Sommaire

5–11 Hélène Njoto et Andrée Feillard
In Memoriam Merle Calvin Ricklefs (1943-2019)

Échos de la recherche

13–18 Charles Coppel
Chinese Indonesians: Identities and Histories (Monash University, 1- 3 October 2019)

Dossier 1965 and Cinema II

19–21 Elsa Clavé
Filmed Memories of 1965

23–27 Saskia Wieringa
The Women and the Generals: Unraveling a Myth of Sexual Perversion

29–33 Vannessa Hearman
Buru Island: Still Much More to Reveal

35–40 Soe Tjen Marching
Forty Years of Silence: The Insanity of Society

41–45 Grace Leksana
A Daughter's Memory : 1965 in Animation

47–73 Gilang Desti Parahita and Vissia Ita Yulianto
The Treachery *on YouTube: The Politics of Memory on New Media in Indonesia*

Études

75–105 Robert Wessing
The Maiden in the Forest: Reflections on Some Southeast Asian Tales

107–141 Arlo Griffiths
Rediscovering an Old Javanese Inscription: Mpu Mano's Donation in Favor of a Buddhist Dignitary in 888 Śaka

143–151 Merle C. Ricklefs
Music and Dance Go to War in Java

153–187 G. Roger Knight
An 'Indies' couple: Colonial Communities and Issues Surrounding Identity in the Dutch East Indies, ca. 1890-1930s

189–213 Syamsul Rijal
Performing Arab Saints and Marketing the Prophet: Habaib *and Islamic Markets in Contemporary Indonesia*

Lectures Critiques

215–261 Jean-Louis Margolin
1965 : L'Heure de l'histoire ?

261–264 Kuncoro Hadi, dkk.
Catatan Hari Per Hari G30S Sebelum Hingga Setelahnya (1963-1971)

Comptes rendus

Préhistoire et Asie du Sud

265–271 Wolfgang Marschall und Markus Wäfler, *Felsmalereien Indonesiens*, Borsdof: Winterwork, 4 vol., 2012-2017 (Antonio Guerreiro)

271–276 Michael Feener and Anne Blackburn, *Buddhist and Islamic Orders in Southern Asia. Comparative Perspectives*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019 (Andrée Feillard, Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière)

Histoire contemporaine et Société

277–278 Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution : China, Indonesia and the Cold War*. Singapore: ISEAS, 2019 (Claudine Salmon)

279–282 Suryomenggolo, Jafar (ed.), *At a Moment's Notice : Indonesian Maids Write on Their Lives Abroad*. Copenhague : NIAS Press, 2019 (Laurence Husson)

282–286 Edwin Jurriëns & Ross Tapsell (eds.), *Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence*. Singapore: ISEAS, 2017 (Deasy R.P. Simandjuntak)

286–289 Alessandra Lopez y Royo, *Contemporary Indonesian Fashion: Through the Looking Glass*. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2020 (Clara Jones)

Études régionales

289–293 Fanany, Rebecca & Ismet Fanany, *The Elderly Must Endure: Ageing in the Minangkabau Community in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS, 309 p., 2018 (Suryadi)

293–295 Richard Fox, *More Than Words : Transforming Script, Agency, and Collective Life in Bali*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018 (Dick van der Meij)

295–298 Agung Wardana, *Contemporary Bali. Contested Space and Governance*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019 (Michel Picard)

298–301 Hans Hägerdal, *Held's History of Sumbawa : An Annotated Translation*. Amsterdam University Press, 2017 (Henri Chambert-Loir)

301–303 Geneviève Duggan and Hans Hägerdal, *Savu: History and Oral Tradition on an Island of Indonesia*. Singapore : NUS, 2018 (Gregory Forth)

304–306 Leontine Visser, *Sejarah Pertanian dan Kebudayaan Sahu di Halmahera* (History of Sahu Agriculture and Culture in Halmahera). Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2019 (Laksmi Adriani Savitri)

307–310 Christopher J. Shepherd, *Haunted Houses and Ghostly Encounters: Ethnography and Animism in East Timor, 1860–1975*. NUS, 2019 (Frédéric Durand)

310–312 Oman Fathurahman, Kawashima Midori, and Labi Sarip Riwarung (eds.), *The Library of an Islamic Scholar of Mindanao: The Collection of Sheik Muhammad Said bin Imam sa Bayang at the Al-Imam As-Saddiq (A.S.) Library, Marawi City, Philippines: An Annotated Catalogue with Essays*. Tokyo: Sophia University, 2019 (Mulaika Hijjas)

Littératures

312–314 Andi Muhammad Akhmar, *Islamisasi Bugis; Kajian Sastra atas La Galigo Versi Bottinna I La Dewata Sibawa I Wé Attaweq*, Jakarta, Yayasan Pusaka Obor Indonesia, 2018 (Faried Saenong)

314–317 Asahan Alham, *Dendam Sejarah*. Bandung: Ultimus, 2019 (Nico Schulte-Nordholt)

317–321 Ajip Rosidi, *Surat-Surat ti Jepang*. Bandung, Kiblat, 4 jilid, 2017 (Julian Millie)

321–324 Luis Cardoso, *L'Année où Pigafetta boucla son tour du monde.* Arkuiris, 2019 (LF Thomaz)

Résumés – Abstracts

© Copyright Association Archipel 2020

En couverture : Photo du studio Kurkdjian de la famille MacNeill – Bezoet De Bie, c. 1905
(voir l'article de G. Roger Knight dans ce volume).

Hélène Njoto[1] *et Andrée Feillard*[2]

In Memoriam Merle Calvin Ricklefs (1943-2019)

Merle Ricklefs nous a quittés le 29 décembre 2019 à Melbourne. La nouvelle de son décès, après une longue maladie, a parcouru les réseaux sociaux, où il est partout acclamé comme une icône et un modèle pour la recherche sur l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de l'Indonésie, et de Java en particulier. Conservant dignité et humour, infatigable malgré la douleur, il avait récemment confié ses deux « last serious scholarly articles », comme il les appelait, à la revue *Archipel*, où il publia en 1986 une première contribution : une note biographique sur l'un de ses maîtres, l'historien néerlandais H. J. De Graaf (1899-1984), figure pionnière de l'historiographie javanaise à la période islamisée. Merle Ricklefs s'est distingué à sa suite, notamment, et à celle du javanologue Th. G. Th. Pigeaud (1899-1988), non seulement par son accès direct aux sources javanaises et européennes, mais aussi pour son engagement dans la reconnaissance de la véracité historique de certaines sources littéraires javanaises. L'ensemble de son œuvre reposait sur ce défi qui consistait à extraire et interpréter les informations historiques de récits jadis considérés comme entièrement ou partiellement légendaires.

Merle Ricklefs a apporté une contribution inestimable à l'histoire indonésienne, et celle de Java aux XVIIe, XVIIIe siècle et au début du XIXe siècle en particulier, grâce à cette laborieuse collecte d'informations dans des textes souvent très complexes. Il soulignait, en milieu de carrière, que

1. CASE (CNRS, Paris), ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore), AUSSER (CNRS-École d'Architecture de Paris-Belleville).

2. CASE (CNRS, Paris).

l'historiographie javanaise était devenue un « domaine particulièrement délicat, sans doute le plus délicat d'Asie du Sud-Est, et peut-être même de toute l'Asie »[3]. La méthode dont il veillait à transmettre l'esprit dans chacune de ses publications, dans un souci didactique, consistait à rendre compte, autant que possible, de tous les points de vue disponibles. Il portait une extrême attention à la fiabilité des sources, aux enjeux politiques, diplomatiques et aux intentions sous-jacentes des auteurs tant néerlandais que javanais.

Au-delà des personnages historiques dont il s'est fait le principal biographe, c'est la dimension psychologique, l'humain, qui intéressait Merle Ricklefs et qui constituait l'un des principaux attraits de son travail. Trois de ses œuvres majeures, qui traitent des règnes de trois souverains parmi les plus illustres de l'histoire moderne javanaise (Mangkubumi/Hamengkubuwana I[4], Pakubuwana II[5] et Mangkunegara I), étaient autant des histoires de leur temps que des portraits intimes. Merle Ricklefs avait l'art de rendre vivants ces personnages historiques en accordant autant d'importance à leur culture matérielle qu'à la complexité de leurs pratiques et croyances religieuses ou spirituelles.

C'est au contact d'un autre maître, le philologue jésuite P. J. Zoetmulder (1906-1995), dont il édita et traduisit la thèse de doctorat, *Pantheism and Monism in Javanese Suluk Literature* (1995) que Merle Ricklefs saisit sans doute toute l'importance des croyances occultes et du syncrétisme religieux islamique à Java. Dans toute son œuvre, Merle plaçait au premier plan cette dimension spirituelle, ses enjeux et ses répercussions sur la politique javanaise. C'est également cette approche holistique de l'histoire qui donne à son œuvre sa force et sa singularité.

Institutionnellement, sa carrière de chercheur, d'enseignant et d'administrateur de la recherche l'a mené à des postes prestigieux, où il a partout laissé le souvenir d'un homme rigoureux, exigeant et engagé. Après une thèse à l'université de Cornell soutenue en 1965 sous la direction d'Oliver Wolters, il a enseigné à la SOAS (School of Oriental and Asian Studies) puis au All Souls College d'Oxford, avant de commencer une longue carrière en Australie où il devint professeur d'histoire à l'université de Monash à Melbourne puis à l'Australian National University (ANU) à Canberra. C'est aussi à ANU qu'il se vit confier la direction de la Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies en 1993, avant de partir enseigner à l'université nationale

3. Ricklefs, Merle C., « Dr. Hermanus Johannes de Graaf (1899-1984) », *Archipel* 31, 1986, p. 5.

4. *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java*, London Oriental Series 10, Londres, Oxford University Press, 1974.

5. *The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java, 1726-1749: History, Literature and Islam in the Court of Pakubuwana II,* St. Leonards, NSW & Honolulu, Asian Studies Association of Australia en association avec Allen & Unwin et University of Hawai'i Press, 1998.

Merle Ricklefs, Jakarta, 2016 : cérémonie de remise d'une décoration par le gouvernement indonésien pour sa contribution à la culture (*Penghargaan Kebudayaan)*. Photo Margaret Ricklefs.

de Singapour (NUS). Il est passé également par l'université de Leyde, et l'Institute of Asian Languages and Societies à l'Université de Melbourne, poste qu'il occupait encore en 2005.

Malgré toutes ces responsabilités universitaires, Merle Ricklefs a publié neuf monographies, la plupart traduites en indonésien et chacune considérée comme une référence majeure. Celle qui l'a fait connaître le plus largement est une histoire moderne de l'Indonésie, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*, réédité quatre fois, et qui a été traduite en indonésien. Merle était aussi devenu un fin observateur de l'Indonésie contemporaine. Curieux de l'expérience de la démocratie post-Soeharto, il suivait les événements politiques de près. Rendant ainsi visite au Président Wahid (Gus Dur), entre 1999 et 2001, il pouvait s'émouvoir des faux-pas d'un homme aussi imprévisible que populaire.

Grand spécialiste du XVIIIe s. javanais, Merle Ricklefs s'est par ailleurs imposé comme l'un des plus éminents experts de l'islam à Java. Sa trilogie sur le religieux à Java est une référence incontournable dans ce domaine. *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries* (2006), *Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830-1930)* (2007), et *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present* (2012)[6].

Le titre du premier de ces ouvrages est resté gravé dans les mémoires, car s'il est une formule pour laquelle Merle est le plus souvent cité, c'est bien celle de la synthèse mystique javanaise. « Mystic synthesis », l'expression était bien choisie. Sans prétendre à une orthodoxie formelle et établie, imposée par les cours javanaises, c'était plutôt, écrivait-il, un mode de religiosité dont les contours étaient malgré tout bien clairs. Il s'agissait d'une « manière javanaise de comprendre le soufisme » qui, pour lui, incluait trois éléments : le sens d'une identité islamique, au moins au niveau des élites ; le respect des cinq piliers de l'islam (avec néanmoins des écarts notoires sur la prière, comme la possibilité de pratiquer la prière permanente, *« everlasting salat* (prayer) », à la place des cinq prières quotidiennes), mais aussi l'acceptation de toute une gamme de forces spirituelles comme celle de Ratu Kidul, la déesse des mers du sud. La piété de cette élite n'excluait pas pour autant intrigues, complots et brutalités. Certains ont pu contester l'étendue de cette synthèse mystique dans la population, car les sources, riches pour l'élite, sont bien maigres pour

6. *Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and Other Visions c.1830-1930*, Singapour, NUS Press, Leiden, KITLV Press, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2007.
Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries, White Plains, NY, Eastbridge, 2006.
Islamisation and its opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present, Singapour, NUS Press, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.

le reste de la société, comme le reconnaissait d'ailleurs Merle lui-même. Malgré ces critiques, on n'a pas encore réussi à faire mieux pour décrire cette complexité religieuse dans l'histoire moderne javanaise.

Dans le deuxième livre de cette trilogie sur l'islam, *Polarising Javanese Society*, plus axé cette fois sur le XIXe s., Merle Ricklefs met en lumière la grande rupture socio-religieuse de ce siècle, où la colonisation néerlandaise est plus active et où l'avancée des techniques de transport (bateau à vapeur, ouverture du canal de Suez, etc.) accélère l'influence des réformateurs du Moyen-Orient exigeant une nouvelle orthopraxie. C'est cette évolution qui rompt, selon Merle, l'équilibre de la « synthèse mystique » des siècles précédents. Il montre comment les réactions anti-islamiques engendrent une nouvelle catégorie de population, les *abangan*, longtemps appelés les musulmans « nominaux ». Cette polarisation prend une dimension politique au XXe siècle, qui explique les événements les plus sanglants de l'histoire contemporaine.

C'est le dernier livre de sa trilogie sur l'islam, *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java : A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present*, qui connaît le plus grand succès : il remporte le prix George McT. Kahin pour le meilleur ouvrage sur l'Asie du Sud-Est en 2015. Les trois ouvrages sont devenus incontournables pour qui s'intéresse à Java ou à l'islam en Indonésie et en Asie du Sud-est au XXIe siècle.

C'est aussi son engagement total pour la recherche qui caractérise cet homme qui a été autant un historien reconnu internationalement qu'un gestionnaire intransigeant. Il affectionnait particulièrement son passage à la direction de grands centres de recherche comme la RSPAS (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies), au centre Coombs (Australian National University). Cette institution s'est fait reconnaître de plus en plus comme un centre de savoirs à destination du grand public autant que des cercles académiques.

Ces qualités exceptionnelles de chercheur et d'enseignant ne diminuaient pas ses qualités humaines. Merle était un réformateur dans l'âme, un défenseur de l'égalité des chances pour les femmes et pour les aborigènes d'Australie. L'une de ses grandes satisfactions, à la direction du RSPAS (ANU), était d'avoir amélioré le sort « lamentable » réservé aux femmes dans la recherche. Sur un total de 50 postes de chercheurs (« academics ») il proposa que 40% soient désormais réservés à des femmes. Ce taux a diminué par la suite.

C'est aussi à Melbourne qu'il s'est le plus battu pour l'accès des étudiants aborigènes à l'université. Déjà au début des années 1980, il avait été à l'origine du Monash Orientation Scheme for Aborigines (MOSA), premier programme favorisant l'entrée des aborigènes à l'université australienne. C'est l'époque où un débat sur l'immigration l'oppose au professeur d'histoire Geoffrey Blainey, pour qui l'Australie devait limiter l'immigration asiatique. Avec son collègue Andrew Markus, il avait alors publié un ouvrage critique

contre les idées de Blainey, *Surrender Australia? Essays in the Study and Uses of History* (1984). Il était aussi l'un des premiers à s'insurger contre le "nouveau racisme", dans les années 1990, au moment de la montée de la politique xénophobe de Pauline Hanson, qu'il qualifiait de "tribalisme". À Melbourne, écrivait-il, avec le franc-parler qui le caractérisait, il aurait été témoin d'une "politique de caniveau non-éthique (unethical gutter politics)" dans une université qualifiée de "bastion de l'esprit de clocher et du copinage (bastion of parochialism and cronyism)"[7].

Merle a multiplié les rôles mais aussi les honneurs durant sa longue carrière. Il était devenu professeur émérite à l'université de Monash et à l'Australian National University (ANU), chercheur (fellow) de l'Australian Academy of the Humanities et ancien membre de la commission nationale australienne pour l'UNESCO. Membre fondateur de l'Australian Foreign Affairs Council, on le nomma également membre du International Council of the Asia Society (New York). En 2003, le gouvernement australien lui a décerné la Médaille du Centenaire (Centenary Medal) "for service to Australian society and the humanities in the study of Indonesia". En 2010, il est élu membre honoraire du KITLV aux Pays-Bas (Institut Royal de Langue, Géographie et Anthropologie), et en 2017 il est nommé « Member of the Order of Australia » (AM). Enfin, en 2016, le gouvernement indonésien lui a attribué un prix pour sa contribution au développement de la culture nationale (*Penghargaan Kebudayaan)*.

Il avait le don inhabituel de mener à bien la gestion de l'administration de la recherche et de l'enseignement sans que ces tâches nuisent à ses publications. Il publia ainsi quatre livres et une douzaine d'articles en quatre années seulement, de 1993 à 1998, alors qu'il était directeur du Centre de recherche à l'ANU. Fin octobre 2019, il continuait à écrire autant que sa fatigue le lui permettait, mais il ajoutait que cela ne lui importait guère, car il avait fait son « devoir envers MN (Mangkunegara) et son domaine de recherche ». ("Tapi tidak jadi soal. I have done my duty to MN and my field. If nothing more gets done, I will have no regrets")[8]. C'est dire l'importance qu'il accordait à ce prince javanais, Mangkunegara, dont il avait su si bien dépeindre la personnalité singulière.

Il a dédié à ce prince rebelle son dernier ouvrage, *Soul Catcher: Java's Fiery Prince Mangkunagara I, 1726–95*, qui marque sans doute l'apothéose de sa carrière[9]. Cette biographie lui tenait particulièrement à cœur, ayant très tôt fait le vœu (à Mangkunegara) d'écrire son histoire, comme il le confiait au lecteur dans l'introduction. Merle a brillamment réussi à faire revivre un personnage haut en couleurs, attachant, fantasque, coléreux, bon vivant entouré par les

7. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt13wwvxv.12.pdf

8. Com. Pers., 25 octobre 2019.

9. *Soul Catcher: Java's Fiery Prince Mangkunagara I, 1726–95*, Singapour, NUS Press, 2018. Voir la recension de ce livre dans *Archipel* 98, 2019, pp. 247-249.

femmes et amateur de genièvre. Toutes les données sont présentes pour qui voudrait en faire un long métrage, une fresque historique, qui certes pourrait choquer les mieux-disants puritains d'aujourd'hui. Ce livre est un modèle d'érudition et de méthodologie en histoire.

