukkan situs LA kurang representatif dalam jumlah dan jenis batu Aceh. Namun keberadaannya mengisyaratkan daerah pinggiran pun mengikuti tradisi nisan impor, baik menandai kubur penguasa, bangsawan maupun tokoh agama.[69] Dilihat dari tipenya, tampak LA tidak memiliki semua jenis di BL, alih-alih jenis khusus seperti di KRN dan KST1 dan KST2 variannya kurang beragam. Perbedaan ragam jenis

69. Cf. Perret 2000: 581.

Gbr. 15 – Tanda kubur varian lokal di halaman luar kompleks makam KST2, Kasunyatan.

memang tidak koheren dengan status sosial, tetapi setidaknya menimbulkan pertanyaan, apakah karena LA hanya daerah pinggiran yang diokupasi oleh masyarakat biasa? Oleh karenanya struktur bata pada Sektor LA-2 dan LA-3 patut mendapat pertimbangan dalam memahami landskap pinggiran.

Struktur dinding bata di sektor LA-2 dan LA-3 menunjukkan perbedaan dengan BL, KST1 dan KNR, bahwa dalam himpunannya, telah memberi karakter periferik, salah satu indikatornya tidak ditemukan monumen signifikan seperti masjid besar dan tokoh yang dikenal. Namun demikian, mengacu pada konsep keterikatan antar-obyek, LA menunjukkan aliran materi, energi, dan informasi dalam hubungan dengan hunian.[70] Sektor LA-1, LA-2, dan LA-3 diwataki oleh satu set makam dan dinding bata dan karang sebagai bagian tidak terpisahkan. Ketiadaan artefak lain selama investigasi, seperti pecahan tembikar, keramik, dan material arkeologi lain di atas permukaan tanah, menimbulkan spekulasi bahwa LA tidak mengisyaratkan okupasi urban, tetapi cenderung aktivitas berskala rural.

Struktur bata dan karang bagaimanapun memegang peran penting sebagai elemen lokal tetapi pada ruang yang sama, batu Aceh memberi karakter khusus dari tradisi pemakaman kelompok 'berselera' di daerah pinggiran pula.[71] Partisipasi batu Aceh dalam konteks ini menjadi 'pembeda' terhadap tanda kubur lokal yang dominan *tumpal* kendati sulit ditentukan konteks waktunya, juga memberi identitas 'kelas' pada kompleks makam LA, KNR dan KST1 dan KST2 (Gbr. 15**).** Namun batu nisan belum dapat dijadikan

70. Lihat Hodder 2012: 10; Antczak & Beaudry 2019: 88.

71. Tafsir status sosial batu Aceh perlu data tekstual tentang tokoh yang dimakamkan. Kronologi batu nisan di LA tidak dapat ditentukan hanya berdasarkan tipologi. Cf. Perret 2007: 317-320.

dasar menentukan bentang waktu okupasi. Dalam hal ini usulan beberapa ahli,[72] patut dipertimbangkan, bahwa batu Aceh di BL, KST, KNR dan LA mungkin berasal dari eksportasi periode kedua, antara awal abad XVII dan akhir abad XVIII.[73]

Berkaitan dengan awal okupasi, sedikit titik terang disumbang oleh beberapa sumber sejarah. Tidak menyebutkan toponim 'Lawang Abang', tetapi istilah *pupungkuran*,[74] pernah dicatat oleh Cortemünde dan juga Stavorinus, yang dikaitkan dengan *krapyak* dan juga *kebon alas* di pinggiran selatan kota,[75] akan memberi jalan pada pemahaman daerah pinggiran. Mengacu pada kronik *Sajarah Banten* (*S.B*.) dan kesaksian asing, konsep *pupungkuran* mengesankan pada suatu tempat relaksasi, sedangkan *krapyak* mengacu pada peternakan, lebih tepat kandang ternak besar.[76] Namun sumber tidak menunjuk satu titik pada bentang luas daerah pinggiran, oleh karena itu secara *grossomodo* dapat diusulkan bahwa situs LA, KNR, KST dan Tasikardi, merupakan bagian dari lokasi *pupungkuran* dan *krapyak*; di luar *intra-muros*, yaitu selatan kota Banten.[77] Pentingnya daerah pinggiran dalam konteks ruang urban, Claude Guillot (1989: 129) menegaskan,

> *La description d'un palais javanais ne serait pas complète sans ses deux compléments: la réserve d'animaux et le palais des eaux. On trouve pour la première fois mention de ce dernier dans la S.B. (pupuh 44). On le situe dans un lieu appelé Pupungkuran près de Kenari*.

Untuk melokalisasi toponim *pupungkuran* di dekat Kenari, perlu memahami kondisi geografis dan bukti-bukti arkeologis di lokasi terduga. Mengacu pada sumber-sumber relevan, dikatakan Guillot selanjutnya,[78] bahwa toponim itu

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72. Lihat Yatim, 1988: 94-96; Perret 2007: 427-30; Lambourn 2004: 212-13; Perret, Surachman & Kalus 2015: 476-79.

73. Beberapa sumber sejarah mengungkapkan bahwa aktivitas ekonomi yang dikendalikan Banten masih berlangsung hingga awal abad XIX. Lihat Boontharm 2003: 106-93; Ota Atsushi 2008: 137-56.

74. Ada dua istilah yang terkait dengan kegiatan di tempat ini: *pupungkuran* dan juga *kebon alas* (sejenis taman hutan raya). *S.B.* pupuh XLIV (Djadiningrat 1982; Guillot 1989: 129).

75. *Pupungkuran* dibentuk dari akar kata *pungkur*, dalam bahasa Jawa dan Sunda mengacu pada waktu telah lewat atau tempat di belakang. Dalam *S.B.* pupuh XLIV, *pungkur* merujuk daerah belakang kota Banten.

76. Keberadaan *krapyak* sebagai lahan peternakan hewan besar terkait dengan sumber protein hewani, dimana kerbau merupakan salah satu makanan favorit (Guillot 1989: 147). Hingga saat ini, kerbau tertentu dianggap hewan keramat. Selain itu daging kerbau merupakan hidangan utama saat Iedul Fitri. Fadillah, 2010: 27.

77. Kawasan *intra-muros* (dalam benteng) berpusat pada kompleks keraton dengan beberapa klaster penting di kota Banten. Guillot 1989: 120-37.

78. Guillot 1989: 147-48.

mencakup pinggiran kota dimana pedesaan membentang lebih dari sepuluh kilometer ke selatan Banten, tetapi alasan sejarah, sentimen, dan terutama ekonomi, daerah pinggiran tidak dapat dipisahkan dari kota. Mengikuti deskripsi geografis itu, maka apa yang dikatakan *pupungkuran* mencakup seluruh daerah kekuasaan Banten sampai ke bagian hulu dimana terdapat Banten Girang; ibukota pra-Islam yang pernah ditaklukan.[79]

Namun, *pupungkuran* dalam pengertian di atas akan mengarahkan kita pada luasan 'tak terhingga'. Lagi pula sumber sejarah mereduksi toponim itu ke dalam lingkup ruang terbatas, yang merujuk pada beberapa lokasi, antara Tasikardi dan Kenari hingga tepian Ci-Banten. Kronik *S.B.* mengisyaratkan bahwa *pupungkuran* diinisasi oleh Sultan Abu'l Mafakhir, sebagai area penggembalaan rusa dan kerbau.[80] Pada masa pemerintahan berikutnya di bawah Sultan Ageng (1651-1682), seperti dicatat Corteműnde,[81] bahwa di pinggiran selatan ada kebun raya yang indah dan besar, yang ditumbuhi oleh pohon buah-buahan dari tanaman langka. Di sini pula terdapat rumah peristirahatan sultan, yang juga berfungsi sebagai reservasi air untuk kebutuhan keraton.[82]

Berdasarkan kesaksian tersebut, tampaknya *pupungkuran* mempunyai multi-fungsi, yaitu terasosiasi dengan penggembalaan (*krapyak*), relaksasi (*taman-sari*) dan reservasi air (*tasik-ardi*), serta *kebon alas*; semacam 'taman hutan raya' di era modern. Dengan menggarisbawahi dua fungsi terakhir, *pupungkuran* juga mencakup areal tanaman pangan. Memang peningkatan usaha pertanian pangan dilakukan oleh Sultan Ageng di pesisir utara, tetapi sesungguhnya, seperti usulan Guillot,[83] kinerja Sultan Ageng tidak ada yang luar biasa, karena hanya melanjutkan kebijakan penguasa Banten sebelumnya, Sultan Abu'l Mafakhir, yang menerapkan kebijakan ganda: merevitalisasi budidaya lada pasca krisis,[84] dan membuka lahan pertanian, yang bahkan meluas sampai jauh ke bagian hulu, kota Serang sekarang.[85] Termasuk didalamnya, budidaya tebu untuk mendukung industri gula di Kelapadua, sekitar 2,5 km di hulu LA.[86]

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79. Guillot, Nurhakim, Wibisono 1996: 136-37.

80. Guillot 1989: 129-30. Ekskavasi di kompleks Surasowan (Fort Diamant) menemukan sejumlah fragmen tulang kerbau dan sapi, indikasi menu utama di lingkungan keraton. Lihat Ueda et al. 2016: 101-112.

81. Corteműnde 1963: 126; Guillot 1989: 129. Kenari mungkin salah satu pohon langka.

82. Guillot 1989: 129.

83. Guillot 1995: 107.

84. Guillot 1992: 67-68.

85. Mungkin nama itu diadopsi untuk mengenang persawahan hasil kreasinya, kendati telah menjadi kota besar, masih ditemukan lahan persawahan di sekitar pusat kota Serang (Guillot 1995: 107).

86. Budidaya tebu di Kelapadua dimulai awal tahun 1620an (Guillot, Nurhakim &



Peta 4 – Sebaran batu nisan Aceh di Semenanjung Malaysia dan Indonesia, beririsan dengan batu nisan Demak-Troloyo. Dimodifikaksi dari beberapa sumber (Ambary 1984: 340 dan Perret 2007: 318).

Secara kontekstual, dengan demikian, situs LA, KNR, KST dan Tasikardi merupakan bagian dari landskap pinggiran selatan kota Banten.[87] Koherensi antar-ruang yang tersirat dalam hipotesis di atas didukung oleh kesamaan bahan dan struktur bata dan khususnya batu Aceh. Hanya saja bukti-bukti yang diperoleh, selain belum memadai, juga masih mengandung ambiguitas temporal. Hasil investigasi di situs LA, dan perbandingan dengan situs KNR dan KST belum dapat menentukan kronologi relatif situs hanya berdasarkan pada tipologi batu Aceh, karena komoditas impor itu masih terus digunakan antara abad XVII hingga awal abad XIX.[88]

Penutup

Penyelidikan Lawang Abang untuk sementara ini belum memberikan bukti keterlibatan langsung Abu'l Mafakhir di LA. Namun, tinggalan arkeologi

Lombard-Salmon 1990: 141-45).

87. Lombard (1969: 136) mengaitkan Tasik-ardi (*mer et montagne*) dengan Sultan Ageng, yang juga mendirikan istana 'Tirtayasa' di timur laut kota Banten.

88. Untuk kasus Barus, importasi batu Aceh terjadi dalam dua gelombang, pertama sejak pertengahan abad XVI - awal abad XVIII dan kedua antara paruh kedua abad XIX - awal abad XX. Di Semenanjung Malaysia, diperkirakan batu Aceh diimpor antara pertengahan abad XVI dan awal abad XIX (Perret, Surachman & Kalus 2015: 578-581: Perret 2000: 590).

dan komponennya mengindikasikan jejak lahan pertanian yang terintegrasi dengan aktivitas sosial-keagamaan di pinggiran selatan kota.[89]

Fenomena arkeologi dan sejarah menimbulkan asumsi dasar bahwa pinggiran selatan Banten adalah solusi untuk keluar dari rutinitas ekonomi politik di pusat kota. Dalam konteks itu, kegiatan keagamaan, atau bahkan 'penyucian diri'[90] menjadi bagian dari tradisi *pupungkuran*. Meskipun demikian, penggunaan batu Aceh dan struktur dinding bata, menunjukkan tradisi urban dalam batas tertentu tetap diikuti. Perbedaan antara tempat pemakaman di dalam dan di luar kota kerajaan tidak mengurangi kharisma Maulana Yusuf dan Abu'l Mafakhir, karena sosok batu Aceh secara simbolis memancarkan pamor status sosial, seperti sebarannya demikian luas di dunia Melayu. Di luar Jawa, batu Aceh digunakan sebagai penanda kubur dinasti Banjar di Banjarmasin dan Martapura, (abad XVI),[91] dan juga dinasti Gowa dan Tallo di Makassar.[92] Selain raja atau bangsawan, batu Aceh pun digunakan untuk menandai makam Dato' ri Bandang di Tallo dan Dato' ri Patimang di Luwu; bersama Dato' ri Tiro, ketiganya dikenal sebagai penyebar agama Islam awal di wilayah Sulawesi Selatan.[93]

Menimbang kehandalan data arkeologi saat ini, keberadaan LA, satu titik kecil di daerah pinggiran, belum memberikan kepastian akan fungsi dan sekuensi waktunya. Data historis mengisyaratkan pinggiran selatan sudah dirintis sejak periode Maulana Yusuf, dan mungkin hingga eliminasi kesultanan mengawali rezim kolonial. Maka, apabila bukan tempat khusus bagi komunitas rural yang terasosiasi dengan pertanian dan keagamaan, jawaban apa yang dapat diberikan dari data arkeologi? Investigasi situs Lawang Abang, Kenari, dan Kasunyatan diharapkan menjadi pijakan awal bagi penelitian selanjutnya.

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89 Semangat keagamaan melekat pada Abu'l Mafakhir melalui tarikat Qadariyya. Lihat Fenner & Laffan 2005: 204-05; Yakin 2016: 376.

90. Bandingkan dengan 'Sunyaragi' di Cirebon. Istilah *sunyaragi* (*sunya:* kosong dan *ragi:* jasmani). Konon para sesepuh Sultan Cirebon sering datang bermeditasi selama beberapa hari. Menurut *Babad Cirebon*, tamansari dibangun pada tahun 1741 (Lombard 1969: 147-38; Falah 1996: 67).

91. Batu Aceh di kompleks makam raja Banjar di Banjarmasin dan Martapura. Mansyur & Effendi 2022: 176-78. Fig. 1.

92. Ambary 1984: 418, Foto 22-23.

93. Dato' ri Tiro kemungkinan besar berasal dari Aceh, sedangkan Dato' ri Patimang (Dato' Sulaeman) dan Dato' ri Bandang (Tuan Guru Abdul Makmur) dari Minangkabau, yang memperkenalkan Islam di Gowa dan Tallo'. Lihat Chambert-Loir 1985: 152-53.

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*Daniel Perret**

Images de Sindanglaya et ses environs au XIX^e siècle

L'artiste-peintre Marius Perret nous a laissé plusieurs aquarelles de Sindanglaya et de ses environs, en particulier du Gunung Gede, avant d'y mourir en septembre 1900[1]. Sa contribution artistique est l'occasion de revenir sur la place particulière qu'occupe cette région de l'ouest de Java dans les récits de voyages et l'histoire iconographique de l'Archipel au XIX^e siècle.

Un environnement unique

Ce qui revient dans tous les témoignages, c'est d'abord une nature extraordinaire. À plus de 1 000 mètres d'altitude, la région de Sindanglaya surplombe la plaine côtière du nord de l'île, se situe au pied de deux volcans culminant à quelque 3 000 mètres et voisine une forêt primaire d'altitude exubérante et unique. Dès le milieu du XVII^e siècle, Hendrick Jacobsz. Dubbels (1621-1707) rend dans une perspective étonnante vue de la rade de Batavia, la majesté des Gunung Gede et Pangerango (illus. n^o 2), que nous citerons de nombreuses fois dans la suite[2]. Dans son *History of Java*, Raffles confirme

* École française d'Extrême-Orient.

1. Cf. D. Perret, « De Moulins à Sindanglaya (Java). Itinéraire d'un peintre orientaliste : Marius Perret (1851-1900) », in *Archipel* 104, 2022, p. 75-158.

2. Peintre de marines, Dubbels ne se serait jamais rendu dans l'Archipel, collaborant à Amsterdam avec quelques-uns des grands maîtres du genre (Jan Blanc, ‟Sensible Natures : Allart Van Everdingen and the Tradition of Sublime Landscape in



1 – Environs de Sindanglaya au début du XXème siècle (adapté de "Map of Buitenzorg – Sindanglaya – Soekaboemi" *in* Official Tourist Bureau, *Illustrated Tourist Guide to Buitenzorg, the Preanger and Central Java*, Weltevreden, 1913).

que ces deux montagnes sont clairement visibles de Batavia et précise qu'elles sont bien connues des marins qui les surnomment « les Montagnes Bleues »[3].

Le premier Occidental connu pour avoir atteint le sommet du Gunung Gede est le naturaliste Thomas Horsfield, vers 1809, au service des Néerlandais à l'époque[4]. Raffles lui-même effectue l'ascension avec un groupe d'amis en février 1815[5].

Seventeenth-Century Dutch Painting," *Journal of Historians of Netherlandish Art* 8:2 (Summer 2016), DOI: 10.5092/jhna.2016.8.2.4 – Available at https://jhna.org/articles/allart-van-everdingen-tradition-sublime-landscape-seventeenth-century-dutch-painting/).

3. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, vol. I, 1994 (1ère éd., 1817), p. 12.

4. Frans Junghuhn, *Java – zijne gedaante, zijn plantentooi en inwendige bouw*, 's Gravenhage, Mieling, vol. II, 1853, p. 34.

5. John Bastin, "Introduction", in *History of Java*, 1994, p. x (v-xxviii).

Qirijn Maurits Rudolph Ver Huell (ou Verhuell), officier de marine et peintre amateur[6], livre de son excursion au col du Puncak en novembre 1818, une description probablement emblématique de cette première moitié du XIXe siècle[7]. Au dessus du village de Gadok, la route monte et la nature devient plus « féroce » ; les crêtes, les vallées profondes et les ravins sont envahis de forêts denses et sombres ; un « désert éternel et impénétrable » habité par le tigre et le rhinocéros. Au col du Puncak, Ver Huell met pied à terre et décrit une vue sur une plaine incommensurable, de hautes montagnes couvertes de forêts, le cratère fumant du Megamendung. Accompagné d'un groupe d'autochtones armés, il entre dans une forêt « dans une obscurité impénétrable d'arbres prodigieux, aussi vieux que le monde », s'attendant à voir apparaître, avec chaque bruit étrange, un tigre ou un rhinocéros. Débouchant sur le lac de cratère Telaga-Warna, il avoue n'avoir jamais vu « une scène naturelle plus saisissante »[8].

L'année suivante, Jannes Theodoor Bik (1796-1875), et plus tard son frère Adrianus Johannes (1790-1872), dessinateurs dans l'équipe du savant Reinwardt, exécutent plusieurs dessins de paysages près de Sindanglaya (vue des volcans Gede, Pangerango et Geger Bentang ; cratère du Gunung Gede ; lac de Telaga-Warna, etc.) (illus. no 3)[9]. Tsing Wang Ho, qui a laissé une illustration du Gunung Gede, faisait peut-être partie de la même équipe (illus. no 4).

En 1826, le dessinateur Pieter van Oort (1804-1834) arrive à Batavia au service de la Commission des sciences naturelles. Il aura l'occasion d'exécuter plusieurs dessins de la région de Sindanglaya lors de missions dans l'ouest de Java, y compris un dessin en couleur du Gunung Gede et du Gunung Pangerango en arrière-plan d'un paysage de rizières (illus. no 5)[10]. D'autres

6. Pour une brève notice biographique relativement récente, cf. Leo Haks & Guus Maris (Comp.), *Lexicon of Foreign Artists who Visualized Indonesia [1600-1950]*, Singapore, Archipelago Press, 1995, p. 275-276.

7. Q.M.R. Ver Huell, *Herinneringen van een reis naar de Oost-Indiën*, tweede deel, Haarlem, Vincent Loosjes, 1836, p. 122, 124-125.

8. Herman F.C. Ten Kate ("Schilder-teekenaars in Nederlandsch Oost- en West-Indië en hun beteekenis voor de land- en volkenkunde", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van de Koninklijk Instituut* 67, 1913, p. 452 *441-515*) mentionne d'ailleurs l'une de ses aquarelles titrée *Telaga Warna op den Poentjak*, dont nous n'avons pas retrouvé la trace. Le même Ten Kate (1913, p. 454, 458) signale qu'entre 1817 et 1828, Antoine Payen (1792-1853) a exécuté un dessin d'une vue du Gunung Gede et du Gunung Pangerango, dont une lithographie serait reproduite dans le premier volume de l'édition de 1828 du *Flora Javae* de C.L. Blume et J.B. Fischer (Bruxelles, Librairie J. Frank). Nous n'avons pas retrouvé cette lithographie dans l'exemplaire que nous avons pu consulter.

9. Pour de brèves notices biographiques relativement récentes, cf. Haks & Maris (Comp.), 1995, p. 33, 34. Pour une notice commune plus complète sur les activités des frères Bik dans l'Archipel, cf. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. I, 1917 : entrée "Bik".

10. J. De Loos-Haaxman (*Verlaat Rapport Indië*, 's-Gravenhage, Mouton & Co. –

dessins sont reproduits dans le volume *Land- en Volkenkunde* (1839-1844) des Rapports (Verhandelingen) de cette commission.

Peintre et dessinateur, entre autres activités, Charles William Meredith van de Velde (1818-1898) a séjourné dans l'Archipel entre 1838 et 1847. Féru de montagne, il aurait escaladé à plusieurs reprises les Gunung Gede et Pangerango sans jamais les avoir dessinés[11]. C'est à la même époque que le naturaliste et explorateur Frans Junghuhn se rend également sur le Gunung Gede, à propos duquel il a laissé une curieuse figuration de l'environnement de son cratère actif (illus. nº 6).

Un naturaliste encore plus connu, Alfred Russel Wallace, est à Buitenzorg en septembre 1861[12]. Il passe deux semaines dans une cabane près du col de Puncak, où il constate rapidement que la faune et la flore y sont différentes de celles de la partie orientale de Java, et qu'on y trouve tous les oiseaux et insectes les plus remarquables et les plus caractéristiques de l'île. Son groupe de chasseurs lui rapporte notamment des spécimens de quarante espèces d'oiseaux, pratiquement toutes spécifiques à Java, ainsi que de nombreux spécimens de papillons. Wallace effectue l'ascension des Gunung Gede et Pangerango, au cours de laquelle il est impressionné par la luxuriance de la flore tropicale et peut observer directement pour la première fois la transition entre flore tropicale et flore tempérée en milieu équatorial.

Dès 1876, une décision du Gouverneur-Général instaure une gestion réglementée de l'ensemble des forêts primaires des régences de Preanger[13], y compris la forêt de Cibodas d'une superficie de près de 300 hectares (alt., 1.425-1.575 m), à quelque trois kilomètres de Sindanglaya[14].

C'est durant les décennies 1880-1890, qu'il faut situer l'exécution de dessins dans la région de Sindanglaya par Whilhelm Christiaan Constant Bleckmann (1853-1942), né à Batavia, fonctionnaire puis professeur de dessin[15] (illus. nº 7). En 1884, Edmond Cotteau vient à Sindanglaya pour faire

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Uitgevers, 1968, p. 27) signale un second dessin du Pangerango par Pieter van Oort, dessin conservé à l'époque au Museum Natuurlijke Historie. Nous n'en n'avons pas retrouvé la trace.

11. Ten Kate 1913, p. 465. Pour une brève notice biographique relativement récente, cf. Haks & Maris (Comp.), 1995, p. 273-274.

12. Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Annotated Malay Archipelago*, edited by John van Wyhe, Singapore, NUS Press, 2015, p. 42, 185-195 (1ère éd., London, 1869).

13. *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1876, nº 229 (2 septembre 1876).

14. Ernst Haeckel, *Uit Insulinde*. Vertaald door H.H. Juynboll. Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, [1902], p. 117.

15. Ten Kate 1913, p. 491-493. Pour une brève notice biographique relativement récente, cf. Haks & Maris (Comp.), 1995, p. 36.

l'ascension du Gunung Gede. Tout comme ses prédécesseurs, il est séduit par le « merveilleux panorama du Col de Puncak » et fait le détour à Telaga-Warna, « petit lac romantique en pleine forêt vierge »[16].

Cibodas, c'est également un emblème de la nature domestiquée dans l'Archipel. C'est là en effet, à 1 400 mètres d'altitude, que sont réalisés les premiers essais de plantation de quinquinas[17], précisément en 1852, par Johannes Elias Teysmann (1808-1882), *hortulanus* du fameux Jardin botanique de Buitenzorg[18]. Un espace de 31 hectares est ensuite aménagé à la limite de la forêt primaire, pour en faire un jardin de montagne destiné à la culture de plantes et d'arbres qui ne peuvent pousser à Buitenzorg. C'est dans ce jardin que Melchior Treub, à l'époque directeur du Jardin de Buitenzorg, installe un petit laboratoire d'étude de la jungle tropicale en 1891[19], à une heure et demie à pied de Sindanglaya.

Ces aménagements, exceptionnels pour l'époque, à l'orée d'une jungle préservée, ne pouvaient qu'attirer naturalistes et artistes européens, qu'il est impossible de citer tous ici. Nous retiendrons en particulier des individus informant sur la contribution de Cibodas au patrimoine de l'illustration naturaliste à peu près au moment du séjour de Marius Perret à Sindanglaya.

Le botaniste belge Jean Massart se rend à Cibodas entre août 1894 et février 1895, après avoir travaillé au Jardin de Buitenzorg et confie : « M. Treub a fait bâtir à Tjibodas un laboratoire qui certes n'a pas son pareil sur la terre ». Sa prospection botanique l'amène à faire l'ascension du Gunung Gede et du Gunung Pangerango. Massart ramène des échantillons botaniques au Jardin de Buitenzorg, échantillons dessinés par un Javanais, Mas Kromohardjo[20].

C'est en 1898 qu'il faut situer le passage du peintre danois Hugo Vilfred von Pedersen (1870-1959) à Sindanglaya, où il exécute en particulier une vue de l'entrée du jardin botanique de Cibodas avec le cratère du Gunung Gede en arrière-plan[21].

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16. Edmond Cotteau, « Voyage aux volcans de Java », in *Annuaire du Club alpin français 1885*, Paris, Hachette, 1886, p. 349-350 (336-370).

17. Dont la quinine est extraite de l'écorce.

18. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. II, 1918 : entrée "Kina" ; vol. IV, 1921 : entrée "Teysmann" ; J.E. de Vrij, "De kinakultuur op Java en in Britsch-Indië", *Tijdschrift voor wetenschappelijke pharmacie* 1, 1865, p. 33-57.

19. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. III, 1919 : entrée "Plantentuin" ; Ernst Haeckel, *Uit Insulinde*. Vertaald door H.H. Juynboll. Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, [1902], p. 117 ; A.H. Blaauw, *De Tropische Natuur in Schetsen en Kleuren*, Amsterdam, Koloniaal Instituut, 1913, p. 32.

20. Jean Massart, *Un botaniste en Malaisie*, Gand, Impr. C. Annoot-Braeckman, 1895.

21. Hugo V. Pedersen, *Durch den Indischen Archipel – Eine Künstlerfahrt*, Stuttgart & Leipzig, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1902, p. 198. Cf. également Ten Kate 1913, p. 498-499, ainsi que Haks & Maris (1995, p. 207), pour une brève notice biographique relativement récente.

Le linguiste et anthropologue Tammo Jacob Bezemer (1869-1944) se trouve à Sindanglaya en octobre 1899. Il se rend bien sûr au jardin de Cibodas, où il fait la connaissance de Max Fleischer, peintre de paysages et botaniste à ses heures perdues qu'il consacre à l'étude des mousses. Il est installé dans l'un des logements du laboratoire[22]. On peut se prendre à imaginer que Marius Perret a pu rencontrer Fleischer sur place moins d'un an plus tard.

Trois mois après le décès de l'artiste français à Sindanglaya en septembre 1900, c'est Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), naturaliste allemand, qui séjourne à Cibodas[23], « la perle de tout ce qui ravit les naturalistes européens dans le monde tropical magique de Java ». À cette occasion, il illustre ses observations botaniques par des dessins et des aquarelles reproduites dans son ouvrage de 1901 (illus. n° 8-9) :

> « J'ai moi-même fait un grand nombre de ces aquarelles colorées qui, pour moi personnellement du moins, gardent parfaitement vivante l'image subjective que j'ai absorbée lorsque j'ai vu cette nature enchanteresse lorsque je m'y suis immergé en la peignant ».

Sur la Grande Route de la Poste

Sindanglaya, c'est aussi un relais sur la Grande Route de Poste (Grote Postweg) aménagée entre 1808 et 1811, sous les ordres du Gouverneur-Général Daendels, entre Anyer, dans le Détroit de la Sonde, et Panarukan, à quelque 70 kilomètres du Détroit de Bali à l'est. Parmi les témoignages les plus anciens conservés sur cette route à propos du tronçon Buitenzorg-Cianjur, Ver Huell (1818) signale qu'au-delà de Cisarua, l'attelage de chevaux est renforcé par des buffles (Ver Huell 1836, p. 122).

Quarante ans après Ver Huell, le chercheur-voyageur et dessinateur Fedor Jagor laisse un nouveau témoignage sur les conditions du voyage dans cette zone[24]. Il confirme le renforcement des attelages avec des buffles pour gravir le col du Puncak. Si Jagor ne mentionne rien précisément sur Sindanglaya, il décrit l'ambiance des *warung*[25] (illus. n° 10), signale tout près, à Cipanas, la « maison

22. T.J. Bezemer, *Door Nederlandsch Oost-Indië. Schetsen van land en volk*, Groningen, J.B. Wolters, 1906, p. 332-350.

23. Ernst Haeckel, *Uit Insulinde*. Vertaald door H.H. Juynboll. Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, [1902], p. 115-143. Fondateur du darwinisme social national, il développe des thèmes comme l'euthanasie et la « sélection spartiate » dans ses ouvrages de vulgarisation (P. Tort, *Darwin et le darwinisme*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France / Humensis, 2022 [1ère éd., 2005] p. 81).

24. Fedor Jagor, *Singapore, Malacca, Java. Reiseskizzen*, Berlin, Verlag von Julius Springer, 1866, p. 136-139. Selon Haks & Maris (1995, p. 136), une collection de milliers de ses dessins serait conservée à la *Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte* de Berlin.

25. Petit restaurant en plein air.

de campagne », d'allure simple avec un grand jardin, du Gouverneur-Général, qui serait rarement fréquentée, avant de faire halte au *pesanggrahan*[26] de Pacet.

Le comte de Beauvoir, qui emprunte la route en novembre 1866, a laissé une description assez imagée des conditions de la montée :

> « […] nous commençons à monter et nos petits chevaux s'en ressentent terriblement : quand ils s'arrêtent, la population accourt, pousse aux roues, s'époumone, et jetant une volée de bâtons et de pierres, remet l'attelage en marche. Mais nous voici au pied de la grande montagne, le Megamendong : dix buffles viennent remplacer nos poneys, et chaque paire est aiguillonnée par un cornac rieur et taquin […] ».

Guy de Contenson, entre 1872 et 1875, profite de la voiture de poste mise à sa disposition par le Gouverneur-Général Loudon pour se rendre de Buitenzorg à Sindanglaya[27] :

> « Le voyage (de Buitenzorg) se fit dans une bonne berline, traînée par quatre chevaux nerveux qui, dans les descentes, nous entraînaient à toute vitesse. Aux montées, on leur adjoignait des buffles […] Des relais de ces animaux attendent les voitures aux passages difficiles ; on en attelle parfois jusqu'à huit, deux à deux, les uns derrière les autres ».

Cette Grande Route de la Poste des années 1860-1870 dans la région de Sindanglaya, est le cadre de plusieurs tableaux de Raden Saleh (ca. 1811-1880) avec ses paysages, ses attelages et ses échoppes[28], dont le *Road over Megamendung*, conservé au Kunstsammlungen Veste Coburg et le *Vue du Megamendung*, vendu aux enchères à Paris en décembre 2021[29] (illus. no. 11).

Le tronçon Buitenzorg-Cianjur décline pour le transport avec l'ouverture, en 1884, de la ligne de chemin de fer Buitenzorg-Bandung[30], qui contourne le col du Puncak en passant entre le Gunung Salak et le Gunung Pangerango, puis rejoint Cianjur via Sukabumi.

Cette même année 1884, Edmond Cotteau emprunte la ligne qui vient d'ouvrir jusqu'à Bandung, avant de revenir sur Cianjur et de se rendre en voiture à cheval à Sindanglaya, où il fait étape, et repart sur Buitenzorg « par une route vraiment ravissante, sablée comme une allée de parc »[31].

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26. Logement destiné aux fonctionnaires itinérants.

27. Guy de Contenson, *Chine et Extrême-Orient*, Paris, E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884, p. 250.

28. Cf. Werner Kraus & Irina Vogelsang, *Raden Saleh – The Beginning of Modern Indonesian Painting*, Jakarta, Goethe-Institut Indonesien, 2012, p. 327, 331-335, 345-347.

29. Nous remercions Pierre Labrousse de nous avoir communiqué cette information.

30. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. II, 1918 : entrée "Megamendoeng". La ligne Batavia-Buitenzorg a été ouverte dès 1873.

31. Edmond Cotteau, « Voyage aux volcans de Java », in *Annuaire du Clup alpin français 1885*, Paris, Hachette, 1886, p. 338, 345, 350 (336-370).

À la fin de la décennie, Marius Buys[32] donne quelques précisions sur les moyens de transport entre Cianjur et Sindanglaya. Le voyageur a alors le choix entre une charrette légère à trois chevaux, qui « survole » parfois littéralement la route, et un quatre-en-main plus confortable, mais plus lent, d'autant plus qu'il nécessite un attelage supplémentaire de buffles dans les montées. Dix ans plus tard, moins d'un an avant le séjour de Marius Perret, les moyens de transport n'ont pas changé entre Cianjur et Sindanglaya. Bezemer témoigne ainsi : « La voiture volait au-dessus des racines et des pierres, de sorte qu'il fallait se tenir à son siège pour ne pas être projeté »[33].

Si Perret s'est rendu à Sindanglaya à partir de Buitenzorg, il a certainement vécu une expérience identique à celle d'Ernst Haeckel, qui emprunte cette route à la fin de l'année 1900[34]. Parti dans un convoi de deux voitures légères à trois chevaux, il traverse d'abord le long *kampung* chinois de Buitenzorg, puis un paysage de vastes rizières en terrasses jusqu'au pied du Megamendung. Là, cinq chevaux supplémentaires sont attelés au convoi, chevaux dirigés par quatre valets chargés d'aider le cocher et de pousser les roues dans les endroits difficiles.

> « Ainsi, les passagers des voitures ont été transportés jusqu'à la hauteur du col escarpé du Poentjak avec l'aide de cinq indigènes obligeants et de cinq petits chevaux indiens, qui ont rivalisé avec eux dans la compréhension de la situation et dans l'étalage de sacrifice. » (*notre trad*.)

L'hôtel et maison de repos

Sindanglaya, c'est aussi, depuis le milieu du XIX^e^ siècle, une maison de repos, qui fait office d'hôtel. Un médecin, ancien officier de santé, J.C. Ploem, en est à l'origine. Installé à Cianjur dès 1857, celui-ci achète la même année un terrain à Sindanglaya, où il fait construire une maison de repos en bois l'année suivante. La première décennie est difficile car l'homme n'a pas bonne réputation auprès du gouvernement. L'établissement reçoit néanmoins des militaires de grades inférieurs en convalescence. Habile à plaider sa cause, Ploem obtient des subventions mensuelles et l'établissement commence à recevoir des malades de plus haut rang et en plus grand nombre (75 en 1880)[35].

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32. *Batavia, Buitenzorg en de Preanger – Gids voor bezoekers en toeristen*, Batavia, G. Kolff & Co., 1891, p. 99.

33. T.J. Bezemer, *Door Nederlandsch Oost-Indië. Schetsen van land en volk*, Groningen, J.B. Wolters, 1906, p. 333.

34. Ernst Haeckel, *Uit Insulinde*. Vertaald door H.H. Juynboll. Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, [1902], p. 115-116.

35. D. Schoute, *De Geneeskunde in Nederlandsch-Indië gedurende de negentiende eeuw*, Batavia, G. Kolff & Co. [1936], p. 337-339.

À l'époque, Sindanglaja est considéré approprié pour les personnes souffrant de paludisme, de béribéri, d'anémie, de maladies pulmonaires, de maladies du système nerveux et du foie[36] (illus. n° 12). Ploem meurt en 1881. Enterré à Sindanglaya[37], sa tombe y est peut-être encore visible.

Abraham Salm (1801-1876), artiste-planteur de tabac à Java, passe près de trente ans dans l'archipel[38]. Il laisse ce qui est probablement la plus ancienne vue encore visible de nos jours (1869) de cet établissement de Sindanglaya, au bord de la Grande Route (illus. no. 13).

Nous disposons de quelques témoignages concernant la partie hôtel à cette époque. Dans la première moitié des années 1870, Guy de Contenson (1884, p. 250-251), y passe une nuit, avec en soirée un spectacle de bayadères masquées (*topeng*) : « La soirée se termina en mangeant quelques friandises avec nos belles danseuses, dont l'amabilité et la bonne volonté à tous égards ne connurent plus de bornes ». Une décennie plus tard, Hugues Krafft décrit les lieux comme suit[39] :

> « Il y a là un grand hôtel-établissement qui comprend une spacieuse maison à balcons de bois, de petits chalets séparés dans un jardin où des familles peuvent s'installer pour toute une saison. Le gouvernement subventionne l'établissement pour les militaires qu'il y envoie. Les sous-officiers et soldats occupent de grands bâtiments-casernes adjacents. »

Marius Buys y séjourne en 1889 et observe[40] :

> « Le grand bâtiment principal, entièrement rénové, est beaucoup plus propre et mieux meublé qu'auparavant. Les chambres d'hôtes sont spacieuses, mais certaines manquent de la ventilation nécessaire […]. La grande salle à manger est simple, mais soignée et spacieuse […]. Contre les fortes pluies, très fréquentes ici, le bâtiment est bien abrité par une toiture effilée en zinc, qui dépasse largement les galeries. Une salle de loisirs et de billard, ainsi qu'un terrain de jeu de quilles et de croquet, offrent des possibilités de détente. Le parc autour de ces bâtiments n'est pas grand, mais magnifique, avec ses arbres *waringin* et ses magnifiques parterres

36. C.J. Boon, *Leerboek der Militaire Aardrijskunde en Statistiek van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*, Breda, De Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1905, p. 248 ; Maurice Buret, « Les villes de santé dans nos colonies », *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales* XIV(139), 1/12/1902, p. 671 *665-681*.

37. M. Buys, *Batavia, Buitenzorg en de Preanger – Gids voor bezoekers en toeristen*, Batavia, G. Kolff & Co., 1891, p. 107 ; P.C. Bloys van Treslong Prins, *Genealogische en heraldische gedenkwaardigheden betreffende Europeanen op Java*, Batavia, Albrecht, 1934, p. 338.

38. Pour une brève notice biographique relativement récente, cf. Leo Haks & Guus Maris (Comp.), 1995, p. 232-233.

39. Hugues Krafft, *Souvenirs de notre tour du monde*, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1885, p. 146.

40. M. Buys, *Batavia, Buitenzorg en de Preanger – Gids voor bezoekers en toeristen*, Batavia, G. Kolff & Co., 1891, p. 101-102.

> de roses. […] Il y a quelques pavillons pour le logement à l'extérieur du bâtiment principal […] un bureau de poste, où l'on peut également communiquer avec le bureau télégraphique de Cianjur au moyen du téléphone. […] Au nord du bâtiment principal, en contrebas, se trouvent des bâtiments simples mais adaptés, destinés à l'infirmerie des membres des forces navales et terrestres. » (*notre trad*.)

La Suissesse Cécile de Rodt, qui fait étape à Sindanglaya un peu plus d'un an après le décès de Perret, en fait une description plus critique[41] :

> « […] un grand hôtel quelque peu délabré avec beaucoup de dépendances. […] Nous étions à peu près les seuls hôtes […]. On ne pouvait même pas lire, car la lumière des quelques misérables lampes à pétrole était par trop insuffisante. Dans les chambres à coucher, l'éclairage consistait en veilleuses alimentées par de l'huile de coco. »

On ne peut pas clore ce rapide coup d'œil sur le Sindanglaya de la seconde moitié du XIX^e^ siècle sans évoquer la présence, au moins depuis le milieu du siècle, et peut-être peu après l'ouverture de la Grande Route de la Poste, d'une résidence de campagne du Gouverneur-Général à Cipanas, qui comme son nom l'indique, signale une source chaude, à deux kilomètres de l'hôtel-maison de repos (illus. n^o^ 14).

41. Cécile de Rodt, *Voyage d'une Suissesse autour du monde*, Neuchâtel, F. Zahn, 1904, p. 328.

2 – Hendrick Jacobsz. Dubbels. *Gezicht op Batavia* (1640-1676), huile sur toile, 65,5 x 84 cm. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, SK-A-2513. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.8333) [Volcans Salak, Pangerango et Gede vus de la rade de Batavia].

3 – Jannes Theodoor Bik, "Krater van den Goenong Gedee, van de noordzijde gezien" [cratère du Gunung Gede vu de la face nord]. Publié dans C.J. Temminck (ed.), *Verhandelingen over de natuurlijke geschiedenis der Nederlandsche overzeesche bezittingen* […] - *Land en Volkenkunde* door Salomon Müller, Leiden, Luchtmans & van der Hoek, 1839-1844, plaat 65 (lithographie par William Johannes Gordon).



4 – Tsing Wang Ho, "Gezigt in den krater van den poentjak Goenong Gedee, en op de zich noordwaarts voortzettende bergen" [Vue du cratère au sommet du Gunung Gede et des montagnes au nord de celui-ci]. Publié dans C.J. Temminck (ed.), *Verhandelingen over de natuurlijke geschiedenis der Nederlandsche overzeesche bezittingen* [...] - *Land en Volkenkunde* door Salomon Müller, Leiden, Luchtmans & van der Hoek, 1839-1844, plaat 64 (lithographie par William Johannes Gordon).