Soul Catcher a aussitôt été traduit en indonésien et doit paraître début 2020. Merle corrigeait les épreuves de la traduction les derniers mois de sa vie, une priorité absolue pour lui. Il revoyait toujours systématiquement la traduction de ses travaux, prêt à ne pas publier plutôt que de laisser passer un texte imparfait : il avait mis toute sa rigueur dans son travail d'écriture en anglais et exigeait la même perfection en indonésien. Son style contribuait à valoriser son travail de recherche, sérieux mais plaisant, toujours agréable. Il se permettait des mots d'humeur, des parenthèses d'humour, des commentaires judicieux, qui rendaient la lecture plus passionnante qu'un roman.

Avec la parution de *Soul Catcher*, il était arrivé au terme de son agenda de recherche et d'écriture, « une pensée libératrice » (a liberating thought) », écrivait-il en 2019 à Kathryn Robinson[10]. Le reste, ses « bits and pieces » ajoutait-il humblement, étaient pour le plaisir. Merle est parti avec la satisfaction du devoir accompli. Il nous a laissé un modèle à suivre. Qui a eu l'honneur et la chance d'échanger avec lui se souviendra de la générosité et de la bienveillance de ses conseils, prodigués jusqu'à la toute fin de sa vie.

Son enseignement et son œuvre ont contribué à former certains des historiens les plus solides sur l'Indonésie. Merle a pu compter sur le soutien constant de son épouse Margaret. Ils ont eu trois enfants (Norman, Charles et Deborah, décédée en 2007). Ces dernières années, Margaret et Merle s'étaient installés sur les hauteurs de Melbourne, dans l'État de Victoria, auprès de leur fils Charles.

10. Com. pers. Kathryn Robinson, 5 janvier 2019, citant un courriel de Merle Ricklefs de 2018.

ÉCHOS DE LA RECHERCHE

Chinese Indonesians: Identities and Histories (Monash University, 1- 3 October 2019)

After the tragic accidental death of Herb Feith in November 2001, many colleagues and friends wanted to commemorate his scholarship on Indonesia, his pioneering role as an international volunteer, and his advocacy of human rights, democracy and peace.

He taught at Monash University from 1962 to 1990. Although the various forms of his commemoration were based there, they had much wider broad support. They included memorial lectures (the first by Daniel Lev in November 2002), the Herb Feith Chair for the Study of Indonesia (first filled in 2007 by Greg Barton), Jemma Purdey's 2011 biography of Herb Feith, and the establishment by Monash University of the Herb Feith Foundation from 2003 (replaced since 2018 by the Monash Herb Feith Indonesian Engagement Centre).

Among the achievements of the Foundation were its long-running annual Memorial Lecture series, the digitization of the print editions of the magazine *Inside Indonesia* from its inception in 1983 to 2007 when it became web-based only, contribution to the digitization of archival records on East Timor by CHART (Clearing House for Archival Records on Timor), collaboration with Monash University Publishing for a Herb Feith Translation Series of accounts of the 1965-66 mass violence in Indonesia https://publishing.monash.edu/series/herb-feith.html/, and support for translation into Indonesian of books related to peace-building and Indonesia-Australia relations.

The recent conference at the Monash University Clayton campus on 'Chinese Indonesians: History and Identity' is the first major activity of the

new Centre. Appropriately the co-convenors were Ariel Heryanto (occupant of the Herb Feith Chair since 2017) and Jemma Purdey (biographer of Herb Feith and author of *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999*).

More than one hundred people attended the conference, including 26 from Indonesia and eleven from Europe, the United States, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. Participants in the twenty panels and roundtable discussions included activists, artists, writers, and museum proprietors as well as academic scholars. Older and younger generations were both well represented. Additional attractions included a display of batik textiles, and demonstrations of paper lantern-making and cooking of peranakan food. Ien Ang launched two new books: *Migration in the time of revolution: China Indonesia and the Cold War* by Taomo Zhou, and *Minority Stages: Sino-Indonesian Performance and Public Display* by Josh Stenberg.

The conference was impressive in scope as well as size. The rich variety of approaches to the subject is evident in the program and was symbolised by the two keynote lectures. Karen Strassler from Queens College and City University of New York ('Intensely Invisible, Profoundly Unseen: Chinese Indonesians and National History') spoke of how she came to think about Chinese Indonesians through her study of popular photography in Java. Hilmar Farid ('Ahok and Chinese Indonesian Politics'), then Director-General of Culture in the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture, addressed their political situation directly. In addition to the wealth of offerings at the conference itself, at the Monash University Caulfield campus there was also a small exhibition of works by F X Harsono, Yaya Sung and Rani Pramesti, and F X Harsono gave an excellent public lecture.

Charles A. Coppel

List of panel sessions and roundtables

Constructions of 'Chineseness' and the 'Other' in the colonial and revolutionary periods

Peter Carey (in absentia), 'Javanese perceptions of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1600-1830'
Susy Ong, 'Envisioning a new and respectable "Chineseness": Impacts of May 4th Spirit on Dutch-educated Chinese in late colonial Indonesia'
Taufiq Tanasaldy, 'Overseas Chinese nationalism: Anti-Japanese movements in the Netherlands East Indies'
Guo-Quan Seng, 'Indonesian mothers and the birth of the Peranakan Chinese of Dutch colonial Java (1910s-1960s)'

Transnational mobility, language and memory making

Julian Millie, 'The semiotics of the Javanese cosmology of Tan Hong Boen'
Siew-Min Sai, 'Nanyang dreaming: What can Kwee Tek Hoay tell us about the sinophone?'
Chontida Auikool, 'The sites of memory: Chinese transnational memory of Deli-Medan and Georgetown'
Lewis Mayo, 'Gunung Kawi, Tan Hong Boen and the imagining of Sino-Javanese religious worlds in 1950s Indonesia'

Gender, sexuality and Chinese Indonesian identity

Benjamin Hegarty, 'Deception: changing ethnicity, changing gender in postcolonial Indonesia'
Dede Oetomo, 'Chinese men as objects of desire in Indonesia's gay communities'
David Reeve, 'Onghokham: Sex and sexuality'
Monika Winarnita, Carol Chan and Leslie Butt, 'Long-term impacts of Indonesia's 1998 violence on transnational Chinese-Indonesian women'

Chinese Surabaya: Past and Present

Rachmah Ida, 'Tionghoa Surabaya and/in the media'
Eka Nurul Farida. 'Chinese Indonesian struggles maintaining existence of Khonghucu religion in the New Order to reformation era in Surabaya (1966-2007)'
Nadia Santosa and Adrian Perkasa, 'Queen Champa of Majapahit: the heritage of Chinese community of Majapahit empire in Trowulan East Java'

Storytelling and representations after May 1998

Barbara Hatley 'Chinese Indonesian identity and post-May 1998 violence in Chinese Indonesian women's writing: Tiffany Tsao'
Monika Winarnita, 'Chinese Indonesian identity and post-May 1998 violence in Chinese Indonesian women's writing: Dewi Anggraeni'
Bianca Winataputri, 'Who am I? Chinese-Indonesian contemporary art practice post-1998'

Chinese-Indonesian popular printing: History, literature, and language

Edward Buckingham, 'The memetics of Cerita Silat'
Ravando Lie, 'Shaping diasporic and class consciousness: The early foundation of *Sin Po*, 1910-1942'
Tom Hoogervorst, 'Language ungoverned: Sino-Malay print-entrepreneurship under colonialism'

Agency and participation in cultural production

Margaret Kartomi, 'Performing the arts of the Riau Islands' Chinese and Malays: community support, tolerance, suppression, and collaboration'
Otto Stuparitz, 'The Indonesian jazz archive: Indonesian jazz as ethnic music'
Meghan Downes, 'Chinese Indonesians on film today'

Political agency past and present

Didi Kwartanada, 'Liem Koen Hian and Ahok: Two tales of rejection'
Djin Siauw, 'The relevance of Siauw Giok Tjhan's political experience to current political environment'
Harry Bhaskara, 'Rise of China unsettles Chinese Indonesian integration efforts'
Margareta Astaman and Sylvie Tanaga, 'Chinese-millennials identity perception and their socio-political activism post 2012 Jakarta governor election'

Home, harmony and the environment

Jony Eko Yulianto, 'Dialogicality of family memory in inter-ethnic marriage: A case-based narrative approach of Javanese and Chinese-Indonesian couples in Indonesia'
Asmarani Februandari, 'The principle of harmony in Chinese Indonesian's house'
Jane Wandari and Wikke Novalia, 'Reflecting on transcultural experiences and identities in sustainable development research'

Intersection, representation and deconstruction of Chinese Indonesian identity by artists: Roundtable discussion

Rani Pramesti, Wulan Dirgantoro, Fanny Hanusin, Bernard Lokman, Elina Simbolon

Telling 'new' national histories from the margins: Roundtable discussion

Ien Ang, 'Diasporic perspectives on Chinese Indonesianness'
Adrian Vickers, 'New histories of the Chinese in Indonesia'
David Reeve, 'Seeing national history from the margins: Onghokham and the Indonesian Chinese'
Azmi Abubakar, 'Museum Pustaka Peranakan Tionghoa, mengabarkan kontribusi etnis Tionghoa dalam sejarah perjuangan bangsa Indonesia'
Udaya Halim, 'Revealing the long history of Cina Benteng and the Chinese contributions to the nation'

The Chinese Indonesian focus of digitisation and library collection and Batik Show and Tell

Anita Dewi and Rheny Pulungan, 'Indonesian Collection at Monash University Library: A unique and comprehensive collection'
Yacinta Kurniasih and Anita Dewi, 'Incorporating research and learning skills delivered by the library in the curriculum'
Beth Pearson, 'Shared collections: engagement through digitisation'
Irwan Julianto, 'Batik show and tell'

The complexity of being "Chinese": Sumatra, 1930s-1950s

Taomo Zhou, 'Revolutionary violence and international relations: The Chinese nationalists, communists, and the ethnic Chinese in Sumatra, 1945-1949'
Josh Stenberg, '"Elegy for the Southern Isles": Writing the Indies in republican Shanghai'
Yen-ling Tsai, 'Dari pulau ke pulau: In search of Tan Tih-hiong'
Shu-min Chung, 'War criminals? Taiwanese interpreters during the Japanese occupation of Sumatra'

Local studies of Chinese Indonesian communities

Haris Wijaya, 'Communication style of Chinese ethnic community in Medan City'
Andreas Susanto, 'Yogyakarta Chinese in the reformation era: Accommodation of changes'
Udaya Halim, 'Saving the ex-Kapitan Liem's mansion in Rembang'

Chinese-Indonesian identity in the visual arts

Caroline Turner, 'Identity, history and human rights in the art of FX Harsono and Dadang Christanto'
Tintin Wulia, 'Things-in-common and the aesthetic reassembling of identities'
Greg Doyle, 'Chinese Indonesians and the artworld'
Wulan Dirgantoro, 'Dukamu dukaku: Gender, race, and memory in post-New Order Indonesia'

'Belonging': Questions of ethnic identity and place in contemporary Indonesia: Roundtable discussion

Andrew MacIntyre, 'Belonging then and now: Some personal reflections'
Dewi Anggraeni, 'Writing fiction about Chinese Indonesians'
Melati Anhar, 'Managing the past in the present; the case of Tugu Kunstkring Paleis'
Elisabeth Yane Ardanesywari, 'The others forever: Never-ending journey to

authenticity of Indonesian mixed-ancestry people'
Lily Wibisono, 'What causes today's racial resentment against the Chinese Indonesians?'
Sastra Wijaya, 'Belong to no one, belong to everyone'

Reportage, representation and identity formation

Iwan Awaluddin Yusuf, 'Representation of Chinese-Indonesians identities in the obituary ads in Indonesian newspapers'
Tonny Dian Effendi, 'Local Chinese Indonesian diversity in book publications'
Irawan Santoso Suryo Basuki, 'Forever outsiders: Chinese Indonesians, nationalism, and the politics of collective memory (1900 - 1998)'

Contemporary cultures and activisms

Ju Lan Thung: 'Chinese Indonesians and middle class activism'
Esther Kuntjara: 'The Chineseness in contemporary Chinese Indonesians hybrid culture'
Rita Padawangi: 'Desegregation in action? Chinese-Indonesian activists of urban kampungs'
Eka Nurul Farida: 'Screams, tears, and laughter's: Retracking Chinese-Indonesian memory over spatial and cultural transformation in urban Kampung Peneleh Surabaya'

Chinese Whispers: Film screening and discussion

Rani Pramesti, FX Harsono, Ria Sumardjo, Bianca Winataputri

DOSSIER 1965 AND CINEMA, II
Coordinated by Elsa Clavé

Elsa Clavé[1]

Filmed Memories of 1965

The fall of Suharto on May 21, 1998 ended the regime he had established 32 years earlier when an attempted putsch by a faction of the army turned in his favour. The abduction of six generals and one lieutenant initially intended to protect president Sukarno, finally triggered his political end when the officers were killed and the Indonesian Communist Party accused of having masterminded the event. During the three decades of the New Order's regime, the legitimacy of Suharto and the evil character of the communists he defeated – allowing the killing of half a million people and the imprisonment of many others – have been at the centre of the politics of memory.[2] Many believed that the collapse of the New Order and the advent of the Reformasi would put an end to it. But collective memory, to use the term famously coined by Halbwachs, works in a complex way. It is institutionalized through museums, monuments, and if the commemoration is not as important as it used to be, the collective memory formed during the New Order has not changed much. The attack in 2017 by a mob on the Legal Aid Foundation's office suspected to host a meeting of communists in Jakarta,[3] or the statements by officials against a latent danger (*bahaya laten*), remind us that the stigma attached to communism remains present and easy to manipulate. Ironically, the defiance

1. Asien-Afrika-Institut, Universität Hamburg.

2. Katharine McGregor. *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

3. On this question, see the analysis of S. Wieringa, *Archipel*, 95, 195-210.

toward communists even appears in works which claim to rehabilitate the victims[4] and which are also sometimes part of the numerous initiatives for truth and reconciliation started mostly after the Reformasi.

Among those initiatives, the publications strike by the unbalance between the wealth of information they offer and the echo they find in the general audience. Over the past ten years, dozens of books have been published in Indonesia unraveling the obvious lies of the previous regime. These academic studies, memoirs, and collections of testimonies presenting different voices have only reached a fringe of the population. The reasons are to be searched in the number of copies, too low, and the restricted distribution, but also in the format of the media which is directly related to the socio-cultural processes involved in collective memory-making.[5]

This is the reason why the films presenting alternative versions of the 1965-1966 events form an interesting addition to the growing body of sources. They remediate narrative elements which have often been published in other media, adding to it a powerful visual dimension. But they do not just present historical events, they also form an archive of the cultural memory. The films are examples of the way Indonesians relate to this painful past in their present. The four films presented in this issue of Archipel continue the panorama started in the previous issue with reviews of *The Act of Killing* by Joshua Oppenheimer, the *Soliloque des Muets* by Stephane Roland, and *Surat dari Praha* by Angga Dwimas Sasongko.

The Women and the Generals (2013), reviewed by Saskia Wieringa below, deconstructs one of the major lies of the campaign against the Communist Party: the sexual dance and the mutilation of the generals by women. It presents a careful investigation of the evidence, most of it available through academic publications, proving that the women organization affiliated to the communist party in 1965, Gerwani, had nothing to do with the murders but were targeted and annihilated because of their successful mobilization for social progress in the 1960s.

The second movie, *Pulau Buru Tanah Air Beta* (2016), reviewed by Vannessa Hearman, presents a well-known place related to the events: the island of Buru. This island has been turned into a concentration camp for long-time prisoners and is mostly known because the writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer has been imprisoned there. Interestingly, the film does not focus on the very hard condition of detention and the forced-labour but turns to the present and to the meaning of what remains. It follows the former detainee

4. The idea that numerous victims were not communists is very often put to the front. See as example the analysis of the movie "Surat dari Praha" by H. Chambert-Loir, *Archipel* 98: 2019, 69-70.

5. Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (eds.). *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory*, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009.

Hersri Setiawan, his wife, and daughter on the island while he and another ex-prisoner, Tedjabayu Soedjojono,[6] recall the past while visiting places loaded with memories.

This attention to the second generation and the legacy which is passed on is at the centre of *Forty Years of Silence: An Indonesian Tragedy* (2009), reviewed by Soe Tjen Marching. The documentary presents the story of four families whose members had their mental health affected by the 1965-66 events. The director, who is a psychological anthropologist, wanted to bring to light the consequence of the violence on the health of victims' children. By showing the lasting impact of events which happened 55 years ago, Robert Lemelson also shows that silence does not erase the past and, on the opposite, makes it even more present.

On a very different way, the short animated-film *A Daughter's Memory* (2019), reviewed by Grace Leksana, gives also the voice to the child of a victim. The name of the victim is known by almost all Indonesians: it is Njoto, a major figure in the central committee of the Communist Party in 1965. Svetlana, one of his daughters, recalls her personal journey from the moment when her father was hunted by the army, to the present, through her period in prison and, later, hiding her identity.

As mentioned, these films are a sample of what is being produced, they are only the tip of the iceberg and about thirty film dealing with 1965 – documentary or fiction – have been referenced so far. The list is not exhaustive and does not reference, for example, the films presented in the previous issue.

"Treachery on YouTube: Counter Narrative and Dynamics of Remembering and Forgetting the 1965/66 Tragedy", by Gilang Desti Parahita and Vissia Ita Yulianto, presents an acute analysis of the viewing and reception of such films on Youtube. The study shows that despite the multiplication of alternative narratives, their impact remains small compared to the State-sponsored version vehiculated by the movie *Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (The Eradication of the Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party). If this movie has the advantage of time, because it is the oldest and the most known, it is also available in several formats on the platform and benefits of many supporters. It is hoped that the relatively new films presented here will be distributed more widely and will, in the future, enjoy the same privilege of having supporters to advertise it online.

6. Tedjabayu's story has been published in *Archipel* based on his unpublished memoirs. See Tedjabayu**,** « *C'est la vie !* Quatorze années de détention politique », *Archipel*, 97, 2019, 269-294.

Saskia Wieringa[1]

The Women and the Generals: Unraveling a Myth of Sexual Perversion

---

The Women and the Generals
Documentary, 56 min., 2013
Director: Maj Wechselmann[2]
Production : Swedish Television (SvT) / Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK) / Fritt Ord (Norway)
Distributed via http://www.wechselmann.se/en/2013/03/26/the-women-and-the-generals/
Language: English/Indonesian with English captions and subtexts
The documentary is also available, via VIMEO, in a longer version (84 min), which is the basis of the present review.