5 – Pieter van Oort, *Landschap op Java,* 1830, crayon, pinceau de couleurs à l'aquarelle, 25,5 x 32,5 cm, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, RP-T-1942-61. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.296064) [Paysage des environs de Buitenzorg avec rizières et volcans Pangerango et Gede en arrière-plan].

6 – Frans Wilhelm Junghun, *De vulkaan Gunung Gede*, 1853, lithographie en couleur par Julius Tempeltey, 23,7 x 38 cm, Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, inv. nr. TM-H-3427. Cliché © Museum van Wereldculturen [Le cratère du volcan Gede].

7 – Wilhelm Christiaan Constant Bleckmann, *Tweelingvulkaan Gedeh-Pangerango. Java*, lithographie polychrome, 104 x 74 cm, musée d'Eindhoven, inv. no. 1985.07.203. Cliché © musée d'Eindhoven [Les volcans jumeaux de Gede et Pangerango – avant 1899].



Fig. 29. Weg im Urwald von Tjibodas, mit Lianen, auf denen Vogelnest-Farne sitzen (Asplenium nidus avis).

8 – Ernst Haeckel, "*Weg im Urwald von Tjibodas, mit Lianen, auf denen Vogelnest-farne sitzen (*Asplenium nidus avis*)*" [chemin dans la jungle de Cibodas, avec des lianes sur lesquelles poussent des fougères nid d'oiseau (*Asplenium nidus avis*) – décembre 1900], in *Aus Insulinde – Malayische Reisebriefe*, Bonn, Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1901, fig. 29, p. 112.

9 – Ernst Haeckel, "*Zannonia macrocarpa, ein kleiternder Lianenbaum, dessen große Früchte an langen Schnüren herabhängen und viele geflügelte, Schmetterlingen ähnliche Samen enthalten*" [*Zannonia macrocarpa,* liane grimpante dont les gros fruits pendants contiennent de nombreuses graines en forme de papillons - Cibodas, décembre 1900], in *Aus Insulinde – Malayische Reisebriefe*, Bonn, Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1901, fig. 31, p. 125.

10 – Woodbury & Page, *Kampong bij Sindanglaja* (1863-1869), impression à l'albumine sur papier photo, 17,2 x 24,1 cm, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, NG-2011-29-19. Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.503014) [Vue du village de Cimacan sur la route de Sindanglaya].

11 – Raden Saleh, *Vue du Megamendung*, 1861, huile sur toile, 130 x 170 cm. Drouot Paris, Auction, Daguerre, 2 December 2021, catalogue From the Cassalette family – Rediscovery of a major painting by Raden Saleh, A View of Mount Megamendung, and two historical Indonesia photo albums.

12 – Gustaaf Frederik Tijdeman, *Gezondheidsoord te Sindanglaya*, c. 1878 – c. 1880, pinceau de couleurs sur crayon, 24,1 x 31,6 cm, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, RP-T-1994-96. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.250115) [Maison de convalescence de Sindanglaya]

13 – Abraham Salm, *Gezicht op de weg tussen Buitenzorg en Preanger*, 1869, lithographie par Johan Conrad Greive coloriée à la main, 26,5 x 36,3 cm, Rijksmuseum (Gift of H.G. Körnicke, Bonn), Amsterdam, RP-P-1975-210. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.418803) [Vue de la route entre Buitenzorg et les Preanger avec la maison de repos de Sindanglaya et les volcans Pangerango et Gede en arrière-plan].

14 – Adrianus Johannes Bik, *Gezicht op de vulkanen Gedé en Pangrango, weg Cianjur-Cipanas en buitenverblijf van de gouverneur-generaal te Cipanas, Priangan, West-Java*, 1845, crayon, lavis d'encre et aquarelle, pinceau de couleur, 31,4 x 49,6 cm. Rijksmuseum (Gift of the heirs of G.L. Arnold Bik-Stemfoort), Amsterdam, RP-T-1999-105. Cliché Rijksmuseum – Public domain (http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.365023) [Vue des volcans Gede et Pangerango, de la route Cianjur – Cipanas et de la résidence du gouverneur-général à Cipanas, Priangan, Java Ouest]

EKA NINGTYAS **

Paving the way to Struggle: First Kebatinan Congress (1955) and the Politics of Religious Discourse in Indonesia ***

Introduction

The 1950s were an essential milestone in the historiography of *kepercayaan* (belief) in Indonesia. It should be noted that the concept of *penganut kepercayaan* (adherents of belief) was politically shaped during the New Order era (1966-1998) to distinguish them from the so-called *pengikut agama* (followers of religion). The *penganut kepercayaan* were previously represented by the Kebatinan[1] movement, which began to show

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1. In this article, I distinguished between *kebatinan* and Kebatinan. The first refers to the vernacular term used to designate mystical practices, and the last one is the name of an eponym group.

massive development in the first and second decades following Indonesian independence. The implementation of the BKKI (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, Indonesian Kebatinan Congressional Assembly) on 19-21st August 1955 was a significant event in the history of the Kebatinan movement and of *kepercayaan* in general.

In contrast to the so-called "Cornell orthodoxy," which holds that there was continuity from the colonial state to the New Order government, this paper supports Vickers' opinion, who argues that the 1950s marked a transition period between the late colonial era and the early years of independence (Vickers, 2008, p. 68). In this period, the intellectual discourse of *kebatinan* practitioners was growing and gaining influence, as shown by the gathering of *kebatinan* intellectuals in the BKKI forum. It was followed by large national, regional, and local meetings, which were regularly held with at least 100 Kebatinan representatives throughout Java (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956). During these events, there was an attempt to conceptualize the Indonesian religious discourse. *Kebatinan* intellectuals created key concepts that would later be used during the New Order era. One of them was the "education of the character" (*Pendidikan Jiwa*) and the interpretation of Pancasila as a specificity of the Indonesian nation (especially the Javanese segment of the population).

This paper aims to analyze the dynamics in the politics of religious discourse in 1950s Indonesia, particularly during the first Indonesian Kebatinan Congress of 1955. This year has been crucial in Indonesia's political history because it was the first time a national election was held after independence.[2] Javanese nationalists, leftists, and Islamic groups were involved in an intense competition for seats in the government. Going back to several years earlier, many national reports regarded the debate over the choices on the Indonesian state formation modalities, whether it was to be an Islamic state or a secular one. A significant event that triggered strong reactions among Islamic organizations and prominent Islamic leaders was President Sukarno's speech at a mass meeting in Amuntai, South Kalimantan, on 27th January 1953 (Sajuti Melik, 1953). In this meeting, Sukarno firmly stated that Indonesia was a national state that covered the entire archipelago (Fogg, 2012, p. 313). He also added that if Indonesia's foundations had to be based on Islam, many areas whose inhabitants were not Muslim would break away (Muhamad Iqbal, 2009, p. 28). Opposition reactions were raised by the Front Mubaligh Islam, in North Sumatra, the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and several personalities, like Isa Anshari, a member of the parliament at the time, and Saleh Suaidy, a member of the Indonesian National Committee (KNI) from the Masyumi party (Saleh, 1953).

2. The first national election of 1955 was held on 29 September 1955 to elect members of the House of Representatives (DPR, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) and on 15 December 1955 to elect members of the Constituent Assembly.

In this historical context, the Kebatinan group negotiated its religious singularity. Led by Wongsonegoro, a political figure from the Partai Indonesia Raya (PIR), a party whose majority supporters were Javanese *abangan*, the BKKI accommodated hundreds of Kebatinan groups in Java to formulate their religious discourses. The Kebatinan Congress showed a significant increase in group members in the subsequent years. These groups also implemented action programs in line with governmental agendas to enhance the quality of education and the role of women in society.

Since the beginning of Indonesian independence, religion (*agama*) and beliefs (*kepercayaan*) have become the subject of political and academic debates. From the point of view of religious politics, we can mention Samsul Maarif's work about ancestral religion recognition (2018), Martin Ramstedt (2004) about the recognition of Hinduism in modern Indonesia, and Michel Picard and Rémy Madinier's work (2011) about the politics of religion in Indonesia, especially in Java and Bali. Simon Butt (2020) has investigated the constitutional recognition of *kepercayaan* in Indonesia. The history of the Islamization of Java, which intersects with the history of *kepercayaan* in Indonesia, has been documented by Ricklefs's work (2012), who mainly analyzed what he called the totalitarian experiment of *aliran* politics between 1966 and the 1980s.

Based on ethnography, Justus Maria van der Kroef's study (1961) was one of the preliminary works about *kepercayaan* in Indonesia. Robert Hefner (1985) also provided an authoritative ethnographic description of the Tenggerese and a sophisticated interpretation of their Hinduist culture and its place in the broader culture of Islamic Indonesia. Andrew Beatty's study (1999) is a sociological analysis of the self-conscious strategies of the Javanese in defining their religion. It gives us an understanding of the diversity of variations within the Javanese religion. Niels Mulder (1978) focused on the rise of Javanese mysticism, especially from the 1960s until the 1980s (1978). Clifford Geertz (1960) introduced a seminal threefold religious-ideological division of Javanese society that forms its structural frame: *abangan, santri, priyayi.* His work received constructive critics from scholars such as Mark Woodward (1989), Harsya W. Bachtiar (1973), and Parsudi Suparlan (1995). Last but not least, several theologians cum scholars have worked on the relationship between religion and *kepercayaan*. Studying missionaries' works, Harun Hadiwijono (1967), Simon Rachmadi (2017), and Rachmat Subagya (1981), have tried to analyze how the Kebatinan movement in Indonesia has impacted the unfolding process of evangelism. Muslim scholars, like Hamka (1971), a high-level representative in the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), has focused on the development of Kebatinan in Indonesia, and Rasjidi (1967), an influential figure of Muhammadiyah, has written about the relation between Islam and *kebatinan.*

This abundant literature is missing a study on the internal dynamics of *kebatinan* in its early formalization and organization. Such a study could

Fig. 1 – The entire committee and participants of the BKKI I Congress, in front of the Asoqa building on 19-21 August 1955 in Semarang (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 69).

address the relationship between the state and Kebatinan's adherents within the framework of religion as codified by the Pancasila. The main concern of the present article is the formation of the concept of *kebatinan*, the debates it raised, and the position of the Kebatinan movement within the religious discourse in 1950s Indonesia.

Javanism and the genealogy of *kebatinan* ideas

At eight o'clock in the morning on 20th August 1955, 680 people waited with great enthusiasm in front of the Asoqa building on Jalan Be Biauw Tjwan no. 4 Kampung Kali (present-day Jalan Pandjaitan), Semarang. They were about to attend the first Indonesian Kebatinan congress that was finally successfully conducted after a long debate among its organizers. That Saturday, which coincided with the first *Suro* of 1887 Javanese calendar (*kalender Jawa*),[3] was chosen as the congress day. The Asoqa building had been the Semarang theosophical group's official main building since the late 19th century.

3. The Javanese, who form part of the majority as adherents of Islam, apart from using the Hijri calendar system, are also familiar with the Javanese calendar system, which was introduced since the reign of Sultan Agung (1613-1645 CE). The first *Suro* is the Javanese New Year. Some believe that the first *Suro* symbolizes the beginning of life. Many Javanese respect this date, which they associate with the idea of living a holy life, especially respecting "almighty God."

Semarang was one of the few towns in Central Java that had connections with the theosophical movement in the Dutch East Indies. In front of the main entrance, the congress participants could see the banner "Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia Jang ke-I" ("The first Indonesia Kebatinan congress") printed in a large size. It was meant to make it easier for the participants to identify the Asoqa building from afar, knowing that they were not all from Semarang. The committee prepared a dormitory in the Bulu Lor village, about four kilometers northwest of Kampung Kali, for guests from outside Semarang.

Near the entrance were present Djumanto, Sudirdjo, Purnomo, Sumanto, Heru, Suwarno, and Diromiharjo, committee members responsible for accompanying the guests during the congress. The participants were invited to enter the hall of the Asoqa building and to sit on the chairs that were made available to them. As mentioned in the book of commemoration, the representatives of the 67 invited Kebatinan groups were guided to fill the chairs arranged in a *mandala* circle (Bagoes Wiryomartono, 2016, pp. 41, 57, 58).[4] The presidium members discussed the fundamental understanding and principles of *kebatinan.*

The hall of the Asoqa building was full of guests from all over Java. There was only one representative from Taman Siswa Palembang, who was the only guest from outside Java. Conceptually, Taman Siswa was essential for the development of the Kebatinan movement. This educational institution was founded by Ki Hajar Dewantara in 1922 in Yogyakarta, who applied the concept of "*among*" in his teaching practice (Sajogo, 1952, pp. 183-127).[5] "*Among*" is derived from the Javanese term *mong* ("to take care"), and *momong* is verbal: to guide, lead, and take by the hand. Thus, the relationship between the *kebatinan* master (*guru*) and his spiritual adherents in the Javanese Kebatinan movement is similar to the relationship between parents taking care of their child (Shiraisi, 1997, p. 10).

The history of Taman Siswa is highly instructive for the emergence of various Kebatinan groups in Java, especially during the 1950s (Bonneff, 1978). The starting point of Taman Siswa dates back to 3rd July 1922. Still, its ideology can be traced from the manifestation of Paguyuban Selasa Kliwon's

4. Mandala (literally means 'circle') is a symbolic representation of the Javanese kingdom in which the center of power is in the center. This setting aims to experience the mystical unity of multiple individuals. As shown in Figure 2, the set-up represents a ring or layers that symbolically distinguish the rank and influence from those sitting in the center to those seated at the outermost.

5. *Among* is a system of education that aims to educate students to think and work independently. In addition to providing necessary and valuable knowledge, the "teachers" are supposed to teach the "students" to seek and use that knowledge. Knowledge of harmony is primordial in the "among" system, which aims to help students' physical and spiritual needs in association with one and another.

Fig. 2 – The participants of the first BKKI congress (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 75).

(Religious Club of Tuesday *kliwon*[6]) (Clément & Bazin, 1985, pp. 193-201). The Paguyuban Selasa Kliwon's maxim was "*memayu hayuning sarira, Bangsa, manungsa*" (feed happiness in each individual, happiness for the Indonesian nation, and happiness of all humanity), which also animated the spirit of Taman Siswa under Ki Hajar Dewantara (S.A. Soedibyo, 1952, p. 167). It is important to note that the slogan of BKKI after its first congress, *memayu rahayuning Bawana* ("to work for the security of the world in general"), was rooted in the slogan of Paguyuban Selasa Kliwon. Ki Suryomentaram, a leader of this organization, recognized that his ideas, discussed in the *paguyuban*, had already manifested in Taman Siswa. Therefore, he decided to dismiss the regular meeting of the *paguyuban* (W. Le Fevre, 1951).

Furthermore, after the official establishment of Taman Siswa in 1922, discussion on topics related to the Javanese mystical and philosophical knowledge continued in Paguyuban Rebowagèn, a *paguyuban* under the Taman Siswa. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Indonesian Prime Minister in 1953-1955, who was also a member of the Madiun branch of *Majelis Luhur* and a teacher at *Taman Siswa* Yogyakarta, explained that he had actively participated in the Paguyuban Rebowagèn's reunions held in Ki Hadjar Dewantoro's residence

6. *Kliwon* is one of the days in the pre-Islamic Javanese calendar called *pasaran*, which is based on five-day cycle of a week: *Kliwon, Legi, Pahing, Pon and Wage*.

Fig. 3 – S. Ramuwisit on the microphone (source: Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 85)

at Wirogunan, Yogyakarta, in the 1930s (Ali Sastroamidjojo, 1952, p. 41). The principle of *sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe* ("not having the desire for oneself instead working hard for the public interest"), which became the principle of the Kebatinan movement in 1955, was indeed designed by Ki Hajar Dewantara for Indonesian national education during the Paguyuban Rebowagèn meeting (Ali Sastroamidjojo, 1952, p. 44). Thus, the Taman Siswa was influential in conceptualizing the 1955 Kebatinan movement in Indonesia.

The description of the congress further enables us to understand how the ideas and concepts were shaped in the Kebatinan movement. The sound of the microphone of S. Ramuwisit (member of Semarang theosophy group), who led the congress, marked the beginning of the program at ten o'clock in the morning on 19th August 1955. Ramuwisit then invited five religious or faith representatives to lead the opening prayer. Tan Bing Oei represented Confucianism, Hadikusumo represented theosophy, Asrar Prawirodisurjo represented Islam, Mangunkawotjo represented Buddhism, and Joedosoetardjo represented Christianity. They took turns reciting prayers before all the congress participants.

In organizing its first congress, the Kebatinan movement in Indonesia received great moral and spiritual support from the Semarang theosophy group. They provided their main building for the congress and three preparatory meetings on 27th March, 3rd April, and 29th May 1955, and their members played a direct

Fig. 4 –. From left to right, Tan Bing Oei, Hadikusumo, Asrar Prawirodisurjo, Mangunkawotjo, and Joedosoetardjo (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 65)

role in preparing the congress. One of them was Wongsonegoro (or Soenardi), Deputy of Prime Minister of Indonesia in Ali Sastroamidjojo's first cabinet from 1953 to 1955, formerly serving as Indonesia's Minister of Education and Culture from 1951 to 1952 (Bakker S.J, 1958). In 1915, together with Dr. R. Satiman Wiryosanjoyo and Kadarman, Wongsonegoro established Tri Koro Darmo, one of the youth organizations that promoted Javanese nationalism and was in line with the spirit of Boedi Oetomo (Nagazumi, 1989, p. 41).[7] Wongsonegoro's role in developing the Indonesian Kebatinan movement was crucial, especially in the run-up to the 1955 elections.

In addition to the support of the theosophy group, the first Indonesian Kebatinan congress was supported by senior members who had been involved in Javanese cultural organizations since the colonial era. The initial phase of the Kebatinan movement in Indonesia was marked by the mobilization of Javanist religious and cultural values. This mobilization appears clearly in the list of the 99 Kebatinan groups integrated into the BKKI as an umbrella organization in 1955 (see table 1). These 99 groups were all from Java and conveyed Javanese *kebatinan* values or javanism. Several of these Kebatinan groups existed until the 1970s or even today, like Sumarah, Perjalanan, Ilmu Sejati, Sapto Darmo, Pangestu, and Hardopusoro.

7. Budi Utomo was one of the early Javanese cultural organizations, which later grew into an essential movement shaping the Indonesian nation.

Soegeng Kusumowardojo, in one of his articles published in the book of commemoration ceremonies of the first and second Kebatinan congresses (for detailed dates see table 2), stated that the implementation of the Indonesian Kebatinan congress of 1955 had been prefigurated since 1933 (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 61). He wrote that in Semarang, there was an art center called Eko Kapti, located in the Pendrikan Utara neighborhood, which was still active in 1955 (when Soegeng's article was published). Eko Kapti had a library (Taman Batjaan), Javanese cultural activities (especially Javanese dance), and a branch of *kebatinan* called Soero-Moerten. Its followers were called *warga* (member), and most of them were senior members (*pinisepuh*) of Eka Kapti. Soegeng also mentioned several Soero-Moerten members, including Coadiat Martodarsono, Ki Wirjoprawito, Soedarsono, Kartyosoemarmo, and Soegeng Kusumowardojo himself.

Ki Wirjoprawito, mentioned by Soegeng Kusumowardojo above, was active in a Javanese cultural organization called Sobo Karti in Semarang since the 1920s. Sobo Karti was a Javanese art association (*kunstkring*) founded on the initiative of two parties in 1916: Thomas Karsten and Sam Koperberg of *Semarangsche Kunstkring*[8] (Coté, 2017, p. 92) on the one hand, and Mangkunegara VII, Dr. Radjiman Wedyoningrat[9] and R. Ng. Sosrohadikoesoemo,[10] on the other hand. Wirjoprawito's name appears in the *Djawa* magazine of 1924, which was linked to the regular meetings of Sobo Karti in May 1922, especially concerning his appointment as a director of Sobo Karti (S. Koperberg, 1924).

However, many Kebatinan groups did not join the BKKI in 1955. One of the reasons was that these Kebatinan groups were usually already institutionally massive. They did not join likely because they felt they were independent enough and did not need to form an association to be widely recognized. One of them was Djawa Dipa, a group based in East Java that had been very active in fighting for civil rights such as marriage, burial, and citizenship rights, including conducting activities without being suspected by the department of religious affairs local branch. Djawa Dipa was a Kebatinan group whose members were mainly former soldiers of the war of independence. In 1955,

8. *Kunstkring* was typical of cultural society that could be found in most of the main cities of the colonies (for instance: In Bandung, *Bandungsche Kunstkring*, in Surabaya, *Surabayasche Kunstkring*, and in Jakarta, *Bataviasche Kunstkring*) in the twentieth century by adapting a similar organization located in the towns throughout the Netherlands. The purpose of establishing *Kunstkring* in Semarang was to educate, entertain and stimulate interest in the arts and, in general, to increase cultural awareness.

9. He was a Surakarta court physician and chairman of Boedi Oetomo.

10. R. Ng. Sosrohadikoesoemo at the time became president of the *ambtenaar Bumiputera* ("indigenous civil servant") association "Mangoenhardjo", a member of the Semarang council and a member of the executive board of the Kartini school.

Djawa Dipa sent a report to President Sukarno containing the names of 167 independence war veterans among its members.[11] In addition to Djawa Dipa, it was noted that Agama Sutji and Imam Mahdi, actively defending their citizenship rights, were not included in the list of the 99 Kebatinan groups that joined the BKKI. It indicates that the number officially recorded by the BKKI does not necessarily reflect the intense mushrooming of the Kebatinan groups in the 1950s.

Table 1: The Kebatinan groups who joined the BKKI organization in 1955 (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, pp. 110-111).

No	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Address	No.	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Adress
1	Pangudi amrih tentrem	Mangundjajan Md. 4/247 Yogyakarta	51	Mardi Katentreman	Ki Wirosengodjo, Prembun Tambak, Sumpuh
2	Sutji-Rahayu	K.H. Samanhudi Street, No. 13, Pati	52	Tarek Akmalijah	Ki Wirosengodjo, Prembun Tambak, Sumpuh
3	Pertapaan Kwogo Branch Solo	Partono Martodiwirjo, Kartotijasan 21, Solo	53	Kawruh Begdjo	Ki Hardjosumarsono, Kebondowo, Banjubiru, Ambarawa
4	Perjalanan	M. Kartawinata, Sukasirna, Tjitjidas, Bandung	54	Ilmu Sedjati	Romo Adji Kromodrono, Podjok, Modjogedang, karanganjar, Solo
5	Sutji Rahayu Branch Bojonegoro	Merapi Street 3, Semarang	55	Budi Muljo	Bonoredjo X / 3, Nusukan, Solo
6	Mardi Santosaning Budi	Madijotaman II/10 Solo	56	Depok Sonopramono	R.M. Prawiromidjojo, Glemore, Banjuwangi
7	K.W.M	R. Nurhadi, Wonokromo, Gombong	57	Roso-sedjati	Ki Onggo, pakis Putih, Kedung Wuni, Pekalongan
8	Hasto Broto	Slamet Rijadi Street, No. 334, Solo	58	Filsafat Kebatinan	Diponogoro Street 53, Jakarta
9	Budi Rahayu	Hasanudin street, No. 10, Ngawi	59	P.T.T.I Sidarta	Batjiro Baru 66 A Yogyakarta
10	Mardi Santosaning Budi	Mantrigawen No. 33 Yogyakarta	60	B.K.K.I. (branch Solo)	Ronggowarsito Street, 60, Solo
11	Agama Budo	Resi Budo, Stang-Wlingi, Blitar	61	Budi Luhur	Pendrikan Barat I / 37, Semarang

11. "Anggota Angkatan Perang Jang Masuk Mendjadi Siswa Pranoto Agung Paguyuban Djowo Dipo" (ANRI, n.d.), No. 153, *Arsip Kabinet President Republik Indo*nesia 1955-1959.

No	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Address	No.	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Adress
12	K.P.G.R.S (budi rahayu)	R. Satmokowigeno, Karanganjar, Solo	62	Sumarah	Onggowongso Street, Nirbitan, 3 / 1, Solo
13	Sakabat Sukohardjo	Gadjahan 7 M/17 Solo	63	Perhimpunan Theosofi (branch Solo)	Taman Kusumowardani 290, Solo
14	Suara Imam Muslimin	Kap. Podjok 212/1, Cirmahi Bandung	64	Pangestu	Sumarto, Gondang Solo
15	Agama Djawa Sunda	Kalibaru Utara 1 / 2 Cirebon	65	Pangastuti	Kratonan, mangunpradjan 107, Solo
16	Paguyuban Sumarah	Panembahan 13 Yogyakarta	66	Kridowatjono	Kartohardjendro, Djojodiningratan blok 24, Solo
17	P.T.I.I. Lodji Djuwono	L.S. Hadikusumo, Diponegoro Street Juwono	67	Perdjalanan (branch Solo)	Atmosutagnjo, Turisari Gg. V / 10, Solo
18	A.D.A.R.I	Pengok F. 1 Yogyakarta	68	Kawruh Djiwo	Penumping, Bendo, No. 3, Solo
19	Wisnu Pandowo	Tegalsari 118 A Semarang	69	Khong Kauw Hwee	Slamet Riyadi Street, 147, Solo
20	Agama Budo Djawi Wisnu	Celaket 1 / 44 Malang	70	Gerakan Ahmadijah	Subandi, Kesehatan 9 / 12 Jakarta
21	Ilmu Sejati (Branch Salatiga)	R. Sugeng, Kaliwungu, Susukan, Tengaran, Salatiga	71	Perhimpunan Hidup Ketuhanan (Branch Malan)	Petjinan 34, Malang
22	H.P. Kediri (Budi Rahaju)	Anggraini Street 22, Kediri	72	Perhimpunan Hidup Ketuhanan) Branch Jakarta)	Tandjung Street 12, Jakarta
23	Bakti	R. Suwarno, Reksowardojo, Brobahan Wetan, Purwokerto, Banyumas	73	Alaude Mystieke Orde Rosae Crucis	Menteng Raya Street, 24 E, Jakarta
24	Luguning Kejawen (L.K)	Ki. O Romodjati, Paviliun 278, Brebes	74	Perhimpunan Theosofi (Branch Jakarta)	Taman Blavatsky 5 Medan Merdeka Barat 17, Jakatya
25	Kamanungsan	Ki Judiprajitno, Alasmalang, Kebumen	75	Perhimpunan Upasika Upasaka	Pontjol III / 12 Semarang
26	Tarek Akmalijah	Rodji Mohamad, Pabuaran, Baturaden, Purwokerto	76	Bhuvana Saraswati	Pandit sastri, Denpasar, Bali

No	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Address	No.	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Adress
27	Ngesti Roso	Bugisan Md 2 / 156, Yogyakarta	77	Perhimpunan pemuda theosofi	Widjajakusuma Street 23, Semarang
28	Kawruh Batin Gaibing Pangeran (Branch Salatiga)	R.M. Nitibudjono, Kaliwungu, Susukan, Tengaran Selatiga	78	Hardjaning Diri	Hardjodipuro, Sulursari, Kradenan, Grobogan, Semarang
29	Kawula Melindung Tuhan (K.M.T)	Joho-Manahan 7 / 20, Solo	79	Wisnu Buda Budi	Setatsiun Street No. 1225, Wonosobo
30	Panggula wentah Ngelmu Kebatinan	Josodadi 21 A Metro, Lampung	80	Pertemuan Filsafat dan Kebatinan	Ampasiet IX/24 Jakarta
31	Sabdo Rukun	Warung sinar-hadi, Pasar Wonosobo	81	Pambuka Djiwo	S. Muljodihardjo, Bogoredjo, Jember
32	Adam Makno	Ki S Hadi-Djojo, Medani, Tegowanuh, Grobogan, Purwodadi	82	Agama Budho Djawi Wisnu	Resi Kusumodewo, Bangil
33	Domas Makuto Romo	Lowokwaru Street, 1 / A, Malang	83	Tarek Akmalijah	Kampung Keramat No. 48, Bogor
34	Bodronojo	Ki Atmoredjo, Serep Weten, Pesu, Wedi, Klaten	84	Sumarah	Halmahera Street II / 34, Semarang
35	Pretapan Kwogo	Wiku Surjokuntjoro, Kwoga-Sidowarno, Wonosari, Klaten	85	Kawruh Kasampurnan, Budi Utomo	Kampung Tjakarajam, 6 / I, Mojokerto
36	Djawi Maligi	Ki Padmosudarmo, Pekilen, Kapungan, Polanhardjo, Klaten	86	Kridosampurno	Jawatan Pengawas Perburuhan Daerah II, Palembang
37	Kawruh Batin Gaibing Pangeran (branch Klaten)	Ki Atmontono, Gempol, Kadilangu, Wedi, Klaten	87	Roso – Tunggal	Pirukunan Street, No. 9, Djetis, Blora
38	P.I.K.M	Mangkunegaran Street No. 27, Semarang	88	I.S.K.I	Pungkuran 12 A, Tegal
39	Wahju Djatmiko	Ki Tarutarjono, Jawatan Pertanian, Sragen	89	Gerakan Patriot, Negara	Kepuh Dalam VI / 5, Jakarta

No	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Address	No.	Name of the Kebatinan groups	Adress
40	Budi Rahaju	Djamsaren, Sarehan 2, Kediri	90	I.L.D.A.T (Iki Limpading Dumadi Anggajuh Tata Tentrem)	Bekasi Timur Street, 74, Djatinegara, Djakarta
41	Pagujuban Pantjasila	Balapan Street, 189 / 295, Solo	91	K.K. Budho Djawa	Tjokroaminoto Street
42	Hardopusoro	Mukti Nitihardjo, Djapen, Kudus	92	Kebatinan-Kedjiwan	Kradjan No. 593, Kalisombo, Salatiga
43	Sutji Rahaju	Kawedanan Street, No. 52, Kudus	93	Pagujuban Samedi	Dr. Sutomo 47, Yogyakarta
44	Perdjalanan (branch Jakarta)	Manggarai Selatan 3 Blok 1 / 156, Jakarta	94	Pagujuban Musjawarat Filsafat Kebatinan	Jawatan Pengairan, Klaten
45	A.D.A.R.I (Branch Solo)	Badran, Kenongo 144, Solo	95	Swatmaja	Kepala Kantor Tilpun, Delanggu
46	Pribadi	S. Purwosuwito, Lengkongrakit, Wonodadi, Bandjarnegara	96	Mardi Santosaning Budi	Dirdjosusastro, Ngemplak, Pos Kalasan Yogyakarta
47	Perdjalanan (branch Purwokerto)	Sikepan Street, 1 / 5 Purwokerto	97	Persatuan Ilmu Kebatinan	Judistiro Street No. 27, Semarang
48	Perdjalanan (branch Bandung)	Sukasirna 41 / 138 B, Bandung	98	Purwaning Sedjati	Wasito Guru Taman Dewasa, Cepu
49	Ngesti Rahaju	Grogolan Wetan blok 22, Solo	99	Mardi Santosaning Budi	Djogokarjan Md. 10 / 152 A, Yogyakarta
50	Agomo Djawa Buda Budi Sedjati	Beran Djetis Pasar 7 A, Blora			

The first congress: discussing the role of women in society, education, and laws

> "The Indonesian nation should return to its fundamental wisdom, grounded on two guidelines: '*sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe*' (not having the desire for oneself instead working hard for the public interest), and '*memayu rahayuning Bawana*' ("working for the safety of the world in general") (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 73).

The above quote was a resolution of the first Kebatinan congress in Semarang, prepared by the committee with the approval of Wongsonegoro as

Fig. 5 – Wongsonegoro in 1951 (source: *Djiwa Budaja disamping Ilmu Pengetahuan*, 1951, p. 2)

chairman. Various Kebatinan groups in Java joined this umbrella organization because they believed that Indonesia had lost its cultural and spiritual identity after ten years of independence. The BKKI thought that the Indonesians had lost their fundamental *kebatinan* practices and values, resulting in a lack of well-being and general peace. Moreover, the first Kebatinan congress assumed that the *kebatinan*, as a critical cultural component of the Indonesian nation, could liberate the country from various forms of colonial remains.

Discussions and debates around the first Kebatinan congress also dealt with the concept of "character education." One of the most exciting presentations was delivered by Prawirodisurjo, who divided education into seven stages: first, the education starts when the baby is still in the womb; second, when the father begins to pray for the child to get a *chakraningrat* revelation[12]; third, when the parents' souls touch and affect the baby in the womb; fourth, when the five senses develop after the child is born; fifth, through the influence of the surrounding environment in the family; sixth, thanks to the education obtained from the school; and, last, through the influence of the environment in which the child grows up (Ki Asror Prawirodisurjo, 1956, p. 69).

The resolution also emphasized aspects of education and the position of women in Indonesian law and society. In education, it was hoped that the values contained in the *kebatinan* could be practiced both at home and school by incorporating character and religion as essential subjects. In addition, the

12. Wahyu Cakraningrat itself is one of the titles of a Javanese *wayang* story that describes the efforts of three knights to gain power.

resolution of the first Indonesian Kebatinan congress advocated the need for a marriage law to protect women. In his speech entitled "pre-advies mengenai kedudukan wanita" (pre-advice on women's position in Indonesia), on 8th August 1955, Wongsonegoro argued that only education and training in legislation awareness could solve the problems of social injustice that women suffered. He said that through character education (*Budi Pekerti*), which he recommended to be included in the educational curriculum, the students in every public school would be able to take care of themselves and distinguish between right and wrong.

Regarding women's status, Sosroperwoto's speech entitled *Kekiyatan adeging Bangsa saking kekiyatan balegriya* ("The strength of nation-building from the power of the household") shows the tribune's position in favor of monogamous marriage. The role of women within the Kebatinan movement raised a debate within the congress. Parwati, the only female speaker in the congress, expresses that women had a noble position as educators who learned about Western sciences and honed their intuition (Heru Suherman Lim, 2015). Wongsonegoro argued that through character education offered in *kebatinan*, which was supervised by women (mothers in the household), people could continuously monitor and control themselves. Joedosoetardjo, an adept of theosophy, also contributed to the debate. He divided women's and men's duties into eight sections by emphasizing women as educators and housekeepers. He further stressed that one could not regard women as it was in the previous era (i.e., before independence). He said that at that time, women were considered as "*tjowèk gopèl*,[13]" which means that when no longer needed they could be discarded (S. Joedosoetardjo, 1956, pp. 66-67). The conclusion of this first congress was to emphasize the role of women in *kebatinan* and their importance in character education. It recommended encouraging character education as one of the mandatory curricula in the Indonesian national education system so that children get physical and spiritual knowledge.

Another central point of debate during the Congress regarded marriage law. In the 1950s, we can find several cases in Java related to marriage practices among the Kebatinan group members that have not been recognized by the state

13. *Cowèk* or *cobèk* refers to kitchen utensils made of stone or clay and shaped like a plate for grinding spices (pepper, chili, etc.). *Gopèl* means a little chipped on the edges or outside. The expression as mentioned above means "Women must only focus on cooking matters" (whereas in Javanese households, the position of *cobèk* plays a vital role in cooking). When women can no longer cook, they can be removed.

(Sudargo Gautama, 1996).[14] A letter from the elder (*pinisepuh*) of Djawa Dipa[15] named Nurtjahjo to Sukarno in August 1955 expressed the demand for marriage recognition according to the Djawa Dipa customs. Until 1955, the government only accepted marriage ceremonies in Islam and Christianity. In addition, Djawa Dipa suggested ratifying the 1st *Suro* (New Year's Eve in the Javanese *calendar*) as one of the national holidays by the Indonesian government. Besides the letter of Nurtjahjo, I have found several personal letters written by Indonesian citizens (not officially members of the Kebatinan groups) addressed to President Sukarno in the archive bundle of the cabinet of the President. These letters relate to the demand for the recognition of *kebatinan* marriages.

> "According to Article 29 paragraph 2, Article 18 and Article 43, the state guarantees the independence of each resident to embrace their religion and worship according to their religion and beliefs. Then, why are Agama Buddha-Djawi/Wisnu religious adherents discouraged from marrying in their own belief? Haven't we already obeyed the Indonesian Law? And yet there are arrangements for the dead, marriage, honoring the New Year one *suro*, and so on, which also include the worship of Agama Buddha-Djawi/Wisnu"[16].

This is an excerpt of a personal letter dated from 7th February 1955, sent by the Agama Buddha-Djawi/Wisnu representatives to the Minister of Religion, Masjkur. The letter demands the recognition of Agama Buddha-Djawi/Wisnu marriage by the Ministry of Religion. Four years earlier, on 9th January 1951, representatives of Iman Igama Hak (IIH) had requested validation of their marriage procedures by the Department of Religious Affairs.[17] Although resistance efforts were observed in the registration of marriages carried out by mystical groups who considered themselves religious, there were also groups who pragmatically followed what was commanded by the state authorities. One example is Tedjabuana, the son of Madrais, a spiritual leader of the Agama Jawa Sunda (Madraism) based in Cigugur Kuningan, who had converted to Islam. Tedjabuana converted in order to marry his daughter, Siti Djenar[18] (Walton, 2007).

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14. Since 1945, Indonesia has not had any marriage law. The legal basis used for marriage issues refers to National Law no. 22 of 1946 concerning the registration of marriages, divorces, and reconciliations (*nikah, talaq, rujuk*). Yet, for areas outside Java and Madura, reference is still made to the Marriage Ordinance for outer islands (*ordonansi Nikah Untuk Tanah Sebrang*) from the *Staatsblad* of 1932, no. 482. Secondly, mixed marriages (in the sense of different nationalities) still refer to the rules of the *Koninklijk Besluit* of 29 December 1896.

15. Djawa Dipa was one of the mystical movements that emerged since the beginning of the 20th century but only started to grow and develop as a Kebatinan movement after independence.

16. "Perkawinan Agama Buddha-Djawi/Wisnu Dicantumkan Dalam UURI" (ANRI, 1955), no. 153, Arsip Kabinet President Republik Indonesia.

17. "Tata Cara Perkawinan Iman Igama Hak (IIH)" (ANRI, 1951), no. 153, Arsip Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia.

18. The name of Tedjabuana's daughter is interesting to discuss because her name is



No: 237/A.III/K.P./51.- Kuningan, 10 Februari 1951.-

Hal: Verslag Agama Tjigugur.- Terkirim tg. 13-2-'51.-

Pada hari Selasa tg: 6/2-1951 kami telah kedatangan sdr. Tedjabuana dia menerangkan akan menikahkan anaknja nama Siti Djenar kepada Subagjahardja B.O.D.M. dengan perkawinan setjara Islam. Kemudian dianja mengaku sendiri sebagai Ummat Islam. Maka dari itu sdr. Penghulu dan Pegawai Pernikahan supaja datang dirumah kami pada hari Kamis tg. 8/2-1951 guna menjaksikan perkawinan saja punja anak setjara perkawinan Islam, karena dari dulunja saja kawin setjara Islam.

Tepat pada waktunja saja Penghulu Kabupaten dengan Naib Kepala Kuningan, Sdr. Naib Kepala Tjiawigebang, Sdr. Naib Kepala Luragung dan Sdr. Badal Kuningan, memenuhi undangan Sdr. Tadjabuana.

Setelah datang dirumahnja sebelum diadakan perkawinan setjara Islam lantas sdr.Tadjabuana membatja "Sjahadatain" disaksikan oleh Pak Kapten Effendi dan Staaf Territorium, Pak Bian, dan oleh semua Undangan Pegawai Kepenghuluan dan oleh murid-muridnja.

Kemudian sdr. Tadjabuana sebelum mewakilkan, menanda tangani dulu surat tanda kenjataannja sebagai ummat Islam jang salinannja sebagai berikut:

S-urat salinan perdjandjia-n Sdr. Tedjabuana.

Tjigugur, 8 Februari 1951.-

Surat keterangan.

Saja nama R. Tedjabuana Alibasah, desa Tjigugur, pada hari Kamis tanggal 8/2-1951 menikahkan anak saja nama Nji Siti Djenar kepada nama Subagjahardja dengan perkawinan setjara Islam karena kami dan keluarga kami dari dulunja telah Islam dengan mengaku dan mengikadkan kepada "Sjahadatain dun" jang diutjapkan pula oleh saja sekarang; didepan kepala Agama Kuningan;

"Asjhadu Anlailaha ilallah "

Abdi njaksian sareng nekadkan jen henteu aja deui Pangeran anu wadjib disembah anging Allah sahidji.

"Waasjhadu anna Muhammadar rosulullah"

Sareng abdi njaksian sareng nekadkan jen Nabi Muhammad eta utusanana Gusti Allah.

Dengan adanja utjapan kami ini kami tetap sebagai Ummat Islam akan menjalankan kewadjiban Islam, dan mentaati segala Peraturan Kementerian Agama tak akan melanggar Undang2 No. 22 tahun 1946 mengenai pernikahan.

Tjigugur , 8 Februari 1951.-

ttd.

(Tedjabuana).-

Kemudian...

Fig. 6 – Archives of information from *Tedjabuana*, the son of *Madrais*, who converted to Islam in order to marry his daughter, Siti Djenar, to Subagjahardja in 1951. Source: (ANRI 1951) No. 153, Arsip Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia.

Until 1963, several marriages aside from Islam and Christianity could not be officially registered. Among them were marriages between Kebatinan groups, Buddhists, and Balinese Hindus outside the islands of Bali and Lombok. In addition, marriages between people who embraced a new religion or belief, including those of the Kaweruh Nalur (KWN) group, Agama Djawa Asli Republik Indonesia (ADARI), Agama Pransuh, Agama Hidup Betul, and Sapta Dharma, were imposed (M.M. Djojodigoeno, 1963, pp. 59-64). Most

taken from a famous Sufi figure in Java. Seh Siti Jenar was a Sufi master, as told in the nineteenth-century *Babad Jaka Tingkir*. Siti Jenar was executed for disseminating a secret that the *wali* (Islamic saints) felt should not be made public. Siti is a feminine first name.

of these people understood that they were not Muslims, and they refused to act hypocritically by claiming to be Muslim so that their marriage could be officially registered. They wanted their wedding to be formally registered, but none of the state officials were willing to do so.

The second and third congresses: defining *kebatinan* in relation to religion

At the second congress,[19] the notion of *kebatinan* was at the center of the debates. Attempts were made to articulate and define *kebatinan* with different approaches. For instance, an attempt was made by Ki Nitiatmodjo to analyze it from a linguistic point of view. He said *kebatinan* came from *batin* ('inner'), referring more precisely to 'soul' (*Jiwa*). He formulated that *kebatinan* was related to the inner-mind, while the inner-mind was an abstract state that the five senses could not grasp. Then, he added that to study the inner-mind, one had to use its intuition and sixth sense, or what he called *rasa sejati* (true intuition) (Ki S. Nitiatmodjo, 1956, p. 94). Thus, one who had successfully mastered *kebatinan* had attained perfection in life (*kasampurnan urip*), and one of its accomplishments was *manunggaling kawula gusti* (mystic union between a man and God). Sutedjo Bradjanegara, a former member of Boedi Oetomo who was active in the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), said that *kebatinan* was a path to spiritual knowledge, a ray of almighty God that could guide humans to the true direction (S. Bradjanegara, 1956, pp. 96-97).

The definition of *kebatinan* that emerged from the first and second Kebatinan congresses shows similarities and differences with religion (*agama*) in Indonesia. *Kebatinan* emphasizes soul cultivation and inner peace, enabling one to be close to God, while religion emphasizes certain worship rituals with the same objective. A member of the Kebatinan Congress, who went by the pseudonym of Pamong ('caretaker'), said that if *kebatinan* was studied carelessly, it could only lead to trouble, giving the example of people competing to claim to be the *ratu Adil* ('just king') and practicing black magic (Pamong, 1956, pp. 74-77).

The definition of *kebatinan* was finally formulated according to the first precept of Pancasila: "*kebatinan ialah sumber azas dan sila ke-tuhanan jang maha Esa, untuk mentjapai budi luhur, guna kesempurnaan hidup*" ("*Kebatinan* is the source of principles and the belief in God for the achievement of noble conduct in pursuit of a perfect life"). According to the BKKI, it means that *kebatinan* is the core principle of the first precept of Pancasila. This definition brought fresh air to the Kebatinan movement because Sukarno gave a positive approach to respond to the definition of *kebatinan*. It was underlined in Sukarno's support as mentioned in his official speech in 1958:

> "[…] especially after having read the definition of *kebatinan* as understood and spelled out by the federation (the BKKI): *kebatinan* is the source of principles

19. Held on 7-10 August 1956.



RUMUS (DEFINISI) ARTI KEBATINAN.

DALAM KONGGRES KEBATINAN KE : II DI SURAKARTA.

Panitia penjimpul terdiri dari 5 orang :

1.	sdr. Ki. O. Romodjati	Ketua.
2.	sdr. A. M. Ismoewidjojo	Penulis.
3.	sdr. Soeleiman Mangkoeatmodjo	Anggauta.
4.	sdr. G. Partokoesoemo	id.
5.	sdr. Sosroperwoto	id.

Kesimpulan jang diambil dari sari2 prae - advies tentang arti kebatinan jang dibitjarakan dalam konggres itu, berdjalan sangat lantjar seolah - olah mendapat tuntunan dari pantjaran Gaib.

Adapun hatsil rumusan (Definisi) berbunji :

„KEBATINAN IALAH SUMBER AZAS DAN SILA KE - TUHANAN JANG MAHA ESA, UNTUK MENTJAPAI BUDI LUHUR, GUNA KESEMPURNAAN HIDUP".

Fig. 7 – The official formulation of *kebatinan*'s definition at the second BKKI Congress in Surakarta in 1956 (Badan kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1956, p. 106).

and the belief in God for the achievement of noble conduct in pursuit of a perfect life (*sumber azas dan sila Ketuhanan Jang maha Esa untuk mentjapai budi luhur guna kesempurnaan hidup*). I feel furthermore happy to be with you here, knowing that your slogan is: 'hard work without self-interest' (*sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe*)" .[20]

Sukarno attended the third Kebatinan congress, held in Jakarta in July 1958. On that occasion, he expressed his satisfaction with the definition of *kebatinan* given by the BKKI (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 19 Djuli 1958), as well as with the adherence of the organization to the first precept of Pancasila. He further stated that *kebatinan* was not a magical belief and emphasized that Indonesian people should not believe in magic. The issue of black magic occupied religious discourse in Indonesia in the late 1950s. It was caused by the turbulent socio-political changes in Indonesia in this decade, which triggered cultural changes in society[21]. Old cultural values had begun to be abandoned, while new values had not yet been formed. In this situation, the inner guidance of Indonesian culture has become blurred and vague. Therefore, many people were attracted to black magic.[22]

Unlike Sukarno, who approved and supported the BKKI on the definition of *kebatinan*, Rasjidi, the first Indonesian Minister of Religion under the Sukarno

20. "Pidato P.J.M. Presiden Pada Kongres Kebatinan Di Gedung Pemuda Djakarta Tanggal 17 Djuli 1958," Pidato Presiden No. 003, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia.

21. S.K. Trimurti, "Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia: Tugasnya Menghimpun Aliran2 Agama, Kebatinan dan Filsafat", *Mimbar Indonesia,* No. 27, 5 Djuli 1958, pp. 18-23.

22. *Ibid.* p. 20.

regime, expressed his disapproval (Rasjidi, 1967). According to Rasjidi, it was not *kebatinan* that was the source of the principle and precepts of the almighty God. On the contrary, it was precisely the first precept of Pancasila that was the source of the principle of *kebatinan.* He said that this precept stated that it was the one and only God who created nature and humans ("Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa-lah yang menciptakan alam dan manusia") (Rasjidi, 1967, p. 122). Therefore, God was the creator of all things and the source of *kebatinan* ("Maka Tuhanlah yang menjadi sumber segala sesuatu, tentu saja juga sumber Kebathinan") (Rasjidi, 1967, p. 122). Rasjidi also complained that the emergence of many Kebatinan groups in Indonesia was not controlled enough by the religious leaders of the Kebatinan movement. Therefore, the heated debate about the definition of *kebatinan* and its position in Pancasila coloured the dynamics of *kebatinan* as both an idea and a movement.

The position of the movement toward the state and Pancasila

Religion plays a vital role in Indonesia. Until the late 1990s, every citizen had to be affiliated with one of the five recognized religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Anyone who was not affiliated with at least one of these religions was considered as not having a religion yet (*Belum beragama*). For this reason, the Kebatinan movement that developed rapidly in the 1950s was associated with backwardness and atheism. Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs, no. 9, 1952, mentions that the official criteria of religion included: belief in the oneness of God, the scriptures, and a prophet to whom knowledge of the Above has been revealed. Mark Woodward (1989) argues while Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism meet these normative criteria, creative interpretation is needed to include both Hinduism and Buddhism. Since the 1950s, this definition has discredited many local religious and spiritual practices, including the Kebatinan movement. The complexity of the dichotomy between "religion" and "belief" is due to the disappointment of Islamic leaders with the rejection and abolition of the Jakarta Charter. The day after the surrender of the Jakarta Charter (19th August 1945), they demanded that the government establish the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementerian Agama, Kemenag), but this was not achieved until 3rd January 1946 (Boland, 1971, p. 106; Samsul Maarif, 2018, p. 22). Islamic leaders used Kementerian Agama as a political vehicle to suppress *abangan* groups, including the affiliated Kebatinan.

The word *kebatinan* was used, especially before the term *kepercayaan* replaced it in the 1970s, to identify a religious movement that had shown massive growth in the first and second decades after independence. In early 1952, the Indonesian government's Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA) in West Java announced the emergence of 29 Kebatinan groups in the region since the national independence. In 1954, the Department of

Religious Affairs (Departemen Agama, Depag) established PAKEM[23] (Supervision of Belief Movements in Society, Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat) to monitor new religious sects[24]. In 1956, the Yogyakarta Office of Religious Affairs counted 63 Kebatinan groups. And in the 1960s, the Indonesian government had already expressed its official interest in the Kebatinan movement.

At the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the Department of Religious Affairs (Departemen Agama, Depag) in Kepatihan district, Yogyakarta, K.H. Muh. Wahib Wahab, as the Minister of Religion, stressed that his Ministry played an essential role in the mental and spiritual fields (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 4 Djanuari 1961). The speech responded to the emergence of various Kebatinan groups since the 1950s. Furthermore, The Attorney General, Gunawan, expressed his concern about Kebatinan in late 1961. He stressed that Kebatinan endangered the security of the state and the nation and should not be tolerated. He also invoked the spirit of *jihad* to subdue the Kebatinan movement, calling the Indonesian people to protect the sanctity of "religion" from the actions of irresponsible groups (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 9 Oktober 1961). Although he did not explicitly mention whom he called "irresponsible," this statement could easily be directed in the eyes of the population to the *kebatinan* groups.

In the early 1960s, resistance to Kebatinan began to emerge due to public suspicion of their involvement with black magic. Although Sukarno, in his opening speech to the third BKKI congress, mentioned that Kebatinan was not magic, the religious discourse developed in Indonesia was moving in a less favourable direction for Kebatinan groups. An interesting case that arose regarding this political situation was the killing attempt of the Attorney General, Gunawan, by Bambang Munadi, a former member of the Attorney General Office at the Jakarta Prosecutor's Department, supposedly by using black magic (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 16 Oktober 1961). Munadi admitted all his actions during the trial and stated that in utilizing black magic (*ilmu hitam*), he was assisted by a shaman (*dukun*) named Haji Maksum.

This incident weakened the Kebatinan groups because everyone became suspicious of black magic, often stereotyped to be practiced by the Kebatinan groups. This evolution can be seen by the increasing intensity of the supervisory duties of PAKEM, the body in charge of the Kebatinan movement supervision. On 4th November 1960, two weeks after the alleged

23. In Javanese, *pakêm* also means basic guidelines (about rules, procedures).

24. However, the emergence of the Law (UU) concerning the Main Provisions of the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia No.15/1961, in which there is an article (article 2 paragraph (3) that assigns the Prosecutor's Office to oversee "*kebatinan*" groups that endanger society and the state, marks the transfer of PAKEM's authority from the Departement of Religious Affairs to the Attorney General's Office.

black magic assassination attempt, PAKEM invited five Kebatinan leaders to talk at the Yogyakarta Attorney's Office. Among those who attended and gave lectures were Ki Mangunwidjojo (Djojowolu) from ADARI (Artawijaya, 2010)[25], Djojowijono from Lagon Nglegewo, Darmowarsito from Pransuh, Karnopawiro from Kawruh Lugu, Sri Pawenang or Suwartini from Sapta Darma (*Kedaulatan rakjat*, 4 November 1961). In addition to the five speakers, the event was attended by 30 Kebatinan leaders, 12 representatives of government agencies, and representatives of the State Islamic Institute of Yogyakarta (IAIN Yogyakarta).

This event seems to have been a form of response of the Attorney General's office, through PAKEM, to oversee the Kebatinan groups in Java. The lectures given by the five Kebatinan leaders covered several aspects, including the history of the emergence of their respective Kebatinan groups, the principles and objectives of the groups, their views on social life, family relations, society, and government, on marriage ritual and spiritual development. Interestingly, Lagon Nglegewo and Kawruh Lugu emphasized that they were Kebatinan groups and not a new religion (*Bukan agama*). Meanwhile, the other three Kebatinan groups claimed that *kebatinan* was a religion. ADARI considered Sukarno as its prophet; Pransuh believed Sastrosuwignyo of Muntilan as a prophet, as did Sapta Dharma with Sri Gautama of Pare.

The conclusion of the conference organized by PAKEM in the Yogyakarta State Prosecutor's Office sounded the alarm about the need for clear definitions and laws regarding religious offenses. On 17-18th November 1961, state prosecutors from all West Java and Jakarta regions proposed the immediate definition of religion in state legislation and regulation on religious blasphemy (*Kedaulatan rakjat*, 21 November 1961). This proposal was considered urgent to purify the state and society from all misleading beliefs and ensure the protection of official religions.

The politics of religious discourse, which were intensified around the 1960s, received an accommodating response from the BKKI at the fifth Kebatinan congress in June 1963. The BKKI decided to support the whole program of the national revolution and the Manipol Usdek that Sukarno had called for in his State address (*pidato kenegaraan*) on 17th August 1959 (Roeslan Abdulgani, 1961). Manipol Usdek is an acronym for "Political Manifestations of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Character (especially Mutual Assistance "Gotong Royong"). A political doctrine initiated by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy

25. ADARI ("Agama Djawa Asli Republik Indonesia" or The Original Javanese Religion of the Republic of Indonesia) was founded in Yogyakarta in 1946 by S.W. Mangunwijaya. ADARI recognized Sukarno as a prophet and Pancasila as a holy book. The principles of ADARI were: Pancasila, freedom, social justice, the divinity in the one and only God, and the defense of Javanese culture.

called for the revival of the spirit of revolution, national justice, and state organizations for a sustainable revolution. The decisions of the fifth Kebatinan congress declared by Wongsonegoro were as follows:

> "I recommend that the Indonesian people sincerely strive to complete the national revolution based on *sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe. memayu rahayuning bawana* ("not having the desire for oneself instead working hard for the public interest," "working for the safety of the world in general"). The expansion of national moral education (*pendidikan moral*) to all levels of society as a continuation of the struggle for the explanation of the national revolution. The government should implement the meaning of the spirit of Pancasila as described in 'Manipol' (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 10 Juni 1963).

In his welcoming speech at the fifth Kebatinan congress in Ponorogo, Wongsonegoro reminded the BKKI members that they should keep the basic principles of the BKKI: "*sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe*" ("not having the desire for oneself, instead of working hard for the public interest") and "*memayu rahayuning bawana*." ("working for the safety of the world in general") (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia, 1963, pp. 5-6). Afterward, he also gave his views regarding the notion of *kebatinan* and *kepercayaan*, adding that religion or *kepercayaan* emphasized what he called "*panembah*" (Devotion to the almighty God). In contrast, *kebatinan* gave more attention to *budi luhur* (honorable moral). However, both *kepercayaan* (which he considered as included in religion) and *kebatinan* shared fundamental values, i.e., *panembah* and *budi luhur*, but placed a different emphasis on them.[26]

26. At that time, the definition between *kepercayaan* and *kebatinan* was not officially formulated in the same way as today. Wongsonegoro, in his speech, treated *kepercayaan* in the same way as religion, while *kebatinan* was considered "the knowledge of spirit."

Table 2 – The chronology of BKKI congresses and seminars from 1955 to 1963

Name of the meeting	Location	Year	Responsible	Resolution
Congress of BKKI I	Asoqa building, Semarang	19-21 August 1955 / 1 Suro 1887	Mr. Wongsonegoro	The Indonesian people should reuse the basis of the Kebatinan in all fields and hold on to "*sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe, memayu hayuning bawana*" ("not having the desire for oneself instead working hard for the public interest", "working for the safety of the world in general").
Congress of BKKI II	Surakarta	7-10 August 1956 / 1 Suro 1888	Dr. Soeharsono	Formulation of the definition of *kebatinan*, as a source of the principles and precepts of the almighty God.
Congress of BKKI III	Gedung Pemuda, Jakarta	17-20 July 1958 / 1 Suro 1890	Mr. Wongsonegoro	World leaders have to be concerned by the safety of humankind, to be able to participate in "*memayu hayuning bawana*" ("working for the safety of the world in general", towards world peace and order).
Seminar Kebatinan I	Gedung Wanita, Jakarta	14-15 November 1959	Mr. Wongsonegoro	Fulfilling one's own obligations, although far from perfect, the result is always more important than performing obligations for other interests that are contrary to one's own inner spirit.
Congress of BKKI IV	Malang, Jawa Timur	22-24 July 1960 (on the month of *Suro*)	Mr. Wongsonegoro	This congress resolved to give an underline to follow the first congress resolution. So that the world in general and in particular the Indonesians can reuse the basics of Kebatinan: "*Sepi ing Pamrih Rame ing Gawe*" and "*memayu hayuning Bawana*" ("not having the desire for oneself instead working hard for the public interest" "working for the safety of the world in general").

Name of the meeting	Location	Year	Responsible	Resolution
Seminar Kebatinan II	Djakarta	28-29 January 1961	R.S. Soekanto Tjokrodiatmodjo	1. At the level of national development, it is necessary to prioritize the basics of *kebathinan* "sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe, memayu rahayuning bawana" ("not having the desire for oneself. Instead, working hard for the public interest", "working for the safety of the world in general"). 2. BKKI believes that to implement the MANIPOL and USDEK, it is necessary to make the people aware of the goodness and to provide a clear understanding of the State Policy, preceded by an irreproachable example from the leader. 3. Kebatinan needs to be included in behavioral lessons to achieve moral and virtuous humans. 4. Calling on all levels of the Indonesian people to put God in their thoughts and actions.
Seminar Kebatinan III	In the Hall of Jajasan Raden Saleh, Jakarta	11-12 August 1962	Mr. Wongsonegoro	Support every effort of mental and spiritual development.
Congress of BKKI V	Ponorogo	1 June 1963 (on the month of *Suro*1895	K. Ng. Achmad Saleh	How Kebatinan can support Indonesia's national revolution. Urge the government to issue a National Marriage Law that can guarantee justice for adherents of *kebatinan.*

The politics of religious discourse leading up to the 1965 political transition increasingly marginalized the Kebatinan groups. In addition to providing official statements through the umbrella organization, the BKKI, several Kebatinan groups also collaborated with other religious groups to guarantee a safe coexistence. In June 1963, in Tasikmalaya, West Java, representatives of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Kebatinan groups issued an official pledge to maintain security and public order in the religious and spiritual domains. This pledge emerged as a response to a leaflet that called for harmony among religious communities (*Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 19 Juni 1963). After the tragic political

transition of 1965, the *status quo* of the BKKI experienced ups and downs. The large number of PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) members who had become members of the Kebatinan groups made this group increasingly marginalized and stigmatized. Yet, not long after the New Order regime was established, in February 1970, the leaders of the Kebatinan groups were informally asked to join Golkar (Golongan Karya, the government party) (Agustinus, 1986, p. 10). Under Golkar, the BKKI, which had been in a vacuum due to the anti-communist political upheaval and pressure from Islamic political groups, was revived. The organization then transformed into BK5I (Badan Kongres Kepercayaan Kejiwaan Kerohanian Kebatinan Indonesia), which was considered equivalent to the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia) and was managed under the Golkar's (Golongan Karya, The Party of Functional Group) Sekretariat Kerjasama Kepercayaan (SKK, "Secretariate for Cooperation of Belief") (Samsul Maarif, 2018, p. 41). Under the SKK, Kebatinan groups were asked to change Kebatinan into a new category: *kepercayaan.*

In the 1970s, the debate over the categorization of beliefs regarding religion reached its peak. On 20th January 1971, the National Spiritual Belief Forum (Musyawarah Nasional Kepercayaan) was chaired by Wongsonegoro and finally met with Suharto. They addressed three propositions to the president: (1) the recognition of belief (*kepercayaan*), (2) the moral education of Pancasila ("Pendidikan moral Pancasila") to be taught at school, and (3) the celebration of the 1st *suro* as a national holiday. As a result, the 1st *suro* was celebrated in various places with prayers, rituals, and Javanese puppet theatre (*wayang*), and at that time, Suharto gave a speech. In the 1970s, the New Order under Suharto himself seemed to offer space for *kepercayaan.*

Conclusion

The first Indonesian Kebatinan congress played an essential role in recognizing spiritual "beliefs" (*kepercayaan*) in the Indonesian state and society. Through this congress, Javanism became the main supporting factor in shaping the Kebatinan organization, later categorized under the "belief" (*kepercayaan*) label in the 1970s. Furthermore, theosophy groups and figures from the Javanese national movement had been involved in various Javanese cultural activities since colonial Indonesia. They helped to give birth to the Indonesian Kebatinan movement in the 1950s.

As a movement gathering dozens of groups in Java, the intellectual genealogy of the Kebatinan has survived after the colonial period. Through activities, discussions, and associations of Javanese culture since the early 20th century, ideals such as *sepi ing pamrih, rame ing gawe* ("not having the desire for oneself, instead working hard for the public interest"), and *memayu rahayuning bawana* ("working for the safety of the world in general") began to take shape in more formal ways. However, national *kebatinan* figures who served in the 1950-1956 period significantly impacted the conceptual formation

of *kebatinan*, the Kebatinan movement, and the congresses. The debates in the Kebatinan congresses from 1955 to 1963 show that the movement played an essential role in post-independence Indonesian religious discourse and political dynamics. In the discussion that arose in the congresses, the 1950s marked a golden age for the intellectual debate among *kebatinan* figures, which did not happen again in later times. The groups were particularly silenced during the New Order era when Kebatinan was categorized as a reified "culture" to be preserved and not a religion to be practised daily.

Entering the 1960s, *kebatinan* ideas, movements, and organizations experienced threats and continued to move in a less favourable direction. They were stigmatized and associated with black magic, with consequences on PAKEM's responses as a Kebatinan supervisory body in more stringent monitoring actions. The 1965 crisis pinnacled with the end of the BKKI *status quo* as the umbrella organization that oversaw all Kebatinan groups in Java. From 1965 to 1978, there were substantial political upheavals to show the "struggle" for *kepercayaan* recognition.

As a result, in 1978, the New Order regime finally stressed that spiritual belief could only be understood and treated as a "culture" and should avoid conflict with the "official religion" in Indonesia. The government then transferred the affairs of spiritual belief from the Ministry of Religion to the Ministry of Culture, confirmed by a People's Consultative Assembly decree in 1978. However, Suharto's close relationship with "belief" coloured the early days of his presidency. It was especially so before the elections in 1971 and during his power until the second election in 1977. As I can say, since the late 1960s, various "beliefs" had been part of the Secretariate for Cooperation of Belief under the Functional Group (Golongan Karya, Golkar) as a party supporting the government. However, it seems that the support from the "belief" group was not as extensive as the political support offered by the Islamic group from the election in 1977. Therefore, it was also one of the factors that changed the political policy of the New Order government regarding the position of "belief" in Indonesia. Further research should enable us to explore the debates that arose after 1978 and document the role of Javanism in the discourse of religious politics in Indonesia until the end of the New Order Era.

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Eduardo Erlangga Drestanta *

Customary Village (*Desa Adat*) and Inter-Ethnic Fragmentations in Seram Island, Maluku

Kalau katong ini su orang adat, kenapa kita orang seng dapat status negeri adat?
Lalu, negeri adat pu arti apa?
Bukannya negeri itu su adat?
Terus, dong biking apa lai, par tambah kata adat dibelakangnya?
Jadi, adat itu pu arti apae?
If we are already an adat *community, why do we not obtain the status of* negeri adat*?*
Thus, what is the definition of negeri adat*?*
*Should '*negeri*' not supposedly possess '*adat*' already?*
*Then, why should there be the word '*adat*' behind it?*
So, what is the meaning of adat*?*
-Zakaria Limehuey, one of the traditional leaders of Masihulan-

Introduction

In contemporary Indonesia, the re-emergence of *adat*, or what Davidson & Henley (2007) refer to as "*adat* revivalism," or in Indonesian known as '*kebangkitan adat*,' has been a prominent phenomenon in the course of

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decentralisation, which began in 2000. It has been marked by the recognition of customary villages (*desa adat*), with, among others, the revival of ancient toponymes, like *pakraman* in Bali, *nagari* in Sumatra and *negeri* in Maluku. In this latter province, the readoption of the term *negeri* has been formalised by the Government Regulation at the provincial level (*Peraturan Daerah/ Perda Provinsi*) of Maluku No. 14 of 2005, which became an umbrella provision (*Perda Payung*) that highlights *negeri* as an *adat* law community in the territory of the Government of the Province of Maluku (Penetapan Kembali Negeri Sebagai Kesatuan Masyarakat Hukum Adat Dalam Wilayah Pemerintahan Provinsi Maluku).[1] This is then further regulated to a certain regional level, for example, in the capital city of Maluku, Ambon in 2008, and in the regency (*kabupaten*) of Central Maluku in 2006. Essentially, this policy changed the status of the uniform village model called *desa* in Suharto's New Order era (through the Law of the Village Administration No. 5 of 1979) to a village model based on *adat*, which, in the context of Maluku, is called *negeri*.[2]

At the moment of its implementation, the administrative structure of *negeri* was divided into two categories with different characteristics: (1) *negeri adat*, which relates to customary law (*hukum adat*), and (2) *negeri administratif*, which is not related to customary law and concerns villages inhabited by transmigrants originating from outside Maluku islands.[3] Through the most recent National Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning *desa adat*, the central government has clarified that the localities placed under the status of *negeri* highlight two matters. First, a decentralisation process that allows the lowest units of state administrations to set up administrative restructuring

1. The provincial *negeri* regulation of Maluku in 2005 was translated from the National Law (Undang-Undang, UU) No. 32 of 2004, Article 1 No. 12 concerning the traditional political forms at the village level that are in accordance with their ancestry (*asal usul*) and traditions (*adat*).

2. *Negeri* is the *adat*-base traditional Maluku system of village administration. According to Cooley (1969:139), the Seramese terms for *negeri* are *hena* or *yama*. *Negeri* presumably replaced these terms as a result of influences from the western part of Indonesia (from the Sanskrit word *nagara*, meaning territory, city or realm). However, when the change took place, it was uncertain. One of Cooley's informants suggested that *negeri* evolved from *negorij*, a term used by the Dutch East India Company officials. The Malukunese village is a collection of 15 to 25 clan groups called *fam* or *mata rumah*, organized on the patrilineal-patrilocal principle. The village is composed of several larger groupings called *soa* (a subdivision of the village consisting of a collection of families), which are organized on the principles of kinship and *adat* of Malukunese societies (Cooley 1966: 138).

3. This division was formalized in the Regional Regulation of Central Maluku Regency No. 1 of 2006 concerning the *negeri*. In it, it states that the *negeri adat* is a unit of customary law community that is genealogical in nature. It has territorial boundaries, has the authority to regulate and manage the interests of the local community based on the rights of origin and local customs in Central Maluku Regency. Meanwhile, the *negeri administratif*, which is a legal community unit from abroad, has the authority to carry out village government affairs as regulated in the provisions of the applicable legislation (Kemenkumham 2006).

(*pemekaran*). In other words, the state central government acknowledges *negeri adat* and *negeri administratif*. Moreover, with this policy, *negeri adat* can establish its customary structure, including rules to elect a sovereign (*mata rumah parentah*) from a specific clan as a traditional leader. Second, both *negeri*s could autonomously manage their financial funding (*Alokasi Dana Desa*/ADD) allocated by the central government. Thus, several regions of Maluku manifested their enthusiasm in gaining such economic autonomy.

However, the minority groups that only gained the status of *negeri administratif* manifested their discontent. The group upon which this article focuses on, Masihulan, a local minority tribe (*suku*) that lives in the forest of Seram Island, is one of these groups. After Masihulan gained the status of *negeri administratif* in 2016, its members were disappointed. Indeed, while they had taken advantage of this policy in carrying out *pemekaran* from its previous principal village of Sawai and had succeeded in developing economically, this status ignored their customary organisations and practices as well as their sovereignty on their traditional territory. Disputes then emerged within Masihulan's community, particularly through grievances addressed to the upper hierarchy of the community, i.e., Sawai, which is considered as their "father community" (*negeri adat induk*). While tensions initially regarded claims of the *adat* authority with Sawai, another open conflict erupted for territorial reasons with the neighbouring community of Rumah Olat, a *dusun* which has not received the *negeri*'s status from Sawai.[4]

For Tania Li (2007: 337) commenting *adat* revivalism in Central Sulawesi, to invoke *adat* is "to claim purity and authenticity for one's cause." The questions that emerge are: who has the right to define the purity and authenticity of *adat*? And what are the causes of the people invoking *adat* in Masihulan? I will examine these questions by focusing especially on the process of *pemekaran* Masihulan into *negeri administratif* vis-à-vis the higher status of *negeri adat*. I will try to unveil how the terminology of *negeri adat* has aroused numerous side effects of overlapping *adat* claims between local comunities. Through the ethnographic method and participatory mapping with Masihulan members in June-August 2016 and a second visit on July 2019, I will reconstruct Masihulan members' migration itineraries and their traditional territorial boundaries. These are poorly documented in the literature, whereas they have been displayed to claim and gain *adat* rights. Based on the interview with one of the community's elders of Masihulan, Zakaria Limehuey, my hypothesis is that the three questions posed

4. These types of conflicts are important to be observed considering a similar conflict provoked by the same territorial reasons also occurred on January 26th, 2022, between Ory and Kairu communities in Haruku Island District, Central Maluku Regency. It caused houses to be burnt down and hundreds of Kairunese to evacuate their homes, while three persons of Orynese origin were killed. See Setiawati (2022) "*Konflik Negeri Adat Pelauw dan Kairu, Siapa yang sesungguhnya perusuh?*," at: www.mediumindonesia.com [accessed on February 10, 2022].

by the interlocutor can help us to point out what is at stake in *adat* rivalries in Seram: (1) If we are the *adat* community (*komunitas adat*), why don't we obtain the status of *negeri adat*? (2) Thus, what is the definition of *negeri adat*? Should *negeri* not supposedly possess *adat* already? Then why should there be *adat* behind it? (3) So, what is the meaning of *adat*?

Adat as a conflictual notion for Masihulan

The definition of *adat* has a broad spectrum and is an object of intense discussions among social agents concerned by *adat* as a label: local communities, the government, promotors of tourism and development, and academia. In Indonesia, the term of *adat* is also known as *adat istiadat,* which generally means "customs" or "traditions", or more precisely "the complex of stable and strongly integrated concepts and rules within the cultural system that regulates human actions in the social life of a particular culture" (Koentjaraningrat *et al.* 1984: 2, author's personal translation). For the Malukunese, *adat* has recently gained a political significance and is considered to be at the core of their "identity" (the sociocultural features that they consider as unique and make them coherent as a community, in comparison to the "others"). It encompasses the norms, habits, or traditions, generally unwritten but conditioning relationship and behaviour. These features are believed to have been established progressively by the ancestors to guarantee the well-being of the community (Cooley 1966: 140; Bartels 2017: 258-259). According to Elengenhoven (2021: 696), *adat* has not yet been clearly defined: "*Adat* is originally an Arabic term meaning "custom" or "habit", and was introduced by Islamic merchants in Maluku and throughout the Indonesian archipelago from the 1200s onward. The term was used as a way to refer to indigenous customs that could not be incorporated into Islamic law." According to Burns (2007), the concept of *adat* that was then referred to as *adat* law (*hukum adat*) in Indonesia was almost entirely the creation of the Dutch during the colonial era. One could therefore interpret that the notion of *adat* was a romanticisation, which was considered to return to the imagination and codification of the Dutch *adat* law.

The concept of *negeri* in the context of Central Maluku-Seram Island, is believed to have been manipulated by the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC) in the 17th century. Cooley stated that:

> The present structure of village society seems to go back at least to 1645, early in the period of Dutch East India Company rule. There is good evidence for believing that in the process of subjugating the area, the Company administrators destroyed an earlier hierarchical structure, groupings of villages under a strong ruler, and sought to give autonomous status to each village by making it self-governing, of course under the supervision of the Company (Cooley 1966: 139).

By the 19th century, the governmental structure of *negeri* was officially integrated into the colonial governmental administration. This incorporation was explicitly stated in the "Bulletin of Acts and Decrees" (*Staatblad*) 19a, 1824, which highlighted the importance of local rights and responsibilities, especially those of *negeri*'s elites in relation with the Dutch government (Leirissa 1982: 1).

From this point on, this paper will focus on the Masihulan by describing their struggle to survive after their settlement has been moved three times and how their traditions have been transformed since the colonial era of early 20th century.

Masihulan is located on Seram Island (see Fig. 1) within the administrative area of Central Maluku Regency, North Seram District, Maluku Province, Indonesia. Maluku is also called "the island of spices" due to the importance played by cloves and nutmegs in its commercial development. Seram Island, the second-largest island of Maluku[5], covers an area of 17,151 km², surrounded by the Seram and Banda seas. The society of Maluku is delineated through ethno-religious divisions. Ethnic identity is not secularised and the different ethnic affiliations distinguish the communities and segregate them across rural settlements. In rural areas, the villages tend to be homogeneously characterised by the distribution of religious identities, a classification legacy from the colonial era.[6] Three areas were established: Protestant Christian, Muslim, and Alifuru villages.

The Dutch colonisers generally designated Masihulan as '*alifuru*.' The term *alifuru* contains the meaning of 'savage', referring to religious practices considered as non-civilised, and was associated to the Masihulan tradition of living in the forest and to their headhunting tradition[7], or what the Masihulanese call '*Uiyaului*.' This tradition is linked to the Masihulanese cosmology before 1966, which was structured around the role played by forces of the environment, particularly sky and earth ('*Lante-Takule*'), considered as complementary structural elements. As with the other hinterland community tribes, they considered the sky as a father figure and the earth as a mother figure.

Generally, *negeri*, whatsoever classifications it may be assigned with, has a system comprised of numerous social units, which we can categorise as houses

5. In the current Indonesian administrative division, Seram Island is divided into three regencies: West Seram Regency, East Seram Regency, and Central Maluku Regency. It features a high mountainous landscape, with Mount Manusela (3,027 m) as its highest point. In 2021, Maluku Province has 11 districts and has 1,848,923 inhabitants with almost 32 inhabitants per km². The largest population is in the Central Maluku Regency, which houses 423,094 people. Then the second most populated is in the capital city, Ambon, with 347,288 people and the third is in West Seram Regency with 212,393 people (Badan Pusat Statistik 2021).

6. Ellen (2014: 256), "Classification of subject peoples by religion was a standard feature of administrative reports and documents produced by officials working in the Groote Oost (The Great East) of the Dutch East Indies during the colonial period."

7. Hoskins (1996: 2) in Ellen (2002: 281) defines head hunting as "an organised, coherent form of violence in which the severed head is given a specific ritual meaning and the act of head-taking is consecrated and commemorated in some form."



Fig. 1 – Masihulan settlement migration patterns and the division of Soa territory

(*mata rumah*), and which together form an ensemble called *soa*. In the context of the compactly populated Masihulan, the *soa* can be considered as a *clan* — Masihulan holds eight clans, some of which are divided into sub-clans.

From the mid-seventeenth century until 1799, the Dutch East India Company maintained a small military post in Sawai in order to monopolise the spice trade (Valeri 2000: 38). During the 19th century, the Dutch established a new military post in Wahai, positioned 120 kilometers from Sawai, along the coastal line. In 1914, an *Onderafdeeling* (administrative district) at Wahai was created, where many of the villages from the interior were forced to move. This displacement was due to the Dutch's assumption that the hinterland population resisted their presence by attacking them using headhunting. By the early 20th century, the area was sufficiently pacified to be placed under the Dutch civilian rule (Valeri 2000:39). Based on the oral narration of Masihulan, the clans used to live in a forest known as Kaisuku, and they were forced by the Dutch to move into a new settlement located in the coastal area called Poputun (whose name was inspired by the name of a guava tree's roots found in the area) (see Fig. 1). In this new settlement, they were finally provided by the colonial authorities the status of a *negeri* sub-unit of Sawai *adat*, in order to be easily controlled. As a result, this situation turned Sawai as the centre of *negeri* (*negeri induk*) and Masihulan as its periphery, functioning as Sawai's guard.

This relationship between the centre and the periphery, known as *pela*[8], was considered by Masihulanese as unequal and even repressive by prioritising "family-hood." This grievance was increased by the displacement of Masihulan's *baileo*[9] (the "big house," where the society's ceremonies were performed) to Sawai's *baileo,* named Luma Salaola. Sawai became the centre and the key holder of the *baileo*, acting as a father guardian (*petuanan*), while Masihulan at the periphery acquired the status of a child (*aniala*). From a historical perspective, *pela* roots from Alifuru's headhunting tradition that was used to invite other villages and clans to defend or attack (Bartels 2007: 179). In Masihulan's understanding, the system of *pela* is semi-permanent and can be modified or renegotiated in certain conditions, especially when feuds continue to emerge. Therefore, this relationship was rejected by Masihulan. But, this hybridised form of *negeri* in both traditional and colonial senses allowed Sawai to claim the integration of Masihulan's *adat* territory inside the *adat* territory of Sawai. Noteworthy, the name of Masihulan in these conditions is an insulting name that was given from Sawai when the Dutch started their administrative data collection from each *negeri* in Seram Island. The name Masihulan is derived from the language of Sawai '*Masiasu*', which means "loser." Quoting one of Sawai's Ipaenin clan elders, "*Masiasu itu pu arti orang yang kasihan. Kasihan… kasihan… kasih lari saja sudah…"* ("*Masiasu means a loser. Pity… what a shame… let them [the Masihulanese] just go and run away...*") (excerpt taken from an interview in Sawai on July 24th, 2016). Masihulanese were renowned in the past as 'warriors' (*manawa kapitane paikole*), and now they are considered by Sawai people (and by themselves) as a weak community that only hides in the forest.

Oral narratives of Masihulan provided a list of kings from the early 19th century until 1937. But after 1937, according to the informants, the last king, Lokoni Patalatu, left them due to humiliation and loss. The disappearance of their king caused a lack of leadership position in Masihulan, with the sole authority embodied by the vice-king, Tuale Patalatu. From this moment, the majority of the population lived in a scattered manner within the forest and the society, being composed of two clan-based social groupings (*soa* Limehuey Utele and *soa* Limehuey Latu) (see Fig. 1), divided in a shared territory.[10]

8. For Bartels (2007: 177), *pela* is a general term in Maluku-Ambon that designates a system of alliance between two or more villages or between clans from different villages.

9. Bartels (2007: 163) explained that the big house-*baileo* as the customary house symbolizes the local culture and is the centre of the cosmos of the village community. It also refers to unity between world-religion and *adat* as well as the separation of powers between gods and ancestors.

10. The first territory section is *soa* Limehuey Utele in the mountain zone of Soya, and the second territory section is *soa* Limehuey Latu in the mountain zone of Keni. Each clan has only to follow these two territorials of *soa* divisions, and thus, ten coordinate points are listed on the forest behind Negeri Sawai. Starting six clans (Limehuey Utele, Asomate, Lumanuele, Sapulete Lumapui,

Adat as a dilemmic notion for Masihulan

The discourse of *adat* in Indonesia has been a matter of discussion during numerous colonial episodes. *Adat* had been used as an instrument of indirect rule by colonial legislators. Subsequently, from the declaration of independence in 1945 onward, the concept of *adat* was turned into a nationalist instrument of state centralisation during Sukarno's (1945-1967) and Suharto's (1968-1998) presidencies (Engelenhoven 2021: 708). In Maluku's post-colonial era, Bartels (2007: 691-722) had used the term '*kebangkitan adat*' to analyse how Maluku's population tried to revitalise their *adat* during several conflicts. This '*kebangkitan adat*' was divided into three periods, with the following implications in the context of Masihulan:

(1) At the beginning of Sukarno Old Order's regime (Orde Lama), in 1950, the separatist movement of the Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) emerged in Seram Island. It ended in 1963 after the capture of the leader of the RMS, Soumokil, by the Indonesian military forces. During the conflict, the forest near Masihulan had become a war zone between RMS and the Indonesian military. Sawai was the basecamp of the Indonesian military force, while the forest of Masihulan became a hiding area for the RMS. Masihulan, at the interface of the two camps, was accused by the Indonesian authorities of cooperating with RMS. A sudden attack from the Indonesian military force caused the death of Thomas Sapulete, one of Masihulan's public figures. This exact event forced Masihulan to move, where Sawai then requested that they be settled down in Rohune[11], located next to Sawai (see Fig. 1). The displacement that Sawai requested to Masihulan was due to 'safety' reasons: Sawai being a basecamp of Indonesian military force and on the basis of their proximity at Rohune, Masihulan would manifest their pro-Indonesia positioning. Moreover, the destruction as a result of the attack, having caused material damages, especially the destruction of Masihulan's *baileo*, was interpreted by the community as a form of rejection of their *Lante-Takule* (sky and earth) belief by their ancestors. Besides that, because Masihulan was located close to the entirely Muslim-populated settlement of Sawai, they began to reflect on the importance of embracing a religion recognised by the state. Masihulan finally decided to voluntarily convert to the Protestant Christianity (*Gereja Protestan Maluku* or GPM) in 1963. Three years later, the whole community converted to Christianity and further

Lumakutile, and Patamanue) in *soa* Limehuey Utele division on 4 points areas: Namauli Besar, Soya Mountain, Karapati Hill, and Morite Mountain. Furthermore, there are six clans (Limehuey Latu, Patalatu, Sapulete Lumakane, Limehuey Sano, Matoke, and Patalatu Latu Lahu-lahu) - in *soa* Limehuey Latu division on 6 points areas: Namauli Kecil, Kanakale, Satenehuwey, Keni Mountain, Kaisuku, and Kobi.

11. The location of Rohune was previously the location of Rumah Olat which was then given to Masihulan as a settlement for their population.

rejected key elements of its tradition —such as killing other human beings in ritual wars and headhunting raids— by associating said acts to sinful practices. Masihulan members nevertheless maintained and reshaped several features of this tradition, particularly by assuming that the church was their '*baileo*'.

(2) After that, under the authoritarian New Order regime of Suharto the different variations of *adat* all across the archipelago were predominantly associated to Javanese *adat* (*adat Jawa*), under the Law of the Village Administration (UU No. 5 of 1979 about *Pemerintahan Desa*). In one hand, this law erased all traditional villages in Maluku that had the status of *negeri* and converted them into *desa*. On the other hand, because *desa* were required to have a minimum population of 1,000 people and 200 registered households (*kepala keluarga*), Masihulan never gained the status of *desa.* It only earned the status of *dusun* and remained under the administrative control of Sawai, which had gained the status of *desa*.[12] Therefore, all village funds and government services went through Sawai. The *desa* status also changed the structure of *negeri*, such as erasing the status of the king. Elections of the head of *desa* (*kepala desa*) and head of *dusun* (*kepala dusun*) were carried out with a democratic system in which every clan (*marga*) in Maluku had the right to become a leader (*mata rumah parentah*). For example, in 1987-1990 and 1991-2011, Masihulan was led twice by a *kepala dusun* from an external clan, Yulius Makatita, from Ambon.