The Women and the Generals by Maj Wechselmann tells the story of the sexual slander fabricated by the Indonesian military under General Suharto which fuelled the campaign to annihilate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The lies center around the presence of women at the site where six generals and one lieutenant were buried in a disused well. They had been abducted and murdered by a group of their own soldiers under the control of junior officers in the night of October 1, 1965. The girls attended a training given by the Air Force in preparation for the anti-Malaysia campaign of

1. Emeritus professor, Amsterdam University.

2. To date the Danish-Swedish director Maj Wechselmann (1942) has produced some 45 films. She became known with her documentary on the defense industry Viggen (1973).

President Sukarno. The documentary explains how and why the lies have been fabricated, their impact up to nowadays in Indonesia and presents a detailed counter-version based on archival images, victims and expert testimonials.

The military under General Suharto blamed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for the deaths of the high-ranking militaries killed on 1 October. In reality, only a handful of top leaders of the PKI had been involved in planning the abductions, but not the murders, and they had not been involved in the execution of those plans. Members of the leftist women's group Gerwani were accused of having seduced, sexually tortured and killed the generals. This slander forms the core of the propaganda campaign that the army used to incite mainly Muslim mass organizations and militias to assist the army in murdering perhaps one million people and incarcerating hundreds of thousands others. The prisoners were tortured, subjected to sexual violence and many were sent to slave labour camps such as on the island of Buru. The victims were never tried, and the perpetrators of these crimes were never charged. The survivors have lived with the stigma that they were considered 'traitors to the nation' ever since and the women among them have always been associated with sexual perversion.

The consequences of this bloody period in Indonesian history were not only felt by the direct victims. As the documentary film shows, after General Suharto had replaced President Sukarno, and established a military dictatorship, called the 'New Order', progressive social movements such as Gerwani, and the progressive trade unions, (as well as the farmers' union and the leftist cultural association, but this is not detailed here) were destroyed. State-dominated women's organizations were established to turn women into obedient housewives and mothers. Labourers and peasants were likewise controlled to serve the interests of the economic and military power holders.

The false accusations that the action of the 30 September Movement, as the group that abducted and killed the generals called themselves, was masterminded by the PKI and that the Party was preparing to take over the country provided the pretext for General Suharto's seizure of power. They were part of a propaganda campaign staged by Suharto which not only led to one of the worst genocides in history which took place between 1965-1968 but which also helped spread terror to sustain the military dictatorship he established.

A major part of the documentary film *The Women and the Generals* is a critique of the three hours' infamous propaganda film that President Suharto ordered to be produced. This film is called 'The Betrayal of G30S/PKI', by Arifin C. Noor. It was obligatory for school children to watch it ever since it was released in 1984. The bloody scenes it contains have traumatized millions of school children, as Chika Noya explains in 'The Women and the Generals'. They had this memory of 'communist women' as devilish, cruel whores etched on their minds.

The Women and the Generals

During the New Order writers and artists were compelled to repeat the 'truth' of the army version of the 'events of 1965' and as a critical discussion of this period in Indonesian history was almost impossible the Indonesian people grew up with these distorted ideas. As the prominent historian Hilmar Farid explains in *The Women and the Generals*, smart students had to uncover the truth of this period themselves. Serious analyses of the army propaganda film and of any aspects related to the mass crimes against humanity by the army and the militias associated with them were prohibited.

To their despair women who had legally and enthusiastically carried out many social, educational and political activities as proud members of the 'socialist family' in Indonesia, and who had been imprisoned for many years under inhuman conditions, came home to find themselves being associated with unspeakable perversions. The memories of their social activism had been supplanted by the fake memories of their alleged perverse acts. To escape the social censorship engineered by these constructed memories, a small group of them lived together in a home in Jakarta, where Maj Wechselmann interviewed them.

The army propaganda film portrays Suharto as the hero who managed to save the nation from murderous and sexually perverse communists. The documentary *The Women and the Generals* exposes the lies of the propaganda film in which fiction poses as truth and thus reveals the 'hero' of the New Order to be a villain. Wechselmann also uses shots of another propaganda tool of the military regime, the Pancasila Sakti (Holy Pancasila) Monument on the site where the generals were thrown into a well. On this monument, the story of 'The Betrayal of G30S/PKI' is repeated. It became an almost sacred place. During the New Order the vast terrain of the Holy Pancasila Monument used to swarm with children and adults in Muslim dress. Below the huge statues of the murdered generals a bronze mural is placed which depicts the post-

independence history of Indonesia according to Suharto and which contains depictions of the so called 'dance of the fragrant flowers' which the women present at the site allegedly had danced to seduce and castrate the generals. The museum complex itself comprises a museum and the building in which the generals had been allegedly murdered and mutilated. As John Roosa and Saskia Wieringa explain in *The Women and the Generals*, the official autopsy demonstrates very clearly the generals were killed by bullets; they were not castrated.

The largest part of the documentary was shot around 2009 and 2010 and contains interviews with women survivors by Maj Wechselmann. They were teachers, journalists, or trade union leaders, heavily traumatized and stigmatized. They spent many years in jail under inhuman conditions and after their release were reduced to poverty. Most of them are no longer alive now, and the interviews provide a rare glimpse into their harrowing experiences. They tell that when they realised the army and the militias went hunting for anyone associated with the left, some of them went on the run, with their children, trying to survive in the jungle. Ultimately all of them were arrested and horribly tortured and raped.

Other former prisoners interviewed for the film include the poet and filmmaker Putu Oka Sukanta and the writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Beside these interviews with survivors, academics like John Roosa, Olle Törnquist, Saskia Wieringa and Hilmar Farid as well as human rights activists like Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Nusya Kuswatin and Chika Noya provide background information. Particularly revealing is the material from the outrageous NBC-film 'The Troubled Victory – The Battle for Asia', which shows both the arrests and murders at the time, and the influence of the CIA on the army. The return of American businesses, some of them previously nationalised by Sukarno, went hand in hand with the destruction of the trade union movement. The documentary also has archival footage from the events of 1965-1968, as well as from the demonstrations and the shootings at Trisakti University that marked the end of the military dictatorship in 1998.

The country is littered with mass graves. The local population usually knows their locations, which have become haunted places, as Nusya Kuswatin explains. She used to live close to one of the largest mass graves, in the Botanical gardens in Purwodadi, East Java. The human rights lawyer Nursyahbani Katjasungkana also lived close by, and as a 10-year old girl she regularly saw the corpses of people murdered in the night, on her way to school. When later she defended one of the victims she was immediately branded as a 'defender of communists'. She was one of the women leaders who spearheaded the protests that led to the fall of General Suharto. The women activists found a soft spot in the General's armour when, in the Asian economic crisis of 1997, food shortages occurred. How come, they mocked him, that a self-styled 'Father of Development' cannot provide milk for the nation's children?

The film shows some footage of the first exhumation of a mass grave in Wonosobo, carried out by a group of human rights defenders around Mrs Sulami, a former Gerwani leader. Some of the bodies could be identified, but when their families tried to give them a proper reburial, they were attacked by an Islamist mob.

A major part of the documentary is devoted to the difficult search for justice for the victims and an end to the impunity of the survivors. Even after the end of the military regime human rights activists like Munir Said Thalib, who received the Right Livelihood Award in 2000 for his courage, were attacked. He was murdered in 2004. So far the mastermind of this assassination walks free. During the short presidency of the charismatic and progressive Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), popularly called Gus Dur, there was hope Indonesia would confront the truth of this ugly period in its history. History school books were rewritten, in which effort Hilmar Farid was involved. But when they were ready, they were burnt; they never reached the schools they were meant for.

When Wechselmann was shooting her film, the National Commission on Human Rights had started its investigation into the mass crimes against humanity committed after October 1 in Indonesia. A valiant effort, but, she notes, how can seven investigators ever be able to cover such massive and widespread crimes?

The film ends with two telling scenes. Filmmaker Eros Djarot recounts how his team was prevented from shooting his fictional film about a former member of Gerwani who was arrested and tortured. Although he had the permission to shoot, a mob prevented him from doing that. The second episode reports the valiant efforts of family members of students murdered by the army during the 1990 unrest, Munir's widow, survivors of the 1965 events and of other crimes against humanity to get justice for these crimes. Every Thursday afternoon they stage silent demonstration named Kamisan in front of the presidential palace.

In her interviews Wechselmann vividly captures the lasting effects on the memory of the nation of the terror that started with the slander of the girls who watched the generals being killed by the military on their training ground. The value of the film is the combination of these and other interviews, and archival footage. It provides a comprehensive overview of this period, with a focus on the sexual propaganda which formed the core of the campaign which was fabricated to incite the Muslim militia to help murder possibly a million people. This documentary provides a much-needed background to understand the silence and impunity that still reign in Indonesia around the crimes against humanity committed after October 1 1965. The effects of this campaign are still felt in Indonesian society. The Kamisan continue and human rights defenders are still labelled 'communists'.

Vannessa Hearman[1]

Buru Island: Still Much More to Reveal

Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta (Buru Island: My Home)
Documentary, 40 min., 2016
Director : Rahung Nasution
Producers : Whisnu Yonar and Dolorosa Sinaga
Production : Beranda Rakyat
Distributed via buttonijo.com
Language : Indonesian with English subtitles

Buru Island: My Home follows the journey of former detainees, Hersri Setiawan and Tejabayu Soedjojono to the island in the Moluccas that was used by the Indonesian New Order regime as a prison site. They meet old friends, visit the graves of those who have passed away and tell their part of the island's history.

Hersri, a writer, was a member of the People's Cultural Institute (Lekra, Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat), a leftist cultural group that was linked to the Indonesian Communist Party. Tejabayu was a student activist in the organisation CGMI (Concentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Movement Centre) at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The two are reasonably well-known publicly as former detainees, Hersri in particular, who has written several books about his experiences on Buru Island. Making use of his creative works, the film

1. Senior lecturer, Charles Darwin University, Australia.

features a few of his poems as a voiceover and text on screen, evoking island life under the barrel of a gun.

The Indonesian government transported and detained about 12,000 men from Java from the time Buru was first used as a place of detention in 1969 until their release in 1978. The camp's most famous resident was Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who, like Hersri, was a writer and a member of Lekra. Works by former detainees and Lekra writers were banned by the government after the 1965 suppression of the Communist Party. Those sent to Buru Island from 1969 onwards by the army-dominated government led by President Suharto came from all walks of life ; the one factor that united them was their actual or suspected links with the PKI and leftist mass organisations.

The film opens with a domestic scene of Hersri making himself a hot drink in his home and then listening to a cassette and looking at some notebooks. Shortly after President Suharto resigned in May 1998, which ushered in democratisation for Indonesia, Hersri travelled to several countries where he collected hundreds of interviews with Indonesians exiled abroad as a result of their differences with the New Order regime. Perhaps the cassette was the result of one such interview, although the filmmakers do not make this clear to the viewer.

The film opens with mention of '30 September 1965' and refers to a genocide and 'survivors of crimes of humanity', but does not provide further explanation. On 30 September 1965, a group of army officers and soldiers calling themselves the 30 September Movement abducted and killed six generals and a lieutenant, including the highest echelon of leadership of the Indonesian Army. Major-General, later President, Suharto led a violent suppression campaign of this group and the PKI that Suharto alleged was the mastermind of the group. The suppression of the PKI resulted in the killing of half a million members and sympathisers of the party by the army and civilian militias. About 600,000 to three-quarters of a million Indonesians were also detained, mostly without trial, including those on Buru. The Suharto regime, over its 32 years in office, carefully restricted discussions about the army's actions to gain power from President Sukarno in those tumultuous years of 1965-1966. By restricting the ability of writers like Hersri to communicate their experiences following their incarceration, the regime ensured that its version of history, provided in the school curriculum and in popular media, was easily transmitted to younger generations born many years after these events.

It is this painful work of re-weaving connections with the younger generation and re-establishing contact with the places and people of Buru that the film is preoccupied with showing. Transmigrants, namely settlers from other parts of Indonesia, and indigenous people also live on Buru. The island is facing environmental problems from gold mining on the adjacent island

Hersri Setiawan and his daughter, Ken Setiawan.

of Sulawesi. Hersri undertakes his journey back to Buru also with his wife, activist Ita Nadia, and daughter, Ken Setiawan, an academic at the University of Melbourne, who herself writes and publishes on the 1965 issue. The film crew follows their journey by land and sea to find those former detainees Hersri knew who chose to remain, and to revisit some sites of significance to detainees. There is rich potential here for exploring how the family negotiates a difficult and mysterious past, given for many younger people, it has been difficult to unearth family histories that entail connections with the 1965 cataclysm. In a poignant scene, the three stand together, while Hersri recounted his early life, including his leadership of a poetry reading association in Yogyakarta and his subsequent placement with the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau office in Colombo, then-Ceylon in the early 1960s.

The film's 'fly-on-the-wall' observational style lends an intimacy to the scene above as we observe the three. In several parts of the film, the bond between Hersri and his daughter Ken is readily apparent and made explicit most frequently by Ken's statements to Hersri's former fellow detainees about her feelings of being on the island, with meeting them, and in retracing Hersri's steps with him. However, we do not gain much further insight into the relationship between father and daughter. Similarly, Hersri's conversations with other former detainees on the island about Indonesian politics lack context, and therefore are obscure for the viewer.

In visiting the sites of memory on the island, those places that marked and recalled incarceration, we see a refurbished cultural hall where detainees

used to perform, a modest monument marking the village established in line with the prison camp, Savanajaya, and the grave of one of his closest friends while in exile, Heru Santoso. The movie does not explain the significance of this particular site.[2] Heru was a leader of the CGMI student organisation in Surabaya, East Java, and had tried to convince Hersri to make an escape attempt from the island. According to one former exile, Heru died from hepatitis in the camp hospital.[3]

Regrettably, there is also little explanation here about the sites other than what is voiced by the interlocutors on screen. Without adequate 'setting up' and organisation of information by the filmmakers, the significance of these sites is not transmitted adequately to the viewer. For example, a scene where prayers are recited by the group, led by a Father, Baskara (who was not introduced in the film), beside Heru's neglected grave could have been even more poignant, had we understood something about the deceased.

This film provides glimpses of Buru Island, a relatively remote part of Indonesia and the return of men who had years of their lives taken by a faraway ruling regime by being placed there. They returned as free men who are still haunted by memories of those they left behind. This is surely a powerful premise for a documentary. Contrasting with other documentaries which provide more contextualization through interviews and archival images, the director chose to follow the men to Buru without providing background information about the key *dramatis personae* and the events that impacted their lives. The film may pose some difficulties for viewers who have little knowledge about Indonesian history, in particular, the history of the Indonesian Left and its destruction by the army in 1965. The observational style leaves the viewer wondering about some of the organisations and individuals mentioned in Hersri's narrative, about which the film does not provide much explanation. In using mainly impromptu observation as its chief technique, the resulting footage contains many narrative gaps. Owing to the technique chosen – the absence of active intervention such as the addition of interviews and tighter editing, and the lack of context and information provided –, it would be hard for younger Indonesians, the film's purported target audience, to follow the narrative thread in this film fully and to develop more knowledge about the anti-communist violence of 1965-66.[4] There continues to be disinformation and confusion in Indonesia and internationally about these events, including

2. Hersri Setiawan, *Diburu di Pulau Buru*, Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2006, p. 194.

3. Anonymous, 'At Australia Bridge', in Baskara T. Wardaya S. J (ed.), *Truth Will Out: Indonesian accounts of the 1965 mass violence*, translated by Jennifer Lindsay, Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Publishing, 2013, p. 301.

4. See comment by Whisnu Yonar in Ika Krismantari, 'Documentary Provides Different Angle on 1965 Tragedy', *The Jakarta Post*, 19 March 2016, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/19/documentary-provides-different-angle-1965-tragedy.html

the phenomenon of long-term imprisonment, Indonesia's major human rights issue of the 1970s. While the film contributes somewhat to our historical knowledge, there continues to be many unexplored possibilities in telling the story of Buru. The survivors of this gross human rights violation are diminishing in number and to tell their stories powerfully and meaningfully would contribute significantly to addressing this past.

Soe Tjen Marching[1]

Forty Years of Silence: The Insanity of Society

Forty Years of Silence: An Indonesian Tragedy
Documentary, 87 min., 2009
Director : Robert Lemelson
Producer : Elemental Production
Distributed via : http://40yearsofsilence.com/#shop
Language : Indonesian and English, with English subtitles

Millions of people were murdered, imprisoned, tortured and/or raped in 1965-66 in Indonesia. Whereas this tragic episode of Indonesian history has been exposed by scholars for decades, it has been silenced by the majority of the population who has been taught, in the New Order, a one-side narration which left no place for the voice of the victims. With the exception of Gus Dur or Abdurrachman Wahid, every Indonesian President since and including Soeharto have denied that this ever happened. Soeharto stepped down, but he was never brought to justice before his death in 2008; and his cronies, such as Titiek Soeharto and Prabowo Subianto, are still free to hold important political positions. When Jokowi was first elected in 2014, many victims of the 1965 genocide became more optimistic about the prospects for justice. Jokowi promised to deal with past human rights abuses in Indonesia. This promise nevertheless has never been realised. In 2017, he even seemed to support the New Order's discourse by attending the screening of the New

1. Senior lector, School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

Order propaganda film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI [The Treachery of the G30S/PKI]* in Bogor, West Java, and by allowing this film to be screened on national TV. In October 2019, Jokowi became an honorary member of *Pemuda Pancasila*, the youth group that took part in the genocide of the communists and alleged communists in 1965-1966. Soon after Jokowi's second inauguration as President in 2019, he appointed Prabowo Subianto, an ex-army general accused of human rights violations, to be Minister of Defence. The new minister instructed school teachers to teach "the truth and nothing but the truth" about the history of the rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its brutality.[2]

It is for this reason that the film *40 Years of Silence* remains relevant in today's Indonesia. The film concentrates on the psychological conditions of the characters, including trauma and PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), allowing to see the long-term impact of the violence on the people's mental health. The director, Robert Lemelson, is a psychological anthropologist as well as a documentary filmmaker. He has worked in Southeast Asia particularly in Indonesia and since early 2000, he has been writing about mental illnesses in Indonesia. Shot between 2002 and 2006, the film *40 Years of Silence* focuses on the stories of four families that had been the subject of "ongoing clinical visual ethnographic research on culture and mental illness in Indonesia conducted by Robert Lemelson over a ten-year period".[3] Lemelson interviewed these families and depicted their activities and surroundings including their homes, places of worship, schools and playgrounds.