(3) The fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime, in a period named *Reformasi*, strengthened the polarisation between Muslims and Christians. It resulted in conflicts in Maluku, beginning in 2000 and ended with the establishment of Malino II Accord, in February 2002. Earlier, in 1999, Masihulan had to move their settlement for the third time, from Rohune to Mapa (whose name was rooted from a water source called *Wae Mapa*) (see Fig. 1). This movement was due to their location being very near to, as previously mentioned, the Muslim-populated Sawai and thus fearing the possibility of an attack from Sawai. Masihulan population then hid and spread throughout the forest according to the *soa* zones mentioned previously. Sawai managed to reduce the tension by using the tradition of *pela petuanan-aniala*. Even though this relational system had always been 'rejected' by Masihulan, the customary approach could muffle the religion-based conflicts. In 2000, when the situation became calmer, Masihulan moved out of the forest and settled in Mapa, relatively far from Sawai (approximately 5 kilometers). This area finally became their permanent settlement until this day, and this movement converged with the official separation from Sawai as a *negeri administratif*. Generally, in Maluku, reflection upon this conflictual experience

12. As an illustration, in 1991, Masihulan only had 50 households with less than 1,000 people in their population.

has been centred around narratives of culture and tradition, especially through the reactivation of *adat* as a symbol of peace, for example, with efforts to revitalize the tradition *'ikatan pela'*. For all the people of Maluku, irrespective of their religion, the definition of *pela* has been enlarged to *pela gandong*, literally: "being from one womb" (*satu kandung*). This notion refers to a common ancestorship, originating from the mountain of Nunusaku in West Seram (Bartels 2007: 717).

Looking at the bigger picture today in post-Reformasi era, following Bartels as well as Davidson & Henley, we can refer to a 4th phase of *adat* revivalism ('*kebangkitan adat*'). More or less similar to previous regimes, *adat* has been used as a political instrument around the narratives of identity. "Adatisation" within regional autonomy policies had the objective of countering the inequalities developed during the New Order regime, perceived as over-centralised and not prioritising civil rights as well as over-unifying local cultural values (Davidson & Henley 2007; Engelenhoven 2021). The demands of returning to the governmental structure of *negeri* in Maluku thus reflected old grievances toward the New Order regime.

Within the context of autonomous regional politics, the revival of *adat* was a potential factor of ethnic hatred and violence from the start (Bourchier 2007: 114). Moreover, *adat*-based movements used ideologically and politically often threaten to become bandwagons for the pursuit or defence of private wealth and power (Davidson & Henley 2007: 5). This tendency can be identified in previous studies showing that *adat* has been used as an instrument of *pemekaran* to mobilise ethnic sentiments by local elites motivated by money and political positions. These instrumental factors have fuelled a series of communal conflicts upon claims for territory and cultural identities, such as in East Sulawesi (Tirtosudarmo 2008), North Maluku (Aini 2012), and West Seram (Seitte 2009). All these conflicts, especially in Maluku, were the result of identity tensions in the context of the *pemekaran* at the provincial and regency levels, which have fragmented the society between the local or 'indigenous' population (*putra daerah*) and transmigrants (*pendatang*) from Java and Sulawesi in particular. However, with the application of *negeri adat* policy, *pemekaran* was also manifested on smaller local entities, causing further fragmentation of the local population. It was especially the case with claims of autochthony between mountain-Masihulan and coastal-Sawai population.

Although the concept of *negeri adat* was accepted by Sawai's community, it was rejected by Masihulan because it officialises the idea of *petuanan-aniala*, indicating a return to the colonial era arbitrary hierarchies and the loss of *adat* rights. Moreover, for Masihulan, the "indigenous" slot is acknowledged to be no longer suitable, considering the community's long history of migration, conversion to Christianity, and the loss of the *baileo* and the king. Nevertheless, *pemekaran* also embedded the promise of more autonomy and economic development, positioning Masihulan in a dilemmatic situation.

Fig. 2 – Illustrations of past and present Alifuru

a

b

a – Illustration of an Alifuru practicing headhunting in Seram Island, 1813 (taken from *Moeurs et coutumes des peuples, ou Collection de tableaux, représentant les usages remarquables, les mariages, funérailles, supplices et fêtes des diverses nations du monde* [1813: 27], available online *in gallica.bnf.fr : http://ark.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb334903l6j.public)*.

b – Masihulan men after the performance of the traditional welcoming dance of cakalele, 2016 (Photo credits: Eduardo Erlangga Drestanta).

Masihulan community - The Alifuru "red dogs" of Seram Island

Alifuru is the specific term used locally to designate the part of the population which has adhered to the indigenous culture, resisting the influences of both Islam and Christianity (Cooley 1966: 137). According to Bartels (2017: 32-33), Alifuru (Arufuru, Alfuren) is a collective meaning that leans towards tribes in remote areas of eastern Indonesia, including but not limited to Sulawesi, Halmahera, and Seram. In the past, Alifuru groups that could be identified and had influence in the coastal area were Alune and Waemale. According to the oral tradition, Alifuru originates from the west of Seram and can be classified as Wemale-Melanesia and Alune-Melayu Polynesia (Bartels 2017: 40-41).

The Masihulanese are also known as Alifuru's fastest warriors and most fearsome in North-Seram due to their ability in headhunting activities; hence them being referred by the surrounding communities as "*si anjing merah*" (the red dogs), or what the Masihulanese call "*yasu manate*." This minority group has a small population, comprised of approximately 427 people, while Sawai has 4,603 people. In terms of geographical characteristics, the population lives in the forest-mountain area, while Sawai is in a more open-coastal area. Furthermore, a discourse of dominant differences exists between interior and exterior populations, revealed through their composition: the coastal village, i.e., Sawai, is composed of a mixed population, with transmigrants coming from Bugis, Java, and Buton; whereas the majority of the interior, i.e., Masihulan, is comprised of Alifuru people and a few transmigrants. The other

differentiation is based on the level of economy and education. The population of Sawai is sedentary, more economically developed, and more educated. The professions that dominate the population are civil servants, teachers, and fishermen. Meanwhile, life in Masihulan is simpler, with daily activities centred on hunting, harvesting, and gathering (cloves, cacao, coconuts, durians, and sagoos). Few of the members have a full-time job and the majority organise their economy outside the banking system. To obtain economic resources they also perform trade or rent their land with the maxim "Entering the forest to live today," practicing what von Benda Beckman & von Benda-Beckmann (1994:119) called 'the economy of *cari*' (in Indonesian, *cari* means "looking for," "searching")[13].

With this classification, Alifuru and their characteristics include Masihulan, and they are still generally associated to this day by coastal Sawai as 'primitive', 'backward', and 'savages'. While trying to counter these stereotypes, during the *pemekaran*, Masihulan had to revive its vernacular specificities in order to legitimate its separation from Sawai, and therefore it strengthened its identity as Alifuru, which had already been identified in the legal documents since the colonial era (see Fig. 3). Nevertheless, this situation posed difficulties for the Masihulanese, since 'Alifuru' is a category considered as inherited from the Dutch era and, in practice, have converted to Christianity. Thus, if they claim their identity as 'Alifuru', they would have to explicitly admit that Sawai is the *negeri adat* that shelters them according to the rules of *pela Petuanan-Aniala*. Remembering the small population of Masihulan compared to Sawai, it was impossible for them to declare an open war or negotiation due to the high chances of being disadvantaged. Therefore, Masihulan's main strategy has been to search for their identity roots in order to distinguish themselves from Sawai. Nevertheless, several public figures reject the identity of Alifuru and would like to turn their identity to another one. Quoting Sony Limehuey, a Masihulanese public figure:

> *Katong bukan Alifuru… kita orang juga seng Masihulan, katong itu Paisipulane!*
>
> We are not Alifuru…we are not Masihulan either, we are Paisipulane!
> (excerpt taken from an interview in Masihulan on July 27th, 2016).

The revival of the moon comb – Paisipulane of Seram Island, at the origins of Masihulan

This section will briefly relate key narratives of Masihulanese oral tradition, which are mobilised by the community as markers of self-claimed identity.

13. According to von Benda Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann (1994: 119), "People speak of *cari* (searching) when going to the forest to look for forest products, as well as when looking for a temporary job in a project, or selling products to the market in order to earn some cash income. And this principle permeates the whole range of economic life."

Regentschappen	Inheemsche bevolking									Andere Inlanders (Ternaten,Binongko's enz.)			TOTAAL			Toelichting
	Christenen			Mohammedanen			Alfoeren									
	M	V	T	M	V	T	M	V	T	M	V	T	M	V	T	
WAHAI																
Aké Ternate (2)	16	14	30	2	1	3	66	56	122	4	4	8	88	75	163	
Boti (2)	17	15	32	3	1	4	97	94	191	–	–	–	117	110	227	
Kobi	–	–	–	8	7	15	21	21	42	22	24	46	51	52	103	
Passahari	–	–	–	–	–	–	28	27	55	77	65	142	105	92	197	
Ajer besar	–	–	–	–	–	–	25	30	55	–	–	–	25	30	55	
Wahai	25	15	40	175	148	323	–	–	–	125	112	237	325	275	600	(Kampong Djawa, Hatoewé, Hatiling)
Opin	–	–	–	1	1	2	38	36	37	–	–	–	39	37	76	
Bessi	–	–	–	31	35	66	–	–	–	4	–	4	35	35	70	
Roemaholat (1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	96	78	174	–	–	–	96	78	174	
Sawai	–	–	–	268	283	551	–	–	–	24	10	34	292	293	585	
Massisihoelan	–	–	–	–	–	–	40	47	87	–	–	–	40	47	87	
Roemahsokat	–	–	–	–	–	–	38	37	75	–	–	–	38	37	75	
Séléman	–	–	–	250	212	462	–	–	–	6	–	6	256	212	468	
Pasanéa	–	–	–	67	74	141	–	–	–	9	–	9	76	74	150	
Horali (2)	42	57	99	2	1	3	139	139	278	–	–	–	183	197	380	(Horali Kolalinje en Horali Roemahreat)
Paoeni (2)	101	95	196	22	33	55	46	38	84	10	–	10	179	166	345	(Paoeni, Wailoeloe Herelanu, Paã, Karloetoe Kara)
Latea	89	79	168	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	89	79	168	(Lisiëla, Maréhoenoe, Latéa, Loõn)
Lissabata	–	–	–	184	172	356	–	–	–	–	–	–	184	172	356	
Roemahmolé	48	41	89	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	48	41	89	(Roemamolé, Roemapéloe)
Loemahweh	94	83	177	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	94	83	177	(Loemahweh en Waëla)
Karloëtoe Warasiwa	93	67	160	–	–	–	4	2	6	–	–	–	97	69	166	
Warasiwa (3)	60	46	106	57	57	114	5	4	9	2	–	2	124	107	231	
Oewin (2)	15	4	19	–	–	–	442	372	814	–	–	–	457	376	833	(Patahoewé, Loemapéloe, Woroloin, Walokoné, Solea, Loetoené, Moesoihoewé)
Soekaradja	–	–	–	40	41	81	–	–	–	–	–	–	40	41	81	
Hatoenoeroe/ Waimalé	–	–	–	–	–	–	75	78	153	–	–	–	75	78	153	(Waimalé en Waimatoe)
Hatoemoeroe/ Aloené	–	–	–	–	–	–	34	40	74	–	–	–	34	40	74	
Loemahlatal	–	–	–	–	–	–	130	102	232	–	–	–	130	102	232	(Loemalatal en Seakasalé)
Ralio Sawelit	–	–	–	–	–	–	41	46	87	–	–	–	41	46	87	
Loahoeë (1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	111	79	190	–	–	–	111	79	190	
Pasinalo	–	–	–	–	–	–	72	82	154	–	–	–	72	82	154	
Sanimala (1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	32	29	61	–	–	–	32	29	61	
TRANSPORTEEREN	600	516	1116	1110	1066	2176	1580	1437	3017	283	215	498	3573	3234	6807	

NOTA OVER HET SANIRI-BESTUUR VAN ASSISTENT-RESIDENT VAN SERAM SCHADEE 1911

Fig. 3 – Classification of Seram Island population by the Dutch, 1911

This document is an archive owned by the church of Masihulan (Gereja Protestan Maluku-Rehoboth Masihulan) taken online from *Bronnen betreffende de Midden-Molukken 1900-1942* (1997: 265) written by van Fraassen and Jobse and was used by the head of *dusun* Masihulan as a proof that they were ethnically Alifuru and differentiated themselves from Muslim Sawai (retrieved in 2016).

In ancient times, Negeri Masihulan was called 'Paisipulane', meaning 'the moon comb' (*sisir bulan*, in Indonesian). It refers to the name of the favourite jewellery of Rapie Hanuele, one of the princesses of the oldest kingdom of Seram Island, Henamena Nunuele, located in the mountains of West Seram. The kingdom was also known by the locals as Nunusaku[14]. Based on the oral history, a banyan tree was located in the kingdom, and it was described to have three big branches, symbolising three separating flows found in the big rivers of

14. According to an interview on August 11th 2016, the traditional leader in Masihulan, Simon Limehuey, explained points regarding Nunusaku, "*Actually, Nunusaku is not the name of the kingdom, but a name of a place. Nunu means banyan tree, and Sakue means witness... Merged together to form the name of Nunusaku, which is a sacred place in the kingdom, as the place of witness to meet each other but the kingdom is called Henamena*".

Seram Island: Tala, Eti, and Sapalewa. These are symbols of three big customary councils, called *saniris*[15], located in the kingdom of Henemena Nunuele.

However, in this big kingdom, communal battles happened continuously, led by factions that desired to seize the king's beautiful daughter, Princess Rapie Hanuele. Even though exiling the princess was the only solution to stop the violence, two major groups entered in conflict. One thought it was best to kill the princess, and another thought it was best to save her by exiling her out of Seram. The latter group decided to hide the princess outside Seram Island. During her exile, her sister and brother visited her. When they returned, they brought the princess scarf filled with pieces of jewellery, covered in deer blood, as a proof of her death to the locals who wanted to kill her under the banyan tree. Finally, they placed the scarf at the centre of the banyan tree and danced the *maru-maru* —a dance with 14 circular patterns.

Fights still occurred because of mutual distrust: the first five circles were represented by those who had agreed to exile Princess Rapie Hanuele, and the next nine circles were composed by the party that had wanted the death of the princess and did not believe in the evidence of the scarf. The majestic *maru-maru* dance became full of blood; war cries resounded to kill each other. Nunusaku, a holy land, was splashed with blood and hatred, cursing the kingdom by sinking it into a lake. Those who survived finally fled and tried to save the princess' jewellery and belongings, looking for a new place, called Sabulawe Latalae. Then, an agreement was arranged. The first five circles settled in the east, from the coast to the mountains, while the nine outer circles settled in the west, from the coast to the mountains. The first five circles are known as Patalima (lit: "the group of five"), and the nine outer circles are known as Patasiwa (lit: "the group of nine"). Then, a Patalima group began a journey to find Princess Rapie Hanuele's jewelry. When they achieved to bring back her moon comb, they called themselves Paisipulane.

The status of *negeri administratif* does not provide Masihulan a possibility to change their name to Paisipulane. However, as a strategy to legitimise their identity, they have placed a pillar at the center of the new settlement. The monument marks the officiation of Masihulan as a *negeri administratif*, obtained on February 17th, 2016, with the symbol of Paisipulane placed on the top.

Between democratic and king's election dilemmas

With the status of *negeri administratif*, Masihulan's *adat* structure to this day is not recognised and still uses the *desa* structure inherited from the Suharto era (the term *desa* was the only word that was replaced by *negeri*) (see Fig. 5b). However, through their oral tradition legacy, the community can still reconstruct its *adat* administrative structure (see Fig. 5a). As shown in the chart below, there are eight main clans in Masihulan: Limehuey (comprising three

15. *Saniri*s is a Seramese term for the council which used to govern the region of the Three Rivers (Cooley 1969:139).

Fig. 4 – Moon comb pillar, symbol of Paisipulane
Paisipulane monument and a billboard of a *bupati* (regent) candidate for 2017 stating "*baiknya katong pilih kembali, Tuasikal.Abua SH dan Marlatu.L.Leleury, SE, untuk melanjutkan*".

sub-clans: Utele, Latu, and Sano), Asomate, Lumanuele, Sapulete (consisting of two sub-clans: Lumapui and Lumakane), Lumakutile, Patamanue, Patalatu (comprising one sub-clan called Latu Lahu-Lahu) and Matoke.

The re-establishment of *negeri* in 2016 in Maluku was marked by new episodes of conflict between the clans who claimed to have the right to become sovereign (*mata rumah parentah*). This conflict was also linked to the access of funds allocated to *negeri* —up to one billion rupiahs (approximately USD 70,000) per year. *Negeri adat* Sawai, as an example, to this day, does not have any king and each *mata rumah parentah* remains in dispute over the rights of the king. Another example is Negeri Batu Merah in Ambon, which was leaderless for 16 years, from 2005 to 2021, since the Mayor of Ambon had not recognised a king for this Negeri.[16]

16. See Kabartimur (2021) *"16 tahun tanpa raja, Walikota didesak sahkan ranperneg (rancangan peraturan negeri) Batu Merah"("16 years without a king, Mayor urged to pass draft of Batu Merah Negeri regulation"),* at: www.Kabartimurnews.com [accessed December 28, 2021].



Fig. 5 – Comparison of *negeri* and *desa* structure

a – Illustration of the government structure of *negeri adat* Masihulan (Source: Focus Group Discussion with traditional leaders in Masihulan on 19th July 2016).

b – Illustration of the government structure of *negeri administratif* Masihulan (Source: Maluku Protestant Church of Masihulan Strategic Plan 2015-2020).

Comparatively, Masihulan, who also had experienced the absence of any king, adopted a more pacifistic reaction. From 2019, Masihulan tried to restore their *adat* within their *negeri administratif* leadership structure by appointing one of the members of Patalatu clan (a legitimate *mata rumah parentah*), Yondri Patalatu, as a head of *negeri*. However, they wanted to transform the role and functions of the king as equivalent to those of the *kepala desa* in order to reinforce electoral democracy mechanisms. In this regard, every clan has the right to be king, similarly to the election of *kepala desa*. One of the traditional leaders, Josias Asomate, stated:

> *Beta pikir sistem desa ini sebenarnya lebih bagus toh, lebih demokratis (jadi) lebih baik akang seperti ini…jadi walaupun katong, orang Maluku harus punya raja lagi… katong seng punya masalah dengan marga mana yang boleh memerintah, asal rajanya bagus memerintah, begitu toh?*
>
> I think the system of desa is good, it is more democratic (so) is better like this... so even if we, the people of Maluku, have a king... we do not [need to] have any

problem about which clan is ruling, as long as the king is good at leading, right? (excerpt taken from an interview in Masihulan, August 13th, 2016).

In addition, Masihulan questioned the reason behind the return of *negeri adat*, since many aspects have changed or do no longer fit to the organisation nowadays. For example, the function of captain (*Kapitan*) as a war leader and that of the king's messenger (*Marinyo*) are considered as no longer relevant. Josias Asomate, who also happened to be the *kapitan* of Masihulan, expressed this matter:

> *Kapitan itu apa pu guna? Kan sekarang su seng ada perang lai macam dulu? Kalaupun ada kan tinggal semua marga pasti ikut bergerak akang… lalu Marinyo juga pu guna apa? Sekarang katong kan tingalnya su berdekatan di Mapa, seng perlu kirim orang lai untuk kirm pesan macam dulu di dalam hutan.*
>
> What is a kapitan for? There is currently no war, right? Even if there is a war right now, all clans will immediately take action... then, what is the function of marinyo? Now that we live close together in Mapa, there is no need for someone to deliver messages like the old days when living in the forests.

Despite the debates and concerns, Masihulan still benefited from its current status as an administrative state, receiving 100 million rupiahs from the central government fund in 2016 using it to install electrical wiring, purchase generators, and other constructions in the village.

The struggle to become *negeri adat*

Before the separation, Masihulan was a *dusun* of *desa* Sawai. In the official structure, *desa* Sawai has five *dusun*: Opin, Besi, Olong, Rumah Olat, and Masihulan (see Fig. 6). The three former *dusuns* are Muslim-populated and the other two latter are Christian-populated. Sawai can claim the territory illustrated by the brown colour on the map in Fig. 4 (approximately 27,000 hectares) due to the all five *adat* territories of *dusun* being under the *pela petuanan-aniala*. This ensemble includes Masihulan's traditional territory, marked by the green line on Fig. 4 (around 11,000 hectares). Masihulan is able to reconstitute how its traditional zones have been constructed, based on an oral history reporting migration itinerary from west to north Seram, and finally entering the *petuanan-aniala* Sawai system. Each displacement has an unwritten story in traditional poetry, phrases, or songs (*kapata*) that explained four geographical points where they drew their natural boundaries with other intersecting communities. The first point is the western boundary of Masihulan in Nakaheli Mountain with Horale; the second point is the eastern boundary of Masihulan in Selawai River with Huaulu; the third point is the southern boundary of Masihulan at the Noa Headwaters with Nuaulu. However, regarding the fourth point, which is the northern boundary with Sawai, no one from Masihulan can tell where the natural boundaries are which limits the land with that of Sawai, meaning that, when faced with Sawai,



Fig. 6 – Reconstruction of Sawai's and Masihulan's traditional territory

Masihulan has difficulties to argue boundaries. Moreover, in 2016, Roho, a neighbouring *negeri* of Sawai, demanded financial compensation through legal action for the traditional internal territory that *negeri* Sawai (2,000 hectares) and *negeri* Wahai (5,000 hectares) took over and which were used by a shrimp agribusiness company named PT. Wahana Lestari Investama (see Fig. 6).[17] Hence, *adat* territory is fluid and can be easily contested by any clan, including Masihulan. This is the reason why Sawai has difficulties to give Masihulan its *adat* status; Sawai would probably lose their *adat* territory based on *petuanan-aniala*[18].

The initial hope for Masihulan to do *pemekaran* from Sawai began during Reformasi, through the regional regulation issued by Central Maluku Regency in 2006, which allowed *desa* to become *negeri*. However, as explained by Lazarus Patalatu, a former *kepala dusun* who became the traditional leader in Masihulan and one of the first initiators of *pemekaran*, the change was not easy. Moreover, the process was stopped due to problems with operational

17. See Patty (2016) "*Warga Adat Tuntut Pengembalian 7.000 Hektar Tanah*," at: www.Kompas.com [accessed on January 5, 2022].

18. I carried out the reconstruction of Sawai's and Masihulan's traditional boundaries in their respective villages (Fig. 6), considering the conflictual context. The validity of this boundary must also be confirmed later with the boundaries of each neighbouring *negeri*. However, this map is an important tool as it illustrates the overlapping boundaries between Masihulan and Sawai.

funds and regency-level political arrangements that went back and forth to the capital regency of Masohi. In addition, Sawai, as the main *desa,* strongly rejected Masihulan's change of status.

In 2009, Marten Limehuey (also known as Ateng), another Masihulan community leader, who has close ties to a member of the Regional Legislative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle political party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) used this relationship to try to change the status of the *dusun* to *negeri*. Together with Mr. Yulians Limehuey (*dusun* secretary), Andi Limehuey (traditional leader), and Sohaley (teacher), they went to the capital regency of Masohi to consult and make a proposition to a member of the council. However, there was no response from the regent (*bupati*) to follow up the proposal due to identical reasons stated above.

In 2012, the *pemekaran* of North Seram Raya Regency (Kabupaten Seram Utara Raya, KSUR) from the Central Maluku Regency (Kabupaten Maluku Tengah, KMT) was in motion to be implemented. To become a new regency, it requires at least five districts (*kecamatan*), but KSUR only had four *kecamatan* at the time, being comprised of Seram Utara (Wahai), Seram Utara Barat (Pasanea), Seram Utara Timur Seti (Seti) and Seram Utara Timur Kobi (Kobi). Sawai was promised a new status of *kecamatan* —Kecamatan Teluk Dalam Sawai. To become the 5th *kecamatan*, Sawai had to divide the *dusun* under its structure because a *kecamatan* is required to comprise at least five villages. Sawai thus proposed the five *dusun* (Besi, Opin, Olong, Rumah Olat, and Masihulan) to become *desa*. However, this motion regarding the division of KSUR was again and again not met with a prompt response by the *bupati* of KMT in 2014, leading to civil unrest and even demonstrations breaking out in the North Seram region.[19] Consequently, Sawai ultimately failed to become a *kecamatan*, and Masihulan's status remained as a *dusun* along with the other four *dusun*.

With the opportunity provided by the most recent law (No. 6 of 2014), Marten Limehuey and his relative Yulians Limehuey immediately contacted the previously mentioned member of DPRD to resubmit a proposal for a new *negeri adat* Masihulan. At first, Sawai refused to give the rights to Masihulan. But, in order to prioritise the success of *pemekaran*, Yulians Limehuey negotiated the possibility of implementing the status of *negeri admnistratif* and to abandon Masihulan *adat* territory to the benefit of Sawai. Moreover, with the election of *bupati* being scheduled for the next year, Masihulan took advantage of this political moment by negotiating to provide a guaranteed vote from them. Finally, on February 17th of 2016, Masihulan officially stood independently as *negeri administratif* apart from *negeri* Sawai, placing a billboard of a *bupati* candidate next to the Paisipulane monument (see Fig. 4). Nevertheless, with

19. See Patty (2014) "*Jalan Diblokade, Lalu Lintas di Pulau Seram Lumpuh Total*" *"Roads Blocked, Traffic in Seram Island Totally Paralysed"*, at: www.Kompas.com [accessed November 22, 2022].

Fig. 7 – Surveillance on the attack of Rumah Olat.Masihulan men protecting their village from attacks of Rumah Olat on 3rd July 2016 (Photo credits: Eduardo Erlangga Drestanta).

this new status, Masihulan only had a small territory of 64 hectares for 410 inhabitants (121 households) and lost their customary territory.

After the split, elements of conflicts began to resurface, particularly when the entrance gate of Masihulan was destroyed by Sawai. In an interview, a young Sawai man explained the reason behind their initiation of the attack:

> *Jalan Masihulan ini milik kita orang (Sawai). Lagian, dong orang memang berani (Masihulan)? Dorang kan cuman beberapa ekor sa!*
>
> [Because] the route that Masihulan passed through belongs to us (Sawai). Besides, where would they get such bravery? There were only handful bunch of them! (excerpt taken from an interview in Sawai on June 26th, 2016).

Other tensions emerged that at one point, resulted in open battle between Masihulan and Rumah Olat. The first factor concerned Rumah Olat's interest in gaining equal status with Masihulan (from *dusun* to *negeri*). Meanwhile, the second factor of tension stemmed from the fact that Rumah Olat claimed rights to the location (Mapa) where Masihulan currently resides. With an equal population of around 400 people, the two clans fought for a week, prompting the evacuation of women and babies from the forest, but without any casualties.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of *negeri adat* in Maluku manifests how the *pemekaran* administrative fragmentation has involved essentially instrumental administrative and economic concerns, whereas cultural, religious, and micro-political dimensions linked to *adat* have been obliterated. This disregard of the different socio-political dimensions embedded in *adat* sharpens the tensions between the social groups that are involved in territorial fragmentation and grouping, raising inequalities and sentiments of injustice. These destabilisations have provoked numerous communal conflicts based on territorial and cultural identity claims. For Masihulan, *negeri adat* is unfairly used and considered as artificial, as it is only used to accommodate old fashioned practices of power, locally titled as colonial, over the Alifuru group and only benefitting to the coastal population. Through the re-establishment process, *negeri* has been regarded as a one-way repressive act enforced by Masihulan's previous main village, Sawai.

Nowadays, Masihulan certainly has the opportunity to self-develop as a *negeri administratif*, but they have lost their customary status and the consequences in the short and medium terms are yet to be known. Masihulan has a long history of migration, religious conversion, and even communication with the outside world, and these features have historically transformed them. Therefore, Masihulan rejected Alifuru's denomination, no longer suitable to their social and religious practices and has self-claimed a new identity referent, with the community's name of Paisipulane. But in reality, when it comes to justifying their authenticity and their separation from the Sawai, they have found themselves caught in a dilemma, as they have to cling to the narratives recorded in colonial documents, giving them only an Alifuru identity. This situation pressures Masihulan community, which has to envisage *adat* as a label to be negotiated with Sawai. The confusion surrounding this negotiation is reflected in the following statement from Masihulan's *adat* leader, Zakaria Limehuey:

> *Katong su mau turun dari gunung, terpaksa kah maupun seng terpaksa… mau pigi ke sekolah, pindah Kristen… tapi sekarang dorang suruh kita balik lai pakai adat macam primitif begitu? Macam Baileo lai? punya Raja lai? Kalau begitu, kenapa katong seng balik lagi saja? Sekalian tinggal di dalam hutan, mulai lagi cincang kepala macam katong pu tete nene moyang?*
>
> We had already come down from the mountains, willingly or unwillingly, to go to school, to convert to Christianity, but now they ordered us to go back to the primitive adat ways. To have baileo "big house" again? And be led by kings again? If that is the case, why don't we just go back again? Might as well live in the jungle, start head hunting all over again like our ancestors.
> (excerpt taken from an interview in Masihulan on August 15th, 2016).

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Hamzah Fansuri *

On the Road of *Hijrah*: Contesting Identity through Urban Mobilities in Contemporary Indonesian Muslims

Introduction

A conspicuous phenomenon in the dynamics of Indonesian Islam over the last two decades is the increasing renewal of Muslims' religious faith or intra-faith conversion who call their movement *hijrah*. The notion of *hijrah* is rooted in Quranic verses and Islamic traditions and refers to the change of a Muslim to become more pious. In its development and dynamics, *hijrah* is interpreted according to various social, political, and cultural contexts. Notwithstanding its importance in Indonesia, practices of *hijrah* can be found in other parts of the Muslim world. Likewise, in both Abrahamic and Indian religions, endeavours to come back to the letter of religious texts and norms can be found in various forms and expressions. In Christianity, for instance, this phenomenon is known as the born-again movement that has emerged since the 1960s, and it is also central to one of the latest branches of Christianity, Pentecostalism. In line with that, Olivier Roy (2004) explained that born-again Muslims of the second and third generation who live in Western culture welcome capitalism and modern lifestyles, even though they hold Islam as a marker of identity. Roy calls this paradoxical attitude neo-fundamentalism. In the Indonesian context, several scholars have examined the dynamics of Islamic expression from various perspectives, ranging from the symbolization

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of Islam through the wearing of the veil as a representation of the Islamic resurgence movement of the later 1970s (Brenner, 1996); institutionalization of piety through Islamic schools that encourages the removal of local customs and traditions from mainstream Islam (Bryner, 2013); to the intertwining of Islam and popular culture, especially in the younger generation (Heryanto, 2011; Hoesterey & Clark, 2012).

Currently, the *hijrah* communities are seeking to attain acceptance among Muslims in Jakarta and other big cities by implementing cultural strategies in both physical and digital spaces. They convey Islamic *da'wah* (Islamic mission) in unprecedented ways, such as approaching hobby-based communities, broadcasting *pengajian* (recitations) in mosques to social media channels, engaging with influencers, providing counselling services to youth in various domains including *taaruf* (matchmaking), publishing Quran *hijrah*, novels, songs and films, while still looking cool and not rejecting urban lifestyles. Interestingly, these communities were initiated by public figures and preachers from Middle East alumni. They attractively play on the emotions and psychology of the masses by offering Islam as a solution to the challenges of everyday life in urban areas. *Hijrah* communities are also attractive in expressing their identity and piety in Islam by glorifying and symbolizing Islam through clothing, language, and others that can still accommodate consumer culture. The movement's followers are a new generation of Muslims, varied, highly mobile and connected to the Internet and social media. Unlike *santri*[1] who are more mature in Islam because they are educated in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), the *hijrah* communities are generally filled by urban youth with superficial religious knowledge, because this knowledge does not come from conventional institutions, such as mosques, *pesantren*, or madrasa, but from anonymous sources, through courses, books, magazines, cassettes, CDs, VCDs, Internet, radio and television. In other words, an Indonesian Muslim scholar, Kuntowijoyo, calls it *Muslim Tanpa Masjid* (Muslims Without Mosques) (Kuntowijoyo, 2001).

One of the most influential *hijrah* communities in Jakarta is the Kajian Musawarah which was founded by several Indonesian celebrities. Some of them are married couples, such as Arie Untung and Fenita Arie; Dimas Seto and Dini Aminarti; Teuku Wisnu and Shireen Sungkar; Irwansyah and Zaskia Sungkar; Dude Herlino and Alyssa Soebandono, among others. Since they are public figures, they have popularized the *hijrah* movement through their respective social media channels, be it Instagram, YouTube or TikTok. Similarly, through the official account of the Kajian Musawarah community, which has nearly one million followers on Instagram. Aside from the Kajian

1. The word "santri" popularized by Clifford Geertz (1976) refers to the pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools. The *santri* study under the conduct of a charismatic leader (*kiyai*) who acts as a symbol of religious authority.

Musawarah, there are other *hijrah* communities in Jakarta that are networked with each other. Since 2018, these communities have organized an annual Islamic exhibition at the Jakarta Convention Center (JCC) with the label *Hijrah* Festival which attracts tens of thousands of young Muslims. To strengthen the *hijrah* community network, the community exchanges their respective *ustaz* (preacher) such as Abdul Somad, Felix Siauw, Adi Hidayat, Umar Mita, Salim Fillah, Hanan Attaki, Habib Muhammad bin Anis, and Lukmanul Hakim. The *ustaz,* who have millions of followers on social media, especially YouTube and Instagram, are known to be able to deliver Islamic *da'wah* in the language of the younger generation and easy to understand. The involvement of famous *ustaz*, besides being mentors for the *hijrah* community, also consists in being a medium of *da'wah* by developing the activities of Kajian Musawarah, especially in the field of education. In this respect, the community currently has a *pesantren tahfiz* (an Islamic boarding school for memorizing the Quran) called Rumah Quran Musawarah, located in Ciputat, South Tanggerang City, Banten. In addition, the Kajian Musawarah also operates a charity called Musawarah Peduli which has been engaged in providing social services since the pandemic hit. Meanwhile, their entrepreneurial activity called Musawarah Merchandise is a forum for business collaboration among Muslim businessmen, especially from the lower middle class.

Scrutinizing the *hijrah* community initiated by the capital's celebrities, of course, requires a variety of perspectives to understand the extent to which the religious activities they carry out give meaning to their followers and the ability of the community to survive in the future. From different perspectives, we can examine the birth of the Kajian Musawarah itself. For instance, we can relate it to the political moment during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, where the tension among Muslims such as Islamists versus moderate Muslims as well as among religious groups rose sharply due to accusations of blasphemy against the incumbent candidate who was a Chinese-Christian, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, familiarly called Ahok. At that moment, Ahok's opponent was Anies Baswedan who was fully supported by Islamic-affiliated political parties and almost the entire Indonesian Muslim organizations, including some *ustaz* and the Kajian Musawarah activists. A year after the election, the Kajian Musawarah was established and introduced to the public. Thus, there is a political tendency behind the birth of this community.

Other studies analysed the *hijrah* phenomenon as a challenge to traditional religious authority (Alatas, 2021; Feillard, 2010; Saat & Burhani, 2020). The dynamics of Indonesian Islam in the last two decades indicated the rise of various new religious authorities, such as the presence of new media and new preacher figures who are popular on television channels and social media, especially YouTube and Instagram, challenge traditional religious authorities such as *Kiyai* (Islamic clerics), *pesantren* and madrasa. From another point of view, previous studies that looked at the phenomenon of *hijrah* celebrities underline

the efforts of these celebrities to maintain their existence in the entertainment industry, as newer and younger figures are emerging (Fitri & Jayanti, 2020). Thus, they promote different types of businesses by packaging them with the *sharia* label. Scholars mention this tendency as the commodification of Islam and the commercialization of religion (Fealy & White, 2008; Muzakki, 2005), or the spread of popular culture in Islam (Heryanto, 2011).

However, some aspects of the *hijrah* phenomenon remain to be explored. How do daily urban mobilities affect the construction of the Islamic identity of *hijrah* communities, both activists and their followers who are Muslim urbanites? Which identities do they construct when they identify themselves as urban modern Muslims? Why are activists of the *hijrah* community able to carry out religious orders, but at the same time still be able to enjoy an urban lifestyle, as a global trend? Further, is there a contradiction when there is a hybridization between religious messages and the material culture in their life?

This article specifically studies the Kajian Musawarah community for two reasons. Firstly, its initiators are mostly public figures of young Indonesian Muslims. Secondly, because this community is based in Jakarta, it has a wide-spanning effect throughout Indonesia. The Kajian Musawarah has succeeded in gaining the sympathy of urban Muslims through several routine religious activities, such as *pengajian* (recitations) and Islamic talk shows about everyday life, and through its skills in using digital and social media to promote its message and activities. Further, this article would like to understand how this *hijrah* community contest and emphasizes a new Muslim identity that can still relish an urban lifestyle and preach Islam at the same time. Some of the Kajian Musawarah activists articulated that they have their way as celebrities, either in looking trendy Islamic or delivering Islamic *da'wah*. Thus, those ways can easily be in-line with the younger Muslim generation's emotions. Interestingly, these efforts are carried out in the megacity of Jakarta, where dense and massive mobility is a feature of people's daily lives, on the one hand. On the other hand, people experience alienation due to inequality, social disruption, and how the ideals of social justice of Pancasila (the five pillars)[2] state have not been realized wherein disparities of economic and social dilate continually. In addition, the pluralistic life of the city of Jakarta with many aspects of social life is also a challenge for the existence of this *hijrah* community. By using the new mobilities paradigm (Urry, 2007) and ethnographic field research where conversations with interlocutors have been conducted, this article discusses how the *hijrah*

2. Pancasila consists of five pillars, namely: 1) Ketuhanan yang maha esa (Belief in the one and only god); 2) Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (Just and civilized humanity); 3) Persatuan Indonesia (The unity of Indonesia); 4) Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan, dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan (democracy led by God's guidance and wisdom arising out of deliberations amongst representatives); and 5) Keadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social justice for all Indonesian people).

community constructs and promotes its identity through interdependent mobilities. The article starts with an analysis of the *hijrah* narrative and the way it participates in the construction of urban Muslim identities, then focuses on the case of Kajian Musawarah activists to examine the role that urban mobilities play in this construction process.

Hijrah movement and urban Muslims

The idea of becoming a pious Muslim is not recent in the dynamics of Indonesian Islam. Indonesia has already witnessed similar phenomena in various configurations, including the movement of urban piety (Bryner, 2013; Heryanto, 2011) and urban Sufism (Darmadi, 2001). Yet, urban Muslims have various interpretations of the *hijrah* movement. Some affirm it as an effort of ethical puritanism, some interpret *hijrah* as having a political background. Some have historical roots and are fighting for in the contemporary context.

Hijrah as a political movement with a political agency

Over the last two decades, the articulation of ideas, expressions, and resistance of Indonesian Muslims in urban public spaces has regained its place after being repressed during the New Order regime (Gibson, 2000; Hefner, 2011; Liddle, 1996), although, in the 1980s and 1990s, Suharto's regime got closer to Islam to try and control it. When the Suharto regime collapsed, Muslim aspirations came to the fore. The contestation of Islamic political force from multiple groups immediately overwhelmed the public spaces. Not only that, there are fears of increasing Islamic piety that might trigger political tensions, threaten local customs and traditions, threaten women's rights, and intensify religious conservatism (Beatty, 1999; Bryner, 2013; Hefner, 2005; Robinson, 2008). Some scholars even mention that the conservative turn has coloured the mainstream of post-authoritarian Indonesian Islam (Van Bruinessen, 2013).[3] The increasing strength of religious identity politics is the result of but one current interpretation of Islam, which contains the general principle of the call to command what is right and forbid what is wrong, as well as the promise of happiness in life after death.

Furthermore, as the post-New Order Indonesian state has less control over identity matters, various social movements, transnational flows, media representation, market forces and local politics, along with social experiences

3. It happened in mainstream Islam in 2005 when modernist and liberal thought that had gained wide approval within Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was increasingly rejected. Some controversial fatwas were issued by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Ulema Council, MUI). One of the most obvious expressions of conservative change is the fatwa (which was released in July 2005 during the MUI's seventh national congress) declaring secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism incompatible with Islam.

and individual choices, impersonate a more crucial role in the formation and contestation of Indonesian Muslim identities (Hew, 2017a). Therefore, several *da'wah* movements that are affiliated with transnational Islamic movements such as Salafism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, and Tablighi Jamaat have developed into political activism and then triggered the spread of Islamic populism in the country (Hadiz, 2016; N. Hasan, 2007; Jahroni, 2015). The *ustaz* educated in the Middle East exert a strong influence on the *hijrah* movement, notably on the affiliated Islamic schools, which are inspired by purist conceptions of Islam and the Islamic Brotherhood (Bryner, 2013; Pribadi, 2021). Unlike Bassam Tibi (2012), who explained the phenomenon of Islamic politics, both within the country and outside, the *hijrah* movement did not have such political ideals. They consider the *ummah* (community) to consist only of all believers who follow the right path, wherever they are. In line with this, they have an imagination of the global *ummah* through interconnected communities. They call on and encourage Indonesian Muslims to behave and have an Islamic way of life, besides offering an Islamic identity as they practice it. This movement appears to resonate with the contemporary Islamic resurgence that targets the community rather than the state and calls for individual spiritual needs. It leads to the expression of diverse religious practices and discourses, related to social movements and the strategies of groups or individuals (Roy, 2004).

Correspondingly, the narratives surrounding the political and religious resurgence of Islam that usually emerge in the *hijrah* movement can be comprehended as a constant and shifting tension among proponents of the local worldview and customary ritual practices —who regard it as local religion or *Agama Asli Nusantara*— and trans-local religions of foreign origin having a claim to universalism and excluding local traditions and religious practices. This tension plays a significant role in the construction of Indonesia's state-recognized religious identity (Picard & Madinier, 2011). Such conditions are reinforced by the mastery of narratives on social media by *hijrah* groups, some of whom openly prohibit Islamic cultural artefacts such as *bedug* (drums) and calligraphy. Besides, they are also trying to seize public spaces, including town squares, roads, and the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta. In such public spaces, the *hijrah* groups and Muslim urbanites hold religious activities such as *tabligh akbar* (mass religious meeting) and *tarawih* prayers in the congregation. In Bandung, for instance, together with the biker community, they held a convoy around the city after the *tarawih* prayer. Such activities often receive support from the government.

In the recent context, the rise of political Islam is gaining momentum from two directions at once, namely general elections at the national and provincial levels and the acceleration of social media which enables the extended circulation of its ideas and propaganda. The last two presidential elections (2014 and 2019) and the Jakarta gubernatorial election (2017) are illustrations

of this political momentum where Muslim movements are seeking to seize dominance over the public sphere. A renewed religious awareness has emerged namely of the belief that as the majority, Muslims are not only a statistical representation of the population but a mass that could be effectively mobilized for political and cultural purposes.

Projection into a historical new era for the global Muslim community

The idea of *hijrah* is a reinterpretation of Quranic verses, referring to an episode of Islamic history: the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622 (Watt, 1981). Meanwhile, in Indonesian history, we can scrutinize how the genealogy of *hijrah* correlates with the voices of Indonesian Muslims since the foundation of the country. The political struggle of the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) in the early years of independence, under the figure of Kartosuwiryo reinterpreted the *hijrah* in a political sense. PSII had to seek *falah* (happiness) and *fatah* (victory) by pursuing its *hijrah* and starting a new era. Kartosuwiryo explained the meaning of *jihad* (holy war), *iman* (faith), and *tauhid* (unity), made generous use of Quranic verses, and put forward its practical implications for the political struggle, namely the establishment of *Daurah Islamiyah* (Islamic state). Hence *hijrah* to an Islamic state —is marked by three steps: *jihad*, *iman*, and *tauhid* (Formichi, 2012). Furthermore, the passionate debate in determining the state ideology between secularism, Islam, and Pancasila was the beginning of the struggle of some Muslim communities, represented by various parties such as Islamic-based political parties and established Islamic organizations in struggling for the enforcement of *Syariat* Islam (Islamic law) (Ichwan, 2011). Although Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the two major organizations of Indonesian Muslims, have agreed to accept the Pancasila state (Barton et al., 2021), some Muslims still resist it, by promoting their own interpretation of its first precept, *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Belief in One Godhead). Moreover, when the successful campaign against the Chinese-Christian Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, fuelled Islamist protests, the *sharia* idea of the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/ NKRI) was constructed by the leader of the *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defenders Front/ FPI), Habib Rizieq Syihab (Facal, 2020; Sebastian & Arifianto, 2017). In short, the group, which was one of the mobilizers of the 212 Islamic Defense Action, accepted the NKRI concept but added the term *sharia* to become NKRI Bersyariah. Genealogically, the notion of *hijrah* in the historical context of Indonesian Islam has features of continuity and discontinuity at the same time, as discussed later in this article. Hence, although *hijrah* tends to concentrate more on Islamic *da'wah* and also struggles with the ethics of puritanism, the political contestation enclosing the birth of this movement cannot be ignored.

A meaningful life-style proposition in the middle of drastic social changes

Hijrah as an urban Muslim phenomenon stems from urbanization, which gave birth to a new generation of Muslims. The new generation of urbanites undergoes distinct alienation in every layer of society. For the urban poor, their concerns include limited access to education and health services and other social problems. Meanwhile, hoping for the government is in vain, they claim. Frequently criticism arises from them against the non-implementation of the ideals of social justice in Pancasila. Thus, being actively involved in religious forums held by mass organizations such as *Front Pembela Islam* (the Defenders of Islam Front/ FPI)[4] has given them the ethos of life, and also feel that their existence as Muslims becomes more meaningful (Wilson, 2014).

For middle-class and wealthy Muslims, alienation derives from an array of disillusions, mainly due to poor rule of law in terms of the absence of legal certainty, lousy governance, inflation, recession, corruption, and severe economic mismanagement. Moreover, there is a perceived threat to their security and income. Ultimately, these displeasures are overcome by collective sentiments that are increasingly tied to religion. In other cases, various wake-up calls for *hijrah* emerge from experiences of great losses such as business collapses, debt, the death of a loved one, and break-ups. By first experiencing inner turmoil, deep down, they believe that the nature of their relationship with God will remain, no matter how far they deviate in living life. In fulfilling the spiritual needs of this new generation of Muslims, new preachers have sprung up and dominated narratives in television, mosques, offices, town squares, and even malls. Some of these new preachers graduated from Middle Eastern education, others are Christian converts and celebrities, and they are not affiliated with mainstream Islamic organizations in Indonesia. In addition to encouraging urban Muslims to be good Muslims in terms of being pious and obedient Muslims, they also urge to help people in need through *zakat* and *sadaqah*. For instance, Munzalan and Kajian Musawarah initiated *Gerakan Infaq Beras* (Rice Disbursement Movement) and *Pasukan Amal Saleh* (the Charity Troops) which have spread to many cities to invite urban Muslims to help each other.

Not only that, the mastery of social media such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok by these new preachers has proven to be very effective in attracting urban Muslims, especially among young people. Conversely, preachers with Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama backgrounds seem to be less aware or late to realize the importance of broadcasting recitations to various social media channels. In addition, recitation content that is related to daily life, easy to understand and practice is the choice for most urban Muslim communities. The popularity of these new preachers has thus outperformed those preachers who represent Indonesia's older Islamic organizations. Despite their sometimes

4. Since 2020, the Indonesian government has officially disbanded FPI as some of its actions were deemed to violate the law and legal provisions of mass organizations.

controversial sermons including their silence on domestic violence or the destruction of *wayang* puppets (Javanese puppet theatre), considered *haram* (forbidden) by them, urban Muslims nevertheless sympathize with them. To borrow a concept from Max Weber, these new preachers have a charisma that builds their authority before a new generation of Muslims who listen and follow their advice and commands. This wide niche between Muhammadiyah and NU, thus, has been well stuffed by new communities and foundations of urban Muslims in the case of *hijrah*. Thus, the insensitivity of Muhammadiyah and NU and other old Islamic organizations in recognizing the emergence of new generations of Muslims who move dynamically in real and digital public spaces dwindled their role in urban communities.

Undoubtedly, the increasing use of social media has significantly influenced recent contestations within the Islamic religious arena in contemporary Indonesia (Saat & Burhani, 2020). Some scholars have investigated how new media shape the dynamics of Islamic life in Indonesian cities (Barendregt, 2009; Husein & Slama, 2018; Nisa, 2018b; Slama, 2017). In contemporary dynamics, challenges to religious authority, as discussed above, continue to this day although it is not monolithic as it has always been decentralized and contested (Feillard, 2010; Mandaville, 2007; Saat, 2018). Moreover, these challenges to religious authority are more complex since in addition to the charisma that shapes authority, there are persuasion and power relations at work in the production of knowledge (Foucault, 1980), and also resistance to the dominant culture (Scott, 1985, 1990).

In the case of urban Muslims trying to become more pious in their religion, the Marxian argument of "false consciousness" is not sufficient to understand the strengthening religiosity of urban Muslims in Indonesia. A further understanding is needed that the novel massive and organized *hijrah* movements are not merely the spread of ideas but a set of practices that involve self-cultivation and ethical practice. Borrowing the terminology from Mahmood, the *hijrah* movement lies its attention elsewhere: namely, the cultivation of submission to what its members interpret as God's will (Mahmood, 2005). Thus, neglecting the potential transformation of the *hijrah* movement makes us fail to understand its potential influence and power in society. The phenomenon of the *hijrah* movement proves that this movement has adequate economic, social and cultural capital in addition to intellectual capital and the strength of networked actors.

Economic incentives

The continued growth of the Indonesian Muslim middle class, despite being hit by the 1998 economic recession, shows promising economic potential among Muslims. This fact goes hand in hand with the increasing willingness among Muslims to overcome economic inequality through social practices such as *zakat* and *infaq* (spending), especially in the fields

of education and health. The emergence of Islamic organizations which are involved in philanthropy and charity outside Muhammadiyah and NU has also enabled the raising of ever-growing amounts of funds from Muslims over the last two decades. However, as is characteristic of the middle-class, Indonesian urban Muslims are open to the self-consciousness of the autodidact which is concerned with conveying appropriate and legitimate signals through their consumption activities (Featherstone, 1990). The ways they negotiate their Islamic identity and social status, thus, are through the activity of consuming all products and services labelled as Islamic. This is what causes Islamic-labelled products to dominate the market with tremendous profits. SWA[5], an economic and business magazine, reported that the Muslim middle-class population reached 112 million people out of the 255 million total population in 2014. Their money turnover and market value reached 112 trillion rupiahs or approximately 6.8 billion euros per month while the growing business sector related to Islam included clothing, cosmetics, banks, insurance, halal food, *umrah*, hotels, education, mutual funds, and beauty salons.

The outburst of the Muslim middle-class market depicts that piety and ethical purity are not at odds with the materialistic and consumerist model of urban life, but rather closely aligned. It is despite the Quranic recommendations to the contrary, namely how to live a life of simplicity and modesty, among others, in *Surah At-Takaathur* 102:1-8 and *Al-Israa* 17:27. By followers of the *hijrah* movement, this contradiction does not seem to be a concern and Islam has been understood as a religion that can conform to material culture without being secularized.

Hijrah communities have particularly fostered the expansion of business activity among Muslims. It has become one of the distinctive characteristics of *hijrah* in the contemporary sense. The success of the 2018 *Hijrah* Festival which is not only a gathering of *hijrah* communities but also a forum for assembling several Islamic-based business groups, such as Islamic housing, Islamic banking, and halal culinary (H. Hasan, 2019) shows that the economy is one of the factors that trigger urban Muslims's attraction to *hijrah*. Some *hijrah* activists in Kajian Musawarah cultivate entrepreneurial values by promoting Islamic-nuanced products and services. Some of them are important figures in the marketing of Islamic clothes for women such as Shireen, Zaskia Sungkar, and Oki Setiana Dewi. Not only that but since the *hijrah*, each of them has been in business, and some have partnered with each other. There is a cake business scattered in big cities, hajj and umrah travel services, film production, and others. In addition, they also sell all kinds of products that already have their brand and logo in an Instagram account. The trend of marketing Islamic products is also taking place in other *hijrah* communities in Jakarta and other cities. Along with the highly consumptive culture of Islamic symbols in urban communities, digital spaces such as the Internet, social media, and shops that market a variety of products

5. https://swa.co.id/swa/magazine-edition/merayakan-ledakan-pasar-kelas-menengah-muslim-swa-edisi-182014

and services have become a profitable medium (Nisa, 2018a). Nevertheless, they have also become a place where various ideas and practices of Islam are not only upheld and promoted but also negotiated and contested (Hew, 2017b).

Intersecting mobilities of the *hijrah* movement

After looking at several factors that influence the development of the *hijrah* movement among Indonesian urban Muslims, we need to comprehend better how the Kajian Musawarah community moves attractively in urban areas, especially in inviting urban Muslims to *hijrah* and become better Muslims. There is a paradigm to see that nowadays, urban mobilities construct a hybrid space that appears when every community that utilizes digital spaces then migrate to physical space through the use of mobile technologies as interfaces. Thus, it blurs the traditional boundaries between physical and digital spaces. Mobile interface such as mobile phones allows users to be constantly connected to the Internet while walking through urban spaces. These hybrid spaces, therefore, are also interpreted as connected spaces, mobile spaces, and social spaces (de Souza e Silva, 2006). This is the so-called new mobilities paradigm (Urry, 2007) which is rooted in the understanding that the world is fluid and always in motion. Everyone is a moving subject who is constantly moving to interact, work, consume, attend recitation, and so on. In other words, there is an emphasis on practice and the meanings, subjectivities, and spaces of movement in all its diverse forms.

Examining urban mobilities in relation to the *hijrah* movement relies on the understanding that religion, religiosity and religious practices are dynamic components in the negotiation of urban lives and spaces (Kong, 1993). It requires an understanding that cities are spatially open and cross-cut by many different kinds of mobilities, from flows of people to commodities to information (Amin & Thrift, 2002). This article, therefore, investigates how the five intersecting mobilities (physical travel of people; physical movement of objects; imaginative travel; virtual travel; and communicative travel) (Urry, 2007) play a role in *hijrah* communities like the Kajian Musawarah, and also examines the interconnections between these mobilities that are central to making and maintaining complex connections in a 'networked society' (Castells, 2000). Further, this article also examines the contestation of Islamic identity through urban mobilities that take place in the realm of the popular culture industry, social media content, and *sharia* products, both individually and on a community scale. The contestation occurs with other Islamic groups, including mainstream Islamic organisations in Indonesia.

Physical, imaginative, virtual, and communicative mobility in the Kajian Musawarah's activities

The Kajian Musawarah has succeeded in gaining the sympathy of urban Muslims through several routine religious activities, such as *pengajian* (recitation) and Islamic talk shows about everyday life. Through *pengajian*,

people who idolize these celebrities want to hear and be inspired by their *hijrah* experiences. It is generally held at the Kebayoran Residences Grand Mosque and recorded before being uploaded on the YouTube channel, @musawarah. When the sermon was only conducted for celebrities, the Kajian Musawarah community was very exclusive. However, with programs other than the *pengajian*, they began to open up and interact with their followers. This is what created proximity among urban Muslims who choose *hijrah.* However, virtual travel (especially via new mobile devices) produces a kind of uncanny life on the screen that may change what is meant by "co-presence." Virtual and imaginative travel does not simply substitute for corporeal travel, since intermittent co-presence appears obligatory for sustaining much social life (Urry, 2002). One of the followers of the *hijrah* community, Mutia Ibrahim[6] like many other Muslim youths, for instance, expressed her exceptional longing to listen to *tabligh akbar* face-to-face as at the 2018 *Hijrah* Festival. Although since the early 2020 pandemic, several *pengajian* had to take place online, they convey different emotions when they take place offline.

> "... I can participate in online recitations on YouTube. However when I can attend directly with other Muslim sisters, I feel something different, a shared emotion to become a kinder Muslim. It strengthens me in living life." (Interview with Mutia Ibrahim, 16 January 2020).

One common reason for urban Muslims to attend face-to-face sermons is that being together in a religious forum involves not only the emotions of being among fellow Muslims but also serves as support for a firm stance on the road of *hijrah*. According to them, committing to the path of *hijrah* is not easy. It is necessary to meet regularly with fellow Muslims who *hijrah*. Not only that, but co-presence also allows for eye contact that enables the establishment of intimacy and trust, as well as sincerity, power and control (Urry, 2002). As Simmel puts it, the eye is a unique "sociological achievement," since looking at one another is what affects the connections and interactions of individuals (Frisby & Featherstone, 2000). In other words, face-to-face encounters enable the intimacy that is essential in building up the community.

Although virtual and communicative travel become more significant ways of meeting up, especially since the pandemic, physical travel as a fundamental movement remains irreplaceable. Physical travel such as travelling from one to another using private or public transportation becomes central to maintaining social capital in most urban communities. Because people do not always act as rational, calculating subjects, it is also important to ask how people experience, understand and negotiate their travel (Easthope, 2009). Accordingly, after the Kajian Musawarah was launched in 2018, its activists organized the *Hijrah*

6. Mutia Ibrahim is a 23-year-old graduate student. All names of the interviewees in this article are pseudonyms.

Festival as an assemblage medium between various *hijrah* communities, urban Muslims, their preachers, and Muslim businessmen. The success of the *Hijrah* Festival shows the enthusiasm of urban Muslims for three activities at once: visiting exhibitions, shopping for Islamic products, and listening to Islamic recitations from well-known preachers. Arie Untung, one of the founders of the Kajian Musawarah, even mentioned that in 2018, the capacity of the two halls at the JCC, where the *Hijrah* Festival is regularly held, was 8.000, but the Muslims who came reached 20.000 people from several suburbs of Jakarta such as Bekasi, Bogor, Tanggerang, Depok and other cities in Indonesia. The circulation of money during the three days of the Islamic expo reached 28 billion rupiahs or about 1,7 million euros.[7] At the same event, in addition to holding *pengajian*, the Kajian Musawarah also held congregational prayers which showed the importance of religion beyond houses of worship: urban religious practices do not only exist in a sacred space apart but amid social life as well (Orsi, 1999).

The *Hijrah* Festival is a meeting point for the physical journeys of the Kajian Musawarah and the urban *hijrah* movement. In this forum, the Kajian Musawarah activists highlight the spirit of *hijrah* for their followers and the Indonesian Muslims by resorting to numerous attributes. As celebrities, they also embody a modern combination of religious practice, fashion and urban lifestyle. Such figures attract the sympathy of urban Muslims, who identify themselves as both modern and religious by participating in the spirit of *hijrah*. The co-presence, therefore, also conveys a special meaning for the followers of the Kajian Musawarah. They are willing to attend *pengajian,* in order to meet *ustaz* and *hijrah* celebrities who are their role models.

> "... The Kajian Musawarah and *Hijrah* Festival events were extremely valuable, the entrance fee and our travel costs to JCC were equivalent to the experience gained. We felt the related emotion, namely the longing to unite and gather among Muslims." (Interview with Hasan, 14 February 2020)[8]

On October 28, 2021, the *Hijrah* Festival was held again during the Covid-19 pandemic. Coinciding with the commemoration of *Sumpah Pemuda* (the Youth Pledge Day), the *Hijrah* Festival took the theme of the joint youth movement to revive Indonesia's *sharia* economy. Although not as lively as in 2018 and 2019, Arie Untung said that the *Hijrah* Festival and the face-to-face *tabligh akbar* in 2021 were mediums to allow Muslims and their *ustaz* to meet directly. According to him, this event is like creating an oasis in a barren desert, after almost two years of online *pengajian.* Travel, thus, is manifested as a necessity for everyone to be physically in the same space with others, including fellow Muslims, business associates, friends, and family, or to be physically present at certain live events. Travel produces moments of physical closeness to certain

7. *Suaramuslim*.net accessed on 25 January 2020.

8. Hasan is a 29-year-old civil servant at Jakarta provincial government.

people, places or events and that closeness is felt as obligatory, appropriate, desirable or inevitable. Physical travel is especially important in facilitating those co-present conversations, to the making of links and social connections, albeit unequal, that endure over time (Larsen & Urry, 2016).

Just like the *Hijrah* Festival, the Rumah Quran Musawarah is also an example of how the Kajian Musawarah provides a space for Muslims to meet each other, and learn Islam, in particular, to memorize the Quran. It is also the response of the Kajian Musawarah community to the growth of the *Pesantren Tahfiz* in many cities over the last two decades. Situated in South Jakarta, precisely in Ciputat, Rumah Quran Musawarah is a new Islamic boarding school launched on April 3, 2021. The recruitment of *santri* (students) is opened to the younger Muslim generation, with an average age of 19-23 years old. As many as twenty male *santri* from different cities in Indonesia were recruited for the first batch. The *santri* are provided with clothes displaying the logo of the Kajian Musawarah to brand their community. The *santri* are not only prepared for one year to become new *tahfiz* but also to become teachers who can preach Islam in the community. Through this *pesantren,* the Kajian Musawarah proves its determination in spreading Islamic *da'wah* and promoting its community among Indonesian Muslims as well. Collaborating with other *hijrah* communities in Jakarta and other cities, this *pesantren* has received many food donations thanks to the Instagram @musawarahpeduli platform and *Gerakan Infaq Beras* (Rice Disbursement Movement). The teachers of this *pesantren* are alumni from Maskanul Huffadz, a *pesantren tahfiz* founded by another *hijrah* celebrity, Oki Setiana Dewi. The mutual support between the *hijrah* communities and the skills of the main actors of the Kajian Musawarah in funding and seeking mutually beneficial cooperation with various parties have played a significant part in the success and sustainability of each of these programs. It has implications for the spreading of the *hijrah* movement and the way it fosters a modern Muslim identity which is now widely accepted in Indonesia, especially in the younger generation.

Contestation of Islamic identity takes place when this *hijrah* community experiences interpersonal relationships and faces new situations, which require rethinking and negotiating their understanding of Islam as well as the right Islamic way to deal with problems that arise in everyday life. In the secular life of Jakarta, coupled with the crushing economic burden, people have sought protection. They join the "holy brotherhood" with limited resources and become part of a solid community. Within these hijrah communities, people receive more concrete social support and even financial assistance, In this sense, many people come to believe that God is the best "spiritual and psychological sanctuary". *Hijrah* communities, in certain cases, also become a spiritual oasis for Indonesian Muslims because there is an early experience of religiosity that is imprinted on their subconscious, namely being exposed to

all aspects of Islamic nuances such as learning to recite the Quran, attending Islamic holiday events and others. When they experience the hustle and bustle of city life and its lifestyle, the awareness to return to religious beliefs arises from the memory of the past. Angga, a 32-year-old driver at a Jakarta private company, was confronted with this type of experience:

> "I felt something different in myself compared to before joining the *hijrah* community. Being together with fellow Muslims who *hijrah* is a strength for me to learn Islam and become a better person. *Hijrah* in Jakarta's urban life is a challenge in itself, because of the attraction of lifestyle, promiscuity, and hedonism. However, the *hijrah* community has creative and varied media in preaching such as online and offline sermons, and Islamic content, which is regularly disseminated through various media and is willing to embrace hobby-based youth communities. It makes me feel able to refrain from the un-Islamic life in the capital city." (Interview with Angga 2 November 2019)

However, the contestation of the *hijrah* movement became even more flagrant when the 2022 *Hijrah* Festival chose to be held in the city of Surabaya, East Java. Kajian Musawarah, as one of the event organisers, chose the title *Surabaya Islamic Festival*. The event, scheduled to be held at Jatim Expo on 14-16 October 2022, was condemned by NU and MUI. The condemnation stemmed from the profiteering of the NU and MUI logos. But then, it was also caused by the fact that the *Hijrah* Festival was held by a group that indicated a movement that tended to discredit the existence of the NKRI and Pancasila. This refers to some of the *ustaz* names in the festival, previously known as supporters of organisations that have been officially banned by the Indonesian government.

In the case of the *Hijrah* Festival and Rumah Quran Musawarah, we can identify two forms of mobility at once, namely physical travel and physical movement of objects. The latter emphasizes the travel of objects and goods as a result of the capability to advertise and market within a consumptive society (Abaza, 2004). As mentioned above, the activists of the Kajian Musawarah shrewdly handle their followers as a market for their products and services. Urban Muslims then recognize them as both celebrities and businessmen or "Muslim entrepreneurs." Each of their products and services is not only marketed in the conventional sense but also packaged in Islamic labels and symbols. They have an impression that so far, Muslim clothing producers tend to be non-Muslims. For them, they must be the leading producers and maximize every opportunity. Hence, *hijrah* celebrities launched Muslim fashion brands, spanning from the everyday style of women dress, men, and children into formal wear and wedding dresses. Most of these entrepreneurs are themselves, Islamic fashion models. Thus, their brands and products quickly took up the Indonesian Muslim fashion market (Triana, 2021). Their success relies on their creativity in designing Islamic clothing that is fashionable and in accordance with the tastes of urban Muslims (Thimm, 2021). Besides, it implies for them an effort to build

a narrative and imagination of the Islamic resurgence through the economy, an intention which cannot be interpreted merely as the commodification of Islam. The commodification of Islam is, thus, not a mere search for profit, but an additional expression of the Islamic revival.

> "... This is a sign that the moment of Islamic economic revival will arrive, based on the evidence of the Quran and hadith. The time will come, why do not we join in?" (Arie Untung 29 September 2020)

Furthermore, the narrative of Islamic revival also developed through tour and travel businesses. Entrepreneurs narrate the rise of Islam not only through the economic revival of Muslims but also through the imagination associated with the rise of Islamic populism in many countries, especially Turkey. Thus, in addition to *hajj* and *umrah*, they also organize religious tours to Turkey. The country and its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are held as symbols of the rise of Islam by some Indonesian Muslims (Nursya, 2021). Indeed, Erdogan's rhetoric of Islamic nationalism has effects on the global scale on the way some Muslims define their identity and place within society.

Apart from these physical and material movements, the activities of Kajian Musawarah also involve imaginative movements based on memories, texts, images, TV and films (Larsen & Urry, 2016). As an urban Muslim phenomenon, the *hijrah* movement has also penetrated popular culture through books and various online channels and represented its material culture. Islamic books, Holy Quran, and novels about *hijrah* are easy to find in bookstores and online stores. One of them is Gramedia, a well-known bookstore that is present in almost every city. These books are even on display on best-selling shelves. Unlike religious books, which tend to be rarely sought after by the younger generation, books with the theme of *hijrah* appear in attractive, colourful packaging, feature comic-style illustrations, and use the language variant associated with the urban youth. Most of these books lead to one goal, namely invitation to *hijrah*. The storylines of the novels are based on daily life themes, such as teenage love problems, juvenile delinquency, and break up. The portrait of a life that is close to everyday life has proven to be very attractive because it offers Islamic views as a way to solve every problem. Likewise, some *hijrah* books feature stories of celebrities, most of whom are currently involved in the Kajian Musawarah. These books narrate how celebrities and influencers have managed to become new role models for the Muslim youth thanks to *hijrah*, after a prior life far from Islamic values and experiencing various forms of great loss. The examples often insist on the change of visual appearance, for women who use the veil, and for men maintaining a beard but still looking fashionable. Other examples deal with the behavior favorable to *hijrah,* such as the frequent use of Arabic language, the courage to stay away from the entertainment world, which is seen as not in line with Islamic values, to chose, on the contrary, pursuing a business world which they assume uses

Fig. 1 – Some examples of books (2021) with the title *hijrah* still circulating in well-known bookshops and online bookstores.

good Islamic principles such as fashion, food, or services.

Borrowing the theory of print capitalism (Anderson, 2006), these books and Holy Quran take part in forming an imagined Islamic community based on the solidarity between Muslims. The imagined Islamic resurgence first involves a change of one's behaviour as a Muslim, followed by campaigning for Muslim entrepreneurship. The use of language and narratives that are easily digested by the urban Muslims maximizes circulation.

The Kajian Musawarah also engages in the production of knowledge about Islamic practices that characterize *hijrah,* in the form of a narrative related to images, which are known in social media as captions. By way of content on their official Instagram accounts: @kajianmusawarah, @rumahquranmusawarah, @musawarahpeduli, and @musawarah.merchandise, narratives about *hijrah* and the spirit of Islam are presented with attractive visualizations, and adapted to the preferences of the public so that they are easily understood and accepted by urban Muslims. The attention paid to digital and visual settings proves that the community spread the *hijrah* movement with mindful preparation, and adequate human resources, both in mastering information technology and illustrative skills in compiling content. The following two screenshots depict how illustrative



Fig. 2 – Screenshot of the Kajian Musawarah Instagram content posted on October 4 and 19, 2021.

Islamic content can be. The picture on the left is a reminder to do honourable things, while the one on the right is about the practice of eliminating sins.

Other forms of imaginative mobility are television, films, and music. Although religious soap operas were very popular in Indonesia in the 2000s, some of the former soap opera actors have now retired from the film industry, partly due to their involvement in *hijrah*. The Indonesian case widely differs from the situation described in the study conducted by Abu-Lughod (1995) on the phenomenon of soap operas in Egypt, where the political content in television films was able to have effects, such as educating people, enlightening them, and making them aware of the socio-political condition in their country. Some soap operas in Indonesia tend to be meaningless even though they are in religious packaging. Stories in soap operas are more portraits of everyday life such as life in the household, Islamic youth-style courtship, domestic violence, and infidelity. However, television is still favoured by Indonesians and is hard to turn off. It is because of the ability of television which allows television programs, especially soap operas, to flow from one scene to another, interspersed with advertisements and back again (Williams, 2004: 66-67).

Among the Kajian Musawarah activists still playing in soap operas are the couple Dude Herlino and Alyssa Soebandono, for instance, in the soap opera titled *Istriku Ajari Aku Shalat* (My wife teaches me to pray). These days, they are both still starring in soap operas with Islamic content that airs on private television stations. Although YouTube has been predicted to substitute for television, it should not further accelerate television obsolescence (Van Dijck, 2013). Thus, Islamic content with the theme of *hijrah* on television still has a loyal audience to this day. A major moment in the recent history of the *hijrah* movement in Indonesia has been the triumph of *Ayat-ayat Cinta* (Verses of Love), a film drawn from the eponymous novel by Habiburrahman El Shirazy. The main character was interpreted by one of the *hijrah* celebrities, Oki Setiana Dewi. The success of the film allowed the spirit of *hijrah* and the narrative of being a devout Muslim to circulate among the younger generation. Imaginative journeys, then, also generate a desire for trips and travel destinations (Crouch et al., 2005; Riley et al., 1998). For example, the Islamic films *Ketika Cinta Bertasbih* (When love glorifies God) and *Ayat-ayat Cinta* were filmed in Cairo, Egypt, which still attracts Indonesian

Muslims to travel or study in Egypt. Not only that, one of the activists for the Kajian Musawarah, Mario Irwinsyah initiated an animated children's film series entitled *Nussa & Rara*. Since 2019, the film has had more than three million followers on the Nussa official YouTube accounts. Interestingly, Mario revealed that the film was his endeavour to preach Islam in the field of acting. In this case, he emphasizes the Islamic messages in a film as a context that needs to be underlined, not looking at the current situation such as the view that Islamic education for children as early as possible has the potential to be exclusive. He even claimed that animated films with children's characters are a popular means of *da'wah*. Therefore, *hijrah* does not lead him to leave the entertainment industry that has popularized his name as long as it is still in the Islamic spirit:

> "The argument for acting is there, you know, how the Prophet Muhammad taught prayer scenes to his friends. So, I am still producing films but how do I keep the production *halal*? We have to look at the context, not the situation," said Mario. (CNN, 8 July 2019)

The virtual and communicative travel intersect because both represent the activities that people are most familiar with nowadays, namely interacting and networking through computer technology devices and the Internet. It refers to space that has become reorganized, (re)combined, and permeated by technologies of extended virtual connectivity through telecommunications and ICT development (Adey & Bevan, 2006). In an imaginative journey, it emphasizes conventional media where television and film are the main cultures, while virtual and communicative travel put the internet technology as its primary pillar. In other words, borrowing Manuel Castells (2015), individuals, groups, communities, and countries networked more intensively in today's internet age.

Intersecting mobilities as a means to plural religious identity construction

Based on the discussion above, the distance between space and time is no more a significant problem for religious groups in spreading their message. Nevertheless, social media and the Internet are becoming a battleground for the discourses of different Islamic schools of thought —as is happening in other fields— raising new concerns about the source of truth, which is difficult to define as a shared reference. Within the scope of the *hijrah* movement, we can examine the dissimilarity of identity among *hijrah* communities, especially in their affiliation of thought and way of understanding religion. For example, all communities believe in the mission of formally implementing Islamic law, but they have a different understanding of practising religious commands. It means that followers of the *hijrah* movement are independent in determining the direction of their religion. It depends on the needs of the *hijrah* followers in immersing in religious messages, especially in living the challenges of life

which differ from person to person. Rismila, a 25-year-old graduate student at a Jakarta private university expressed this experience when she regularly attended *pengajian* on Niqab Squad, a *hijrah* community for women who wear *niqab*:

> "I do not feel the necessity to wear the niqab. I only need to attend the *pengajian*. My heart is constantly pushed to attend the *pengajian* organized by the *hijrah* communities. However, after the sermon ended, I returned to my initial life as a student which was not leisurely." (Interview with Rismila 15 October 2019)

Oki Setiana Dewi's draws similar conclusions in her doctoral study about the *pengajian* of Muslim middle-class *hijrah* celebrities. In an autoethnographic study, she noted that Indonesian celebrities who *hijrah* tend to have a "hybrid" religious understanding, insofar as they have autonomy in interpreting what *ustaz* says according to what they feel is right for themselves (Dewi, 2020).

On the one hand, the Kajian Musawarah lays a *da'wah* strategy that combines online and offline activities creatively to invite and persuade potential followers to *hijrah*. On the other hand, they skilfully intertwine ustaz from various disagreeing currents of thought both in political orientation and *da'wah.* For instance, Felix Siauw, a founder of the YukNgaji community and has millions of followers on social media, is usually invited to Islamic talk show forums held by the Kajian Musawarah. As a *mualaf* (convert to Islam), he was also a propagandist of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), who is skillful at approaching people with visual and textual approaches in various media. His approach has succeeded in normalizing religious radicalism (Hew, 2018). Likewise, Khalid Basalamah was involved in several *pengajian* of the Kajian Musawarah. This ustaz is often blamed for spreading Salafi Wahhabism because of several controversial statements such as the ban on singing the Indonesian national anthem and the ban of *wayang kulit* (the shadow theatre). Both Felix Siauw and Khalid Basalamah are among the new preachers who are well-known on social media. It has an echoing effect not only on the Kajian Musawarah community but also on the *hijrah* movement as a whole.

Interestingly, urban Muslims prove to be prone to accept any *hijrah* content offering the possibility for success simultaneously in worldly life and in the hereafter (Hoesterey, 2020). Urban Muslims, with their preferences, may be affiliated with various *hijrah* communities because apart from following the community activists as role models, they will mainly follow *ustaz* who they think fit their needs, such as sermons that are not rigid, easy to understand, and also easy to practice. The involvement of urban Muslims with such practices has important implications for the construction of identity, their sense of privacy, their ideas about place and space, civic and political participation, and cultural production and consumption in everyday life. Likewise, with intersecting mobilities experienced consistently and continuously, they find themselves more

anchored and actively involved in the interrelated network. In turn, this network fundamentally changes the way they perceive the internet and the physical space around them.

Conclusion

The *hijrah* movement shows intersecting mobilities and important resources of identity construction for contemporary urban Muslim groups. The diversification of Jakarta's urban space, intersecting both physical and digital dimensions, opens access for *hijrah* communities and urban Muslims to offer a novel model of Islamic identity. This process involves a renewal in expressions of piety that adjust to modernity values, the integration of consuming mass culture, and the mobilization of Islam as a solution for all types of everyday life problems, especially for the younger generation. In order to attract urban Muslims to *hijrah*, the Kajian Musawarah community cleverly applies cultural and communication strategies that pave the way to what some scholars call the commodification of Islam and the shallowing of religious practices.

This article has indicated how intersecting mobilities shape social relationships between an array of social agents with whom the *hijrah* followers interact. The people we meet and then socialize with, either friends, family, colleagues, or acquaintances, in one way or another, are reached by at least one other form of mobility. This can be, and often is, very local, but we are increasingly getting used to having close relationships with people who live far away. Sometimes we move physically to meet them, but we also maintain relationships and create online communities. Today we can witness a close relationship in online communities (Wellman & Gulia, 1999). This mobility turn approach simultaneously offers a more comprehensive perspective than partially seeing social phenomena, for instance, only on social media or just on direct interactions. Thus, between physical displacements, imaginary journeys, and virtual mobility are forms of mobility that occur in the daily life of contemporary society, especially in urban areas because of the infrastructure that supports it. Regarding the study of the *hijrah* movement and its community, this article has shown that the contestation of Islamic identity is achieved through attractive, fashionable and popular symbols. On the one hand, expressions of piety blooming in the folds of urban mobility have echoed the call for *hijrah* across other cities in Indonesia and this has been going on since the last decade. On the other hand, it opens up space for urban Muslims from various social strata to engage in a movement that re-understands the verses of *hijrah* in the Quran and also Islamic tradition, especially in dealing with social disruptions as well as economic and political uncertainties. An analysis of the *hijrah* movement from the urban mobilities perspective depicts that there is a dynamic component of identity negotiation and contestation in urban life and spaces that circulates between Islam and religious practices, whether mediated or not.

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Chronique

*Peter Carey**

Clio's Stepchildren: How Oxford Missed the Boat in Southeast Asian Studies, 1979-2018

"There is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness; [Africa's past is] the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe." Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper, Baron Dacre of Glanton (1914-2003), Regius Professor of History, 1957-1980

Introduction: A Eureka Moment

It was the evening of Thursday 1 February 1979 and I was in my final year as a Prize Fellow at Magdalen (1974-79). My flat on the ground floor of the Daubeny Buildings had windows overlooking the Botanic Gardens. But it was not the view of the 17th-century walled physic (herb) garden or the monumental Danby Gate which held my attention that evening. Instead, I was glued to the evening news on my black-and-white TV set—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-89) was descending the steps of the Air France plane which had brought him from Orly Airport in Paris. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 had reached its final *dénouement*. The Shah had fled (17 January 1979) and the repressive theocracy of the Ayatollahs was about to begin. With history unfolding before my eyes, I hardly heard the excited knocking at my door and the urgent words hissed through the keyhole: "Peter! Peter! Are you at home? It's Angus! I have come direct from a meeting of the General Board. Your election as CUF[1] Fellow in History at Trinity is confirmed. *Many* congratulations!"

* Fellow Emeritus Trinity College and Adjunct (Visiting) Professor at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia, Jakarta

1. Tutorial Fellows at Oxford Colleges were, at the time of my appointment in 1979,

When eventually I flung the door open, I found my close friend and Magdalen College colleague, Angus Macintyre (1935-94), standing before me. He had come to tell me the good news that I was now officially Laithwaite Fellow in Modern History at my undergraduate college, Trinity, a post I would hold for nearly the next 30 years (1979-2008). Ever since that day, the image of the fearsome Ayatollah returning in triumph to his shattered homeland is forever associated in my mind with a moment of pure joy in my life.

Shortly after this historic evening, I had a dream. I was walking in Trinity gardens, the slate-grey skies of February transformed to glorious summer. Rounding a corner, who should be standing before me but my former and recently deceased Trinity history tutor, John Phillips Cooper (1920-1978; in post, 1952-1978). Dressed in a natty houndstooth tweed jacket and beaming at me, he seemed magically transformed from the history tutor I had known who had succumbed to a heart attack while driving into college from his home at Stanton St John in April 1978. No longer the hunched and sickly middle-aged don of his later years, the man who stood before me in Trinity's famous Lime Walk was bursting with energy and well-being. My heart lifted: "Thank God, I have found you, Sir! They need you back in College!" John shook his head and replied smiling, "No! No! Peter, that is not my job any more, it is yours! Godspeed!" And there the dream ended as suddenly as it had begun. The baton had been passed to me: I had received the blessing of my predecessor. My move back to Trinity was starting well.

"All you have here, Peter, are opportunities," seemed to me the message of both these encounters, but how to maximise these when my specialization was as an historian of modern Indonesia? This was far outside the scope and curricula of the Oxford Modern History school as then constituted. Teaching and research on non-European history was still in its infancy. Moreover, Hugh Trevor-Roper, then in post as Regius Professor of Modern History (1957-1980), had made his views on non-European history, that of Africa in particular, plain: "It is not an historical part of the world. It has no movement or development to exhibit […] There is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness; [its past is] the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe."[2] Almost in the same breath, he had also dismissed the Oxford History School as "a retrograde provincial backwater" for excluding Fernand Braudel (1902-85) and the *Annales* School from any part in the History syllabus.

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funded through a system known as the College-University Fund (CUF). This was supported jointly by the University and individual Colleges usually on a 50-50 basis. There are also lecturers who have College affiliations and are solely funded by the University, sometimes through a specific endowment. These latter are known as UL (University Lecturers).

2. Ascherson 2010.

Round Peg in a Square Hole: A Southeast Asianist in a Eurocentric History Faculty

The Regius was gracious enough to invite me to dine with him in Oriel College soon after I took up my appointment at Trinity. But I wondered what he made of my own fascination with the "gyrations" of the Javanese in my particular "irrelevant" part of the world—Southeast Asia. Where to begin? Obviously, an accident of history had dealt my part of the world a bad hand when it came to securing a place amongst the stars in Oxford. If Java had been retained as a Crown Colony, as had happened with South Africa (Cape Colony, 1806-1910), instead of being handed back to the Dutch at the 13 August 1814 Convention of London during the interim administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816), my prospects as a young Fellow would have been totally different! From Kabul to Wellington there would have been an arc of anglophone territories. One of the foremost jewels in the British crown, Java in all its luxuriant equatorial beauty, would have been stuff of literary legend. A British "Multatuli" might even have emerged to write an English version of *Max Havelaar*, the book that "killed colonialism" in the Dutch East Indies.[3] I would certainly not have had to make the case for being a specialist on Indonesian history!

Since the British were already involved in the Malay peninsula following Captain Francis Light's establishment of Penang (George Town) in 1786, Indonesia, or the "British East Indies" as the Crown Colony might have been called, would probably have been part of a wider Malay Federation. Like British Burma after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), it would have been ruled from India. There would have been no need to found Singapore – Batavia (post-1942, Jakarta), "the Manhattan of Southeast Asia" under the VOC, would have been a free port and principal British base in the region. Academic studies on Indonesia—a term coined by an English ethnologist, George Windsor Earl (1813-1865), and popularised by his close friend, the Penang-based lawyer, James Richardson Logan (1819-1869) through his *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*[4]—would have been well provided for at

3. "Multatuli [I have Suffered Much]" was the pen name of the former colonial civil servant and Dutch author, Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820-87), whose famous novel, *Max Havelaar of de Koffij-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company) (1860) was a devastating critique of the Dutch colonial state. Known as the "book that killed colonialism," it brought home to a Dutch reading public the suffering of the indigenous populations of Java under the "Forced Cultivation" system (1830-1870). Multatuli wrote of the Dutch East Indies as that "beautiful kingdom of Insulinde which coils the equator like a girdle of emeralds [*van 't prachtig rijk van Insulinde dat zich slingert om den evenaar als een gordel van smaragd*]."

4. Jones 1973: 93-118, available at: https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1973_num_6_1_1130

Britain's ancient universities. One could envisage a Raffles' chair of Javanese or a Marsden lectureship in Austronesian languages to go alongside Oxford's historic endowments in other oriental languages like the Laudian Professorship of Arabic (1636, permanently endowed 1640),[5] and the Boden Professorship of Sanskrit (1832).[6]

But this was the stuff of dreams. The reality which confronted me as I set out on my often lonely three decades as Laithwaite Fellow was quite different. I can remember very early on in my Fellowship being invited by the then holder of the chair of Latin American History, Christopher Platt (1934-1989; in post 1972-1989), to give a seminar in the History Faculty on "The British in Indonesia." Perhaps Platt, who was born in Canton and spent part of his childhood in Buenos Aires, took pity on me. But if the all-encompassing title of the talk he proposed was designed to attract the multitudes, then we were in for a disappointment. The appointed hour came, and I had arrived in good time with my notes for the talk (this was the age before PowerPoints) to find Platt in his gown (this was to be a formal faculty event) standing around hesitantly as we waited together for the expected inrush. Ten minutes passed then quarter of an hour, and still no audience—not a single soul! Perhaps by "The British in Indonesia" title the punters thought I was going to talk about something obscure like the Amboyna Massacre of 1623, when twenty-one men, including ten in the service of the English East India Company, had been tortured and executed by agents of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*/VOC, 1602-1799). In fact, I intended to talk about the British in Java during the Raffles' period (1811-1816). Whatever it was, the indifference was absolute. Not even the most intellectually curious Oxford history student could evince a scintilla of enthusiasm to find out more about such a place as obscure and insignificant as Indonesia. Rather than lecture to thin air, Platt looked at me with embarrassment and weary resignation—"Let's just call it a day!" We went our separate ways—not even a beer at the adjacent King's Arms could provide solace on such a night.