In this film, Lemelson also involved researchers, psychiatrists and counselors both from Indonesia and USA, who gave comments on the historical and political backgrounds of the film and the behaviour of some of the characters. Lemelson juxtaposed the interviews of the characters with black and white documentary excerpts from the 1965-67 genocide, analyses from the experts, as well as short excerpts from the propaganda film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*. This technique renders the visual images of how the intense terror surrounds the victims and their families for many years, more powerful. The contrasts between the New Order propaganda film with the testimonies of the four families demonstrate how the one-sided and State-sponsored discourse functioned to support and even instigate fear amongst the victims and their families for many years.

2. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/11/23/17112481/menhan-prabowo-minta-pemberontakan-pki-diajarkan-di-sekolah, accessed on 1 January 2020.

3. Robert Lemelson, Laurence J. Kirmayer, and Mark Barad, "Trauma in Context: Integrating Biological, Clinical, and Cultural Perspectives", In L. Kirmayer, R. Lemelson, & M. Barad (Eds.), *Understanding Trauma: Integrating Biological, Clinical, and Cultural Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 451-474 ; Robert Lemelson, Ninik Supartini, and Emily Ng. *Ethnographic Case Study: Anak PKI: A Longitudinal Case Study of the Effects of Social Ostracism, Political Violence, and Bullying on an Adolescent Javanese Boy.* Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 379-389.

40 Years of Silence: An Indonesian Tragedy

Degung and Kereta

The first part of the film takes place in Bali, focusing on two men whose fathers were murdered during the 1965 genocide: Degung Santikarma and Kereta. Both tell their stories with a certain degree of doubt. For Degung, it was because he was too young and uninformed about what happened at that time. In the case of Kereta, his mental state renders him confused when narrating his story.

Degung says that his father was important and well-off. However, he never mentions what his father actually did. If he was important, what made him important? What was his position? Degung also says that his parents often went overseas, probably for conferences. Again, he is not sure what these conferences were about because he was too young then. Degung's father was arrested and later murdered in 1965. However, Degung also does not know how he was murdered. Degung's uncertain narrative is not the only one here. It is common for many of these victims and their families not to have clear ideas about what happened to their own families during the 1965-66 incidents. Pak Kereta is another example. He lives in a rural area of Bali. Kereta states that he witnessed the mass murder of many people and the brutal assassination of his own father in the family compound. Some of the perpetrators were his neighbours, and his own cousin also took part in the violence towards his father. His father's body was eventually buried in a local cemetery, but was never given the proper Balinese cremation ceremony. According to Balinese belief, not being given such a cremation will mean that the person's soul cannot rest.

This could be the reason why Kereta has delusions and keeps seeing the ghosts of communist people calling him. But Kereta's delusions also raise the possibility that his story about his father and the other murdered communists are also delusory. Ironically, Kereta describes the ghosts of the communists as "evil" beings who entice him to join the Indonesian Communist Party, something that he resists. He wears camouflage clothes and a military helmet to keep these communist ghosts away. The film shows how Kereta goes around in this clothing, as he believes that the military symbols can appease and protect him against the dangerous black spirits of the communists. The paradox here is that Kereta, who suffers from the impact of the military brutality, seeks refuge by adopting the perpetrator's image.

Budi and Lanny

Besides Degung and Kereta in Bali, the film presents the stories of two families in Central Java, those of Budi and Lanny. Budi lives in an orphanage in Yogyakarta, although his parents are still alive. From this film, we learn that Budi's parents decided to move him there because Budi had been violently bullied by the children around him. Budi's father, Mudakir, was accused of being a communist because he fell in love with the same girl as the son of the head of his village. After his release, Mudakir married Sumini, whose father had also been imprisoned as an alleged communist. In their marriage, Mudakir abused Sumini. The victim becomes the perpetrator : he beat up Sumini until her mouth bled and at one point, he nearly killed her. While Kereta adopts the perpetrator's image, Mudakir adopts the perpetrator's behaviour.

Both of the sons of Mudakir and Sumini have a tendency towards disruptive behaviour. When Budi first entered the orphanage, he had a bad temper, was often restless and out of breath. His elder brother, Kris, also expresses a lack of confidence in his future. Smoking while aimlessly wandering with other street kids, Kris admits that he has often been scolded as "a child of communists" and has been blamed if anything bad happened in his village. For many people, Budi and Kris may be seen merely as trouble-makers or good-for-nothings, but the film makes us ponder and understand that there is a long past behind their present troubles.

The fourth family that this film focuses on is that of Lanny. She was born into a very well-off and respected family. One day in 1965, hundreds of people threw stones and axes at their house, while shouting her father's name. Lanny's mother told how their house was looted then and as a result, they became very poor. But she asked her children to be tough and to work hard. Interestingly, Lanny's mother never mentions communism but keeps insisting that her family's identity is Chinese: "Show them that you are really Chinese, not just fake Chinese." She opposes the stigma and sufferings in their lives by insisting that as Chinese, the family can persevere and survive, as though by adopting this identity, they can oppose the injustice.

The Central Condition of the Society

By combining these four families, the film demonstrates the underlying cause of these disjointed narratives. Having an interest in mental illness and psychological issues in Indonesia, Robert Lemelson notes that in both Java and Bali, people adopt convictions that may contribute to the recovery process.[4] In the case of Kereta, his delusion of seeing ghosts can be viewed as a spiritual experience by the local people. And Kereta aligns his delusion with people's conviction around him, that communists are evil. In the same way, he tries to tackle his delusion with another ideologically accepted convention: the wearing of military attire.

In Java, Lemelson notes that the *ngemong* approach[5], "used for children or for someone who appears to be 'acting like a child', encompasses tolerance of aggressive and impulsive behavior" and ensures "an absence of criticism, blame, or hostility" towards such behaviour.[6] This kind of approach does not only apply in Java, but is adopted widely in Indonesia. Most Indonesians are familiar with the proverb "Sing waras ngalah" (The sane/healthy one has to give in), implying that aggressive and anti-social behaviour should be considered as coming from insane or sick people and therefore treated as such.

Nevertheless, in this film, most of the victims have to adopt the role of *ngemong* in conformity with the society surrounding them. Degung for instance, analyses the brutality of the people around him as part of the propaganda of the government. He even approaches one of the perpetrators who lives next door to his family's home, and talks about the death of his father. Degung mentions the suspicions that the victims had about this neighbour: that he was one of the decision makers in the 1965 mass-murder in the village. His neighbour, while being friendly, still sounds rather threatening by claiming that if he was truly "that kind of person, I would have finished you all off." Somehow, with a threatening tone, he implies that Degung has either to be grateful to him or stop suspecting him. Degung's face registers a bit of a shock, but he remains calm and polite. Here, he acts as the person who understands, the person who does the *ngemong.*

In relation to the treatment of the neighbours to Budi's family, it is Budi's mother that shows the attitude of *ngemong*. She has to tolerate her husband's

4. *40 Years of Silence: an Indonesian Tragedy. Film Guide.* www.der.org, accessed on 22 December 2019.

5. *Ngemong* is Javanese for 'empathy'.

6. Several scholars such as Douglas Kammen, John Roosa, Robert Cribb and Saskia Wieringa have emphasized the role of the Indonesian army in this genocide. Brad Simpson and Jeffrey Robinson have pointed to the involvement of several Western countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia in assisting the operations behind the 1965 genocide. Recent findings by Jess Melvin in Aceh demonstrate that this genocide was planned, and that Soeharto's role in these incidents was crucial.

abuse as well as the society's contempt stating: "Maybe I was immune to slander and pain." While she is victimised in multiple ways, she is the one who is forced to show tolerance and the absence of anger and criticism against the attackers and abusers. It is only after her children are victimised that she feels her sadness and pain.

Lanny in the end finds consolation in Buddhism and makes peace with her anger. She even organizes relief for the village where her father had been murdered, after a massive earthquake. She takes on the role of *ngemong*, of trying to understand her society and the injustice that has been inflicted on her family. While watching the film, one has the impression that the movie aims at conveying a message: the sufferers of the mental disorder inflicted during the 1965 incidents are not only the main characters portrayed, but also the societies surrounding the victims as they show aggressive, malicious and erratic behaviour. The "truth and nothing but the truth" narrative repeated by different Indonesian governments has justified the "insanity" of the people and normalised the mental illness of the society. Importantly, the claim of a single truth prevents the possibility of other discourse(s) – such as the ones portrayed in this film – come to light and reduces the possibility of Indonesia undertaking enlightening debates about its history.

Reference

Anderson, Benedict. "How Did the General Die." *Indonesia* 43, April 1987.

Cribb, Robert, ed. *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali.* Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University Australia, 1990.

Kammen, Douglas and Katharine McGregor (eds.). *The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965-1968*. Honolulu : University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.

Lemelson, Robert and Annie Tucker. *Afflictions: Steps Toward a Visual Psychological Anthropology.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Lemelson, Robert, Laurence J. Kirmayer, and Mark Barad. "Trauma in Context: Integrating Biological, Clinical, and Cultural Perspectives." In L. Kirmayer, R. Lemelson, & M. Barad (Eds.), *Understanding Trauma: Integrating Biological, Clinical, and Cultural Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 451-474.

Lemelson, Robert, Ninik Supartini, and Emily Ng. *Ethnographic Case Study: Anak PKI: A Longitudinal Case Study of the Effects of Social Ostracism, Political Violence, and Bullying on an Adolescent Javanese Boy.* Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Robinson, Geoffrey B., *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66*, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2018.

Roosa, John. *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30 Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia.* New Perspectives in SE Asian Studies. Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.

Simpson, Bradley, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Wieringa, Saskia and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, *Propaganda and the Genocide in Indonesia: Imagined Evil,* London and New York: Routledge, 2018.

Grace Leksana[1]

A Daughter's Memory : 1965 in Animation

A Daughter's Memory[1]
Animated short film in color, 8 min. 40 sec., 2019
Director : Kartika Pratiwi
Production : Kotak Hitam Forum
Language : Indonesian with English subtitles

The animated short film starts with a Scrabble board game. One night in a house in Gunung Sahari, three siblings are playing Scrabble. These children compose words in Indonesian as they are trying to win the game. However, their situation transforms drastically when a military truck arrives at that house. Captain Suroso enters the house, takes over the Scrabble board, and writes the word "Njoto" – the name of one of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)'s central committee leaders, who was also a supervisor of the party's *Harian Rakjat* newspaper and a minister in the 1962 Cabinet. Njoto is also the father of those children.

Captain Suroso's hunt for Njoto was part of a national-scale military project to eliminate the Left in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966 (then again in 1968 in East Java). During that period, more than 500,000 people were killed, detained, tortured, and experienced acts of gross human rights violations. While this narrative of violence remains at the margins of Indonesia's historiography, the event that triggered it has been widely commemorated. This is the 30

1. Ph.D. candidate, Leiden University.

September Movement, or Gerakan 30 September 1965 (G30S), which is centered on the death of six generals and one army officer during an attempted military coup. The government accused the PKI of being the instigator, which became a pretext for a complete annihilation project against the communists, the Left, and their sympathizers.

A Daughter's Memory presents another face of this historical event. Using Scrabble as a gimmick, it connects national violence with a family's memory. By capturing the story of a young daughter who lost her father, the film aims to represent the 1965-1966 violence from an alternative perspective. It is a national tragedy but also a personal experience. It is not only about loss and sorrow but also about struggles and overcoming fear. These experiences presented in the film are the ones of Svetlana Dayani Njoto, one of Njoto's daughters who has been actively involved in the film project. Through Svetlana's narratives, Njoto, who is remembered in Indonesia's history as a PKI leader, became another figure – a patient father who taught his daughter how to use the typewriter, for example. But Svetlana's narrative does not spare the details of the horror that happened in 1965 and 1966. She recalls her experience of being detained in a jail along with her mother and other siblings. She remembers seeing victims of brutal interrogation techniques being dragged back to their cells covered in blood on a daily basis. Svetlana was often instructed to clean up the interrogation room in the morning when it was not in use. Here she saw traces of torture, such as the stingray tail and the floor covered with blood.[2]

The film reveals that Svetlana began to understand the larger picture when she was in middle school, particularly the reason for her father's disappearance and their family's detention. In her history textbook, she saw her father's picture along with other PKI leaders – Lukman and Aidit – with the caption "PKI's kingpin" or *gembong* PKI. They were blamed for the G30S movement and the deaths of the generals. Along with their families, they became enemies of the state. Svetlana and her family had to hide their identities until 1987, when she decided to start using her real name again. Through the story of the young Svetlana, *A Daughter's Memory* conveys a different narrative of 1965, one in stark contrast to the State's narrative that revolves mainly around the G30S and the deaths of the generals. More than that, this memory of a young daughter enables the audience to comprehend what 1965 violence actually represents for families and ordinary citizens – the losses and struggles that have left traces up to the present.

2. Svetlana's memory also appears in Soe Tjen Marching (ed.). *The End of Silence: Accounts of the 1965 Genocide in Indonesia.* Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press, 2017.

A Daughter's Memory

Producing the Film

The most interesting aspect of this film is that it is a short, animated documentary. Kartika Pratiwi is the director and producer. She is the founder, managing director, and one of the filmmakers at Kotak Hitam Forum, an organization that uses audio-visual works as a medium within Indonesia's cultural movement to highlight and discuss Indonesia's diversity. Besides producing films, Kotak Hitam Forum also conducts educational programs for the public in the form of discussions, workshops, and research. They believe that audio-visual media has the strength to convey and generate critical ideas and to provide spaces for marginalized voices.

With this background, presenting topics related to the violence in 1965 has been a passion for Kotak Hitam Forum's founders since its establishment in 2008. Related to this specific event in Indonesia's political history, Kotak Hitam has produced three other documentaries, including *Yang Bertanah Air, Tak Bertanah* (A Motherland but no land, 2008), *r.i.* (The republic of indonesia, 2010) and *Api Kartini* (Kartini's Fire, 2012). *A Daughter's Memory* was produced in 2019 and takes the form of an animated documentary. This genre was chosen because the director wanted to experiment. While several documentaries on the 1965-1966 violence have already been shown in previous years, the challenge was to produce another documentary, that would

be interesting and, at the same time, convey a strong message through the personal figures of survivors such as Svetlana. As Kartika Pratiwi mentioned in an interview with *The Jakarta Post* (1 November 2019), she sees digital technology as something that could change the way memories and history are preserved. Her work, together with her production team, received acclaim when *A Daughter's Memory* was awarded the prize for Best Film and Best Animation at ReelOzInd! 2019, a short film festival in Australia dedicated to Indonesian and Australian productions.

Kartika Pertiwi wanted to use a narrative from second-generation victims for a particular reason. In a discussion with *Watch 65* in Leiden, on 15 July 2019, she explained that narrative is the only thing that these victims have to express themselves. Recording and presenting them visually is one way to create a different kind of archive—to preserve their memories—as they are also aging. This type of films creates spaces for victims to articulate their own memories about the violence. It should be participative and involving the victims who actually hold these memories. This is why, for the director, the memorialization of the 1965-1966 violence should find its own form and not merely reproduce successful forms of memorialization found in other countries with similar histories of mass violence.

Future Directions

While Indonesia is moving very slowly toward the memorialization of the 1965-1966 violence, at the grassroots level, we are seeing the increasing involvement of younger generations—as exemplified in the film—in creating and producing mediums to preserve the diverse narratives of violence. This tendency is what Marianne Hirsch, a leading scholar in memory studies, has named postmemory:

> The relationship that the 'generation after' bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before – to experiences they 'remember' only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory's connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. (Hirsch 2012: 5)

Hirsch developed her concept while working with Holocaust survivors. The case of Indonesia in 1965 presents a different yet interesting aspect of postmemory. In the context of impunity and exclusion of violence against the Left in Indonesia's history, Indonesians have lived for years within the public discourse initiated by the State on G30S but also within the private narratives of the mass violence in 1965. Decades after the violence and after the fall of Suharto, these narratives are not exclusively competing but also coexisting. Svetlana's story shows how she managed to comprehend her family's experience when she encountered the State's narrative – the history textbook

that wrongly depicted her father as a national traitor. Indonesia's postmemory of 1965, therefore, is built by understanding these diverse narratives rather than negating any of them. Both the killings of the generals in G30S and the mass killings occurred simultaneously in 1965 and should become part of Indonesia's history. The fabricated anti-communist narrative is also part of the process in understanding this violent past. One should be *understood* in relation to each other, not *silenced* for the benefit of the other.

Both the public and private narratives drove Indonesians to take action to expose more voices on the events surrounding the violence of 1965 and 1966. While victims themselves are becoming older and dying, it is now the younger generation who is taking the initiative. These people were not necessarily affected by the past violence like victims' families, but they are driven by curiosity and motives to reveal the 'truth.' This is a generation born and raised toward the end of the New Order in a more democratic atmosphere and, thus, tired of being force-fed with a monolithic version of history. As Kartika Pertiwi explained in the discussion with *Watch 65*, her motive to produce documentaries on the 1965 violence was partly because of her guilt, as she once believed the New Order's national narrative. Furthermore, this post-New Order generation is taking a more creative and digital approach to convey experiences of violence. Besides audio-visual formats such as those produced by Kotak Hitam Forum, there is also a digital media platform, such as *Ingat 65*, which has compiled testimonies from the younger generations related to 1965. Others take creative performances as their medium, such as the Papermoon Puppet Theatre or the collaboration between the singing choir Dialita, which consists of women survivors and young generations of Indonesian musicians. There is no reason to believe that this tendency will change in the near future. Therefore, one can hope that the younger generations will remain increasingly involved in creative and innovative ways of talking about 1965.

References

Figge, Katrin. "A Daughter's Memory: A Voice for the Forgotten." *Jakarta Post*, November 1, 2019.

Hirsch, Marianne. *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust*. New York : Columbia University Press, 2012.

Gilang Desti Parahita[1] *and Vissia Ita Yulianto*[2]

The Treachery on YouTube: The Politics of Memory on New Media in Indonesia

Introduction

Media, be it fiction (Suryajaya, 2015; Heriyati, 2015; Wirawan, 2015) or factual—documentaries (Paramaditha, 2013), journalistic reports (Parahita, 2014), as well as videos conveying alternative perspectives of the 1965/66 massacres—have been used to enhance social memories of 1965/66. Such media have been distributed through new media platforms, including YouTube (Espena, 2017; Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019).

Owing to its capacity to offer different means of interpreting and remembering the trauma of modern Indonesian history, cinema has become part of the battle for history in Post-Soeharto Indonesia (Espena, 2017: 59). Arifin C. Noer's film *Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (*The Eradication of the Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party*), more

1. Gilang Desti Parahita is a communication scientist and assistant professor at the Department of Communication Science at the Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Her research projects mainly cover a range of topics within new media and marginalised communities as well as digital journalism. Her current projects include "citizenship and social inclusion" and "safety in journalism." She can be contacted at gilang_parahita@ugm.ac.id.