This experience convinced me that I would gain no traction in Oxford if I presented myself primarily as an historian of Indonesia. The fact that Indonesia was at that time under the rule of General Suharto and his repressive "New Order" regime (1966-1998), architect of one of the "worst mass murders of the 20th century" against the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis*

5. Now the Abdulaziz Saud AlBabtain Laudian Professorship of Arabic, its first incumbent, Edward Pococke (1604-1691), held the post for 55 years (1636-1691) until his death.

6. Founded in 1832 with money bequeathed to the University by Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Boden, a retired soldier in the services of the English East India Company (1801-1867), the chair was created "to assist in the conversion of the people of British India to Christianity" and elected by Oxford graduates (both clauses removed by the 1882 Oxford University reforms). Holders of the chair include Sir Monier Monier-Williams (professor, 1860-1899), and Richard Gombrich (professor, 1976-2004).

Indonesia/PKI),[7] meant that the country was seen as a Cold War proxy of the United States. In terms of global awareness, it was a complete zero: the Suharto regime had made no effort to project itself internationally or raise the country's profile by the export of its cultural "brand" or "soft power." This stood in contrast to his predecessor, Sukarno (1901-70; in office 1945-1967), who had successfully hosted the April 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung and been the inceptor of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), both initiatives which had had a resonance worldwide.

As for Indonesia's education system and intellectual life, these had both suffered a steep decline following the 1965-1966 massacres which had brought Suharto to power. The murder, exile and silencing of voices from the political left together with the so-called "normalization" (read: bureaucratization and political control) of government universities had destroyed the intellectual legacy of the late Dutch colonial period (1816-1942) and Sukarno's ideologically contested "Old Order" (1945-1966). I can remember being invited to speak at one of these new government universities when I was still a research student in Indonesia in the late 1970s. This was the Eleventh March University (post-1977 Universitas Negeri Surakarta Sebelas Maret; post-1982 UNS Sebelas Maret) in Surakarta, founded (11 March 1976) under the auspices of Suharto's wife, Ibu Tien Suharto (Siti Hartinah, 1923-1996), a minor noble from one of the court city's royal families. They wanted me to lecture on my research subject, the Java War (1825-1830). But, when my hosts read my lecture notes and realized I was going to be quoting from contemporary Javanese sources which described in vivid detail the breakdown of law and order in the pre-war royal governments of south-central Java, their red censor pencils came out. Observations like "There were changes in the direction of the state / [and] there was much wickedness: bandits, highwaymen, robbers [and] pickpockets could move about in the kingdom" were immediately struck through. So too was the next verse from the selfsame Javanese chronicle:

> "All the essential elements of the law were disregarded,
> arbitrariness prevailed,
> and in authority were those who were still strong,
> [acting] in an unsuitable [and] unmannerly fashion.
> They did not think far ahead.
> Many people were dismissed by ruses [and]
> in the councils of state other men took their places,
> descendants of common people."[8]

7. According to a secret CIA report of 1968, see Schmitz 2006: 48-9.

8. Carey (ed.) 2019: 5.

In fact, so many changes and omissions were demanded that my promised lecture, which had once sprouted as luxuriantly as a spring-flowering Sakura (Japanese cherry), now looked more like a telegraph pole!

Judging it impossible to speak with any degree of honesty and openness about my historical research, which dealt with a period which was by then already 150 years the rearview mirror, I decided to decline the invitation. Soon after, in November 1983, my initial involvement with the cause of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, then under Indonesian military occupation (1975-1999), made me immediately *persona non grata* with the Indonesian authorities.[9] All further invitations from Indonesian universities and indeed all formal contacts with the Indonesian embassy in London ceased forthwith. During the Suharto era (1967-1998) I received no graduate or undergraduate students from Indonesia. This only changed after the dictator's fall on 21 May 1998, when I received my first and only Indonesian graduate student, Jan Suhardiyoto Hariyadi (born 1960), a former journalist and Reuters Fellow (1999-2000), with whom I later co-authored a book chapter on the prospects for democracy in Indonesia.[10]

Working from the Sidelines: First Faculty Initiatives and the Asian Studies Centre

By contrast, I had several able students who hailed from other Southeast Asian countries, Singapore in particular. This made me realize that if I was to gain traction within the University, I would have to cast my net wider. Perhaps not the whole of Southeast Asia, but at least the island world, usually referred to as "Maritime Southeast Asia." This comprised the modern states of Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia, which then accounted for nearly three-fifths of Southeast Asia's 450 million-strong population. An immediate opportunity presented itself to get a foot in the door. The Modern History School's undergraduate syllabus had an "Imperialism and Nationalism" Further Subject originally devised by the Beit Professor of Commonwealth History, Ronald Robinson (1920-99; in post, 1971-1987). This allowed students to study a range of non-European subjects: South Asian History (under Tapan Raychaudhuri, 1926-2014, then Reader in Modern South Asian History, 1973-1992), African history (under Tony Kirk-Greene, 1925-2018, Senior Research Fellow at St Antony's, 1967-92), Latin America

9. Carey 2000: 3-7.

10. Suhardiyoto Haryadi and Carey 2014: 137-56. Suhardiyoto (Jan) later made a career for himself in the palm-oil industry in East Kalimantan as a Business Development Office initially with PT Kalpataru Investama (1999-2009), and is now (2022) an adviser on biodiversity and tropical forest rehabilitation with the Center for Biodiversity and Tropical Forest Rehabilitation in Bogor (2013-present).

(under Professor Christopher Platt until his untimely death in 1989)[11] and the Dominions (Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, initially under Colin Newbury and subsequently under John Darwin, Beit Lecturer in Commonwealth History, 1984-2019).

Very soon after I took up my post in Trinity in Michaelmas (Winter) Term 1979, I managed to get a fifth option added to that list, namely "Maritime Southeast Asia, 1830-1973". This looked at historical developments from the end of the Java War (1825-1830) to the first OPEC[12] oil price "shock" (22 December 1973). I was encouraged by the degree of support I received within the History Faculty, particularly from medievalists like Henry Mayr-Harting, then Faculty chairman. Taught for the first time in Hilary (Easter) Term 1982, it would continue to be offered for the next 26 years until I took early retirement in October 2008. It was then briefly revived by the economic historian of late (post-1870) colonial Southeast Asia, Dr Gregg Huff (Senior Research Fellow, Pembroke College, 2008-present), and by the young scholar of Indonesian Islam, Dr Kevin W. Fogg. The latter in particular would make a signal contribution to the teaching of Southeast Asian history at Oxford during his six years (2012-18) as Al-Bukhari Fellow in the history of Islam in Southeast Asia (2012-2018) at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS) until his unfair dismissal by OCIS on 30 September 2018.[13]

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11. After Platt's death in 1989, his chair of Latin American history was eventually filled after a three year hiatus by Professor Alan Knight (born 1946; in post, 1992-2013), but following Knight's retirement the post was allowed to lapse. This means that the entire American hemisphere is presently (2022) only represented in Oxford by historians of the United States, with currently two professors, namely, the Rhodes Professor of United States History, the Finnish historian, Pekka Hämäläinen (born 1967; in post 2012-present), and the Harmsworth Professor of US History, a one-year visiting post, Professor Bruce Schulman (born 1950; in post 2022-23). I am grateful to Professor Richard Drayton (born 1964), Professor of Imperial History at King's College London (KCL) for this information and reflection, electronic communication, 7 October 2022.

12. Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in Baghdad in September 1960, more than doubled the price of oil overnight from US$5.12 a barrel (around US$60 in present-day [2022] money) to US$11.65 (US$145 in present day [2022] money).

13. See Employment Tribunal Decision, 10 March 2021 (Dr K. Fogg versus The Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies: 3300482/2019), available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60478af78f577c95c1527/Dr_K_Fogg_v_OCIS_-_3300482-_2019_judgement_and_reasons.pdf, downloaded 27 August 2022.

Since Fogg's departure in September 2018 (he now teaches at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), there is no longer any member of the Faculty with a primary research interest in Southeast Asia, who is teaching Southeast Asian history to undergraduate students. Professor Gregg Huff is indeed a member of the Faculty and provides supervision for graduate students writing their theses on Southeast Asia, but since 2012 he does not teach undergraduates. This means that the "Maritime Southeast Asia, 1830-1973" option of the Imperialism and Nationalism Further Subject, which

The inclusion of the Maritime Southeast Asian option in the "Imperialism and Nationalism" Further Subject of the History syllabus meant that almost from the start of my Fellowship at Trinity I could teach my research specialty for at least one term of the academic year. It was never going to be a popular subject, but it did attract a handful of undergraduates each year (my largest cohort was 12, it was usually under half that number). Some of these students had been born or raised in the region, others had spent a gap year backpacking through the island world, still others were just driven by curiosity. This meant that over my period as a Tutorial Fellow some 120 Oxford undergraduates had exposure to modern Southeast Asian history through this Further Subject option. As they built their careers, they could set the big events which occurred in the region during these 26 years in a wider historical perspective. Amongst these were the ouster of President Ferdinand Marcos (1917-89; in office 1966-1986) and his shoe-besotted consort in the "People Power Revolution" of 22-25 February 1986 in Manila; the emergence of their now discredited fellow Oxford graduate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (born 1944),[14] as a democracy icon in Burma following the 8-8-1988 uprising; the fall of President Suharto (21 May 1998) and the beginning of the *Reformasi* (Reform) period in Indonesia (1998-present).

Besides this rather specialized option, two other developments increased the opportunity to bring modern Southeast Asia history into the mainstream. The first was the launch of a new general history paper, "Europe and the Wider World, 1815-1914", which I devised with John Darwin a decade after his arrival in Oxford in 1984.[15] This initiative was assisted by the arrival in Oxford of Dr Richard Drayton as Darby Fellow in History at Lincoln College (in post 1994-1998), with research interests in science and technology in 19th-century imperialism. In Darwin's words, the new paper was aimed at exposing "history undergraduates to the bigger themes of European expansion and local resistance to it".[16] Besides imperial rivalries and the economic impact of colonialism, it also dealt with slavery, race, Christian missions, and the first stirrings of nationalism in the early 20th century. Those taking the paper were also required to engage with the historiography of at least two non-European regions, including South and Southeast Asia, East Asia (China, Japan, Korea), Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America—and to study their history from a local rather than a Western perspective.

Fogg taught so ably between 2013-18, is now suspended.

14. See Carey 2021:12-14.

15. Originally designed in 1994 as two separate general history papers, "Europe and the Wider World, 1713-99" and "Europe and the Wider World, 1800-1856", these were later collapsed into one, "Europe and the Wider World, 1815-1914", covering a shorter period, which was of more interest for history undergraduates.

16. See Darwin 2018, accessible at https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/empire-history-at-oxford, downloaded 27 August 2022.

We were able to call in a range of lecturing expertise both from within the History Faculty (Avner Offer [economic history], Malcolm Deas [Latin America], David Washbrook [1948-2021, India], Albert Hourani [1915-93, Middle East], Mark Elvin [China], Ann Waswo [1940-2020, Japan], Terence ("Terry") Ranger [1929-2015; Colonial Africa]), and we provided joint tutorial classes until I took early retirement in October 2008. Three years later, in 2011, this paper would morph into its current incarnation as "Imperial and Global History, 1750-1930" following Faculty Board chair, Professor Chris Wickham's, success in securing a large start-up grant to found the Oxford Centre for Global History. The key architect of victory here was the German-born Beit lecturer in Commonwealth History (2002-2016), Jan-Georg Deutsch (1956-2016), a specialist in African history. The most loyal and selfless of colleagues, it was he who persuaded Chris Wickham, a medievalist, then Chichele Professor of Medieval History (in post 2005-2016), to take Global History seriously.[17]

The other major development was the relaunch of the St Antony's Centre Far Eastern Studies Centre as the Asian Studies Centre (ASC) in 1982. Originally founded in 1954 by the Far East (present-day East Asia) scholar, Geoffrey Hudson (1903-74), following his appointment as a Fellow of St Antony's (1954-1974), this was another meeting point for scholars of South, Southeast and East Asia. Those involved in the relaunch included other St Antony's College fellows: Mark Elvin (China), Tapan Raychaudhuri (India), Arthur Stockwin (founder-director of the Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, 1982-2003), and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's husband, Michael Aris (1946-99), a specialist on Bhutanese, Tibetan and Himalayan Studies, who was then a Senior Research Fellow at Wolfson (in post, 1980-89).[18]

Together, we launched the newly rebranded ASC with a highly successful eight-week seminar program on "World War II in Asia" in Michaelmas (Winter) Term 1982, where we were able to attract a number of able and inspiring speakers. High on the list here was Louis Allen (1925-91). Portly, bearded, charismatic and fluent in Japanese, Louis' daytime job was Reader in French at the University of Durham, but his real passion was World War II in Asia—in particular, Burma, where he had served as an intelligence officer at the end of the war taking the surrender of Japanese troops.[19] He was just then putting the finishing touches to his classic wartime history, *Burma: The Longest War* (1984), and when he talked to us to launch the seminar series, he began with a spirited rendition of a popular Japanese wartime song from the

17. I am grateful to Professor John Darwin for pointing this out, electronic communication, 13 September 2022.

18. Michael Aris (1944-99) was at the time of the Asian Studies Centre launch, a Senior Research Fellow of Wolfson College. He became Senior Research Fellow at St. Antony's in 1989 until his death in 1999.

19. For an appreciation of Louis Allen (1925-91), see Starr 2016:94-107.

well-known Japanese novel, *Harp of Burma* (1946), about a Japanese soldier who becomes a Buddhist monk and stays behind in Burma after the war to bury the bodies of his slain comrades.[20]

During his two presentations in the series, the first an overview of the whole war in Asia and the other specifically on Burma (above), Louis introduced this classic novel to us and much more besides. In his Burma talk, we heard in vivid detail about the desperate fate of General Renya Mutaguchi's 85,000-strong army at the twin battles of Imphal and Kohima in Manipur (northeastern India) in March-July 1944. Based on his debriefings of captured Japanese soldiers in 1944-45, Louis explained how some 55,000 of the original attacking force had been killed and wounded, many succumbing to starvation as they tried to break through to the Dimapur railhead on the Brahmaputra River, gateway for the planned Japanese invasion of India. Other speakers included the diplomat, Sir John Addis (1914-83), former ambassador to the Philippines (1963-70) and China (1972-74), and the SOAS-based scholar, Ruth T. McVey, who spoke on the Philippines and Indonesia respectively,[21] while our local Wheatley-based colleague, Colonel Hugh Toye (1917-2012), another intelligence officer tasked with the interrogation of captured Japanese troops—in Singapore in his case—spoke on his book on Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945) and the Indian National Army (INA) in India and Burma.[22]

We had a very strong line-up. So much so that we even attracted the attention of two former Imperial Japanese Army supply officers, then pursuing careers with Japanese banks and businesses in London. They were friends, but their respective wartime experiences could not have been more different. The first had enjoyed a cushy posting in Bandung in wartime Java (1942-45). The second had been one of Mutaguchi's logistics officers at Imphal. He had staked his resupply strategy on capturing the British supply dumps—"Churchill Rations" as he referred to them—which he witnessed being destroyed from the air by Allied bombers on the very night that his supply unit entered the British stronghold.

We were also joined by a senior member of the University who had served in Malaya and been captured in Singapore following the British defeat on 15 February 1942. This was Richard M. Hare (1919-2002), then White's Professor of Moral Philosophy (in post, 1966-83), who had fought as a young officer with the 155th Artillery Regiment at the Battle of Slim River and Tanjung Malim (6-8 January 1942). Later captured by the Japanese in Singapore, he described the skill of the attacking Japanese infantry, who fired firecrackers over the heads of his fixed artillery positions creating the impression amongst his field gunners

20. Michio Takeyama 1966.

21. Sir John spoke on the Hukbalahap (*Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon*, People's Army against the Japanese) in the Philippines and McVey on the PETA, the Japanese-trained army (*Pembela Tanah Air*; Defenders of the Homeland) in Java.

22. Toye 1959.

that they were coming under enfilading fire from the rear. Hare's wartime experience in Malaya apparently had a lasting impact on his later philosophical views, in particular, his assertion that moral philosophy has an obligation to help people live their lives as moral beings, and his insistence that philosophical systems should "serve as a guide to life in the harshest conditions".[23]

With this remarkable seminar series, the Asian Studies Centre was launched. Sadly, this was an age before the internet and social media, so we have no YouTube or online text video recordings to immortalize it. Over the next decade, however, there would be a number of memorable speakers, events and seminars, some of which I helped to facilitate as the Centre's Executive Director (1985-88). It was under my watch, for example, that the celebrated freelance war photographer, Tim Page (1944-2022), was hosted at the Centre in Trinity (Summer) Term 1987, bringing the Vietnam War (1955-75) and the post-May 1970 US invasion of Cambodia vividly to life with his remarkable images. Inspiration for the drug-crazed photojournalist immortalized by Dennis Hopper in Francis Ford Coppola's Oscar-winning "Apocalypse Now" (1979), Page's language was as raw as his photography. Even the former journalist and current President of East Timor, José Ramos Horta (in office, 2007-12, 2022-present), then in residence as a Senior Associate Member (SAM) of St Antony's,[24] a man used to expressing himself in unvarnished expletives, declared his amazement that such language could be used in the hallowed halls of Oxford!

Forging wider contacts in the region: José Ramos-Horta and Dr Mahathir Mohamad

Horta's presence was another side effect of my Directorship. I had first heard him speak on the East Timor issue to a thin crowd of students in New College in late 1984 at a talk organized by Professor Michael Dummett (1925-2011), then Wykeham Professor of Logic (1979-1992) and a doughty human rights defender. I thought that bringing Horta to Oxford for a term (Trinity 1987) as a SAM at St. Antony's would help raise the Timor issue both within the University and more widely. In this I was greatly assisted by the then Warden, Sir Raymond Carr (1919-2015; in post 1968-87), one of Britain's leading authorities on Iberian history, and Arthur Stockwin, who had known Horta in Canberra. The future East Timorese head of state's presence in St Antony's allowed us to stage a major international seminar on the former Portuguese colony, with Horta presenting on, "East Timor: Third World Colonialism and International Hypocrisy" (13 May 1987). This talk incensed the Indonesian Embassy in London, who had prevailed on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) to send the Head of the FCO's Southeast Asian Department,

23. Taylor 2002.

24. Horta was in residence during the eight-week Trinity (Summer) Term of 1987, which began on 26 April and ended on 20 June 1987, see Carey 2000:5.

Christian Adams (1939-1996; in office, 1986-88), to speak on their behalf. The impact of these Oxford events related to East Timor have been described by the present writer in a separate article.[25]

Elsewhere, contacts were made with the Malaysian Government through the Director-general of the Ministry of Tourism, Dato' Hamzah bin Abdul Majid, a former career diplomat, whom I had met at an Oxford Analytica Global Horizons Conference in September 1984. We immediately struck up a rapport. As our correspondence developed, he asked me to do something quite extraordinary—organize a one-day visit to Oxford for the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad (born 1925; in office, 1981-2003; 2018-20), in March 1985. Planned as part of his "hatchet burying" initiative with the British Government following his "Buy British Last" campaign (1981-1983),[26] this was a golden opportunity to raise the profile of Southeast Asia in the wider University and explore the possibility of establishing a specific academic link with Malaysia in terms of a graduate student scholarship scheme.

Mahathir came to Oxford with his wife and five cabinet ministers, to deliver a lecture on Malaysia in the Old Library at All Souls and to be entertained to a private lunch in Trinity. His theme was "decolonizing" Asia's relations with the West, in particular the Anglo-Malaysian relationship, where, he argued, that Britain still looked down on Malaysia as a country not fully independent. Forcefully rejecting the Western notion of moral superiority and the idea that Westerners were the saviours of the human race, the Malaysian prime minister depicted such attitudes as a throw over from colonial days.[27] One aspect of his lecture which still resonates with me nearly forty years later was Mahathir's assertion that the reporting of world news was deeply distorted in the mass media. This was because over 90 percent of the wire services (Agence France-Presse, AP Dow Jones, Reuters etc) and news sources were then in the hands of Western media outlets. Although this was the age before the Doha-headquartered cable TV news network Al Jazeera (1996), even now (2022) well over two thirds are still dominated by Western-owned news providers.[28]

The All Souls' event was to have been hosted by the Vice-Warden, Denis Mack Smith (1920-2017), the leading British historian of modern Italy and a Research Fellow at the College (1962-1987). The Warden, Sir Patrick Neill QC (1926-2016; post-1997, Baron Neill of Bladen; in post 1977-1995), had

25. See Carey 2000: 5-7.

26. See Mohd. Afendi bin Daud 2016, available at http://studentsrepo.um.edu.my/12051/1/Mohd_Afendi.pdf

27. Badd, "Buy British Last: Malaysia's Boycott Campaign that Once Crippled the British Economy," available at https://cilisos.my/buy-british-last-malaysias-boycott-campaign-that-once-crippled-the-british-economy/

28. Founded in Doha, Qatar, on 1 November 1996 by Sheikh Hamad ibn Khalifah Al Thāni, the former Emir of Qatar (r. 1995-2013).

initially declared that he would be unavailable. But, *mirabile dictu*, no sooner did news reach him that his College would be playing host to the stormy petrel Malaysian prime minister and five of his cabinet, than he changed his tune—he would host the Old Library lecture in person, not his genial deputy. Since Sir Patrick would go on to play a less than stellar role in determining the fate of Southeast Asian Studies in Oxford, it is a pity that his March 1985 encounter with Dr Mahathir, leader of a country which had contributed over half the US dollar earnings to the sterling area in 1951-1952, [29] the penultimate year of the Korean Civil War (1950-1953), did not impress him more deeply. At the very least, it should have brought home to him the importance of the region—Malaysia in particular—to the UK economy and the future development of area studies in his own University.

The Trinity lunch, meanwhile, was a triumph of improvisation. Hosted by our sole honorary fellow with Southeast Asian interests, the former ICS/BFS (Indian Civil Service / Burma Frontier Service) colonial officer, Sir Leslie Glass (1911-1988),[30] we all crammed into the Old Bursary, an elegant 18th-century oak-panelled dining room looking out onto the walled Fellows' garden where the Malaysian Prime Minister's party had been initially received. An experienced diplomat and close family friend from my father's pre-war days in Burma (1931-1942), Sir Leslie rose to the challenge setting everyone at their ease with a humorous welcoming speech. Our lunch even made it into the Court Circular of *The Times*, Sir Leslie being deemed to have acted as the diplomatic host on the Queen's behalf to entertain a Commonwealth Head of State! This augured well for the future—an opportunity had opened for the University to take the development of its links with Southeast Asia further now that we had made our mark with the Malaysians. The next stage was to seek funding for a post in Southeast Asian Studies in the region.

Gathering Momentum for a post in Southeast Asian Studies

As momentum built to gain traction for Southeast Asian studies in the wider University, an opportunity arose to project Oxford in the region. Shortly after Dr Mahathir's Oxford visit, the Malaysian Government, through my friend, the Director-General of Tourism, Dato' Hamzah, invited me to visit Kuala Lumpur in July 1985. At eight o'clock on my first morning in the Malaysian capital, he had arranged a meeting with the Minister of Education, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (in post, 1984-1986) to discuss how academic links between Malaysia and Oxford could be deepened. I had in mind a Southeast Asian "Rhodes Scholarship" scheme, along the lines of a roughly similar scheme for South

29. Schenk 1991: 47.

30. "Sir Leslie Glass, Obituary", *The Times*, 21 December 1988.

and Southeast Asian students established by Dr Anil Seal in Cambridge.[31] The Minister listened politely, but seemed more interested in exploring how the "full cost" overseas student fees, which had been introduced by Mrs Thatcher's Conservative government in the autumn of 1980, might be further reduced following the 1983 review.[32] He was also interested in getting more Malaysian students in British universities, Oxbridge in particular. Still jet-lagged and disoriented from my long journey from London, I doubt I made a very deep impression on the Malaysian Education Minister, a true Malay gentleman. I certainly could not draw on the wide contacts in the region enjoyed by Anil Seal and his fellow historians of British India—many of them students of the legendary Eric Stokes (1924-81, Smuts Professor of Commonwealth History, 1970-81)—in Cambridge. But at least I was determined to give it my best try.

After visiting a number of Malaysian universities, colleges and government institutions with Arthur Stockwin to introduce the idea of a Southeast Asian Rhodes scholarship scheme, I decided to extend my tour to two other Southeast Asian countries, namely Brunei and the Philippines. I had a number of contacts in both places. These included the Brunei Education Minister, HE Pehin Dato (Dr) Haji Abdul Aziz (in post, 1984-86), whom I had met in Oxford in the late 1970s, when he was visiting Queen Elizabeth House (QEH), and who confessed that he had been hugely inspired by President Sukarno's fiery speeches on the radio during the *Ganyang Malaysia* (Crush Malaysia) campaign—better known as *Konfrontasi* (Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, 1963-66)—until he realized that this campaign, if successful, would likely topple the Brunei sultanate and spell the end of his own political career! Meanwhile, in the Philippines, my host was the futur chairman of the National Historical Institute of the Philippines (in office, 1986-96), Dr Serafin D. Quiason Jr. (1930-2016), a Marcos appointee, who would end up encouraging one of the Philippine dictator's close family to apply to Trinity. I had been introduced to Dr Serafin by Dr John Villiers (1936-2020), the last Director of the British Institute in Southeast Asia (in post, 1979-85), who accompanied me on my regional tour.

In retrospect, Brunei and the Philippines were an odd choice of countries to visit. It might have been better to start with Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. But we reckoned that Singaporean students were already well provided for in terms of Government scholarships to Oxford and Indonesia was problematic because of its lacklustre education system and my growing commitment to East Timor. As for Thailand, we lacked good Oxford contacts despite the kingdom's long association with Oxford going back to King

31. See "Trustees of the NTICVA [Nehru Trust for the Indian Collections of the Victoria & Albert Museum]: Dr Anil Seal", accessible at: http://www.nehrutrustvam.org/trustees/anil-seal

32. Williams 1984:258-78.

Vajiravudh of Siam (r. 1910-1925; Christchurch, 1899). These contacts would soon be renewed, even as we were making our Southeast Asian tour, through the presence of the Newcastle-born Abhisit Vejjajiva (born 1964), a future Thai prime minister (in post, 2008-2011), who read PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) at St. Johns (1985-88).[33]

The oil-rich Brunei Sultanate with the fourth largest per capita income in the world and its fabulously wealthy ruler, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (r. 1967 to present), were not amenable to our proposals. They were far more interested in supporting the newly established Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS) (1985 to present) than the wider University.[34] The closest I got to the Sultan was the antechamber of his *istana* (palace) where the swifts glided effortlessly through the honey-coloured proscenium arches. Later, in the Philippines we received a typically warm Filipino reception and met with a number of Southeast Asian scholars and historians—amongst them José Rizal's (1861-1896) brilliant biographer, Dr Ambeth R. Ocampo.[35] But our idea of establishing a Southeast Asian Rhodes scholarship scheme met with a less than enthusiastic response. "Why should I go to Oxford to meet with other Southeast Asians? I want to interact with Western scholars and students! Why, we Filipinos don't even feel Southeast Asian! We are much more part of Latin America! Remember the saying—300 years in Sunday school [under the Spanish] and 50 years in Hollywood [under the Americans]!"

Apart from professions of friendship and respect, all we would end up with at the end of our July 1985 visit to Manila would be a couple of Filipino students who applied to read history at Trinity, the first as an undergraduate,[36] and the other for a two-year graduate degree (MLitt). This latter was Philip G. Romualdez (born 1961), Mrs Marcos's nephew, whom Serafin had steered in my direction earlier. Unlike his first cousin, Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos Jr (born 1957), the current President of the Philippines (in office 2022-present),[37] who had read PPE at St Edmund Hall (1975-1978) and flunked his final exams, ending up with a face-saving "special diploma

33. "Profile: Thailand's new Eton educated prime minister," *The Telegraph*, 18 January 2010, accessible at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/37775505/Profile-Thailands-new-Eton-educated-prime-minister.html/

34. He would later endow OCIS with the Sultan of Brunei International Prize (1992) recognising academic excellence and achievement, a prize which now (2018) focusses on the development of the theory and practice of Islamic finance, see https://www.ocis.ac.uk/international-outreach/

35. Ocampo 1990; expanded second edition 1999. Ocampo's biography is based on his historical essays in his popular "Looking Back" column in the *Philippine Daily Globe,* which appeared between October 1987 and July 1990.

36. Gatbonton (matriculated 1986), pass degree in Modern History June 1989.

37. Inaugurated 30 June 2022. Philip Romualdez was in residence at Trinity 1983-1985.

in social studies",[38] Philip would go on to complete a well-researched MLitt thesis on his native Leyte-Samar region during the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). One of his examiners, Colin Newbury, even suggested that it might be developed into a doctorate. Despite these modest beginnings, my links with the Philippines continued to develop in the aftermath of my initial visit, helped in part by the fact that my brother-in-law, Keith MacInnes, became British Ambassador in Manila (1987-1992), and my first doctoral student, James Putzel (enrolled, 1984-1987), was writing his thesis on land-reform in the Philippines, which would result in a well-regarded book.[39]

Missing a Golden Opportunity: Sir Patrick Nairn, Stanley Ho and the Hong Kong Jockey Club Lunch (June 1988)

An opportunity then arose in my last year as Asian Studies Centre Director (1985-88) for the University to secure funding for a permanent post in Southeast Asian Studies. The potential donor was Stanley Ho (1921-2020), a Hong Kong-Macau billionaire businessman, who had a near monopoly of Macau's gambling industry.[40] He was prepared to establish a chair at Oxford in his name with an initial brief to study the overseas (Nanyang) Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. This, my ASC colleagues and myself reckoned, was a skillful entry point for understanding the economic history of the entire region and one which avoided pivoting the post on a single Southeast Asian country.

The link with Ho came through Professor Mary Turnbull (1927-2008), one of only two females ever to have served in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS, in post 1952-1955) and author of two acclaimed standard histories of Singapore and the Straits Settlements.[41] In 1987-88, she was coming to the end of a distinguished career as an historian of Southeast Asia at the Universities of Malaya (1955-1971) and Hong Kong (1971-1988), and was serving as Head of HKU's History Department. She put the University in touch with Stanley Ho through her businessman husband, Leonard Rayner (1926-1995), who worked for the Hong Kong-Macau billionaire. I was not a party to these negotiations. But it was clear that any permanent post in Southeast Asian Studies would be

38. Quinn 2022, accessible at: https://amp.theguardian.com/education/2022/may/16/ferdinand-marcos-jr-urged-to-stop-pretending-he-has-an-oxford-degree

39. Putzel 1992. Putzel completed his Oxford DPhil in 1987, and became Professor of Development Studies and Director of the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics (LSE) (in post 2000-2011).

40. Stanley Ho was the only licensee (up to 2002) for the island's numerous casinos through his Tourism and Entertainment Company of Macau (Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau SA). At the time of his death in 2020, his company still owned over half the former Portuguese colony's 44 licensed casinos, including the largest, the Gran Lisboa.

41. Turnbull 1972, 1977, 2009.

greatly to the benefit of both the Asian Studies Centre and St Antony's, where the chair would most likely be attached.

After due diligence had been done by the University Development Office, it was arranged that Sir Patrick Neill QC, then Vice-Chancellor (in post 1985-1988), would meet with Ho in Hong Kong on his Asian tour in late June 1988. A private luncheon was then organized by Ho's team at the prestigious Hong Kong Jockey Club, at which some twenty to thirty of the billionaire's close family and assistants would be present. A photo opportunity was scheduled at which Ho would present his cheque for the £1,500,000 sterling required to fund the post in perpetuity, and the Vice-Chancellor, suitably attired in academic regalia, would receive it. Smiles all around, cameras would click, recording the scene for posterity, and Stanley Ho's munificence to Southeast Asian Studies at the colonial power's ancient seat of learning would be the lead story on all Hong Kong's TV channels and its journal of record, the *South China Morning Post.*

That was the script. But nothing happened! Why? Maybe Neill was poorly briefed by his team in Hong Kong. Maybe, as an Edwardian gentleman—one of his obituaries speaks of him as a "Gladstonian figure"[42]—he deemed it impolite to speak of "work, women or money" in a public gathering. Maybe the University had bigger fish to fry in mainland China—Ho would later endow a chair in Chinese history at Pembroke College (2009),[43] after having donated a similar £2,500,000 sterling sum for Chinese studies at Oxford (2006) and a University lectureship in Chinese history (2002).[44] So the University would go on to have a good innings with the Macau "gambling king." At the same time, in the aftermath of Sir Patrick's ill-starred luncheon at the Jockey Club, a major benefaction would soon be secured for the University from another Hong Kong tycoon—the entertainment mogul and philanthropist, Sir Run Run Shaw (1907-2014). In 1993, he endowed the University's professorship of Chinese in perpetuity through a £3 million sterling gift.[45]

Who can fault the University? They had their own priorities. When compared to the newly emerging Asia-Pacific superpower what did the motley

42. University Church of St Mary the Virgin Oxford, "A Tribute Given by John Vickers in Memory of Patrick Neill, 8 August 1928-28 May 2016", Saturday, 12 November 2016, accessible at https://www.asc.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/migrated-files/Patrick%20Neill%20memorial%20address.pdf

43. This second donation from Stanley Ho generated controversy, see Reference FS50173361, "Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Section 50) Decision Notice," 21 July 2009 accessible at: https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/decision-notices/2009/473074/FS_50173361.pdf

44. Made in 2006, the gift was announced in the *South China Morning Post* on 8 May 2007. Four years earlier, Ho had already endowed a Lectureship in Chinese Studies (2002), see https://governance.admin.ox.ac.uk/legislation/stanley-ho-lectureship-in-chinese-history.

45. https://governance.admin.ox.ac.uk/legislation/shaw-fund-for-chinese-studies

countries of Southeast Asia have to offer? But why traduce our efforts to raise the wind for Southeast Asian Studies in this fashion, especially one so free of national baggage given its *Nanyang* origins? Why indicate to a potential donor that the University wanted a chair of Southeast Asian Studies only to baulk at a semi-public event at the Jockey Club? Stanley Ho may have been temporarily perplexed at the Oxford Vice-Chancellor's bizarre behaviour. But if he was, the confusion was temporary. A new beneficiary was speedily identified—within weeks Ho had given the money intended for Oxford to Hong Kong's near neighbour, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, where its municipal university, Shenzhen University (SZU), received an unexpected windfall: an endowed post in *Nanyang* (overseas Chinese) studies!

As the facilitators for this Southeast Asian fundraising initiative, both Mary Turnbull and her husband, Leonard Rayner, deserved an explanation from the University. So did I as the luckless go-between. Instead, there was silence. None of us received any official report from the Vice-Chancellor's office following Sir Patrick's return to Oxford in July 1988. For the bureaucrats at Wellington Square, the Hong Kong fiasco was water under the bridge. There was not even an attempt to encourage us to try again later, still less explore further, amongst the many contacts we had made in Malaysia and the Philippines on our 1985 tour. Trevor-Roper's "retrograde provincial backwater," namely the University's Modern History Faculty and its Eurocentric concerns, now dictated the agenda.

Given this situation I immediately informed Mary and Leonard that any further fundraising for Southeast Asian Studies at Oxford should be stood down. The region was simply not a priority for the University. Not only was there no collective memory, still less tradition, of such studies in Oxford, but more pressing concerns now loomed in East Asia. Over the course of just over three decades, starting with the establishment of the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies in 1981, the University would see the foundation of the Shaw Centre for Chinese Studies (1993), the Oxford China Centre (2008; post-2014 in its own building in St Hugh's College), the Taiwan Resource Centre for Chinese Studies (2012), and a new Korean Studies (M. Stud.) program. This formidable line up meant that East Asian Studies, along with the older established posts in South Asian history, now ruled the roost in Oriental Studies (post-1 August 2022, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies).[46] Southeast Asia remained on the margins. Clio's stepchild, there would be no place for Java at Oxford's high table.

The Aftermath: Activist Years, 1988-2008

After Leonard's death in 1995, Mary Turnbull moved to Oxford (1999) and played an active part in our ASC seminars until her unexpected death from

46. Clarence-Smith 2022, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/09/21/oxford-renames-oriental-institute-links-colonialism-imperialism/

a ruptured aorta on 5 September 2008. Her presence and the bequest of her substantial personal library on Southeast Asia would later inspire the Oxford "Project Southeast Asia" initiative (2009-2018), which is discussed below. As for myself, I would put my energies into non-academic projects. These included the Cambodia Trust (1989-2014), a UK-based disability charity founded in Adderbury (Oxon) in November 1989. Initially established to address the plight of landmine victims in Cambodia following the end of the long-running civil war (1979-1991) between the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh government and the Khmer Rouge, it would end up running five separate prosthetic-and-orthotic (P&O) training schools and clinics throughout South and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma/Myanmar). One of these—the Jakarta School of Prosthetics & Orthotics (JSPO) (2009-present)—would provide me with the bridge back to Indonesia after I took early retirement from my tutorial fellowship in October 2008.[47]

Other projects were the foundation of the Dharma School, the first full-time primary school in the UK based on the Buddhist faith in Brighton (1994-2020), where I acted as one of the inceptors and first directors,[48] and the Sunyata Retreat Centre in County Clare in the West of Ireland, where half the funds to build a new Dhamma (meditation) Hall were provided by the Hong Kong tycoon, Eric Hotung (1926-2017), in the millennium year 2000.[49] Both of these initiatives drew on my involvement with the Theravadin sangha (community of ordained Buddhist monks and nuns) in the UK, which dated back to 1986. As of the time of writing (September 2022), only the last, namely Sunyata, is still going strong. The Cambodia Trust ceased to exist in its original form in 2014 when it was relaunched as Exceed Worldwide,[50] and the Dharma School closed its doors in July 2020 shortly after the start of the Covid-19 pandemic.

In terms of my direct involvement with Southeast Asia in the two decades which followed the Hong Kong Jockey Club fiasco until my October 2008 early retirement, I continued to be closely involved with a number of different issues related to the region. These included Vietnam, where I helped organize in late December 1988[51] a discrete track-2 diplomacy meeting in Trinity between Henry Kissinger's top adviser at the Paris Peace Accords (27 January 1973),

47. See Stanfield 2009, accessible at: https://opedge.com/peter-carey-transforming-nations

48. Queen 2000: 413; Bluck 2008: 23.

49. The University Development Office had asked me to meet Eric Hotung, the Hong Kong billionaire businessman, financier and philanthropist, at the Ritz Hotel in London in March 1999, see "Thai Fidelity in Co. Clare," *Irish Times*, 24 August 1999; "Pack your mantra, and leave your earthly troubles behind", *Irish Times*, 8 August 2000. For further information, https://www.sunyatacentre.org/

50. Stevens 2014, accessible at: https://www.oandp.com/articles/2014-05_02.asp

51. The meeting occurred shortly after the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988.

Ambassador William Healy Sullivan (1922-2013), and the head of the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Communist Party) in the UK, His Excellency Trang van Hung (in post, 1986-1990),[52] who also served as the Vietnamese Ambassador. The initiative had originated through a close Oxford friend, Louise Vidaud de Plaud (circa 1905-2007),[53] who had good contacts with the Vietnamese Embassy in London and with the reforming Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach (1921-98; in post 1980-1991). Thach had been Sullivan's former North Vietnamese negotiating partner, and the aim of the Trinity meeting was to explore ways in which US-Vietnam relations could be normalized. It had a positive outcome—following Sullivan's initial discussions with the Vietnamese Ambassador in Trinity, he would go on to visit Vietnam (May 1989), meet with Thach and establish the US-Vietnam Trade Council.[54] This continued to work on steps towards historic normalization, a goal achieved six years later on 11 July 1995 during President Bill Clinton's first administration (1993-1996).

I was also active on Burma, where I helped my ASC colleague, Michael Aris, to support his wife, Daw Suu's, long-running struggle for democracy in a country dominated by the military since the early 1960s. Daw Suu was then under house arrest (July 1989-10 July 1995) and would spend a total of 15 of the 21 years between 1989 and 2010 in residential detention. Although fatally compromised by her subsequent support for the *Tatmadaw* (Burmese Army's) genocide against the Rohingya (Burmese Muslim) population in Rakhine State (Arakan) in 2018,[55] the Burma democracy campaign in the 1990s generated great hope. Following the award of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize to Daw Suu, I helped to organize a one-day conference on Burma in St Antony's to celebrate her achievement. This happened in late 1992 and the proceedings were subsequently published in a volume in the St Antony's-Macmillan monograph series under the title *Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society* (1997).[56]

Throughout this decade, when I worked with Michael up to his tragically early death from prostate cancer on 26 March 1999, Burma and Daw Suu would become an international *cause célèbre*. Looking forward from the vantage point of the new millennium, I had no inkling of the tragedy which would unfold just twenty years later following Daw Suu's appearance before

52. On an incident at the Vietnamese Embassy in London in September 1988 involving the Ambassador, see https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/09/07/Britain-summoned-Vietnams-ambassador-to-the-Foreign-Office-Wednesday/3011589608000/

53. An obituary notice of Louise Vidaud (ca. 1905-2007), can be found on: http://freebornjohn.blogspot.com/2007/02/louise-vidaud.html?m=1

54. See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_H_Sullivan

55. Carey 2021: 13, the genocide displaced 750,000 Rohingya, three-quarters of the Burmese Muslim population of Rakhine, the majority of whom sought shelter in neighbouring Bangladesh.

56. Carey (ed.) 1997.

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 11 December 2019 to defend her country from accusations of genocide.[57] The subsequent military coup of 1 February 2021, Daw Suu's rearrest and the outbreak of a civil war have undone nearly all the achievements of the period of democratic transition from 2012 to 2021.[58] Today, Daw Suu is widely seen as one of history's losers. But few could have predicted that outcome in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, East Timor and its struggle for self-determination also ranked high on my agenda. This was especially the case after the 12 November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, which saw at least 250 pro-independence demonstrators done to death by the Indonesian military in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timor capital, Díli, and in subsequent killings. [59] The fact that these massacres were witnessed by Western reporters and widely reported in the international press meant that East Timor was now far better known in the West.[60] This was also the case in Oxford, where, what had once been an unknown conflict, became considerably more prominent.