2. Vissia Ita Yulianto, PhD, is a socio-cultural anthropologist. She is the author of *Reframing Modernities in Contemporary Indonesia: Ethnographic Studies on Center and Periphery in Sulawesi and Java* (Regiospectra, 2015). She works at the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies, and teaches at the Graduate Program of Performance and Visual Art Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: vissia.itayulianto@ugm.ac.id.

commonly known as *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, has been widely propagated to produce an official memory of 1965/66 and its aftermath (Zurbuchen, 2002; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019). However, since the collapse of Soeharto's New Order in 1998, at least forty alternative films dealing with the 1965/66 massacre have been released.[3] In the current digital era, the internet has been widely used to distribute films. As YouTube viewership in Indonesia is among the highest around the world (Katadata, 2018), the website has thus become one major locus of memory contestation (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019). Within the context of the 1965/1966 Tragedy, both official and vernacular versions are available on YouTube.

However, not much research has explored YouTube videos related to the 1965/66 tragedy within the context of the politics of memory. This study, therefore, asks how YouTube has interconnected with the politics of memory within the Indonesian state. How does YouTube reflect the politics of memory as a contested space and the dominance of certain social memories? Exploring Indonesia's creation of social memories through YouTube is beneficial, as many countries have experienced similar traumas in the past and have used new media to contest such memories.

Literature review

The Politics of Memory and New Media

The politics of memory refers to how political communities articulate, and hence gain recognition of, certain memories and narratives (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000: 12). It moves beyond the dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up approaches, as it operates within the intermediate space between the public (the State) and the private (the individual), an arena or socio-political space within which social actors seek recognition of their memories and channel their agency (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000:12–17). The battle for memory is waged over the meaning and "ownership" of symbols, academic conferences, commemorations, reunions, and rituals, as well as through conventional and new media (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000; de Brito, González-Enríquez & Aguilar, 2001).

The politics of memory produces different expressions of memory and positions within society. Bodnar recognises two types of memory expression: official and vernacular (Marschall, 2010). Official memory is promoted by cultural leaders and authorities at all levels of society, driven by social unity and the attainment of societal and political goals to foster particular interpretations of the past that reduce the power of competing interests (Marschall, 2010:141). In official memory, the state holds the institutional

3. Jusuf (2016:12) notes that, between 2000 and 2011, 25 such films were released. More alternative films are found on YouTube (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2018). See Appendices, Table 1.

power to influence how citizens remember and forget, often for nation building purposes (McGregor, 2016; Bijl, 2012; Sulistiyanto, 2007; Sturken, 1997; Bargueño, 2012). Meanwhile, vernacular memory is abundant and diverse, propagated by 'ordinary people' interested in protecting particular values and memories of their direct experiences with past events or narratives. It is predominantly developed at the local level in small-scale communities (Marschall, 2010: 141), often being created and contested through cultural production and education (Huyssen, 2011).

Utilising technology, the state can create an official "prosthetic" memory[4]. Depending on the socio-economic power of the groups who produce and maintain memory, the state may transform official memory into monumental memory, something that is hegemonically produced and maintained through multiple possibilities, from "the word in stone" to the medium of film (Mitchell, 2003: 443). Censorship can provide a means of buttressing the official memory, being used to dictate the link between society, the filmed event, and its filmic representation (Stora & Stevens, 2007). As history is incorporated into popular culture and information and communication technology, memory can be created through media which allows a moment of the past to exist in the present (such as through biopics or documentary films) and flow freely between groups (Landsberg, 2008).

YouTube has become a new site where people can record, share, exhibit, and retrieve memory, as well as mediatise artefacts over time and space (House & Churchill, 2008). Virtual memorials are able to augment the remembrance experience by cultivating fluid, interactive, and creative spaces that encourage high levels of participation, collaboration, and self-expression (Jones & Gibson, 2012). In the internet era, virtual memory has thus expanded beyond individual persons, spaces, institutions, and nation states, becoming a socio-technical phenomenon—one that is neither entirely social nor entirely technical (House & Churchill, 2008). Technological features work in tandem with larger cultural contexts. However, they are also subject to medium-specific constraints and thus contribute to the rapid obsolescence and disappearance of historical consciousness; they also tend to serve commercial and entertainment purposes, thereby nurturing a narcissistic amnesia (Haskins, 2007: 406).

Monumentality, thus, can manifest in cyberspace and the information highway, thereby conquering both time and space but it might remain seamlessly connected with the existing traditional monuments (Huyssen, 2003: 47). Similarly, virtual knowledge on YouTube can result from the colonisation of memory by the private sector and by the developed world; if a memory has no commercial value, no one will bother preserving it. Consequently,

4. The term was coined by Alison Landsberg (2008), who defined it as memories that disseminate through mass culture and are acquired by people who have not a live experience of the events.

vernacular knowledge and minority views—the records of small populations and information perceived as uninteresting and invaluable—are left out of digitisation processes (House & Churchill, 2008).

The inequality of memory within the digital realm has been explored by Markotyrkh (2017:12), who found that YouTube has facilitated the remembrance of traumatic pasts by revealing Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian interpretations of the Battle of Kiev, all of which are inclined to support unilateral perspectives and ignore alternative ones. Although alternative narratives are represented (unequally) on YouTube, Ukrainophone and Russophone users tend to utilise YouTube not to challenge national narratives of the past, but to disseminate and propagate these narratives online (Markotyrkh, 2017). By extension, alternative memories do not necessarily become monumental; official histories can be recreated in and dominate digital realms, receiving massive popularity due to the algorithms of economic power.

Observing the use of YouTube as a medium, Knudsen & Stage (2012: 432) found that the website enables "democratized memory practice where official justifications of war are disputed and scrutinized via all sorts of discursive and affective investments." As such, although global spaces such as YouTube enable the circulation and reproduction of collective memories in de-territorialised and transnational modes, they may also contribute to the strengthening of national, and indeed, nationalist memories (Drinot, 2011). This is exacerbated by the disparate starting points of monumental and vernacular memories. A Telekom advertisement in Germany, for example, cannot create monumentality in cyberspace without a national monument; it thus enlists the Brandenburg Gate to signify something "made in Germany" (Huyssen, 2003: 48).

The 1965/66 Killings in Indonesia and the State Politics of Memory

In the 1960s, the largest communist party in the world outside of the Soviet Union and China was the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI/Partai Komunis Indonesia), which was then the fourth largest political organisation in the country, after the National Party of Indonesia (PNI/Partai Nasional Indonesia), the Masjumi, and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (McVey, 1965). Nevertheless, the party was annihilated between 1965 and 1966, and its followers and sympathisers, including left-leaning intellectuals, artists, workers, teachers, soldiers, and ordinary peasants, all fell victims. In the New Order regime that emerged afterwards, the official history—based on a book by Nugroho Notosusanto—justified these killings by identifying PKI and its supporters as having masterminded the killing of six generals during a failed coup (Herlambang, 2014).

However, the claim is debatable; seeking an explanation for 30 September and its aftermath, scholars have put forth at least four alternative narratives

about the killings of the generals. In an article popularly known as the "Cornell Paper", Anderson and McVey (2009, initially published in 1966, see Kammen [2017]) argued that G30S represented a culmination of internal army conflicts. This is also supported by Cribb (1990), who wrote that political tensions between the Army and the PKI had increased in the last years of Guided Democracy—especially after Sukarno's health became an issue. Crouch (2007) identified three possible drivers of the coup: military officers dissatisfied with army leadership, the PKI, or dissident army officers in conjunction with PKI collaborators. The narrative that President Soekarno was involved in the coup was presented by Fic (2004) and Dake (2006). Other studies have identified Soeharto as the initiator of the killings, as no other actor benefited more than him and he did nothing to prevent the attack (despite having the ability to pass intelligence reports to generals Ahmad Yani and A. H. Nasution; see Latief, 1999). Still others have speculated that the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had become involved as part of its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies (Scott, 1985; Wardaya, 2006). Such counternarratives, though prohibited officially, circulated in Indonesian academic and intellectual circles throughout the New Order regime.

Adam (2018) identifies 1965/66 as having three phases—the prologue, the main event, and the epilogue—and argued that the epilogue (or impact) of G30S has continued into the present day. He describes the prologue as starting five years before 1965. In this, he departs from the New Order, which identified the prologue as having started with the Madiun Affair in 1948; Madiun was critical in this narrative, as it was used to argue that the PKI had betrayed the Indonesian Republic while it was fighting for independence. The main event was the killing of six generals on 1 October 1965, while the epilogue consisted of mass killings, discriminatory policies, and official histories of the main event.

Despite Indonesia's democratisation since 1998, the Soeharto regime's official version of the 1965/66 mass killings remains monumental in Indonesia's public memory (Budiawan, 2000, 2004; Adam, 2018). Even as new evidence from both survivors and perpetrators has enabled scholars to identify systematic patterns of violence across the Indonesian archipelago (Chandra, 2017; McGregor, Melvin & Pohlman, 2018; Hearman 2018), none of Indonesia's post-New Order presidents have prioritised dealing with the past (Zurbuchen, 2002; Pohlman, 2016).

Of the five presidents who have ruled Indonesia since Soeharto's resignation—B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Joko Widodo—only Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) invited all Indonesians living abroad as political exiles to return, asked government ministers to take steps to restore the civil

rights of former detainees and exiles, apologised for the mass slaughter of communists, and encourage citizens to expose the 1965 massacres and other incidents of human rights abuses (Zurbuchen, 2002). However, when Wahid called for an investigation into those killings and proposed rescinding the Decision of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly no. 25 of 1966 (TAP MPRS 25/1966), which banned the PKI, he faced immediate opposition from anti-communist groups—including NU, Indonesia's largest Islamic group and an organisation in which he had cultural roots. As Zurbuchen notes (2002: 573), "the public process of coming to terms with the legacies of 1965 thus lost its earlier focus on recovering history and was readily subsumed within familiar polarizations: left vs. right, communism vs. Islam."

Certain social memories become dominant as a result of the politics of memory, be it practiced by state or non-state actors. In Indonesia, although current president (Joko Widodo) initially vowed to settle past human rights cases—including the 1965/1966 tragedy—the government has maintained the New Order's narrative through monuments, ideologies, and school textbooks, as well as requirements to watch certain films at school (Putten, 2017; McGregor, 2016, McGregor, 2007; Zurbuchen, 2002). Even today, state histories identify the defeat of communism as the salvation of the nation, as well as the victory of religious values over dangerous foreign influences. Communists have been stigmatised as foreign, immoral, barbaric, and inherently dangerous (McGregor, 2016: 248).

At the same time, however, the politics of remembering has been exercised by state and non-state actors. Some civil organisations have challenged attempts to revise the official history, including judicial, military, police, and Islamist institutions—all of which participated in the killings (McGregor, 2016; Fealy & McGregor, 2010). Moreover, civil society organisations have made efforts to promote truth and justice in post-Soeharto Indonesia, holding inclusive activities, using theological approaches, and sponsoring meetings mediated by young Islamist activists (Wahyuningroem, 2013).

Nonetheless, these have faced significant resistance. For example, although the Indonesian government authorised a new history curriculum open to potential alternative discussions of 1965/1966, the Attorney General declared that books that did not use the acronym PKI (or G30S/PKI) to describe the Movement would be banned (McGregor, 2016). Similarly, since 2014, anti-communist groups have protested book launches, film screenings, and meetings of former political prisoners in Indonesia (McGregor, 2016). Meanwhile, NU threatened to sue *Tempo* after the magazine issued a special edition that featured confessions from NU executioners (McGregor, 2016).

Method

This research employs a mixed methods approach to analyse alternative memories of 1965/66 that have or have not been uploaded to YouTube. First, between 1–14 August 2018, we entered the keywords *G30S* (30 September Movement), *Peristiwa '65* (*'65 Event*), and *Komunisme* (communism) in the YouTube search bar and listed the 39 suggested videos that had received more than 300,000 views. This list predominantly consisted of scenes or full copies of *Treachery*; we found only 10 videos that provided alternative views of the events, and these were among the least popular (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019). During the course of this analysis, we viewed more than 30 films with alternative narratives of 1965/66 (Appendices 1, Table 1), randomly selecting the titles from a list of films screened at the Memory and Marginalised Voices Film Festival held by Kineforum on 24 October 2015 (Utami, 2015). To supplement these films, we consulted works identified in previous research (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019), as well as those mentioned in interviews conducted for this specific study.

On 11 November 2019, we entered the keywords *film PKI* into the YouTube search bar; again, the six most widely viewed videos were copies of *Treachery* (Appendices, Table 2). Other videos perpetuating the dominant narrative of 1965 included scenes from *Treachery* as well as newly made videos presenting the voices of military museums and the descendants of the killed generals. To complement this analysis, we decided to analyse the top comments of the three most-viewed films on YouTube: *Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (*The Treachery of G30S/PKI*), *The Act of Killing (TAoK)*, and *Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!* (*We Only Follow Orders, General!*, KHMPJ!).

A review of the literature was used to identify past incidents and policies related to the commercial and non-commercial films about the 1965/66. We interviewed eleven informants, mostly filmmakers but also activists, in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Bali[5]. Analysis was qualitative, as the topic is resolutely

5. We interviewed I Gusti Ngurah Termana, the founder and coordinator of Taman 65 Bali; Dr Baskara T. Wardaya, the head of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies at Sanata Dharma University; Ruth Indiah Rahayu, a columnist, historian, feminist, and human rights activist; Lexy Rambadetta, who produced *Mass Grave*; Ratrikala Bhre Aditya, the producer and director of *C'est La Vie* (an independent film screened at the Jogja-Netpac Asian Film Festival); Ari Yurino, program officer at ELSAM; Hanung Bramantyo, the director of *Topeng Kekaksih* (Lover's Mask), *Lentera Merah* (Red Lantern), and *Legenda Sundel Bolong* (The Legend of Sundel Bolong); Dwitra J. Ariana, the director of *Masean's Message*; Alexander Matius, the manager of the #50tahun 1965 Film Screening; Ilman Nafai, the director of *Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!*; Janet Deneefe, the director of the Ubud Readers and Writers Festival; Faiza Marzuki, scriptwriter and drama director of *The Silent Song of the Genjer Flowers*; Bowo Leksono, the founder of Cinema Lovers Community of Purbalingga and the Purbalingga Film Festival; Dwidjo U. Maksum, the director of *Air Mata di Ladang Tebu*; Rommy Fibri, former commissioner of LSF

Fig. 1. *Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!* (KHMPJ!) contains testimonies from former members of Cakrabirawa, the presidential security forces of Sukarno.

impressionistic and thus unable to be understood through quantitative means (Kracauer, 1953: 640).

Findings and Discussion

The first section discusses the socio-technical factors underlying the high viewership of *Treachery*, including the discourse strategies of alternative filmmakers and upload dates of political videos on YouTube. The politics of remembering, as practiced by alternative filmmakers and YouTube users, have interacted with Indonesia's broader political and social tensions. Recognising that the state, filmmakers, civil society, and mass organisations have taken part in the memory politics of the country, the second section discusses how regulation, censorship, filmmaker agency, film festivals, and vigilante groups have shaped the memory of 1965/66 on YouTube.

The Monumental 'Treachery' on YouTube

This study argues that the videos which appear on YouTube reflects the social and political situations in which the platform is operated and utilised. However, before further discussing the social and political contexts of observed YouTube videos, this section shows that the monumentality of *Treachery* on YouTube can be analysed from the fact that numerous versions have been

and M. Nur Khoiron former commissioner of Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM).

uploaded, and that these versions tend to be popular (Appendices, Table 2). The six most-viewed versions of *Treachery* on YouTube have been seen by thousands, receiving more likes than dislikes; likewise, they have received thousands of supportive comments.

The six most-viewed videos we found on YouTube are full copies of *Treachery* as released by its director, Arifin C. Noer. However, in many other videos (not listed in the Table), footage from *Treachery* is frequently re-uploaded or incorporated into new videos. Several have received millions of views. This can be seen, for example, in a talk show published by VisualTVLive entitled "Eksklusif! Kesaksian Anak Ahmad Yani atas Kejamnya G30S/PKI" (*Exclusive! The Testimony of the Son of Ahmad Yani on the Cruelty of September 30 Movement/PKI*" (uploaded on 29 September 2017, 4 million views). Videos offering alternative voices have received much lower viewership, as seen by the examples of *Mass Grave* (2001) (uploaded by dphotografer, 7,900 views), *The Look of Silence* (2014) (uploaded by Jagal Senyap, 707,000 views), and *Jembatan Bacem* (2013) (uploaded by Belajar Mandiri, 161,000 views).

On YouTube, the monumentality of memory might be influenced by identity forces, commercial culture, temporal social media trends, and unclear hypertextual narratives (Jones & Gibson, 2012; Horsti, 2017: 125; Huyssen:194). For example, being a spectator and creator of online video impacts on one's national identity formation. The frequent uploads and remixes of *Treachery* show the influence of YouTube's identity forces and commercial culture, which pushes and invites users to reuse existing video. The film has become prosthetic memory. Scenes of dark shadows and eerie tune of the conspirators in contrast to the bright houses of the Soeharto's and generals in *The Treachery* lead to remembering 1965/66 as simply evil and secretive PKI versus the military (Putten, 2017:114). Usep Kartawibawa, who uploaded a copy of *Treachery* in 2011, provided a complete description of the film's cast and crew. He also wrote that, although the movie was no longer broadcast on television, it still deeply affected anyone who watched it because *"...the setting feels intense, the music score is terrifying, and the director smartly directs the casts to show firmness, sadness, anger, and sadism."*

Despite the vernacular memory of 1965/66 being found on YouTube, as observed in the most popular videos related to the tragedy, the monumental memory on YouTube is limited to the events surrounding the generals' killings. The complications and aftermath are ignored. This finding might be related to the tendency of the military and human rights activists to focus on different parts of the events. "I often watched discussions of 1965/66 on television that involved members of the military and human rights activists. Their talks concentrated on two different things: the military's focus was on the days of the generals' killings, while the activists [focused on the events]

after October 11, after *Berita Yudha* wrote disinformation about the killings."[6]

Based on comparison of these six uploads of *Treachery* and two alternative videos (*Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal*!, KHMPJ!; uploaded by TV Dokumenter; 1.6 million views; uploaded on 18 July 2017), and *TAoK* (uploaded by Jagal Senyap; 1.9 million views; uploaded on 17 December 2013), it can be seen that the social memories on the September/October 1965 and its aftermath are highly contested on YouTube. *Treachery* continues to attract high levels of viewership. Meanwhile, despite many alternative narratives being available, only a few have received millions of viewers.