On 15 December 1990, I was involved with other East Timor specialists in organising a one-day conference on East Timor co-hosted by the Asian Studies Centre at St Antony's and the Refugee Studies programme at Queen Elizabeth House (QEH). This was the first major meeting on East Timor in Oxford and the proceedings were subsequently published.[61] Some of the funding came from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), courtesy of the former British ambassador to the Philippines (1985-87) and China (1991-94), Sir Robin Mclaren (1934-2010), who had arranged for the ASC to receive a £10,000 block grant to support Southeast Asian seminars.[62] Although it had never been the intention of the FCO mandarins to support anything as radical as a conference on East Timor, the grant gave us independence. As a Filipino reviewer, Patrício ("Jojo") Abinales, put it in the prestigious US journal, *Journal*

57. "Aung San Suu Kyi defends Myanmar from accusations of genocide at top UN court," *UN News*, 11 December 2019, accessible at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053221

58. This had seen Daw Suu's National League for Democracy (NLD) briefly in power (2015-2021).

59. Cox and Carey 1995:51, citing the Portuguese solidarity group *A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste*, which compiled a careful survey listing 271 killed, 278 wounded and 270 "disappeared." These figures include the subsequent massacre of the wounded survivors from Santa Cruz on the grounds of the RS Wira Husada No.7 military hospital in Lahane, Díli.

60. The international impact of the massacre is detailed in the book by the British freelance photojournalist, Steve Cox (born 1962), who was present at Santa Cruz when the killings took place, see Cox and Carey 1995.

61. Carey and Carter Bentley (eds.) 1995.

62. We invested this block grant with Scottish Widows and drew on the five percent annual income.

of Asian Studies, "in a period where many scholars are uncritically attached to the spectacular growth of Southeast Asian capitalism, or are immersed in the depoliticizing world of post-modernism, or have simply remained quiet because they fear loss of research access, it is encouraging to see scholars who openly support the East Timorese struggle for self-determination and criticize one of Southeast Asia's [last] remaining despotic regimes."[63]

Following this one-day conference support for East Timor grew in the University. Through extensive networking –I lobbied nearly every academic in the Humanities listed in the University's list of members of Congregation (nearly 1,000 of the 5,500 names listed)—an Oxford academics' statement on East Timor was eventually published in *The Independent* (27 January 1997). It called for an immediate moratorium on all further British arms sales to Indonesia and was signed by more than 40 Oxford academics and heads of colleges.[64] Far away in his prison in Cipinang, Jakarta, the East Timorese leader, Xanana Gusmão, personally signed a thank-you card listing all these signatories by name. As the only major university to nail its flag to the mast in this fashion, the Oxford appeal had a worldwide impact and was a big morale boost in East Timor.

In the event that a chair of Southeast Asian Studies had been created in 1988, all these activities could have been put to the credit of the University, thus developing a higher profile for Southeast Asia within the wider academic community. But, through a decision-making process known only to the Vice-Chancellor and his minions, a golden opportunity had been lost. In the twenty years I remained in Oxford (1988-2008), there was never another chance to secure such a permanently funded post.

The consequences of this missed opportunity were evident when my colleague John Darwin proposed that we co-host a Global History seminar in Trinity starting in Trinity (Summer) Term (May-June) 1997. We had a stellar "steering committee", which included Mark Elvin (China), David Washbrook (India), the aforementioned Richard Drayton (science and technology) and post-2002, the brilliant but short-lived Africanist, Jan-Georg Deutsch, whom, as we have seen, would later play such a crucial role in launching the new Imperial and Global History paper in 2010. We were even joined by one of the University's leading medieval historians, Patrick Wormald (1947-2004), a specialist on Anglo-Saxon and early medieval England, who was just then putting the finishing touches to his magnum opus, *The Making of English Law* (1999).[65]

Wormald's interest in what we were about in terms of trying to orbit global history in a still staunchly Eurocentric history faculty, underscored the fact

63. Abinales 1996:776.

64. "Oxford dons call for peace in East Timor," *The Independent*, 27 January 1997, available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letter-oxford-dons-call-for-peace-in-east-timor-1285455.html

65. Wormald 1999.

that the international dimensions of the history of the British Isles and its European hinterlands (the Anglo-Norman and Angevin empires in France) was better understood by our medievalist colleagues than those working on the modern (post-1500) period. I still recall here Henry Mayr-Harting's critical support in the History Faculty in 1981-1982, when I was applying to get the new "Maritime Southeast Asia, 1830-1973" option accepted, and the key role played by Chris Wickham in establishing the Oxford Centre for Global History in 2011. Unfortunately, our steering committee's stellar line up was not enough to guarantee us a student audience. After the initial enthusiasm generated by our Trinity (Summer) Term 1997 launch, numbers steadily dwindled until we had more members of our steering committee attending than students. This soon became an embarrassment, especially when we had world-class scholars, like the Dutch economic historian, Jan de Vries (born 1943), as paper givers. The embarrassment of having such a scholar come all the way to Oxford from Berkeley (California) and face an almost empty meeting room became too much. After just a few short terms, we abandoned the seminar.[66]

Weighing Anchor from Oxford: East Timor and the Cambodia Trust

In the early years of the new millennium, I concentrated on supporting newly independent (post-2002) East Timor, travelling there with my family in October 2003 and spending my sabbatical year (2003-2004) in the capital Díli where I stayed with José Ramos-Horta's relatives in their family compound in Balide. During this year, I took the lead in setting up the new Cambodia Trust-run Centre for Physical Rehabilitation in Becora, founding a local charity, the Association for the Empowerment of the Disabled of Timor (*Associação Hi'it Ema Raes Timor*), to act as the local Timorese counterpart. Funded by Leprosy Mission International and the Christian Blind Mission (CBM), a leading German NGO, the Centre was opened by the then prime minister, Marí Alkatiri (in office, 2002-2006). and the First Lady of Timor, Kirsty Sword-Gusmão, formerly a visiting researcher at Oxford's Refugee Studies' Centre (1989-1990), in April 2005. This soon became the key referral point for those with severe physical disabilities. Princess Anne, in her capacity as President (post-2017, Patron) of the Save the Children Fund UK, and her husband, Commander (post-2007, Vice-Admiral) Timothy Laurence, included it in their official tour of East Timor in September 2005.

East Timor was a physically beautiful place to live—the sea, beaches and mountains were all within easy reach. I found it a big wrench to return to Oxford again. Everything seemed insipid and colourless—humdrum even—after East Timor. The following academic year (2004-2005), I spent every vacation in East Timor trying to keep in touch with the project, attending

66. For a reference to this short-lived Global History Seminar (1997-98), see Drayton and Motadel 2018: 6.

the official opening in April 2005, and witnessing the early beginnings of the rehabilitation programme as well as the preparations for Princess Anne's official visit. These were all deeply satisfying developments. In early January 2006, on my return from East Timor, as my mother lay dying at our family home in Surrey, I was awarded the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator by the Portuguese Government, the highest civilian honour for a foreign national, for my work in East Timor. I had a deep feeling of satisfaction—a job well done.

In late 2006, the Cambodia Trust contacted me to ask whether I might be interested in going out to Indonesia. The post offered to me was that of Project Director of the new Sasakawa-funded Indonesia programme to establish a School of Prosthetics & Orthotics in Jakarta. "First in, last out" the CEO of Cambodia Trust told me, indicating that the job would be a long-term commitment—perhaps ten years, the usual life of a Sasakawa-funded project.[67] I suppose I could have played safe and said yes, I would take the job but only for a year and after that I would return to my Fellowship at Trinity. This is what I had done in 2003-2004 when I had suspended my Fellowship, taken a year's leave of absence without pay, and then returned to my teaching duties at Trinity. This would be hedging my bets, but hardly in the spirit of adventure which I had first envisaged. No, I thought, if I went to Indonesia it must be for longer than a year. What could I achieve in a year, especially working with a government partner as slippery and difficult as the Indonesian Ministry of Health? Surely it would be at least two years before the Cambodia Trust could get something effectively established in Jakarta? But then if I went for two years would not that be short-changing Trinity? In the two years I was away, my history undergraduates would be taught by a short-term replacement. At best, this would be a young part-time lecturer or a newly minted doctoral student. This was hardly a recipe for continuity and quality of tutorial teaching. So, I decided that if I did go to Indonesia it would be all or nothing. I would make a clean break and resign my Fellowship.

This I did in November 2007 with effect from the following October, by which time I had precisely one taker signed for my "Maritime Southeast Asia, 1830-1973" optional subject in the Hilary (Easter) Term of my final academic year (2007-2008). It seemed the time was right for me to move on after having been—man and boy—forty-two years in Oxford since coming up to Trinity as a callow History undergraduate in 1966.[68]

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67. The Sasakawa Foundation, officially known as the Nippon Foundation, was established in 1962 by suspected Japanese war criminal, far-right politician and philanthropist, Ryōichi Sasakawa (1899-1995). It directs Japanese motorboat racing revenue, of which Sasakawa was given a monopoly, into philanthropic activities, focusing on social welfare, public health and education. Since 2005, Yohei Sasakawa, Ryōichi's son, heads the Foundation.

68. After graduating in June 1969 with a First Class Honours in history, I spent a year at Cornell University (1969-1970) on an ESU (English Speaking Union) scholarship,

Conclusions: Quo Vadis Southeast Asian Studies in Oxford?

Looking back from the vantage point of 2022—now as a permanent resident of Indonesia fourteen years on from my early retirement (1 October 2008)—it is difficult to judge whether this Southeast Asian region, which is home to more than half a billion people collectively living in eleven nation states with some of the most diverse populations on earth, including over 300 million Muslims, will ever enter the lists as an established field of study in the UK's oldest university. During my nearly thirty years' "before the mast" as an Oxford don, I certainly gave the project for an Oxford Centre for Southeast Asian Studies my best shot. In this period, the University was presented with a host of opportunities for fundraising in the region through contacts with high-worth individuals. But a combination of indifference on the part of the University authorities, lack of collective memory, and the inability of the region's largest country, Indonesia (2022 population 280 million) to project itself internationally, all meant that getting traction for posts in Southeast Asian Studies proved problematic. The situation remains largely unchanged to this day.

There is also another problem, namely that unlike other regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, North America and East Asia, which have widely shared lingua franca such as Spanish (Portuguese for Brazil), Russian, English and Chinese (Mandarin), Southeast Asia shares no such linguistic unity. True, Malay/Indonesian is in the world's dozen top languages in terms of speakers—over 300 million worldwide—but it is not an international language. Outside Maritime Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Timor-Leste) and a few outliers like Surinam and New Caledonia, it is not a language which is taught or spoken globally. In Mainland Southeast Asia (Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), for example, there is no support for Indonesian/Malay as the lingua franca for the main regional grouping, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Instead, the Association continues to rely on English.

This means that raising money for Southeast Asia as a whole is tricky. Most potential funders in the region will want to prioritise their own national interests. This can be seen in the experience of Oxford's rival, Cambridge, where the University's Malaysian Studies Centre (post-1995, Malaysian

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where my interest in Indonesian history was first aroused. I then went out to Indonesia as a research student on an SSRC (Social Science Research Council) grant in 1971-1973 by which time I was registered as a graduate student back at my old College, Trinity. In February 1974, I was elected to a Prize Fellowship at Magdalen College (1974-1979), one year of which (1976-1977) was spent working in the Indonesian National Archives (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia/ANRI) in Jakarta where I was supported as a British Academy Travelling Fellow. In February 1979, my election to a Laithwaite Tutorial Fellowship in Modern History at Trinity was confirmed as I have explained at the beginning of this essay.

Commonwealth Studies Centre),[69] and the Cambridge Thai Foundation (CTF, 1990),[70] both founded in part by the aforementioned Dr Anil Seal, Director of the Cambridge Overseas Trust (COT), drew on substantial backing from Malaysia and Thailand respectively. Regional donors have understandably focused their support on ensuring that their own nationals are prioritized when it comes to scholarships and fixed term research posts in Cambridge. This means that the only meaningful avenue for regional funding for a Southeast Asian post in Oxford is likely to come from an overseas (*Nanyang*) Chinese funder, which is why the University's failure to secure the Stanley Ho endowment in 1988 was such a missed opportunity.

In the absence of permanent posts, the default setting for Southeast Asian Studies at Oxford is what might be called "birds of passage," namely, academics with Southeast Asian interests who hold permanent University posts,[71] but are required to teach subjects which have nothing to do with their research specialty and on whose departure no Southeast Asian institutional legacy remains. During my nearly three decades teaching at Oxford, I fell into that category. I was employed as a CUF lecturer and College tutor to teach a whole range of undergraduate history subjects—Plato to NATO—none of which were specifically linked to Southeast Asia. When I took early retirement in 2008, I was replaced by an historian whose specialty was North African (Algerian) history not Southeast Asia. The same holds for Professor Gregg Huff, who moved from Glasgow to Oxford to take up a Senior Research Fellowship in Economic History at Pembroke College in October 2008. During his time at Oxford he has enriched Southeast Asian historiography with a series of impressive publications on the economic development of post-1870 Southeast Asia, culminating in his benchmark *World War II and Southeast Asia: Economy and Society under the Japanese Occupation*.[72] But

69. See https://www.gci.cam.ac.uk/file/malaysia-commonwealth-studies-centre. Through the Cambridge Malaysian Education and Development Trust, this has facilitated some 30 Malaysian students studying in Cambridge in a wide range of subjects each year since 2010, see https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/charity-search/-/charity-details/4050305/governing-document

70. On this initiative, partly sponsored by the Cambridge Overseas Trust under the patronage of the Prince of Wales (now [September 2022] King Charles III), and partly by Thai donors coordinated by Dr Chris Baker, a former Fellow of Queen's College (Cambridge), see http://www.cambridgethaifoundation.org/overview. Since its establishment in 1990, it has facilitated some 105 Thai students to study in Cambridge.

71. Namely, College-University Fund (CUF) and University Lecturers (UL), see above footnote 1.

72. See, in particular, Huff 2020, which won the biennial Lindert-Williamson Prize from the Economic History Association for the most outstanding book in the past two years on global, African, Asian or Latin American history, see https://www.pmb.ox.ac.uk/news/professor-gregg-huff-wins-lindert-williamson-prize. A list of Professor Huff's publications can be found at https://ocesh.web.ox.ac.uk/people/

his post is not specifically linked to Southeast Asia, so he will not necessarily be replaced by a Southeast Asianist when he retires.

Besides these University positions, which happen to be filled fortuitously by Southeast Asian specialists, there are also a number of other short-term posts which have brought young Southeast Asian scholars to Oxford. The case of Dr Kevin Fogg, Al-Bukhari Fellow in the history of Islam in Southeast Asia (2012-18) at OCIS, has already been mentioned. Shortly after Fogg took up his appointment, two new fixed-term research posts in Burmese Studies were created in the name of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK). These were a Junior Research Fellow (JRF) in gender studies at Lady Margaret Hall and a Senior Research Fellowship in Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony's. Filled by Dr Ma Khin Mar Mar Kyi (in post 2014-2016; now Gender Research Fellow in Burmese Studies, Oxford, 2016-present),[73] a social anthropologist, gender specialist and filmmaker, and Dr Matthew Walton (in post 2013-18), a specialist on the religion and politics of Southeast Asia, particularly Buddhism in contemporary Myanmar/Burma, they became the inaugural DASSK Junior Research and Senior Research Fellows respectively. Together they made an impact on the teaching of Southeast Asia in the University, Walton coordinating the Southeast Asian seminar at St Antony's, establishing the Oxford-Myanmar blog Tea Circle, and producing a monograph on *Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar* (CUP 2016).[74]

Unfortunately, Burma's ongoing political turmoil, turbo-charged by the 1 February 2021 military coup and Daw Suu's implication in the September 2018 Rohingya genocide, compromised their position as DASSK Fellows. Who, after all, would want to hold a post named after a suspected *génocidaire*? In July 2018, the funding for Walton's Senior Research Fellowship came to an end and he moved to the University of Toronto where he is currently Assistant Professor in Comparative Political Theory.[75] Meanwhile, the DASSK rubric of Dr Khin Mar Mar Kyi's post, now attached to the International Gender Studies Centre at Lady Margaret Hall,[76] has been quietly dropped. With the collapse of the short-lived experiment in democracy, the ongoing civil war and the deepening contestation between the Burmese army (*Tatmadaw*) and the ethnic militias, Burmese studies have lost their sheen. The fate of Daw Suu's former economic adviser, the Australian economist, Dr Sean Turnell (born 1964), detained in Insein Prison in Yangon for 21 months (6 February

professor-gregg-huff.

73. Dr Khin Mar Mar Kyi's cv can be found at https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-daw-khin-mar-mar-kyi-bbb97511?originalSubdomain=uk

74. Walton's cv can be found at https://utoronto.academia.edu/MatthewWalton

75. See https://utoronto.academia.edu/MatthewWalton/CurriculumVitae

76. On the IGS Community based at LMH, see https://www.warandpeace.ox.ac.uk/centres-and-programmes/igsc

2021-17 November 2022) and initially sentenced to three years imprisonment for violating the Official Secrets Act (29 September 2022) before being released, underscores the dangers for academics of conducting research in, or even visiting, Burma at this time of *Tatmadaw* terror.

Another initiative taken independently by Oxford academics in this selfsame period, 2012-2018, when Burmese Studies were being given renewed support in Oxford, was Oxford Project Southeast Asia. Established as an independent educational charity, it was founded in 2009 to raise funds for the establishment of a world-class Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at the University.[77] Spearheaded by two Singaporean graduate students—historian, Dr Pingtjin (PJ) Thum, and medic, Dr Xin Hui Chan (until March 2014), it was also supported by two Oxford academics with strong interests in Southeast Asia, Dr Philip Kreager, a demographer,[78] and Jeffery (Jeff) Burley (1936-2021), a forester who had served as Vice-Warden of Green (post-2008, Green-Templeton) College.[79] Meanwhile, the present writer and Dr Gerry Bodeker,[80] a public health researcher and academic specializing in lifespan wellness and integrative healthcare, based in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur respectively, provided support from the region. The former Regius Professor of Medicine, Sir David Weatherall (1933-2018; in post 1992-2000), agreed to be our patron. He had strong Southeast Asian interests having been the first to identify and research thalassaemia, a group of inherited blood conditions which affects 1-2 percent of the world's population, amongst those of Asian ethnicity during his period of national service in Singapore in 1958-1960.[81] It was a strong team.

Over time, we began to develop a profile both within the University and internationally for our annual Southeast Asian Studies Symposia, which attracted participants from all over the world. Starting modestly in 2012, with a 30-strong mini-symposium in St Antony's, we developed into one of the largest annual gatherings of Southeast Asianists in the world. By 2016, the annual

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77. For a brief description of Oxford Project Southeast Asia, see https://m.facebook.cm/projectsoutheastasia

78. Senior Research Fellow in Human Sciences, Somerville College; Tutor and Lecturer in Demography at the Institute of Human Sciences; Director Fertility and Reproduction Group (2010-present) (see https://www.frsg.org/), and Research Associate, School of Anthropology, Oxford, now (2022) Sanofi Chair, Centre Virchow-Villermé, University of Paris-Descartes.

79. An obituary notice for Jeffery (Jeff) Burley (1936-2021), a former Vice Warden of Green (post-2008, Green Templeton) College and Director of the Oxford Forestry Institute (1983-2002), can be found at https://www.gtc.ox.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/professor-jeffery-burley-1936-2021

80. Bodeker's cv can be found at https://www.linkedin.com/in/gerrybodeker?original Subdomain=au

81 "Sir David Weatherall obituary", *The Guardian*, 16 December 2018, available at: https://amp.theguardian.com/science/2018/dec/16/sir-david-weatherall-obituary

meeting, which was held in the University's Mathematical Institute, featured over 200 papers in 80 sessions spread over three days. The following year, we were chosen jointly with the Asian Studies Centre (ASC), then under the able direction of Dr Matthew Walton, who did the lion's share of the preparatory work with his ASC colleagues, to host the biennial European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS, founded 1992) in the Examination Schools.[82] This was an organization which I had played a small role in helping to develop in the late 1980s.[83] Once again, the University was being given a golden opportunity—and one which was offered entirely free of charge. Given the presence of Jeff Burley and Gerry Bodeker at Green-Templeton, one might have expected the then Warden, Sir David Watson (1949-2015; in post 2010-2015), to lend us a hand and allow the College to be cited more prominently in our literature, but he refused.

Sir David's refusal reflected the wider attitude of the University. During these six years (2012-2018), the University's top brass tolerated what we were doing but held us at arm's length. Then, early in 2018, they informed us that they wanted Oxford Project Southeast Asia stood down. Their reason was that they needed to take all fundraising initiatives relating to Southeast Asia into their own hands. Belatedly, they had woken up to the importance of the region and they now had their very own knight in shining armour to enter the lists to lead the charge as Southeast Asian fundraiser on their behalf. This was His Royal Highness Sultan Nazrin Shah of Perak (r. 2014-present). An Oxford graduate who had read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at Worcester College in 1976-1979, his outstanding generosity to the University had already been evidenced in his recent endowment of the £17 million Sultan Nazrin Shah Conference Centre at his own college.[84] On 10 October 2018, flanked by the

82. The Symposia were held between 2012 and 2018 in St Antony's (March 2012), St Anne's (March 2013), Keble (22-23 March 2014), Sunway University, Malaysia (20-24 March 2015), the Mathematics Institute in Oxford (14-16 April 2016), The Examination Schools, Oxford (16-18 August 2017) and at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta (March 2018).

83. In early 1987, I received a Leverhulme travel grant to visit three European countries—the Netherlands, Germany and France—to explore the possibility of pan-European cooperation in Southeast Asian Studies. Later that year, in my capacity as Director of the Asian Studies Centre (1985-88), I hosted Professor Denys Lombard (1938-1998), then head of the Division des Aires Culturelles at the EHESS (*École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*), and Professor Bernhard Dahm (born 1932), holder of the chair of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Passau (in post 1984-1997), in St Antony's. It was one of the small beginnings to what would become EuroSEAS, founded in 1992 to stimulate pan-European scholarly cooperation in Southeast Asian Studies, see https://www.euroseas.org

84. On this Centre, which was officially opened in 2017, see https://www.meetworcester.com/conferences-day-meetings/conference-facilities/sultan-nazrin-shah-centre/ and Rob Wilson, "Sultan Nazrin Shah Centre at Worcester College, Oxford, by

Vice-Chancellor, Louise Richardson (in post, 2016-2023), and the Head of the Division of Social Sciences, Professor Sarah Whitmore (in post, 2018-present), the Oxford Southeast Asian Studies Centre initiative was launched outside his recently completed Worcester Conference Centre, with the pledge that within two years "this ambitious thoughtfully-integrated knowledge enterprise will put Southeast Asia at its heart, benefitting both the citizens of the ASEAN countries and the people of the wider world."[85]

Four years on we still await the outcome of this "thoughtfully integrated knowledge enterprise," although, unrelated to this fundraising initiative, the prospect of a major Southeast Asian originated donation was briefly in prospect for Oxford's poorest college, Linacre, in 2022.[86] This was the £155 million sterling (US$176.5) offered by Vietnam's sole woman billionaire, Madame Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao (born 1970). This looked set to increase Linacre's endowment eightfold and greatly enhance the flow of postgraduate scholars from Southeast Asia. But, given that the donation required Linacre to change its name to Thao College in honour of a donor who had begun her business career with a low-budget Vietjet airline involving bikini-clad flight attendants, Linacre's feminist and green alumni, the majority of their college community, were not amused. As of the time of writing (8 October 2022), the first tranche of £50 million sterling (US$59 million), originally due on 30 June 2022, has still not been paid.[87]

Meanwhile, Southeast Asian Studies at Oxford continue in the doldrums, repudiated stepchildren of Clio. Although the waters have long closed over my less than stellar career as an Oxford Southeast Asianist, I still imagine in my dreams being transported back to my former University on a magic carpet and having a present-day Professor Christopher Platt advertise yet another talk by a much younger self on "The British in Indonesia" and for us still to be fumbling with our gowns and waiting forlornly besides an empty door through which no student ever passes. Oh! Oxford! Home of lost causes and forsaken

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Niall McLaughlin Architects," *Architects Journal*, 11 January 2018, available at: https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/buildings/sultan-nazrin-shah-centre-at-worcester-college-oxford-by-niall-mclaughlin-architects. It was one of six buildings in the UK shortlisted for the prestigious Stirling Prize in 2018.

85. See Worcester College press release, 11 October 2018, "HRH Sultan Nazrin Shah becomes Patron of Southeast Asia Studies Centre," available at: https://www.worc.ox.ac.uk/about/news/hrh-sultan-nazrin-shah-becomes-patron-southeast-asia-studies-centre

86. A postgraduate college, Linacre was founded in 1962 and named after the early 16th-century humanist scholar and physician, Thomas Linacre (also spelt 'Lynaker', 1460-1524). As of 2020, it had 550 postgraduates enrolled, and a total endowment of just £19 million sterling.

87. Camilla Turner, "Oxford college renaming in doubt after donation from 'bikini' airline tycoon fails to materialise," *The Telegraph*, 8 October 2022, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/10/08/oxford-college-renaming-doubt-donation-bikini-airline-tycoon/

beliefs; unpopular names and impossible loyalties! *Stet fortuna domus*!

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1 – Dr John Darwin, Beit Lecturer in Commonwealth History, Oxford (1984-2018), shortly after his arrival at Nuffield College, Oxford, in 1984. Photograph courtesy of Dr John Darwin.

2 – Front cover of Michio Takeyama, *Harp of Burma* (1946), Shinchosha edition, Tokyo, 1988. Photograph courtesy of Shinchosha Publishing Co, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan.



3 – Tim Page (1944-2022), British-Australian war photographer, famous for his coverage of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s in which was wounded four times. Photograph by Clare Clifford, Page's third wife (m. 1992). Image Eye Ubiquitous/Photoshop/Avalon. Photograph courtesy of Alamy Stock Fotos.

4 – Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad (in office, 1981-2003, 2018-20), image taken following his meeting with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow on 13 November 2018. From the website of the President of the Russian Federation and licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license.

6 – Stanley Ho (1922-2020), the "gambling king" of Macao, and Oxford's potential donor for the endowment in perpetuity of a chair in Nanyang (Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia) Studies, a donation which was mishandled by the then Oxford Vice-Chancellor, Sir Patrick Neill QC (post-1997, Baron Neill of Bladen) (in office, 1985-1989), during his visit to Hong Kong in June 1988. Photograph by Tài Pí from his 2006 Flickr account licensed under Creative Commons.



5 – José Ramos-Horta, currently President of Timor-Leste (May 2022-present),at the time of his appointment as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau and head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), 2 January 2013. Evan Schneider/UN Photo.

7 – Constance Mary Turnbull (1927-2008), historian of Singapore and the Straits Settlements, during her induction into the Singapore Women's Hall of Fame on 1998. Photograph by Wi-Cin Liauw, courtesy of *The Straits Times*, 11 September 2008 (obituary notice).

8 – Sir Patrick Neill QC, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University (1985-89). Photograph courtesy of Rex/ Shutterstock.

9 – The Cambodia Trust clinic in Calmette Hospital, Phnom Penh, with prosthetist-orthotist Prum Sovann in the in the late 1990s. Sovann, who graduated as a Category II (BSc) prosthetist-orthotist in the first graduation of the CSPO (Cambodian School of Prosthetics & Orthotics) in March 1997, is still active as a senior prosthetist-orthotist in Cambodia. Photograph courtesy of The Cambodia Trust (post-2014, Exceed Worldwide).



10 – Louise Vidaud de Plaud (circa 1905-2007) visiting the nurses' crèche at the Children's Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City (pre-1975 Saigon) in June 1980. Photograph Mike Goldwater courtesy of Alamy Stock Fotos.



11 – Ambassador William Healy Sullivan (1922-2013), who came to Trinity College, Oxford, in the last week of December 1988 to meet with the Vietnamese Ambassador to the UK, His Excellency Trang van Hung, to discuss ways forward for the normalization of US-Vietnam diplomatic relations. Photograph by William E. Sauro courtesy of *The New York Times*, 28 October 2013 (obituary notice).

12 – Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach (1921-98; in office, 1980-91), Ambassador Sullivan's counterpart in the negotiations which followed the December 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Photograph by Bert Verhoeff for ANEFO (Algemeen Nederlandsch Fotobureau). Image courtesy of the Dutch National Archives (Nationaal Archief), The Hague, Fotocollectie Nederlands Persbureau, 1945-1989, file number 2.24.01.05, order number 928-8800.

15 – Peter Carey with his wife, Lina Surjanti, at Tutuala at the extreme eastern point of East Timor in late 2003 or early 2004. Photograph Peter Carey.

13 – East Timorese President Xanana Gusmão (in office, 2002-2007) and Peter Carey at a New Year's Eve Party at José Ramos-Horta's residence, 31 December 2003. Photograph Peter Carey.



14 – Peter Carey with his arm around former Falintil commander, Ma'huno Bulerek Karathayano (alias José António Gomes da Costa, 1949-2021; in post, 1992-93) at the inauguration of the renovation of the new Centre for Physical Rehabilitation in Becora, Díli in March 2004. Ma'huno had suffered a major stroke in November 1999 as a result of the prolonged torture he suffered at the hands of the Indonesians (1993-95). He was a strong supporter and patron of ASSERT (Associação Hi'it Ema Raes Timor, Association for the Raising up of the Disabled of East Timor). Our project contractor, Pak Frans (a Hakka Chinese born in Makassar), is at the rear. Photograph Peter Carey

COMPTES RENDUS

Guo fan ge wenxian ziliao jizhu 过番歌文献资料辑注 (Annotated Documentation on Songs of the Going Abroad), *Fujian juan* 福建卷 (Fujian Volume), Liu Denghan *deng* 刘登翰等 *bianzhu* 编注, Xiamen 厦门, Lujiang chubanshe, 2018, 10 + 5 + 414 p. Illustrations. ISBN 978-7-5459-1401-6

The *Guo fan ge* or "Songs of the Going Abroad" are poems written in Southern dialects, here mainly Minnanhua 闽南话 (with some in Fuzhouhua 福州话),[1] that circulated in the Chinese communities of Fujian, Taiwan and Southeast Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They constitute a minor part of the vernacular songbooks or *changben* 唱本 that were written in verse (of seven, six, five, and four feet), and eventually published in highly popular editions in Xiamen and other cities in South China. They may be divided into two subgroups according to the gender of the narrator. The long ones, *changpian shuochang* 长篇说唱, emanating from male migrants retell their fate abroad (except one play named *Fanpo nong* 番婆弄, or "The Foreign Woman" which consists of a funny dialogue between a Chinese man and a foreign woman (pp. 187-189)), while the short ones *duanpian shuochang* 短篇说唱, composed by females, deal with the points of view of the womenfolk on the harms of migration of their relatives abroad. It is a literature aimed at discouraging young men to go abroad to find a job. This explains why with the end of mass migration these songs have slowly disappeared.

1. Such as the one retelling the adventure of Wong Nai Siong 黄乃裳 (1849-1924), an educator and reformist leader who, with the help of missionaries, founded Xinfuzhou 新福州 or New Fuzhou by attracting about 1000 adult men and women and 300 children from the area of Fuzhou to Sibu, Sarawak. See *Archipel* 22, 1981, pp. 244-246.

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In the 1960s the late Dutch Sinologist Kristopher Schipper, then posted in Taiwan, managed to obtain one such song dating from the Daoguang 道光 era (1821-1850), entitled *Xinke guo fan ge* 新刻过番歌 or "Newly Engraved Song of the Going Abroad," compiled, *ji* 辑, by someone using the pen name of Nanan Jianghu ke 南安江湖客 or the Traveler of Nanan (South Fujian) of which he offered us a photocopy.[2] In 1987, we gave a copy of it to Liu Denghan specialist of Chinese literature at Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, and this was the starting point for his research on *the Guo fan ge*. Between 1991 and 2017, he published several articles related to this song and its variants. At the same time, he undertook surveys in various villages of South Fujian and, with the help of other researchers, recorded short and long songs which were still known locally. He also collected other songs recorded independently in Fujian and in Malaysia especially thanks to the help of the late So Khin Wah 苏庆华 and by Lau Tzy Cheng 刘子政.

This collection of 100 texts, plus 36 variants, allowed him to break down the whole documentation reproduced in this volume (pp. 1-332). As far as the long songs are concerned, there are 8 different stories, and 11 variants, *yiben* 异本 and *yiwen* 异文. The short songs amount to 92 poems, plus 31 variants. The main texts (excluding the variants) are provided with very detailed notes commenting on the dialectal terminology. In addition, some of the long poems are followed by a rather long explanatory commentary. This critical apparatus is of great help to the researchers who do not master these dialects.

The corpus is preceded by an introduction in four parts (pp. 1-9). The first part gives an overview of the economic reasons why the poorest villagers were forced to leave with the hope of finding work; the second deals with the difficulties encountered by the immigrants and the way in which the *Guo fan ge* reflect this alternative way of escaping poverty; the third gives a general presentation of these collective literary works, and the last sketches a comparison with the literature produced by the immigrants who went to the United States, and notably studied by Aying 阿英, and Him Mark Lay, Genny Lim, and Judy Yung.[3]

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2. The catalogue of the songbooks collected by Schipper has been published, see "Wubai jiuben gezice mulu 五百旧本歌仔册目录," *Taiwan fengwu* 台湾风物, 1965, 10 *yue* 月.

3. Aying, *Fan mei huagong jinyue wenxueji* 反美华工禁约文学集 (Anthology of literay texts opposing American prohibitory regulations against Chinese labor), Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1960. Him Mark Lay, Genny Lim and Judy Yung, *Island: Poetry and History of the Chinese immigrants on Angel Island 1910-1940*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1991 (first published in 1981). Angel Island in San Francisco Bay, was the entry, internment centre, and often closest approach to the US for Chinese immigrants in the early 20th century.

A rich appendix of five papers previously published (pp. 335-410), three by Liu Denghan, and two by researchers from Taiwan, Chen Yi-yuan 陈益源 and Ke Rongsan 柯荣三, provide an overview of what is known so far about the *guo fan ge*. Liu Denghan looks at the oldest *Guo fan ge* and its variants, the collective creation and dissemination of songs emanating from men, their contents and the message they convey. Chen Yiyuan and Ke Rongsan focus on five *Guo fan ge* found in Taiwan, while Ke alone in a final article focuses on the main message conveyed to their contemporaries, namely 千万不通行 or 'Never go to the South Seas'.

In the epilogue (pp. 411-414), Liu Denghan reflects on the chances that condition our research, and the passion he nurtured for this literature for nearly thirty years, but also on the technical difficulties encountered in producing this volume. In particular, the use of characters specific to the Minnan dialect which had to be created with the computer.

In short, this work on Fujian *guo fan ge*, which were on the verge of being forgotten, sheds new light on the way in which, for more than fifty years, this collective literature, both oral and written, was used in the struggle against the emigration of workers. In order to have a broader view of this phenomenon of cultural resistance to the impact of colonisation in Southeast Asia, let us hope that the collection of similar songs in other parts of southern China, in particular in Guangdong and Guangxi will be undertaken by other scholars.

Claudine Salmon

Leonard Blussé, *De Chinezen Moord. De Kolonisatie van Batavia en het Bloedbad van 1740* (The Chinese Massacre. The Colonisation of Batavia and the 1740 Bloodbath), Amsterdam, Balans, 2023, 395 p., 4 Maps, 21 Plates, Index, ISBN 978 94 638 2181 0

The first accounts following the massacre of the Chinese, including Governor General Adriaan Valckenier's report, as well as other anonymous texts arrived in Amsterdam in 1741 to be examined by the Gentlemen XVII of the Dutch East India Company (hereafter VOC) and some were published.[1] About hundred years later, Pastor W.R. van Hoëvell undertook a reconstruction of the events based on various archival accounts. According to him, it was not the colonial administration that had failed but one man, namely the

1. *Verzameling van verscheide echte stukken van Batavia herwaards gezonden* : *Concerneerende de opstand der Chineezen buiten, en de daar op gevolgde gruwelyke massacre binnen gemelde stad*, Dordrecht, Van Braal, a.o. (1741) (published anonymously).

Governor General.[2] Still nearly a century later, J.Th. Vermeulen reconsidered the subject in a thesis defended in 1938 at the University of Leiden,[3] and entitled "The Chinese of Batavia and the troubles of 1740" in which he came to the conclusion that all the faults could not be attributed to Valckenier, but rather to a weak government, led by an indecisive man who had been unable to provide leadership under very difficult circumstances. Although these two authors were aware of the existence of the *Kai ba lidai shiji* 开吧历代史纪 or "Chronicle of the Chinese of Batavia" and its adaptation in Dutch, which gives the author's point of view on the massacre, they hardly made use of it.[4] But for the Chinese historian, who sometimes interprets a little freely, but on a basis of truth, this catastrophe would not have taken place if, on October 9, "Van Imhoff had not given the order to send to the sea and to drown during the night all the Chinese who had been gathered on the sugar cane plantations and inside the city, falsely saying that they were going to be embarked on boats."

Leonard Blussé felt that the time had come to give a new interpretation of the facts by placing them in a more global perspective of the socio-economic relations between the VOC and the Chinese of Batavia and its surroundings, or Ommelanden, since the 17th century, but also of its relations with other European companies as well as with Imperial China. The author has also taken care to reintroduce quotations from the chronicle of which he had previously published a new translation in collaboration with Nie Dening 聂德宁,[5] thus restoring a certain balance between the Dutch and Chinese views. He divided his work chronologically into five parts presented like the acts of a classical tragedy: setting, plot, climax, catastrophe, events and catharsis, having, he tells us, been inspired by the poet Onno Zwier van Haren's (1713-1779) tragedy: "Agon, Sultan of Bantan."[6]

In the first part, which deals with the seventeenth century, the author emphasizes a form of partnership and even economic cooperation between the

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2. W.R. van Hoëvell, "Batavia in 1740," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1840 (3-1), pp. 447-556.

3. J.Th. Vermeulen, *De Chineezen te Batavia en de troebelen van 1740,* Leiden, N.V. Boek. En Steendrukkerij Eduard Ijdo, 1938. English translation by Tan Yeok Seong 陈育崧, "The Chinese in Batavia and the troubles of 1740," published (without the notes) in *Journal of South Seas Society*, Vol. IX (1), June 1953, pp. 1-68.

4. Cf. W.R. Hoëvell en Pieter Meijer (red.), "Chronologische Geschidenis van Batavia, Geschreven door een Chinees, uit het Chinesisch vertaald door W.H. Medhurst," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1840 (3-2), pp. 447-556. It is in fact the adaptation of an English translation by W.H. Medhurst since lost.

5. *The Chinese Annals of Batavia, the* Kai ba lidai shiji *and Other Stories (1610-1795*), Translated, edited, and annotated by Leonard Blussé & Nie Dening, Leiden, Brill, 2018; compte rendu dans *Archipel* 97, 2019, pp. 308-309.

6. See Denys Lombard, « Pages d'exotisme IX : "Agon Sultan de Bantan" Tragédie en cinq actes et en vers », *Archipel* 15, 1978, pp. 53-64.

VOC and Chinese merchants. First of all, with Governor General Jan Pietersz Coen, who felt that the Chinese had much to offer the Dutch (even to the point of devising a policy of forced emigration towards them); then with Pieter Jane van Hoorn (1619-1682) and his son Joan (G.G. from 1704 to 1709) who had a very original perception of China and the Chinese, with whom they engaged in agriculture and the sugar cane industry —a speciality of southern Fujian, the place of origin of the emigrants to Java— in the vicinity of Batavia, under the guidance of a chief of their nation. After his return from an official mission to China in 1675, P.J. van Hoorn, who had experienced "culture shock," went so far as to publish in Batavia an anthology of Confucian precepts in verse (*Eenige voorname eygenschappen van de ware Deugd, voorsichtigheydt, wyshseydt en volmaeckheydt, Getrocken uyt den Chineschen Confucius*), possibly adapted from a Latin translation of the Confucian classics by the Jesuits, and apparently lost.

The two following parts, which in our opinion would have benefited from being more synthesized, deal with the various changes of the end of the 17th century and the first decades of the 18th century: —socio-political upheavals in the Chinese world leading to significant migratory flows of a new type and difficult to integrate economically, —natural disasters, epidemics of malaria, mismanagement in the management of the sugar industry,— bitter competition with the other European trading companies, —strong rivalries between these gentlemen of the Company, in particular between G.G. Adriaan Valckenier and Gustav Willem Van Imhoff, former G.G in Ceylon, who had just returned to Batavia on April 21, 1740. In summary, according to Cheng Xunwo 程逊我, Chinese scholar who stayed in Batavia in the 1730s, the Dutch authorities worried about the development of the Chinese community, took oppressive measures and established abusive taxes which made the atmosphere unbearable and were the cause of strong discontent and widespread fear, which sparked the rebellion.[7]

In the fourth part, the measures taken on the initiative of Van Imhoff are considered in order to deport as many Chinese as possible without work and without papers, which Valckenier was not in favor of and which he ended up opposing, but without being able to erase the harm they had caused to society. Then, the author analyzes in detail the reactions that followed: rebellion in the Ommelanden, attacks in the direction of Batavia, military repression, but also looting, fire, and systematic massacre of the Chinese inhabitants by the dregs of the European society, finally continuation of the war in the interior of Java until 1743.

It also follows the chronology of the conflicts between Valckenier and van Imhoff. The former, who had thought he could get rid of the latter by having

7. See here Claudine Salmon, "The Massacre of 1740 as Reflected in a Contemporary Chinese Narrative," *Archipel* 77, 2009, pp. 149-154.

him arrested and sent to the metropolis in 1741, was finally stripped of the office of G.G. and put in prison where he died in 1751, before his trial had been completed. As for van Imhoff, he returned to Batavia in 1743 and took up the post of G.G., which he held until his death in 1750. The local society took a long time to recover, as did the sugar industry and trade with China. The Chinese community remained without leaders until 1747 and the Chinese were forever banned from the walled city and their freedom of movement was tightly controlled. Before the authorities had time to fully appreciate the significance of the changes in the social fabric of the 1730s, colonial society had exploded as a result of extremely brutal administrative measures. Social harmony was gone forever, and Batavia never regained its former status.

At a time when many countries are looking back, not without difficulty, at their colonial past in order to rewrite their respective histories, Blussé's approach is significant. The question that arises is why the author chose to write in a rather arduous Dutch language that seriously limits the impact of his work? Judging by some recent publications in Indonesian on the massacre of 1740, and the various reinterpretations of the 1740s disturbances in the newly privately built museums, the horror of this massacre is undoubtedly much more present in the memories of Indonesia than in those of the Netherlands.[8] Such an account in English would have helped to broaden the historical reflection on this still painful past.

Claudine Salmon

David Van Reybrouck, *Revolusi: Indonesien und die Entstehung der modernen Welt.* Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2022. (*Revolution: Indonesia and the emergence of the modern world*.) Translated by Andreas Ecke from Van Reybrouck, *Revolusi: Indonesië en het ontstaan van de moderne wereld.* Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2020. Bibliographic note, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-3-518-43092-7.

Van Reybrouck, an experienced Belgian journalist, published this book in Amsterdam amidst a number of Dutch publications dealing seriously and critically with the colonial experience and the independence war in the East Indies. Nevertheless, and in contrast to public opinion about colonial histories in Great Britain or France, many people in the Netherlands still retain a nostalgia for its imperial past. Perhaps not surprisingly, an adherent of a right-wing party, angered by the negative picture the book paints of Dutch colonial policies, insisted that Van Reybrouck should first examine his own Belgian

8. For a partial list, see Mary Somers Heidhues, "1740 and the Chinese Massacre in Batavia: Some German Eyewitness Accounts," *op. cit.*, pp. 117-119; Claudine Salmon, & Myra Sidharta, "Sino-Indonesian Private History Museums, Cultural Heritage Places, and the (Re)construction of the Past," *Asian Culture*, 42, 2018, pp. 1-28.

colonial past. The reproach was too late: the author's prizewinning volume on the Congo had appeared almost a decade earlier.

This mammoth volume (751 pages) goes far beyond the Indonesian Revolution itself in its wide-ranging history of modern Indonesia. Only in the last chapters does it really explore its title: how Indonesia and its revolution gave birth to the modern world. It devotes nearly 200 pages to colonial times before turning to the pivotal experience of the Japanese Occupation. Intriguing is the author´s comparison of colonial society to a steamship; it uses the example of the passenger ship Van Wijck, which capsized near Surabaya in 1936, to illustrate how the different races/classes were largely confined to their own "deck" in the Netherlands East Indies. Obviously, Europeans occupied the top deck. Mobility between classes was strictly limited.

Japan's rapid conquest of the Dutch East Indies in early 1942 owed much to the expectant welcome native Indonesians gave to the occupiers. Native nationalists, many still in prison or exile, had new but limited chances for leadership and political experience. Later, disillusionment set in as Japan's forced recruitment of labor and requisition of rice devastated the populace. Yet, Japan was still in near-full control of the Archipelago when the war ended, and the expectation of the Netherlands that colonial authority would be restored with the help of the British proved unrealistic. Indonesia was free. Its leaders had declared their independence. In the next years, one outside force after another attempted to gain control and restore some form of Dutch sovereignty—1946 was the brief "British Year," the "Dutch Year" lasted from November 1946, when the Netherlands had enough forces on the ground to attempt control, until July 1947. Then followed a forceful "American Year" of diplomatic interventions, with the USA increasingly leaning to the Indonesian side but maintaining its own interests, from August 1947 to December 1948. The final year, from December 1948, was a "Year of the United Nations" that drew the intervention of a wider circle of nations, including India. The "Transfer of Sovereignty" ended the fighting, but left Indonesia in a union with the Netherlands and deprived, initially, of control over its easternmost territory, West New Guinea.

The story is well-known to readers of *Archipel*; the account is devoted to facts but never dense. The bibliography cites several hundred well-qualified but secondary sources, while a bibliographic note reviews the most important ones; the author spent years assembling them. Special to this work, however, are the oral history interviews with historical witnesses—not, for the most part prominent ones, but participants and witnesses nevertheless, who at the age of 90 and 100 or more still recollect their experiences. They include Dutch and Indonesian soldiers, minor political figures, victims of camps and even former Gurkhas in Nepal, who had fought for the British military, or Indonesian communists who, stranded in wartime Holland, contributed to the

Dutch Résistance against Germany. For these, Van Reybrouck employed an entire corps of translators, and they add to the immediacy of this eminently readable account. Many informants have since died, but, when they spoke to him, their memories remained surprisingly vivid.

In general, the author takes the Republic's side and centers on Java. He is extremely critical of Dutch policy during most of these years, especially of the decisions of conservative politicians and military to torpedo the Linggajati agreement and others for cessation of hostilities. These figures led the turn to military intervention with the excuse of Republican violations of the agreements. The two euphemistically-named "Police Actions" initiated by Dutch General Spoor were textbook examples of Pyrrhic victories, as they expanded Dutch territory but left it indefensible. The book also discusses military atrocities on the Dutch side that a later official investigation vaguely called "excesses", but says little about the violence on the Indonesian side. Although recent studies have been more critical of the Netherlands' side, the later issue remains a controversial one in domestic politics.

How did Indonesia's Revolution give birth to the modern world? The author's answer is largely at the end of the book. Did the Revolution of 1945-1949 drive independence movements (but how about Vietnam's revolution of 1945)? Instead, Van Reybrouck attributes Indonesia's greatest influence to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955. The independence of African countries followed and the non-aligned movement became an important third factor in the Cold War rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union. The composition of the United Nations changed greatly, with dozens of new nations admitted. Colonialism in its old form became unthinkable, whether through violent revolutions or non-violent political transitions. The author insists that the Indonesian Revolution was not merely a sideshow of World War II, or an exceptional outbreak of violence, but the beginning of a new world balance of power.

Even experienced Indonesia hands will appreciate this overview, if not all the author's arguments. In such a monumental study, one or two minor mistakes may creep in. Taufik Abdullah, an eminent historian, has become "Abdullah Taufik." In all, Van Reybrouck has performed a monumental task, producing an informative, readable volume. From its original Dutch edition, this work has been translated into French, German, Spanish, and Italian; translations in English and other languages are in planning.

Mary Somers Heidhues
Göttingen

Ada Apa dengan Raden Saleh [What's up with Raden Saleh]? *Pangeran dari Timur* – A Review, A Novel by Iksaka Banu & Kurnia Effendi, Bentang Pustaka, 2020, 604 pages, 5 illustrations Novel Historical Fiction, ISBN: 978-602-291-675-8

Synopsis: Based on the description on the back cover of the book edited by Peter Carey



Raden Saleh (circa 1811-1880) was still a teenager when he was separated from his family in Terboyo, Semarang, in early 1829 as the Java War (1825-30) entered its final year. Colonial officials, including the German missionary, JFC Gericke (1798-1857), had early on discerned the young Sarib Saleh's artistic talent. Trained by the Belgian painter-architect, AAJ Payen (1792-1853), in Bogor and West Java in the early to mid 1820s, he was chosen to accompany the Belgian Director of Finances, Jean-Baptiste de Linge, on the lengthy 10,000 nautical mile journey to the Netherlands, a country he had only heard about through the stories told him by his family in Terboyo and educated Javanese. In Europe, first the Netherlands, then Dresden (Germany) and finally Paris, Saleh mixed with leading European artists and developed his own unique artistic genius. He showed that he could paint not only the lush landscapes of his native Java, but also the faces and events of the Romantic era (1800-1850) in Europe.

Years of living on the other side of the world meant that, when he did eventually return to his homeland in early 1852, he found a land transformed by the indigo and sugar factories of the Cultivation System (1830-1870). Despite his initial feelings of alienation, he still could not deny his calling to depict the beauty of his native Java on canvas. As he explained in the introduction to his now lost 1849 "Memoirs" written in Maxen (Saxony): "Between these two poles [Europe and Java] my life is divided [and] I feel compelled to make *both* a sacrificial offering of grateful love. I believe there is no better way of doing this than by telling my friends [in Europe] about the simple customs and happiness of the people amongst whom I was born, and by painting my loved ones at home a picture of the wonders of Europe and of the majestic dignity of human intellect. The language I speak is not the pompous language of […] science but the simple childish speech of the heart" (Kraus and Vogelsang 2012:25). Although Saleh's artistic oeuvre developed beyond the wildest expectations of his artistic mentors it also created a fierce debate among art connoisseurs during the era of the Indonesian national independence movement or *pergerakan nasional* (1909-1942). Was he an

"Uncle Tom" who had sold out to the Dutch, or an anti-colonialist who used his artistic skills to critique and undermine the colonial project?

Syamsudin, a Bandung-based architect active in the interwar years, had developed an interest in modern art, in particular the Romantic paintings of Raden Saleh. He succeeds in transmitting his passion to Ratna Juwita, the Sundanese girl whom he adores. On the revolutionary side of the nationalist movement, Syafei, with his rebellious spirit, takes the hard high road towards the ideals of being an independent nation ending up dying young in the notorious Dutch prison camp of Boven Digul in West Papua. Together, they complete the history of the founding of a country, with their own desires, ambitions and passions. And, in the midst of the long drawn out social and political turmoil of the birth of a nation fighting for its destiny, a love story will always provide a flame: warm and dangerous.

Review

Synopsis

Pangeran dari Timur, a 600-page historical novel divided into 45 chapters, is a remarkable achievement resting as it does on over 20 years of serious research on the part of the lead author, Iksaka Banu, who researched and wrote all the sections on Raden Saleh. Kurnia Effendi, his co-author did the same with the sections of Bandung in the inter-war years and the 1926 rebellion in West Java. But despite its depth of research and ambitious scope, the book fails to take off as a novel because it tries to go in too many different directions all at once. In particular, the mirroring of the novel plot of Saleh's time in Batavia and the interwar romance between Syamsudin and Ratna Juwita in Bandung strains credulity.

Apparently, the idea of developing a multi-strand "War and Peace" style narrative was suggested by the book's publisher, Bentang, who felt that a monographic —single-strand— narrative based on Raden Saleh's life would not attract a younger audience. This is why the frankly insipid characters of Ratna and Syamsudin were forced on the book. They are there to create a love interest thus appealing to millennials and Generation-Z readers. But I am not sure that this really works. This is especially the case when two-thirds of the way through the book, the novel branches out into three separate storylines —Raden Saleh himself, the Bandung situation 1926-1945, and Syafei's Boven Digul imprisonment and death. These take the reader into completely different chronologies and milieux. All three strands might have made for strong narratives in themselves, but moving from Saleh's very compelling fictionalised life history to these other plots is frankly distracting. It might have worked better if the authors had focussed on greater background depth for the context of the main storyline on Raden Saleh and the different milieux

through which he moved. Others, however, may think this multi-layering of the novel a masterstroke. For the present reviewer, it was like someone pressing on your doorbell on your wedding night!

Why is Pangeran dari Timur *Important for contemporary Indonesia?*

> "A Senegalese poet once said: 'In the end we will conserve only what we love. We love only what we understand and we will understand only what we are taught'." (Yo-Yo Ma, White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy, 2000)

Obviously, *Pangeran dari Timur* is a fictionalized version of Raden Saleh and his world. There is no harm in that. *Du Coté de Chez Swann* (Swann's Way) (1913) and Combray (Illiers), the fictionalized Normandy village —now Illiers-Combray in Proust's honour— is a recreation of the world of Proust's childhood. But, whereas Proust's novel works at the level of the imagination, *Pangeran dari Timur* does not. I will dig more deeply into this below, but first what is the significance of this novel for Indonesia?

In contemporary Indonesia, it is particularly important to have such a novel because works of history need to be presented in culturally accessible ways. These can include films, novels, art exhibits, paintings, cartoons, animated films ("Diponegoro 1830," available on YouTube), documentaries, operas, *tuturan* (dramatic readings in the traditional Malay spoken *hikayat* style), *wayang* and dance performances. This is the way a wider readership, particularly millennials and members of Generation Z, the generational cohort born between the late 1990s and early 2010s —28 percent of Indonesia's 280 million population—will access history here in Indonesia. Since a recent survey (Miller and McKenna 2016) has estimated that one in a thousand Indonesians read books on a regular basis, it is unlikely that multi-volume tomes like *Kuasa Ramalan: Pangeran Diponegoro dan Akhir Tatanan Lama di Jawa, 1785-1855* (2012), the Indonesian translation of the present reviewer's full-length 2007 KITLV Press (Leiden) Diponegoro biography, *Power of Prophecy; Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855* (Carey 2012), will be their doorway to learning about their past. Such weighty works are immediately off-putting and seen by most as '*berat di tangan dan berat di kepala*' (heavy on the hand, heavy on the head)!

Although very few have read my work on Diponegoro (1785-1855), many more have seen Mas Don (Professor Sardono W. Kusumo's) *Opera Diponegoro* (1995), or been to Mas Landung Simatupang's "Aku Diponegoro [I Diponegoro!]!" *tuturan* readings (Simatupang 2015),[1] or visited the "*Aku Diponegoro; Sang Pangeran dalam Ingatan Bangsa* [A Prince for All Seasons:

1. These dramatic readings took place in four venues associated with the prince's life: Magelang (24 November 2013), Tegalrejo (Yogyakarta, 8 January 2014), Jakarta (5 March 2014) and Fort Rotterdam (Makassar, 5 June 2014). See Simatupang 2015:xiv-xv.

Diponegoro in the Memory of the Nation from Raden Saleh to the Present]" month-long art exhibition at the Indonesian National Gallery (GalNas 2015), which attracted nearly 26,000 visitors in the 24 days the exhibit was open between 6 February and 8 March 2015 (Agnes 2015)!

A measure of the impact of such literary and artistic events related to Raden Saleh is the popular heist film *Mencuri Raden Saleh* [Stealing Raden Saleh] (Angga Dwimas Sasongko, 25 August 2022). Based on a fictional plot involving the stealing of Raden Saleh's masterpiece, "The Arrest of Diponegoro" (1857) from the Istana Merdeka (Merdeka [Freedom] Palace), the official residence of the Indonesian President, this film attracted a movie audience of 1.5 million viewers within the first fortnight after its release (*Jawa Pos* 2022). Sequels are now being planned (WhatsApp, Subianto [documentary film maker], 9 September 2022).

What is striking is that such a film, which trades on the instant "brand recognition" of Raden Saleh's name and his famous "Arrest" painting, could not have been made over a decade ago. Before June 2012, Raden Saleh was only a name with resonance amongst the Indonesian artistic cognoscenti. I know this because when my friend, Bang JJ Rizal, was about to publish the volume of essays, *Raden Saleh: Anak Belanda, Mooi Indië, & Nasionalisme* in February 2009 at his Komunitas Bambu (Kobam) Press in Depok, I had to provide a copy of Raden Saleh's "Arrest" painting for the back cover.[2] Apparently this image was unobtainable on the internet at that time. Luckily, I was able to provide a diapositive colour image (slide) which I had obtained directly from the Museum Bronbeek, Arnhem, the Netherlands, where the painting was displayed until its return to Indonesia in 1978.[3] At the time, I needed the image to prepare my article on "Raden Saleh, Dipanagara, and the Painting of the Capture of Dipanagara at Magelang (28 March 1830)" (Carey 1982).

The solo exhibition "Raden Saleh and the Beginning of Indonesian Modern Painting," curated by the German Raden Saleh expert, Werner Kraus, at the Galeri Nasional 3-17 June 2012, was the turning point here. Supported by the German government and the Goethe Institute Jakarta, this was the first major exhibition of Saleh's works since his death in 1880. It brought together some 40 of the 140+ paintings still believed to be extant in private and public collections. The "jewel in the crown" was of course, the "Arrest of the Javanese leader Diponegoro" (original German title: "*Ein Historisches Tableau: De Gefanghenname des Javanischen Häuptlings Diepo Negoro*," 1857), borrowed from the Presidential Collection. This had been given a preliminary cleaning by the German art restorer, Suzanne Erhards,[4] before her complete restoration

2. This publication is now in its second revised edition (June 2022). See Rizal 2009, 2022.

3. This occurred under the auspices of the Oranje Nassau Foundation, see Carey 1982:2 quoting Depdikbud 1978.

4. Stellvertrender CEO at Fine Art Conservation, Fachhochschule Köln.

of the masterpiece in June-August 2013.[5] The exhibit broke all records for visitor numbers, attracting over 20,000 in its brief 14-day showing. This was a substantially higher *per diem* inflow than those who attended the February-March 2015 'Aku Diponegoro' show three years later (Agnes 2015).

A friend, Michael Nicholson, a senior member of the Indonesian Heritage Society (IHS), who was given a "private" viewing by the curator, Werner Kraus, recalled how he was asked to come after the exhibit closed at six o'clock in the evening. But, when he turned up, the queue of visitors still stretched all the way from the National Gallery (GalNas) to the main road, Jalan Merdeka Timur, a distance of some 150 meters. So the closing time had to be extended to eight o'clock at night by which time the "private viewing" had taken place with a gallery still full of the general public. "It was an outstanding exhibit that is unlikely to be repeated because of technical difficulties [ie the expense and difficulty of bringing paintings from all over the world]" was Nicholson's verdict (WhatsApp, Mike Nicholson, 22 February 2023).

Here we can witness how literary and artistic events can shape popular consciousness. This can make ordinary Indonesians better aware of their cultural inheritance. Few amongst the 20,000 visitors who attended the June 2012 GalNas exhibit, still less the 1,5 million who flocked to post-Covid cinemas to see the heist thriller "Mencuri Raden Saleh" probably had more than a passing acquaintance with the details of Raden Saleh's life let alone the historical context of his "Arrest" painting. But by late 2022, both Saleh and his magnum opus were sufficiently lodged in the national consciousness that they were recognised as national "treasures" capable of attracting a sizeable film audience. This creates a "virtuous cycle" in which cultural events, dramatic performances and works of literature can feed into a wider popular understanding of art and culture in Indonesia. This is where *Pangeran dari Timur* comes into its own.

Critical Reflections on Pangeran dari Timur

One thing which immediately leaps off the page when reading this book is that it is based on serious archival research. The present reviewer even found a mention of his Sundanese-Hokkien-Japanese wife's grandfather, Tōshirō Aimono (deceased circa 1934), the owner of the Toko Toyama ("mountain of iron' in Japanese —" Toijama & Co Toko Japan' in the original iteration)— general store, originally situated at Pasar Baru 36, Bandung. Such details could only have been gleaned from a very close reading of the local Dutch-language press from the interwar years —for example, *Preangerbode*, 10-11-1922 and

5. The US$70,000 cost was paid for jointly by the Goethe Institute Indonesia, who covered all Erhards' travel and living expenses, and by the Yayasan Arsari Djojohadikusumo (YAD), whose head, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, had his own collection of Raden Saleh paintings, Rulistia 2013.

De Indische Courant, 13-12-1934 (available at www.delpher.nl/nl/kranten)—or reference works like Katam and Abadi's *Album Bandoeng Tempo Doeloe* (2006). I found this impressive.

Sometimes, this archival sure-footedness deserts the authors. For example, the famous English photographer Walter Bentley Woodbury (1834-1885), who opened a studio in Batavia with his partner, James Page (1833-1865), and were active in the years 1856-1861, was born in Manchester and was a British national not German as he is referred to in the book. More important, in the long chapter "Kuda Pacu dan Begal [the Race Horse and the Robber]," which deals with Raden Saleh's arrest in a case of mistaken identity in 1869 (Kraus 2018:175-5), it is very unlikely that an Assistant-Resident, Van Musschenbroek (Buitenzorg/Bogor), would speak to his superior, the Resident of Batavia, Hendrik Jeronimus Christiaan Hoogeveen (1823-1881; in office, 1866-73), in the truculent way depicted in this book. This sort of "insubordination" just did not occur in the Dutch colonial administration—the *Binnenlands Bestuur* (Internal Administration, BB) —where Residents were gods in their respective localities. We know this from the famous example of Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820-1887). Writing under the pen name, Multatuli ("I have Suffered Much"), he vividly described what happened when junior ranked civil servants got above themselves and contradicted their superiors. In the case of Douwes Dekker and the Lebak Affair (1856), a case involving the exploitation of the native population by local Bantenese officials, this led to the stormy petrel Dekker/Multatuli's immediate dismissal (1857), an event later immortalised in his famous novel *Max Havelaar* (1860).

In the latter part of the book we are told that on the fifth day the cruiser *Java* carrying Syafei and his fellow revolutionaries to Boven Digul eventually reaches Makassar ('*pada hari kelima kapal merapat di Pelabuhan Makassar*' p.425). It is simply not possible that even a large man-of-war with coal-fired engines would take *five* sailing days to reach Makassar from Surabaya. Tanjung Perak to Makassar is a distance of just 430 nautical miles. If one assumes that one travels at an average speed of 14 knots (nautical miles) an hour, such a journey would take at the most 30 hours to complete. The present reviewer has made this selfsame voyage as a deck passenger when he was a graduate student following in the footsteps of Diponegoro and sailing on a *Radeau de la Méduse* (Medusa's Raft) type PELNI (Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia) ship from Surabaya to Makassar in September 1972. At that time, the cargo ship took two days and a night. Exactly 30 hours in fact.

Still on the theme of Makassar, *Pangeran dari Timur* gives a detailed description of Fort Rotterdam (p. 563), when Ratna and Syamsudin are passing through in 1953 on their way to Boven Digul. The text states that "on the extreme right-hand side [of the Fort], which we saw from the outside, there is the Bastion Bacan. In this place formerly, Prince Diponegoro apparently

ended the remainder of his days with his family [*Yang di ujung paling kanan adalah kubu Bacan yang tadi kita lihat dari luar. Di tempat ini dahulu, konon, Pangeran Dipanegara menghabiskan sisa hidup bersama keluarganya*].” But this is entirely a figment of the authors’ imagination. The actual location of Diponegoro’s detention in Fort Rotterdam (1833-1855) was in an officer’s dwelling (post-1844, two officers’ dwellings) situated besides the main guardhouse or *hoofdwacht* overlooking the *landpoort* (landward gate) leading into the city of Makassar (Carey 2008:737). A political prisoner as important as Diponegoro would certainly have not been located on any bastion which were gun emplacements not places of residence.

Then there are the larger historical contexts and milieux which the authors could perhaps have made more of. One has already been mentioned, namely the fact that when Raden Saleh returned home from his 22-year sojourn Europe in 1852, he found a completely changed Java. This was no longer the tradition village world of “old order” Java in which the young Raden Saleh had grown up, but one transformed by the sugar and indigo factories and *de facto* slavery of the Cultivation System (1830-1870). It was as though the painter had suddenly stepped into an antebellum Southern United States of ‘king cotton’. This was a huge shock. Saleh may also have experienced the same feeling in reverse when he returned to Europe in the 1870s and found a Germany transformed by Bismarck’s politics of “blood-and-iron.” Uniformed officers could now be spotted at railway stations as they travelled between their various barracks and military posts, a fact also noted by the Filipino nationalist writer, José Rizal (1861-1896), when he lived in Berlin for six months between November 1886 and May 1887.[6] By this time, Germany had become a highly militarised society, a fact which struck me forcibly when I visited Berlin and Potsdam immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall (9 November 1989). Walking through what had been East Berlin, I saw row upon row of late 19th-century barracks recently vacated by the Soviet Red Army but originally built in Wilhelmine Germany for the army of the Second Reich (1871-1919) after its great victories in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian Wars (1870-1871). This was a Europe transformed from what Raden Saleh had known during the much cosier —*gemütlich*— Germany of the *kleinstaaterei* (little states/principalities of pre-unification Germany) in the 1840s, when he had been so entranced by the cultural atmosphere of Dresden with its openness and refreshing lack of racism. This was so different from the arrogant and demeaning views expressed by Queen Victoria’s (r.1837-1901) lady-in-waiting, Lady Canning (1817-1861; in office 1842-1855), and the British Foreign Minister, Lord Aberdeen (1784-1860, in office 1841-46), when they visited Coburg, home of the queen’s cousin Grand-Duke Ernst II of Saxe Coburg-Gotha, in the entourage of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort in 1845:[7]

6. Zaide and Zaide, Chapter 7.

7. See Kraus 2018:56 quoting Surtees 1975:158.

> "In the Gd. [Grand] Duke of Baden's room, I saw one of the works of the Java Prince Ali [Raden Saleh], who lives at Coburgh [Coburg] like a tame monkey about the house. Ld. [Lord] Aberdeen was so taken aback the first day [at Coburg] to see this black in his Turkish dress instead of handing us coffee, quietly take some to drink himself."

Raden Saleh made two great historical paintings relating to Java in his 60-year artistic career. The first was "The Arrest" painting (1857) (see above), which the authors make much of and feature in a special image in the present volume (p. 296). But the second, *Watersnood in Midden Java* [A Flood in Central Java] (1862), which draws on Théodore Gericault's politically charged *Le Radeau de la Méduse* (1819-21), is only mentioned in passing (pp. 312-313). Yet this is a really important 'political' painting, which gives us an insight onto the nature of Raden Saleh's anti-colonial struggle through his art. It depicts the aftermath of the devastating flood which followed the torrential rains of the night of 21-22 February 1861 (Carey 2008:36 fn.99; 2012:42 fn.99; Kraus and Vogelsang 2012:101-106, 229). Saleh focusses on the Central Javanese district of Banyumas, where the flooding was particularly severe. A senior Javanese official —perhaps a *wedono* (district head)— recognisable from his striped *lurik* jacket and blue batik wrap-around cloth (*kain*) is depicted atop a raft made up of a rapidly disintegrating palm-thatched roof. The message of the painting is clear. In their hour of need, the Javanese can count only on themselves. Despite the scale of the disaster, there is no trace of a representative of the colonial state anywhere to be seen. And this despite the fact that it is that very state which is supposed to ensure the safety and welfare of its Javanese subjects. Instead, the latter have been left to fend for themselves. The rescue, as depicted in Saleh's work, is being effected by a villager in a small dug-out canoe as though underscoring the message, in Werner Kraus's words, 'that the Javanese cannot and must not rely on help from the colonial government in times of disaster. The only thing that can save them is their own mutual self-help and solidarity' (Kraus and Vogelsang 2012:106).

Obviously, there is a limit to what can be introduced into a novel, especially one as ambitious as Iksaka Banu and Kurnia Effendi's magnum opus. But I hope these reflections may provide a starting point for a revision for a second edition. As I wrote to Bung Banu when I finally turned the last page on his novel during the first year of the Covid lockdown which for the present reviewer was the "best and the worst of times" (the best because it gave so much space for reading and writing, the worst because so many close friends died):

> "I really appreciated receiving your great novel and reading it and feel sure that many more Indonesian readers will now come to Raden Saleh and his *oeuvre* who would previously have only known him as a name. A great achievement! Well done!"

Peter Carey, Serpong, 24 February 2023

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Résumés – Abstracts

Mohammad Ali Fadillah (Dept. of History Education, Faculty of Teaching and Education Programmes, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa University, Serang, Banten)

Pinggiran Selatan Kota Banten: Investigasi Arkeologi Situs Lawang Abang

The growth of international trade in the sea lanes of Southeast Asia affects Banten's progress in the economic and social fields. This research focuses on socio-religious aspects in the southern suburbs of Banten which have not been widely studied during the research season two decades ago. This research was conducted to explore the archaeological remains that still exist in the area. Archaeological investigations at the Lawang Abang site, near Kenari village on the southern outskirts of Banten city, have uncovered the brick and coral structures and the burial complex marked with Acehnese tombstones. With archaeological and historical approaches, surface data show the remains of religious monuments that are estimated from the second half of the 17th century to the beginning of the 19th century.

Les franges méridionales de la villes de Banten : investigations archéologiques sur le site de Lawang Abang

La croissance du commerce international dans les voies maritimes de l'Asie du Sud-Est influença les progrès de Banten dans les domaines économique et social. Cette recherche se concentre sur les aspects socio-religieux dans la banlieue sud de Banten qui n'ont pas été beaucoup étudiés pendant la saison de recherche il y a deux décennies. Cette recherche a été menée pour explorer les vestiges archéologiques qui existent encore dans la région. Des investigations archéologiques sur le site de Lawang Abang, près du village de Kenari, à la périphérie sud de l'ancienne ville de Banten, ont mis au jour des structures en brique et en corail et des sites funéraires marqués de pierres tombales d'Aceh. Dans une approche archéologique et historique, les données de surface montrent des vestiges de monuments religieux datant de la seconde moitié du XVII^{e} siècle au début du XIX^{e} siècle.

Daniel Perret (École française d'Extrême-Orient)

Images de Sindanglaya et ses environs au XIX^e^ siècle

L'artiste-peintre Marius Perret, qui a fait l'objet d'une contribution dans le précédent numéro de cette revue, nous a laissé plusieurs aquarelles de Sindanglaya et de ses environs. Sa contribution artistique est l'occasion de revenir sur la place particulière qu'occupe cette région de l'ouest de Java dans les récits de voyages et l'histoire iconographique de l'Archipel au XIX^e^ siècle. Les témoignages de cette époque sont principalement alimentés par trois thèmes : un environnement unique, le relais sur la Grande Route de Poste, l'hôtel et maison de repos.

Images of Sindanglaya and its surroundings in the 19th century

The artist-painter Marius Perret, the subject of a contribution in the previous issue of this journal, has left several watercolors of Sindanglaya and its surroundings. His artistic contribution is an opportunity to remind the special place occupied by this region of West Java in travelogues and the iconographic history of the Archipelago in the 19th century. The various accounts are mainly focused on three themes: a unique environment, the relay on the Grote Postweg, the hotel and rest home.

Eka Ningtyas (INALCO Paris-France, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta)

Paving the way to Struggle: First Kebatinan Congress (1955) and the Politics of Religious Discourse in Indonesia

Kebatinan ("the knowledge of spirit") is a religious movement first established in 1955 with the Semarang theosophical group's support. The movement's name is derived from mystical practices that have developed in the Malay world since the end of the 19th century, characterized by an emphasis on spirituality to get closer to God. This article focuses on the formation of religious discourse in the Indonesian Kebatinan Congress of 1955 as a response to the relationship between the state and society within the framework of religion as codified by the Pancasila. The main concerns of this paper are the formation of the concept of kebatinan, the debates it raised, and the position of the Kebatinan movement within the religious discourse in 1950s Indonesia. The article argues that at this period, Indonesia's religious discourse was fluid and loosely formalized. The progressive formalization process starting from this period can be analyzed through the formation of an umbrella organization for the Kebatinan movement by some adherents who considered themselves as representing a brand different from mainstream religious institutions.

Ouvrir la voie à la lutte : le premier congrès du Kebatinan (1955) et la politique du discours religieux en Indonésie

Kebatinan (la connaissance de l'esprit) est un mouvement religieux créé en 1955 avec le soutien du groupe théosophique de Semarang. Le nom du mouvement est dérivé des pratiques mystiques qui se sont développées dans le monde malais depuis la fin

du XIX^e siècle, caractérisé par un accent mis sur la spiritualité pour se rapprocher de Dieu. Cet article se concentre sur la formation du discours religieux dans le Congrès du Kebatinan de 1955 comme une réponse à la relation entre l'État et la société dans le cadre de la religion telle que codifié par le Pancasila. Les principales préoccupations de cet article sont la formation du concept de kebatinan, les débats qu'il a soulevés et la position du mouvement Kebatinan dans le discours religieux de l'Indonésie des années 1950. L'article soutient qu'à cette période, le discours religieux indonésien était fluide et peu formalisé. Le processus de formalisation progressive à partir de cette période peut être analysé à travers la formation d'une organisation faîtière pour le mouvement Kebatinan par certains adhérents qui se considéraient comme représentants une marque différente des institutions religieuses dominantes.

Eduardo Erlangga Drestanta (Paris-Sorbonne, France)

Customary Village (*Desa Adat*) and Inter-Ethnic Fragmentations in Seram Island, Maluku

This article introduces the socio-spatial implications of the recent transformation of inter-ethnic relations in Seram Island, Maluku. These transformations follow the implementation of the current regional autonomy policies in Indonesia, specifically on Customary Village (*Desa Adat*) Law No. 6 of 2014, which provides legal support for re-strengthening the traditional political forms at the village level or commonly known as *negeri adat* in the context of Maluku. The author highlights the consequences of this law on the change of governmental structural status from the uniform village model of *desa*, which was held previously in Soeharto's New Order era, to *negeri adat*. This law provided a chance for minority groups generally termed by the surrounding population as "primitive" or "backward" to gradually emerge as political actors. Yet, this revival of *adat* has also generated a rivalry among villages on obtaining the "adat" label. It resulted in renewed identity claims and encouraged villagers to demand an increased village fragmentation (*pemekaran desa*) in order to gain independent financial resource from the government as well as to reinforce their autonomy in managing their traditional territory. Given these contesting claims, the challenges around the discourse of *adat* and the definition of *adat* itself remain unclear and need to be discussed. In Indonesia, especially in the context of Maluku society, *adat* is still considered as a natural state that is widely prevalent within the society's daily life, such as social hierarchies and institutions as well as land transmission processes. On the other hand, this article attempts to show how *adat* also promotes areas of intervention in political contests and, thus, will concentrate on the processes of administrative configuration and on the power games between village societies. Examined through ethnographic method and participatory mapping, the focal point of interest is a sub-village (*dusun*) named Masihulan, a minority hinterland community of animists in North Seram, the so-called Alifuru. The author analyses how the application of *desa adat* law has provided this community the opportunity to split from its previous principal village, called Sawai, in order to become an independent village. Besides the economic oriented objective, divergent identity claims exacerbate local tensions and may provoke disintegration between social groups.

Villages coutumiers (*desa adat*) et fragmentations inter-ethniques sur l'île de Seram (Moluques)

Cet article présente les implications socio-spatiales des récentes transformations des relations interethniques dans l'île de Seram, aux Moluques. Ces transformations résultent de la mise en œuvre des politiques d'autonomie régionale en Indonésie, en particulier la loi n° 6 de 2014 sur les villages coutumiers (*Desa Adat*), qui apporte un soutien juridique au renforcement des formes politiques villageoises traditionnelles, communément appelées *negeri adat* dans le contexte moluquois. L'auteur souligne les conséquences de cette loi sur le changement de statut structurel de gouvernements locaux, passés du modèle uniforme du village *desa* en vigueur depuis l'Ordre Nouveau de Soeharto, à celui de *negeri adat*. Cette loi a permis aux groupes minoritaires généralement qualifiés de "primitifs" ou "arriérés" par les populations environnantes, d'émerger progressivement en tant qu'acteurs politiques. Cependant, le renouveau de l'*adat* a également engendré une rivalité intervillageoise pour l'obtention du label "*adat*". Il a donné lieu à de nouvelles revendications identitaires et a encouragé les villageois à exiger une fragmentation accrue des villages (*pemekaran desa*), afin d'obtenir des ressources financières indépendantes de la part du gouvernement et de renforcer leur autonomie dans la gestion de leurs territoires traditionnels. Compte tenu de l'existence de revendications opposées, les défis liés au discours sur l'*adat* et à la définition de l'*adat* lui-même restent flous et doivent être débattus. En Indonésie, plus particulièrement dans le contexte des sociétés moluquoises, l'*adat* est toujours considéré comme un état naturel largement répandu dans la vie quotidienne de la société, notamment en matière de hiérarchies sociales et d'institutions, ainsi que dans les processus de transmission des terres. Par ailleurs, cet article tente de montrer comment l'*adat* favorise également les domaines d'intervention dans les luttes politiques et se concentre donc sur les processus de configuration administrative et sur les jeux de pouvoir entre les sociétés villageoises. En s'appuyant sur l'ethnographie et sur une cartographie participative, l'auteur examine un quartier (*dusun*) nommé Masihulan, une communauté minoritaire animiste de l'arrière-pays dans le nord de Seram, appellée Alifuru. L'auteur montre comment l'application de la loi *desa adat* a permis à cette communauté de se séparer du village dont elle dépendait, appelé Sawai, pour devenir un village indépendant. Outre l'objectif économique, les revendications identitaires divergentes exacerbent les tensions locales et peuvent provoquer la désintégration des groupes sociaux.

Hamzah Fansuri (Institute of Anthropology, Heidelberg University)

On the road of* Hijrah*: Contesting Identity Through Urban Mobilities in Contemporary Indonesian Muslims

This article analyses how the hijrah movement, a contemporary religious movement that reinterprets the meaning and practices of being pious, has gained widespread sympathy among Indonesian urban Muslims. Although numerous studies have endeavoured to scrutinize the phenomenon of *hijrah* in communities or movements, most focus on social media, and only a few examine their daily mobilities in urban life. By focusing on the Kajian Musawarah, one of Indonesia's most prominent *hijrah*

communities and employing interdependent mobilities, the article reveals those activists and followers of such community contest new Islamic identities through their intersections with various forms of urban mobilities. Within physical, imaginative, virtual, and communicative travel, the Kajian Musawarah amplifies the symbolic value of *hijrah* over Islamic attributes, including clothing, language and recitation circles to attract urban Muslims. Furthermore, their Islamic identity is also contesting many aspects of social life such as urban lifestyle, consumptive culture, and relation to other Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Sur la route de l'*hijrah *: contestation de l'identité à travers les mobilités urbaines chez les musulmans indonésiens aujourd'hui

Cet article analyse comment le mouvement *hijrah*, un mouvement religieux contemporain réinterprétant le sens et les pratiques de la piété, a gagné une large sympathie parmi les musulmans urbains indonésiens. Bien que de nombreuses études aient tenté d'examiner le phénomène de la *hijrah* dans les communautés ou les mouvements qui la portent, la plupart de ces travaux se concentrent sur les médias sociaux, et seuls quelques-uns abordent la question des mobilités quotidiennes dans la vie urbaine.
En se concentrant sur la Kajian Musawarah, l'une des communautés *hijrah* les plus importantes d'Indonésie, et en traitant des mobilités interdépendantes, l'article révèle que les activistes et les adeptes de cette communauté revendiquent de nouvelles identités islamiques à travers leurs intersections avec diverses formes de mobilités urbaines.
Dans le cadre de déplacements physiques, imaginatifs, virtuels et communicatifs, le Kajian Musawarah amplifie la valeur symbolique de la *hijrah* par rapport aux attributs islamiques, y compris les vêtements, la langue et les cercles de récitation, afin d'attirer les musulmans urbains. En outre, l'identité islamique des membres de cette communauté, se heurte également à de nombreux aspects de la vie sociale, tels que le mode de vie urbain, la culture de la consommation et les relations avec les autres communautés, musulmanes et non musulmanes.

Peter Carey (Fellow Emeritus Trinity College and Adjunct (Visiting) Professor at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia, Jakarta)

Clio's Stepchildren: How Oxford Missed the Boat in Southeast Asian Studies, 1979-2018

Between 1979 and 2018 Oxford University was presented with numerous opportunities to develop Southeast Asian Studies, nearly all of which were not taken up. This autobiographical article describes how these opportunities arose and how the author tried to generate support for Southeast Asian Studies during the period when he was Laithwaite Fellow in Modern History at Trinity College, Oxford (1979-2008) and following his early retirement in October 2008. The article describes the challenges of developing interest and commitment to area studies in a firmly Eurocentric Oxford history faculty, and the lack of institutional support from the wider University. This

culminated in the embarrassing event at the Hong Kong Jockey Club in June 1988, when a substantial endowment for a chair of Nanyang (overseas Chinese) Studies offered by the Macao gambling tycoon, Stanley Ho, was allowed to slip out of the University's grasp as a result of the ineptitude of its then Pro-Vice Chancellor, Sir Patrick Neill QC. Following that debacle, the article describes the author's involvement in a number of parallel non-academic activities relating to Southeast Asia. These include lobbying in the University on East Timor, support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's campaign for democracy in Burma through her Oxford-based husband, Dr Michael Aris, in the 1990s, and the establishment of the UK disability charity, The Cambodia Trust (1989-2014), and its spreads to East Timor (2003-5) and Indonesia (2008-12). Reference is also made in passing to the author's involvement in a Track-2 diplomacy initiative aimed at normalizing US-Vietnam relations in 1989-90, and Oxford Project Southeast Asia initiative (2009-2018), an organization set up by Oxford graduate students from Southeast Asia, which hosted seven high profile Southeast Asian Studies Symposia in Oxford and in Southeast Asia between 2012 and 2018.

Les beaux-enfants de Clio : comment Oxford a raté le coche des études sur l'Asie du Sud-Est, 1979-2018

Entre 1979 et 2018, l'Université d'Oxford a eu de nombreuses occasions de développer les études sur l'Asie du Sud-Est, mais presqu'aucune n'a été saisie. Cet article autobiographique décrit comment ces opportunités se sont présentées et comment l'auteur a essayé de générer un soutien pour les études sur l'Asie du Sud-Est alors qu'il était Laithwaite Fellow en histoire moderne au Trinity College, Oxford (1979-2008) et après sa retraite anticipée en octobre 2008. L'article décrit les difficultés rencontrées pour susciter l'intérêt et l'engagement en faveur des études aréales dans une faculté d'histoire d'Oxford fermement eurocentrique, ainsi que le manque de soutien institutionnel de la part de l'université dans son ensemble. Cette situation a culminé avec l'événement embarrassant survenu au Hong Kong Jockey Club en juin 1988, lorsqu'une dotation substantielle pour une chaire d'études Nanyang (sur la Chine d'outre-mer) offerte par le magnat du jeu de Macao, Stanley Ho, a échappé à l'université en raison de l'inaptitude de son vice-recteur de l'époque, Sir Patrick Neill QC. À la suite de cette débâcle, l'article décrit l'implication de l'auteur dans un certain nombre d'activités parallèles non académiques liées à l'Asie du Sud-Est. Il s'agit notamment du lobbying au sein de l'université sur le Timor oriental, du soutien à la campagne de Daw Aung San Suu Kyi pour la démocratie en Birmanie par l'intermédiaire de son mari basé à Oxford, le Dr Michael Aris, dans les années 1990, et de la création de l'organisation caritative britannique pour les personnes handicapées, The Cambodia Trust (1989-2014), ainsi que sa diffusion au Timor oriental (2003-5) et en Indonésie (2008-12). Il est également fait référence à la participation de l'auteur à une initiative de diplomatie parallèle visant à normaliser les relations entre les États-Unis et le Viêt Nam en 1989-90, et à l'initiative de l'Oxford Project Southeast Asia (2009-2018), une organisation créée par des étudiants diplômés d'Oxford originaires d'Asie du Sud-Est, qui a accueilli sept symposiums de haut niveau sur les études sud-est asiatiques, à Oxford et en Asie du Sud-Est entre 2012 et 2018.

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