On uploads of *Treachery*, most comments voiced condolences to the killed generals, reminded readers of the importance of maintaining Pancasila (the state ideology), condemned PKI either for killing the six generals or for practicing atheism, or recalled the Madiun Affair of 1948, in which the PKI was said to have killed devout Muslims and religious leaders. Some comments advocated the killing of people descended from PKI followers, arguing that this was necessary to totally eradicate communism.

Although it must be recognized that, owing to its production during the New Order, *Treachery* has had more time to dominate Indonesia's social memory, two socio-technical factors have also enabled it to become popular on YouTube. **First,** *Treachery,* its remixes, and other videos promoting the official narrative often refer to PKI with sensational keywords such as "violence" (*keganasan*), "brutality" (*kebiadaban*), "cruelty" (*kekejaman*), or "terrifying" (*mengerikan*) in their titles; similarly, emotional terms such as "sad" (*menyedihkan*) are used to refer to the children of the killed generals. These films' provocative titles and hashtags, as well as their use of official terms such as G30S/PKI, make them more readily found by YouTube users.

Ironically, the use of such terms may also benefit alternative narratives; take, for example, a version of *Jembatan Bacem* uploaded by Belajar Mandiri under the title "Jembatan Bacem Film Dokumenter tentang Peristiwa 1965 [Awas Kiri] [Full Video] [Dokumenter]" (Bacem Bridge a Documentary about the 1965 Incident [Beware the Left] [Full Video] [Documentary], 161,000 views, uploaded on 11 July 2014). Similarly, the use of the word *jenderal* (general) in *KHMPJ!* may fit into YouTube's algorithms, as the word is often used in the title of videos showing the six generals' exhumation; indeed, KHMPJ! even trended on YouTube when it was first uploaded by an anonymous user[7].

Most videos promoting alternative narratives of 1965/66, however, employ metaphorical titles and non-sensational hashtags, focusing instead on the epilogue or the aftermath of the killings of the six generals (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019). Only some of these titles refer explicitly to the camps that held political prisoners or other sites, such as *Plantungan* (Putu Oka Sukanta,

6. Interview with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 29 May 2018.
7. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 12 November 2019.

Fadillah Vamp Saleh, 2011), *Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta* (Rahung Nasution, 2016), *Tjidurian 19* (Abduh Aziz, Lasja F. Susatyo, 2009), and *Jembatan Bacem* (Yayan Wiludiharto, 2013); of these, the first two could not be found on YouTube.

Fig. 2. *Jembatan Bacem* reports testimonies from the families of lost persons in Central Java during 1965/66. Bacem bridge in Solo, Central Java is believed to be a place where some PKI followers/symphatizers were shot to death.

Shortly, because alternative filmmakers do not use binary or confrontational words in the titles or descriptions of their films, *Treachery* has retained its position as the monumental memory of the 1965/66 tragedy on YouTube. To find alternative narratives, users must have prior knowledge and information on the films or on the 1965/66 event itself. *KHMPJ!* and *TAoK*, for example, received widespread media coverage and were subject to controversy, granting them greater public recognizability.

Second, remembering requires momentum. The fact that most popular videos were uploaded in the months of September and October indicates that the uploaders realise that they will reach broader audiences if they upload videos on or about Pancasila Sanctity Day. They recognise that, as Pancasila Sanctity Day is held annually on 1 October to commemorate the killing of the generals, people are more likely to search for related videos on YouTube (McGregor, 2002).

The six most-viewed versions of *Treachery* on YouTube were mostly uploaded in 2017, at a time when popular debate focused on whether it was necessary to continue screening the film to prevent the resurgence of communism in Indonesia. For example, General Gatot Nurmantyo of

the Indonesia National Army (TNI) recommended that local army offices conduct public screenings of the film, despite the Ministry of Education and Culture of Indonesia having previously prohibited compulsory screenings for students (KumparanNews, 2017). President Joko Widodo, who had often been denounced as communist by his political opponents—particularly Islamist hardliners—watched the film together with soldiers at Makorem, Bogor, in September 2017 (Rahmawaty, 2017). Two national networks, TVOne and SCTV, even broadcast the film in late September 2017; both got high ratings (Lubis, 2017; Irfani, 2019).

Also common in 2017 was the use of terms such as "communism" and "PKI" to attack political opponents, most prevalently in Jakarta's gubernatorial election and in national politics (Parahita, 2017; Jaya, 2017; SMRC, 2017). These attacks, as well as widespread rumours of a communist resurgence, further sharpened the political divide between supporters of President Joko Widodo and his 2014 opponent Prabowo Subianto (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019: 112). In this context, fear of communism and the momentum of the 1965 tragedy could be exploited for commercial and political benefit (Laksono, 2017; Bawaslu, 2014; KPI, 2019).

Conversely, none of the videos presenting alternative narratives of the 1965/66 tragedy utilised the momentum of Pancasila Sanctity Day, as they were not uploaded between the end of September and early October. This may be related to the political stance of the survivors and human rights activists. For example, I Gusti Ngurah Termana—the founder of Taman 65 in Kesiman, Bali—stated that they avoid commemorations in September and October because these transitional dates belong to the army not survivors.[8] Those films that have received relatively high viewership, namely *TaOK* (2012) and *KHMPJ!* (2016), may have done so because of media coverage. For example, *TaOK* had received two prizes at the 2013 Berlin International Film Festival and covered by the global media before it appeared in Indonesian media.

Social Memories of 1965/66, the State and the Agency of Cinema Communities

Although the state may have officially declared which history and memory

8. Taman 65 is a grassroot forum established by some local Balinese to voice the repressed memories of participants and enable them to talk about their missing relatives and share the testimonials of family members. The forum often invites filmmakers, musicians, and English-language educators to create dialogue among members. Ngurah, the coordinator of Taman 65, says that survivors focus not on 30 September or 1 October, but the end of 1965 and subsequent years. (Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, on May 8, 2018). Similarly, Dr Baskara T. Wardaya, the head of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies at Sanata Dharma University and a researcher focused on 1965/66 (as well as reconciliation efforts), suggests that activities countering mainstream discourses should be limited because survivors' stories start in the weeks after the events (Focus Group Discussion, 11 April 2018).

of 1965/66 is true, the experiences of survivors' families are legion. As stated by I Gusti Ngurah Termana:

> I found that no one understands this extreme pain… my tears, my laments, my stories… who cares? … I had thought that it was better buried here (pointing at his heart), but I finally realized that it was wrong… If I keep it, then it is my burden forever… not only for me, but also my whole family, my children.... Of course, my grandmother was deeply sad when we set up this memorial right in front of her rebuilt house. Digging up the past means burning her with sorrow. … Yes, this extended discrimination is really evil… but to the point we tell lies to ourselves? To our family members? My grandfather was killed by one of his own family members, my grand-uncle (with a flat voice). … We should start to be truthful now, to break the silence… be truthful about our own history, our family histories. I don't care about the government's history.[9]

The uploading and provision of alternative memories, despite the monumentality of *Treachery*, is similar to Termana's efforts to create alternative memorialisation and remembrance in his home, to break his silence and communicate his pain. Although such acts may invite protests, this only strengthens the alternative voice. For example, although Indonesia's Film Censorship Body (*Lembaga Sensor Film*) refused to allow *TLoS* to be screened at Indonesian festivals,[10] its appearance on YouTube has given it another means to reach wider audience. Indeed, our observations showed that YouTube has offered filmmakers—no matter their motivations—a way to reach broader audiences than possible with film festivals. This was also mentioned by Lexy Rambadetta, the director of *Mass Grave* (2001), who said that he deliberately distributes his films related to 1965/66 through YouTube (using the account Jakartanicus) because the website is the most popular video-sharing platform in Indonesia[11]. A similar idea was also mentioned by Faiza Marzuki, the director of a filmed theatrical performance titled *Silent Song of the Genjer Flowers* (2015).[12] As she put it, "Having my theatrical performance uploaded to YouTube let it reach more remote audiences, though my drama was originally written (under the title 'Nyanyi Sunyi Kembang-Kembang Genjer') and performed for an on-location audience". Her video depicts heartily conversations between Rakhma and her grandmother in a livingroom. Rahma is curious about the life of her grandmother who was actively involved in women's movement in her youngest years and she found the truth in the conversations. Meanwhile, Dwidjo U. Maksum uploaded his film *Air Mata di Ladang Tebu* (Tears in the Sugarcane Field, 2019) to YouTube as he could not

9. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana on 6 May 2018.

10. Interview with former commissioner of LSF 2015–2019 Rommy Fibri, on 1 January 2019, and former commissioner of Komnas HAM, Muh. Nur Khoiron (who applied for the censorship), on 4 January 2019.

11. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.

12. Interview with Faiza Marzuki, 14 November 2019.

access commercial theatres.[13] This drama movie taps the story of a man who returns from exile and how he is accepted by his ex-fiancée and neighbours.

In this context, it should be noted that—unlike the monumental *Treachery*, which is merely uploaded to YouTube or remixed in new uploads—vernacular memories are created from new materials. To remediate vernacular social memories of 1965/66 on YouTube, film communities have exercised their agency despite relatively strict regulation and threats from local vigilantes. The state, through the Film Censorship Body (LSF/*Lembaga Sensor Film*) and Article 18, Paragraph 3b of Government Regulation No. 7/1994, clearly prohibits content that promotes communism and/or Marxism/Leninism. However, such censorship only applies to films that are screened theatrically or televised, rather than those screened privately or to limited audiences.

Fig. 3. *Izinkan Saya Menikahinya* (Let Me Marry Her) won the best fiction at FFP 2016. The relationship between two lovers must end since the woman is suspected to have familial relations with former members/ followers of PKI while the man is a member of the army.

As of writing, YouTube content or channels have never been intentionally blocked by the Indonesian government—despite the authoritarian leanings of Law No.11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions. However, the Ministry of Communication and Information is permitted to block certain YouTube content or channels, as it has done with other online platforms (citing hate speech and pornography) (CNNIndonesia, 2019; Untari, 2019). In addition, the teaching of history at schools has not changed much, even though Indonesian millennials have a great desire to learn[14]. A study conducted by

13. Interview with Dwidjo U. Maksum, 17 November 2019.

14. Ruth Indiah Rahayu (a columnist, feminist, historian, and human rights activist) has rejected arguments that Indonesian millennials are ignorant and uninterested in

Tika Savitri shows that high schools students are more interested in learning about this tragedy from alternative media, in this case a filmed theatrical performance entitled *MWATHIRIKA* (Savitri 2018)—even though teachers (in Yogyakarta, for example) are reluctant to use alternative films as learning media (Pratiwi, 2016). As stated by I Gusti Ngurah Termana, "Our community struggles not only to disclose the dominant memory but mainly to reveal the ignorance about 1965/66 events. They even do not know what PKI actually was or the controversy surrounding it."[15]

Before the massive influx of the internet and threats from local vigilantes, two routes were used to present alternative narratives and create vernacular frames. **First,** alternative narratives were presented through commercial films and theatrical releases during the early 2000s. According to Hanung Bramantyo, the director of *Lentera Merah* (Red Lantern, 2006) and *Legenda Sundel Bolong* (The Legend of Sundel Bolong, 2007) the earliest years of Indonesia's political reform offered creative professionals the greatest freedom to circulate media (books, films) about the 1965/66 tragedy. Although Bramantyo's films were motivated by personal aspiration, his agency was also supported by commercial producers' willingness to support such films.[16] "When filming *Gie* (2005), military troops—the Diponegoro Mobile Brigade—even protected the shooting sites, and lines of cameos hoisted the PKI flags," he narrated.[17] Importantly, however, *Gie* (2005, directed by Riri Reza) did not represent the massacre itself. It was a biopic about Soe Hok Gie, a young political activist; and never explicitly explored the organised massacre (Lee, 2011: 327).[18] Meanwhile, although the song *Genjer-Genjer*—associated with the PKI—was allowed to appear in the film, a line including the title was cut by LSF.

Second, non-commercial films (both documentaries and works of fiction) were exhibited in film festivals or in limited public screenings. In early 2000's, *Mass Grave* (2001) was distributed in VCD format—despite high costs—and screened at many Indonesian campuses by students and cinema communities (with the notable exception of Udayana University, Bali)[19]. *Mass Grave*

Indonesia's modern history, feminism, or social movements. Citing her experiences with students, she argues that the problem is not millennials, but the methods used to teach history. Visual media may be more readily accepted by millennials, but textual literacy is prioritised. Despite Indonesia's old-fashioned approach to teaching history, some students were asked to interview her about 1965/66. Among the questions asked is, Do you think the event of 1965/66 has ruined the nation of Indonesia?" (Interview with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 29 May 2018).

15. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 6 May 2018.

16. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019.

17. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019.

18. *Gie* received eleven Citra Awards at the 2005 Indonesian Film Festival. In this, it surpassed *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, which had only received Best Screenplay at the 1985 Indonesian Film Festival.

19. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.

(2001) was screened at Taman 65, Bali, even though the Balinese people were afraid of discussing the tragedy. Ngurah Termana recalled that, when Taman 65 screened *Mass Grave* (2001) in the mid-2000s, audience members fled from the venue when they heard words such as "PKI" or the song "Genjer-Genjer".[20]

In recent years, however, screenings of films presenting alternative narratives have faced more threats and intimidation from local vigilantes. In 2015, a planned screening of *The Look of Silence*, as well as related discussions at the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival (UWRF) faced objections and pressures from local authorities; it was ultimately cancelled[21]. Meanwhile, screenings of *We Only Followed Orders, General!* (Ilman Nafai, 2016) and *Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta* (Rahung Nasution, 2016) at the Purbalingga Film Festival were swarmed by people dressed in Islamic garb (Iswinarno, 2016). Screenings of *TLoS* at Gadjah Mada University, the Indonesian Institute of Art, and the Yogyakarta office of the Alliance of Independent Journalists were cancelled because of protests from mass organisations[22]. "If I were asked to make a film dealing with 1965/66 today, I would think twice, because people are now more willing to attack others who have different views," said Hanung[23].

Despite this threat, filmmakers derived agency from their interactions with survivors as well as extant books and films. Commercial filmmakers such as Hanung Bramantyo had studied about the history communism in Indonesia long before the fall of Soeharto. Despite having been raised in a strongly Islamic family, Hanung Bramantyo had learned about this chapter of Indonesia's history and incorporated his knowledge in his non-commercial film *Topeng Kekasih* (2001). He identified the 1965/66 tragedy, as well as the

20. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 8 May 2018.

21. According to Janet Deneefe, "We cancelled the panels because we were told that, if we continued to hold them, the Festival would not be granted a permit. Everyone in Indonesia knows that the authorities will suddenly close down events without the correct paperwork, if they choose. So we had to think of the bigger picture—we believed that, for all our paying guests, we had an obligation to guarantee the smooth running of the Festival and not a sudden cancellation. Our actions focused on the greater good. In the end, 1965 was discussed in so many panels, so the cancellation actually drew more attention to this issue. It became the most important subject for that year, and international press also wrote about it, after hearing about the UWRF's dilemma." (Interview with Janet Deneefe, 18 November 2019).

22. On 17 December 2014, LPPM Sintesa, a study group at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, scheduled a screening of *The Look of Silence*. However, the organising committee faced intimidation from a local civil society organisation as well as police pressure (Asmaning, 2014). Similar persecution was experienced by the Yogyakarta Institute of Art and the Yogyakarta Chapter of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI, Asosiasi Jurnalis Independen) (Detiknews, 2014).

23. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019.

deadly riots that precipitated Soeharto's resignation in 1998, as some horrific cases of violence in Indonesian history; he thus used horror to convey the terror of these incidents.[24]

Non-commercial filmmakers, meanwhile, have generally been motivated by direct interactions with survivors or human rights activists, and supported by cinema communities. Lexy Rambadetta, the director of *Mass Grave* (2001), has concentrated on social justice issues—especially the 1965/66 tragedy—since the fall of Soeharto; he learned of the opportunity to record the exhumation of PKI followers' bodies in Kebumen, Central Java, after meeting some former members of Gerwani (a women's organisation associated with PKI). According to Lexy, the issue of 1965/66 remained sensitive in the early 2000s. However, many survivors began asserting their identities. Lexy met Sulami, Sulastri, Sumarni, and Putmainah—all survivors of 1965/66—as well as several former Gerwani members. Through conversations with them as well as some feminists, he learned to criticise the singular truth of 1965/66 (and patriarchal culture in general) and that Gerwani had never performed the 'Dance of Fragrant Flowers' (*Tarian Harum Bunga*). Learning of an exhumation from Sulami, he travelled to Kaliwiro Village, in Wonosobo, Central Java, to record the process.[25]

According to Lexy, this exhumation was sponsored by Danielle Gouze, the wife of former French President Francois Mitterrand.[26] Meanwhile, *Jembatan Bacem* (2013, Yayan Wiludiharta) and *Masean's Message* (2016, Dwitra J. Ariana)—both alternative narratives—were supported by the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM). *Jembatan Bacem* (literally, Bacem Bridge) documented a rare pilgrimage of victims' families to Bacem Bridge in Solo, Central Java, where more than 70 people were executed; their bodies were subsequently dumped in the river.[27] Meanwhile, *Masean's Message* received Rp 35 million in funding from ELSAM. [28]

Film festivals have become the main venues for alternative 1965/66 social memories to reach, attract, and engage audiences, as festival managers and audiences recognise the importance of these films. Alexander Matius, the coordinator of the Memory and the Marginalized Voices Film Festival (which was fully supported by the Jakarta Arts Council) says that the event was organised to denounce the state's failure to recognise and apologise for past

24. Hanung Bramantyo was also inspired by *Cabinet Caligary*, the first horror film in the world. He chose to integrate 1965/6 into the film's narrative, arguing "Horror itself is about terror, not ghosts". Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019.

25. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.

26. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.

27. Interview with Ari Yurino, ELSAM Programme Officer, 30 May 2018, as well as local people along the river banks.

28. Interview with Dwitra J. Ariana, 16 November 2019.

violence.[29] Film festivals conducted outside Jakarta have also offered significant mediums for young, local, and talented filmmakers to articulate and represent complex local issues, and even to promote trauma healing in Indonesia (Irawanto & Octastefani, 2019; Kurnia, 2018). Janet Deneefe, the above-mentioned director of the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival, acknowledged that festivals have become one of Indonesia's most important platforms for discussing global issues and ideas. "With its fifty-year anniversary, and as one of the most tragic events in recent times, it was important to commemorate '65 during the Festival as part of the healing process."[30]

Similarly, Bowo Leksono, the founder of Cinema Lovers Community (CLC) and Film Festival Purbalingga (FFP), urged young participants to produce films based on their interests and concerns, up to and including the 1965/66 tragedy. "Students are generally unfamiliar with 1965/66. Schools do not teach the subject fully. Therefore, before they produce their films, they conduct research. CLC supports their discussion and equipment," said Bowo.[31] The local government has subsidised the film festival, but not CLC's filmmaking activities. As such, Ilman Nafai (born in 1999) used his own pocket money to cover the cost of producing his documentary *KHMPJ!*. In such a situation, the capacity to remember and remediate the past through cinema and other media depends significantly on the socio-economic power of the groups who produce and maintain them (Mitchell, 2003).

In 2016, Ilman's film, together with Raeza Raenaldy Sutrimo's film *Izinkan Saya Menikahinya* (Let Me Marry Her), received the Indonesian Film Appreciation Award at FFP. Both films have been made available by CLC Purbalingga on its YouTube account[32]. Another film dealing with Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, Firman Fajar Wiguna's film *Sum* won Best Documentary at the 2018 Purbalingga Film Festival. It follows Suminah, a former member of the Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI/Barisan Tani Indonesia), a PKI-affiliated mass organization (Baqiroh, 2018).

Before writing the script for *KHMPJ!*, which conveyed testimonials from three former members of Batalyon I Cakrabirawa, Ilman read *Kesaksian Soebandrio tentang G30S* (Soebandrio's Testimony on G30S) and other documents.[33] "I wanted to create a movie that could be contrasted with the

29. Interview with Alexander Matius, 15 November 2019. In late October 2015, Kineforum at the Jakarta Arts Council held a film festival titled "Memory and the Marginalized Voices" to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 incident (Utami, 2015).

30. Interview with Janet Deneefe, 12 October 2019.

31. Interview with Bowo Leksono, 17 November 2019.

32. *Izinkan Saya Menikahinya* tells the story of a woman who cannot marry her fiancé, a member of the army, because during the pre-marital administrative process, he finds out that she has family members related to PKI.

33. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 16 November 2019.

mainstream story about 1965/66," explained Ilman.[34] Through his filmmaking activities and his interactions with survivors, Ilman modified his previous prosthetic memory. He had once believed that PKI were sadistic atheists, but gained new perspectives that differed significantly from those taught in school and by *Treachery*.[35] Cinematic attempts to enliven and propagate alternative memories of 1965/66 thus offer not a means of remembering a forgotten past, but acknowledging a past that has been covered up and slanted.[36]

Conclusion

Cinema has been a tool for keeping the 1965/66 tragedy spilling over into and being present in Indonesian public discourse, enabling the state-sponsored version of the 1965/66 killings be reinforced. At the same time, however, YouTube has offered a platform for both sharing official memory and contesting it with alternative vernacular memories. This study has found that *Treachery* has become a monumental memory on YouTube, as evidenced by its viewership, its high number of likes, the positive tone of comments, its regular uploads, and its remixing into new videos.

YouTube, despite popularly being perceived as a means of channelling and sharing the past, is actually recreating the monumentality of *Treachery*. For decades, this film has offered a prosthetic memory, becoming monumental not only through its official status but also through the activities of the communities who commemorate and enliven it. As shown by Landsberg (2008: 150), prosthetic memory has the unique ability to generate the empathy necessary to form political alliances and solidarity despite being indebted to commodification and mass culture.

Treachery's commodification and mass culture have resonated with YouTube. As such, the platform has not promoted vernacular memory, but rather brought past fears and propaganda into the present. As stated by van der Putten (2017: 2013), *Treachery* continues to instil new generations of Indonesians with "a sense of terror towards and ignorance of communism." Conversely, even though vernacular social memories of 1965/66 are available on YouTube and provide tremendous alternative memories, one must have prior knowledge to connect with these alternative videos.

The politics of the present play a much more significant role in shaping monumental memory than do political communities' experiences of the past (Danforth & Boeschoten, 2012: 247). On YouTube, the politics of the present related to 1965/66 revolve around cinema communities, the political communities of memories, state regulations, and contemporary political

34. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 16 November 2019.

35. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 12 November 2019.

36. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 8 May 2018 and with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 29 May 2018.

tensions. At the same time, YouTube algorithms favour certain dates and keywords. These socio-technical factors have all contributed to monumentality and vernacularity. It might be true that for generation Z and younger millennials in Indonesia, watching 1965/66 on YouTube is not about contesting memories, but conquering fear towards and unknowingness of communism.

Acknowledgements

This study was funded through a collaborative research grant from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM). For this, they have our gratitude. We would also like to express our appreciation to Venda Pratama, from the Department of Anthropology, UGM, who was actively involved in our discussions and meticulously assisted us in collecting data.

References

Adam, A. W. (2018). "Beberapa catatan tentang historiografi Gerakan 30 September 1965" (*Dossier the aftermath of 1965: an Indonesian perspective*). *Archipel*, 95, 11–30.

Anderson, B. R. O'G, & McVey, R. T. (2009). *A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing. (Reprint of the 1966 publication.)

Ashplant, T. G., Dawson, G. & Roper, M. (2000). "The politics of memory and commemoration: contexts, structures and dynamics". In T. G. Ashplant, G. Dawson, & M. Roper (eds.). *Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory.* London: Routledge.

Asmaning, T. (2014). "Teror fasisme di pemutaran Senyap di UGM" (Facist terror during a screening of Senyap at UGM). *Warningmagz.com*

Aspinall, E. & Mietzner, M. (2019). "Southeast Asia's troubling elections: nondemocratic pluralism in Indonesia". *Journal of Democracy,* 30 (4), 104–118.

Baqiroh, N.F.A.B. (2018). "Film berlatar tragedy 1965 menang di Festival Film Purbalingga 2018" (*Film based on the tragedy of 1965 wins the 2018 Purbalingga Film Festival*). *Bisnis.com.*

Bargueño, D. (2012). "Cash for genocide? The politics of memory in the Herero Case for reparations". *Holocaust and Genocide Studies,* 26 (3), 394–424.

Baqiroh, N.F.A.B. (2018). "Film berlatar tragedy 1965 menang di Festival Film Purbalingga 2018". *Bisnis.com.*

Bawaslu (2014). "Remotivi: TVOne, Metro TV dan MNC Group jadi media partisan" (*Remotivi: TVOne, Metro TV and MNC Group become partisan media)*. *Bawaslu.go.id.*

Bijl, P. (2012). "Colonial memory and forgetting in the Netherlands and Indonesia". *Journal of Genocide Research,* 14 (3–4), 441–461.

Brito, B. de, González-Enríquez, C. & Aguilar, P. (2001). "Introduction". In *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budiawan, (2000). "When memory challenges history: Public contestation of the Past in Post-Soeharto Indonesia". *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 28 (2), 35–57.

Budiawan (2004). *Mematahkan pewarisan ingatan wacana anti-komunis dan politik rekonsiliasi Pasca-Soeharto*. (*Breaking the chain of anti-communist memory and reconciliation politics after Soeharto*) Jakarta: ELSAM.

Chandra, S. (2017). "New findings on the Indonesian killings of 1965–66". *The Journal of Asian Studies,* 76 (4), 1059–1086.

CNN Indonesia (2019). "Kebebasan di era Jokowi dan jerat lima pasal panas UU ITE". (*Freedom in the Jokowi era and five tangled articles in the ITE Law*). *CNNIndonesia.com.*

Cribb, R. (1990). *The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966: studies from Java and Bali.* Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Crouch, H. (2007). *The army and politics in Indonesia.* Jakarta: Equinox Publishing

Dake, A. C. A. (2006). *The Sukarno file, 1965–67: chronology of a defeat.* Leiden: Brill.

Danforth, L. M. & Boeschoten, R. V. (2012). *Children of the Greek Civil War: refugees and the politics of memory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Detiknews. (2014). "Pemutaran film Senyap dibubarkan ormas, Rektor UGM hentikan intimidasi" (*Screening of the film Senyap dispersed by mass organization, UGM Rector stops intimidation*). *Detik.com.*

Drinot, P. (2011). "Website of memory: The war of the Pacific (1879–84) in the global age of YouTube". *Memory Studies*, 4 (4), 370–385.

Espena, D .M. (2017). "Remembering 1965: Indonesian cinema and the 'Battle of History'". *Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia* 53 (1), 39–65.

Fic, V. M. (2004). *Anatomy of the Jakarta Coup, October 1, 1965.* Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

Haskins, E. (2007). "Between archive and participation: Public memory in a digital age". *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 37 (4), 401–422.

Fealy, G. & McGregor, K. (2010). "Nahdlatul Ulama and the killings of 1965–66: Religion, politics, and remembrance". *Indonesia*, 89, 37–60.

Hearman, V. (2018). *Unmarked graves: death and survival in the anti-communist violence in East Java, Indonesia*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Heriyati, N. (2015). "Translating pain: women's struggle in their everyday life after G30S tragedy as represented in Putu Oka's Istana Jiwa". *Proceedings of the 3rd Literary Studies Conference: The 1965 Coup in Indonesia, Questions of Representation 50 Years Later.*

Horsti, K. (2017). "Communicative memory of irregular migration: The re-circulation of news images on YouTube". *Memory Studies,* 10 (2), 112–129.

House, N. V. & Churchill, E. F. (2008). "Technologies of memory: Key issues and critical perspectives". *Memory Studies*, 1 (3), 295–310.

Huyssen, A. (2011). "International human rights and the politics of memory: Limits and challenges". *Criticism,* 53 (4), 607–624.

Huyssen, A. (2003). *Present pasts: Urban palimpsests and the politics of memory.* California: Stanford University Press.

Huyssen, A. (1996). "Monumental seduction". *New German Critique,* (69), 181–20.

Ikhwan, Y., Yulianto, V.I., Parahita, G.D. (2019). "The contestation of social memory in the new media: A case study of the 1965 killings in Indonesia". *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 12 (1), 3–16.

Irawanto, B. & Octastefani, T. (2019). "Film documenter sebagai katalis perubahan sosial studi kasus Aceh, Ambon dan Bali" (*Documentary films as catalysts of social change: case studies of Aceh, Ambon and Bali*). *Jurnal Kawistara*, 9 (1), 107–119.

Irfani, F. (2019). "Kok bisa film G30S/PKI ditayangkan lagi oleh SCTV dan TVOne?" (*How could the film G30S/PKI be broadcast again by SCTV and TVOne?*) *Tirto.co.id.*

Iswinarno, C. (2016). "Pembubaran Film Buru bukti ketakutan yang tak perlu". *(Dispersal of the film Buru proof of unnecessary fear)*. *Merdeka.com.*

Jaya. (2017). "Distorsi komunikasi pembangunan pemerintahan Presiden Jokowi di media social" (*The Joko Widodo regime's distortion of development communication on social media*). *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi,* 14 (2), 259–276.

Jones, S. & Gibson, L. (2012). "Remediation and remembrance: "Dancing Auschwitz" collective memory and new media". *Journal for Communication Studies, V*(2), 107–131.

Jusuf, W. (2016). "Remembering Indonesia's 1965 killings in film". *Media Asia*, 43 (1), 10–13.

Kammen, D. (2017). "World Turned Upside Down: Benedict Anderson, Ruth Mcvey, and the 'Cornell Paper'". *Indonesia 104*, 1–26.

Katadata.id. (2018, February 1). "Ini media sosial yang paling sering digunakan masyarakat Indonesia" (*These are the social media most often used by Indonesian citizens*). *Databoks, Katadata.id.*.

Knudsen, B. T. & Stage, C. (2012). "Online war memorials: YouTube as a democratic space of commemoration exemplified through video tributes to fallen Danish soldiers. *Memory Studies,* 6 (4), 418–436.

KPI. (2019). "Metro TV dan Grup MNC klarifikasi keberimbangan dan netralitas siaran" (*Metro TV and the MNC Group clarify balance and neutrality in broadcast*). *KPI.go.id.*

Kracauer, S. (1953). "The challenge of qualitative content analysis". *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 16 (4), 631–642.

Kumparan. (2017). "Pemutaran dan penghentian film G30S/PKI" (The screening and stopping of the film G30S/PKI). *Kumparan.com.*

Kurnia, N. (2018). "Young, creative and independent: Cinema Lovers Community Purbalingga and its strategies to enliven independent filmmaking in Indonesia". In L. Lim and H.K. Lee (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in Asia.* London: Routledge, 296–308.

Laksono, D. D. (2017). "TVOne, Drama Turki, dan PKI" (*TVOne, Turkish dramas, and PKI*). *Geotimes.co.id.* Retrieved from https://geotimes.co.id/kolom/politik/tv-one-drama-turki-dan-pki/.

Landsberg, A. (2008). "Prosthetic memory: The ethics and politics of memory in an age of mass culture". In P. Grange (ed.). *Memory and Popular Film.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 144–161.

Latief, A. (1999). *Pledoi kolonel A. Latief: Soeharto terlibat G30S* (Statement from colonel Latief: Soeharto involved in G30S.) Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi.

Lubis, U. (2017). "Ternyata banyak anak menonton film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI". (*Turns out plenty of children watched the film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*). *Rappler.com.*

Lee, D. (2011). "Images of youth: on the iconography of history and protest in Indonesia". *History and Anthropology*, 22 (3), 307–336.

Makhortykh, M. (2017). "Remediating the past: YouTube and second world war memory in Ukraine and Russia". *Memory Studies*, 1–16.

McVey, R. T. (1965). *The rise of Indonesian communism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Marching, S. T. (2017). *The end of silence: accounts of the 1965 Genocide in Indonesia*. Leiden: Amsterdam University Press.

Marschall, S. (2010). "Commemorating the 'Trojan Horse' massacre in Cape Town: the tension between vernacular and official expressions of memory", *Visual Studies*, *25* (2), 135–148.

McGregor, K., Melvin, J., & Pohlman, A. (2018). *The Indonesian genocide of 1965*: *Causes, dynamics and legacies*. Palgrave Macmillan: London.

McGregor, K. (2016). "Cold War scripts". *South East Asia Research,* 24 (2), 242–260.

McGregor, K. E. (2013). "Memory studies and human rights in Indonesia", *Asian Studies Review*, 37 (3), 350–361.

Mitchell, K. (2003). "Monuments, memorials, and the politics of memory". *Urban Geography,* 24 (5), 442–459.

McGregor, K. E. (2002). "Commemoration of 1 October "Hari Kesaktian Pancasila": a Post-Mortem Analysis?". *Asian Studies Review,* 26 (1), 39–72.

Möckel-Rieke, H. (1998). "Introduction: media and cultural memory". *Amerikastudien / American Studies*, 43 (1), 5–17.

Muhajir, A. (2015). "Kronologi pembatalan diskusi 1965 Ubud Writers Readers Festival". (*Chronology of the cancellation of the 1965 discussion at the Ubud Writers Readers Festival*). *Rappler.com.*.

Parahita, G. D. (2014). "Hegemonic and counter-media frames of the unsolved past tragedy". *Proceedings of the Asian Conference on Culture and Social Studies (IAFOR), Osaka, Japan*. Retrieved from http://papers.iafor.org/papers/accs2015/ACCS2015_05638.pdf.

Parahita, G. D. (2017). "Voters (dis)-believing digital political disinformation in the Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta, 2016–2107". *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, 22 (2), 127–143.

Paramaditha, I. (2013). "Tracing frictions in The Act of Killing". *Film Quarterly*, 67 (2), 44–49.

Pratiwi, K. (2016). "Respon guru sejarah sekolah menengah atas wacana alternatif tragedi kemanusiaan 1965" (*A middle school history teacher responds to alternative discourses of the 1965 tragedy*). *Retorika: Jurnal Ilmu Humaniora Baru*, 4 (1), 13–33.

Putten, J. van der (2017). "A nation in a state of suspended disbelief: the construction and unravelling of the Indonesian massacres of 1965–66 as a site of memory". In J. van der Putten, M. Arnez, E.P. Wieringa & A. Graf. *Traditions Redirecting Contemporary Cultural Productions,* Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 99–126.

Rahmawaty, L. (2017). "Presiden Jokowi nobar film G30S/PKI di Makorem Bogor". (*President Jokowi joins others to watch the film G30S/PKI at Makorem Bogor*). *Antara.*

Rudiana, P. A. (2017). "Festival Film Dokumenter 2017: Antara mencari kebenaran atau realitas". (*2017 Documentary Film Festival: between looking for truth and reality*). *Beritagar.id.*

Sabarini, P. (2016). "The Silent Song of Gender Flowers: against despair through storytelling". *The Jakarta Post*.

Savitri, T. (2018). "Memaknai sejarah 1965 melalui video MWATHIRIKA" (*Giving historical meaning to 1965 through the video MWATHIRIKA*), Master thesis, Performance and Visual Arts Programme, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Scott, P. D. (1985). "The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967". *Pacific Affairs*, 58 (2), 239–264.

SMRC. (2017). "Isu kebangkitan PKI, sebuah penilaian publik nasional". (*Rumours of PKI's resurgence: national public judgment*)

Stora, B. & Stevens, M. (2007). "Still fighting". *Intervention*, 9 (3), 365–370.

Sturken, M. (1997). *Tangled memories: the Vietnam War, the AIDS epidemic, and the politics of remembering*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Suryajaya, M. (2015). "Masalah 1965 dalam representasi artistik dan ideologi estetis". (*The problem of 1965 in artistic representation and aesthethics ideology*). *Proceedings of the 3rd Literary Studies Conference: The 1965 Coup in Indonesia, Questions of Representation 50 Years Later.*

Untari, P.H. (2019). "*KPI bisa blokir konten porno di YouTube dan TV Online".* (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission able to block pornographic content on YouTube and Online TV) Okezone.com.

Utami, E. (2015). "Potret tragedy 1965 dalam film" *(Portrait of the 1965 tragedy in film)*. *Suara.com.*

Wahyuningroem, S.L. (2013). "Seducing for the truth and justice: Civil society initiatives for the 1965 mass violence in Indonesia". *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 32 (3), 115–142.

Wandita G (2014) "Preman nation: watching The Act of Killing in Indonesia". *Critical Asian Studies*, 46 (1), 167–170.

Wardaya, F. B. T. (2006). *Bung Karno menggugat!: Dari marhaen, CIA, pembantaian massal '65 hingga G30S* (Bung Karno accuses!: from Marhaen, CIA, '65 mass killing until the September 30 Movement). Yogyakarta: Galangpress Group.

Wieringa, S. E. & Katjasungkana, N. (2019). *Propaganda and the genocide in Indonesia: imagined evil.* Oxon: Routledge.

Wirawan, Y. (2015). "Cerpen berlatar peristiwa 1965 dalam Koran Kedaulatan Rakyat 2012–2015" (*Short stories with a 1965 background in the Kedaulatan Rakyat daily, 2012–2015). Proceedings of the 3rd Literary Studies Conference: The 1965 Coup in Indonesia, Questions of Representation 50 Years Later.*

Zurbuchen, M.S. (2002). "History, memory and the '1965 Incident' in Indonesia". *Asian Survey,* 42 (4), 564–581.

APPENDICES

Table 1. List of Alternative Movies Related to 1965
(Source: Utami (2015), Baqiroh (2018), Ikhwan, Parahita, Yulianto (2019) and our own interviews/observations)

No.	Titles (Directors/Release Year/Duration)	Genre (Topic)	Modes of Exhibition (YouTube views/ upload year, if any)
1	*Puisi Tak Terkuburkan*/Unburied Poem (Garin Nugroho/1999/86 mins)	Fictional (survivor's testimonial)	Festivals (1,300 views/24 March 2019)
2	*Mass Grave* (Lexy Junior Rambadeta/ 2001/26 mins)	Documentary (Exhumation of victims' remains)	Limited public (8,000 views/ 2016)
3	*Bunga dan Tembok/*Flower and Wall (Yayan Wiludiharto/2003/36 mins)	Documentary (Survivors looking for justice)	Limited public (766 views, 2013)
4	*Terlena: Breaking of a Nation* (Andre Vltchek/2004/84 mins)	Documentary (Suharto's dictatorship)	Festivals, DVD
5	*Djedjak Darah: Surat Teruntuk Adinda*/ Traces of Blood: A Letter for Adinda (M. Aprisiyanto/2004/12 mins)	Fictional (a local artist taken away on 1965)	Festivals
6	*Klayaban*/Wandering (Farishad Latjuba/2004/15 mins)	Fictional (interpersonal reconciliation)	
7	*Kawan Tiba Senja: Bali Seputar 1965*/ Twilight Friends: Bali in 1965 (Kuntjara Wimba P./2004/43 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of survivors)	Festivals (821 views/2017)
8	*Kado untuk Ibu*/Gift for Mother (Ruwekso Setiadi/2004/24 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of survivors)	Festivals (1,380 views/2014)

9	*Gie* (Riri Riza/2005)	Biopic (about Soe Hok Gie)	Major cinemas, festivals
10	*Rantemas* (B. W. Purbanegara/2006/21 mins)	Documentary (a killing site)	Festivals
11	*Menyemai Terang dalam Kelam*/ Sowing Light in the Dark (IGP Wiranegara/2006/65 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of survivors)	Festivals (8,153 views/2014)
12	*Lentera Merah* (Hanung Bramantyo/ 2006)	Fictional (female ghost)	Major cinemas, Festival (4,000 views/2011)
13	*Legenda Sundel Bolong*/Legend of Sundel Bolong (Hanung Bramantyo/ 2007/91 mins)	Fictional (female ghost)	Major cinemas (366,000/2014)
14	*Tumbuh dalam Badai*/Growing in the Storm (IGP Wiranegara/2007/50 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of survivors)	Festivals, limited public (353/2015)
15	*Perempuan yang Tertuduh*/Accused Woman (Lilik Munafidah/2007/36 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of former Gerwani members)	Festivals (19,000/2014)
16	*Seni Ditating Jaman*/The Art that Will Not Die (Putu Oka Sukanta, Lilik Munafidah, Hendro Sutono/ 2008/40 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of former LEKRA members)	Festivals, limited public
17	*Tjidurian 19* (Abduh Aziz, Lasja F. Susatyo/2009/36 mins)	Documentary (profile of LEKRA)	Festivals, limited public
18	*40 Years of Silence: An Indonesian Tragedy* (Robert Lemelson/2009/86 mins)	Documentary (testimonial of survivors)	Festivals, internet (2,400 views/2019)
19	*The Women and the Generals* (Maj Wechselmann/2009/32 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of former Gerwani member)	Festivals, limited public (778 views/ 2013)
20	*Sang Penari*/The Dancer (Ifa Isfansyah/2011/111 mins)	Fictional, Novel Adaptation (Story of Ronggeng Dancer)	Major cinemas, limited public (997,000 views/2011)
21	*Mwathirika* (Puppet Papermoon Project/ 2012/ 20 mins)	Fictional (Puppet show)	Limited public (11,000/2012)
22	*The Act of Killing* (Joshua Oppenheimer/2012/159 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of killers)	Festivals, limited public, internet (2 million views/2013)

23	*Jembatan Bacem*/Bacem Bridge (Yayan Wiludiharto/2013/30 mins)	Documentary (killing site)	Festivals, limited public (163,000 views/ 2014)
24	*The Look of Silence* (Joshua Oppenheimer/2014/99 mins)	Documentary (testimonials of killers)	Festivals, limited public (723,000 views/2015)
25	*Surat dari Praha*/Letter from Prague (Angga D Sasongko/2015/94 mins)	Fictional, novel adaptation (intergenerational reconciliation)	Major cinemas, festivals
26	*Masean's Message* (Dwitra J. Ariana/2016)	Documentary (exhumation of victims)	Festivals, limited public, internet
27	*Izinkan Saya Menikahinya*/Please Let Me Marry Her (Raeza Raenaldy Sutrimo/2016/ 9 mins)	Fictional (romance)	Festivals, limited public (3,700 views/ 2017)
28	*Nyanyi Sunyi Kembang-kembang Genjer*/ Silent Song of the Genjer Flowers (Faiza Marzuki/2016)	Filmed theatrical performance (intergenerational trauma)	Festivals, YouTube (6,600 views/2014)
29	*C'est La Vie* (Ratrikala B Aditya/2017)	Fictional	Festivals
30	*Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!*/We Only Follow Orders, General! (Ilman Nafai/2017/12 mins)	Documentary (Testimonials of survivors)	Festivals, YouTube (1.7 million views/2017)
31	*Road to Justice* (Lexy Rambadetta/2017)	Documentary (reconciliation process)	Limited public, YouTube
32	*Melawan Arus*/Against the Current (Eka Saputri/2018)	Fictional (Injustice, slander)	Festivals, limited public
33	*Sum* (Firman Fajar Wiguna/2018)	Documentary (testimonials of former BTI member)	Festival
34	*Air Mata di Ladang Tebu*/Tears in Sugar Cane Fields (Dwidjo U Maksum/2019)	Fictional (Reconciliation)	Limited public (11,000 views/ 2019)

Table 2. Titles of Six Most-Viewed Copies of *Treachery* on YouTube (Search conducted 11 November 2019 with the keyword *#filmpki*)

No.	YouTube Title	Uploader (Subscribers)	Date of Upload	Number of Views, Comments, Likes, Dislikes	Hashtags
1	FILM G30S/PKI (HD) VERSI ASLI - Kwalitas Gambar BENING (Satu2nya di Youtube Kwalitas BAGUS)	Viral Update (74,300)	9 October 2017	6.8 million views, 11,300 comments, 72,000 likes, 3,900 dislikes	#filmpki #pki #trending #viralupdate2
2	PENGKHIANATAN G 30 S/PKI - part 2 of 3	Usep Kartawibawa (64,400)	12 October 2011	6 million views, , 4,400 comments, 18,000 likes, 2,600 dislikes	No hashtags
3	FILM PENGKHIANATAN G30S PKI	Hendra Ahya (13,300)	24 September 2017	2.1 million views, 4,200 comments, 22,000 likes, 1,300 dislikes	No hashtags
4	FILM G 30 S PKI FULL	Mas Mugi (9,350)	28 September 2018	1.2 million views, 850 comments, 7,700 likes, 754 dislikes	No hashtags
5	FILM G30S PKI	tvMu Channel (74,600)	30 September 2017	1.8 million views, 1,700 comments, 12,000 likes, 4,000 dislikes	No hashtags
6	FILM G 30 S PKI 1984 full 4:33 jam tanpa dipotong	Apple Win (5,000)	26 September 2017	818,000 views, 1,200 comments, 9,100 likes, 350 dislikes	No hashtags

Source: Authors

ÉTUDES

Robert Wessing[1]

The Maiden in the Forest: Reflections on Some Southeast Asian Tales

Introduction[2]

In this article I look at various Southeast Asian stories from especially Central and East Java and Sunda (West Java) but also Bali, Madura, Malaysia and, where relevant, India,[3] in order to discover whether a common core of ideas underlies these seemingly different tales. On one level the stories are about the origin or discovery of rice, and the rise of royal houses. By looking at the nature of some of the protagonists, and especially the context of their actions, another level will become apparent that speaks about the understandings of the peoples whose tales these are and about their position vis-à-vis nature and the supernatural world. These are deep understandings of which people perhaps

1. Independent researcher, <robertwessing@yahoo.com>

2. Many thanks to Dr. Rosemary Gianno, Dr. Jos Platenkamp, and Mr. Randall Baier for their inputs, comments, and support as the ideas explored here took form, and to *Archipel's* anonymous readers who caused me to rethink and clarify several points.

3. With occasional reference to stories told elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago and in South and Southeast Asia. The themes explored here are indeed found throughout Southeast Asia, India and some as far away as Japan. This is not surprising, given the long history of trade and cultural exchange throughout the South, Southeast, and East Asia areas, nor is the fact that once transmitted stories take on local color and meaning. Such similarities combine to form the idea of what Mus (1975) called a Monsoon Asia. See also De Josselin de Jong (1935) and Abahalin (2011) for respectively a more restricted and a wider perspective. The stories were published between 1881 and 2004, though sadly no information is available when or where and on what occasion they were collected.

are or were not always fully consciously aware, and which were, therefore, not stated explicitly. Indeed, as the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset observed,[4] such not-stated understandings, which he characterizes as silences, are an essential part of language. Without them it would be impossible to say anything as every aspect would have to be explained in infinite detail. These silences are found in all languages, though what remains unspoken varies between them. Depending on the narrative, much is therefore often left to the listener to fill in. This gives narratives some flexibility, allowing them to be tailored to the need of the moment. How great this flexibility is of course depends on the importance of the narrative to the community.

I am not concerned here with sharply differentiating between various types of stories like myths, folk tales, sagas, and the like, which are in any case often difficult to tell apart. A narrative that appears as a myth in i.e. a *hikayat* or *babad* (history, chronicle) or a *wayang* story (puppet/shadow play) (cf. Pleyte 1905; Ajip Rosidi 1973; Wessing 2006a: 41, note 42.), may in another context be presented as a folktale in a children's book. Its presentation in the former context can surround it with an aura of sacredness which it might not have in the latter, and which is not necessarily part of the story itself.[5] Yet when we compare the tales themselves, they often do not differ significantly. For clarity's sake I shall refer to them all as stories, tales or narratives, ignoring the question of their intended purpose on any one occasion.

For our purposes these are all narrations that shape the listeners' (or readers') perceptions about the nature of their local reality, thereby creating a 'truth' in which the members of the community participate, which marks them as members of the local community. In other words, narratives shape people's understanding of the world and are the basis for their social identities: we 'come to *be* who we *are* … by being located or locating ourselves … in social narratives *rarely of our own making*' (Somers 1994: 606). I would amend this by observing that while most indeed do not make up the tales, all are nevertheless active participants in shaping them, in that on hearing a tale and its silences, all must construct their own understanding of it. In effect, they create their own version of the story, which can lead to considerable variation. Thus even locally more than one version of a narrative can exist and be regarded as true. Also, not all participants necessarily and unquestioningly accept the truth of any one version. Through listening to or retelling the tales we reconstruct them and make them our own. Even doubters generally know the tales and must take them into consideration when participating in the community.

4. Cited by A.L. Becker (1995:6).

5. See for instance the story of Nyai Rara Kidul in Olthof (1987), where it is part of the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, and in children's books such as HAR (n.d.) or Subiyanto (n.d.), or, further afield, in films about her (Wessing 2007).

The assumption underlying this article, therefore, is that the stories analyzed here reflect some fundamental aspects of society, some obvious, others more hidden, that were accepted as evident truths, at least at a time in the past, even if they have now fallen into disuse or even disrepute. These include not just features of the social and physical environments, but also encompass the realm of the spirits or the world of the gods. Since this realm cannot be known through the senses, it is given reality through narratives created to account for it, narratives and thus also a reality, that may change over time and with the social context in which the narratives are told. Thus the 'reality' of e.g. spirits varies considerably over time and between different categories of observers, some of whom, perhaps decreasingly, 'experience' them as forces, both benign and dangerous and sometimes both simultaneously (Wessing 2006a) while others, perhaps increasingly, consider them to be nonsense or, if real, to be enemies of new religious and cosmological priorities, contact with which is best avoided (cf. Wessing 2013:115-116.)[6]

The narratives considered here can be roughly divided into two categories,[7] namely stories about the origin or discovery of rice, and romances about princes and their rise to power. The tales about rice can furthermore be subdivided into ones dealing with the courts of Java, and those about villagers and their encounter with wondrous maidens that for a time bring them welfare and ease. These divisions are only very general ones, however, as elements from one category can and often do appear in other tales.

The Origin of the Rice Goddess

The tales Sulanjana from Sunda (West Java) (Hidding 1929; Van der Horst van Doorn 1929:123-127)[8] and Mengukuhan from Java proper (Rassers 1959:14-9) both account for the arrival of rice as a human food. In the Sulanjana tale, the action begins when the god Guru orders all the gods to participate in a construction project. All set out to do so except the snake god Antaboga, who cries and laments that he cannot possibly obey because he has no hands or feet. His tears turn into three eggs, which he is told to offer to Guru. This

6. It should be pointed out that in East Java this idea that contact with spirits is best avoided was expressed to me by both Muslim informants and Pentecostal ones, the latter calling those dealing with spirits (*pawang*, *dhukun*) devil worshippers. This should not be taken to mean that all Muslims and Christians avoid contacts with such practitioners. Rather, while religious teachings may discourage or forbid it, many still use the putative skills or other remedial powers these individuals are believed to have when looking for solutions to their problems.

7. Considerations of space force me to relate the tales only in outline, referring the reader to published versions for greater detail.

8. The stories retold by Van der Horst van Doorn (1929) should be approached with some caution as elements are found in them that are not found in the Indonesian and scholarly Dutch treatments, giving the impression that they were smoothed out for the Dutch readers of the time.

he sets out to do, encountering some obstacles on the way in which two of the eggs are broken. He finally surrenders the last egg to Guru, who tells him to see to its incubation. After some time a beautiful maiden, Tisnawati, emerges from the egg, who is adopted by Guru and his wife. Later Guru falls in love with his adopted daughter and proposes to marry her.

The Javanese version, Mengukuhan, starts with Kanekaputra in possession of a wondrous jewel, the Retna dumilah. In the realm of the gods, Guru pressures him to show him the jewel. Reluctantly Kanekaputra throws it to Guru, who fails to catch it. The falling jewel is swallowed by Antaboga, who is meditating in the middle of the ocean. The gods search high and low for the jewel until they finally come to Antaboga, who refuses to give it up. The gods then attempt to take Antaboga to Guru, jewel and all, at which Antaboga goes there on his own. He produces the jewel which is encased in a box that none can open. Guru finally throws it down and from it a beautiful maiden appears, Tisnawati, whom Guru later either marries or wants to marry. In both narratives Tisnawati makes certain demands before the marriage can be consummated, including a food that once eaten, will forever satisfy. While the story does not say so explicitly, this is probably a reference to rice. Guru then orders one of the gods, *bathara* Kalagumarang, to fulfill Tisnawati's wishes.

With that, the activities move to earth, where the searching Kalagumarang happens upon the goddess Dewi Sri, the wife of the god Vishnu, bathing in the garden Banjaran sari. Smitten, he pursues her, even demanding that Vishnu surrender his wife to him. At this Vishnu and Sri disappear, incarnating as the king and queen of the realm of Mendangkamulan, while Kalagumarang turns into a pig. All these delays frustrate Guru who, unable to contain himself, eventually violates Tisnawati, who dies as a result. In the Sulanjana tale, she dies of hunger, waiting for the food Kalagumarang was sent to fetch.

Filled with remorse Guru recalls Kalagumarang, and orders Tisnawati to be buried in a clearing in the forest in the kingdom of Mendangkamulan.[9] There, miraculously, a coconut palm grows from her head, followed by rice growing from her genitals, and bananas, maize, bamboo, an *arenga* palm and many other kinds of plants growing from other parts of her body. The pig Kalagumarang[10] and his offspring turn into the pests that still threaten the rice and other crops today.

In the Sulanjana tale the action then moves to the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran, whose king, Prabu Siliwangi, is to supervise the care of the rice crop, now known as Nyi Pohaci Sangyang Sri. His wife, the *widadari* (nymph) Dewi Nawang Wulan Sasih (Nawang of the Full Moon) instructs the

9. *Kamulan* from *mula* (beginning, original). Kats (1916:179) writes Kamulyan, from *mulya* (prosperity, honor, esteem) (Robson and Wibisono 2002:498).

10. Elsewhere, however, Gumarang is the name of a mythological ox (Robson and Wibisono 2002:270).

women in cooking this miracle crop, one stalk of which will feed a hundred persons. One instruction she gives is that the king, her husband, is never to touch the kitchen equipment. If he does so, they will immediately be divorced and the magic of the rice would disappear.[11] This last detail will reappear in other tales, as will the bathing in the garden by Dewi Sri.

Sri Mahapunggung

This Javanese narrative is more specifically about Dewi Sri, the rice goddess. As the tale opens, Dewi Sri is fully grown and lives in the palace of Mendangkamulan, clearly an earthly kingdom. A discussion is ongoing about the whereabouts of her brother, prince Sedana, who has been missing for a while. Messengers arrive, bearing a proposal from the powerful king Pulagra that he be married to Dewi Sri. Dewi Sri, however, firmly rejects the idea, even at the cost of her life. Angered, the king exiles her to the wilderness, telling Pulagra's emissaries that they can have her if they can catch her.

This notion of exile to the wilderness and generally the differentiation between village or realm and the forest discussed in these tales should not be understood as one of total opposition. Indeed some overlap between them had to exist for communication between humans and forest denizens to be possible. In India, Schnepel (1995: 158) writes, there is a differentiation between *vana* and *kṣetra*, wilderness and settled space, which 'occupy two complementary poles on a continuum in the people's experience of their habitat and of the various forces associated with it.' The wilderness, then, is part of human social space, so that exile to it did not mean a total exclusion from social life. It is just the space occupied by the spirits who, while not totally without order, maintained rules of their own that did not necessarily correspond to those of the human community (cf. Schefold 1989). The forests, furthermore, were differentiated into two or even three separate domains, the *hutan pinggir* near villages, home of the tutelary spirit and the community's (tiger) guardian. Further away, transitioning into the mountain slopes, was the 'real' forest (*alas*), where the forest spirits were found. The forest on the mountain slopes, finally, was where aspiring kings went to meditate and gain cosmic powers (*kasekten*) (Wessing 2006a: 25-6; Lombard 1974: 477). The forest, therefore, should not be thought of as the impenetrable tangle of brush and trees of the cinematic imagination, populated by fierce tigers and fearsome snakes. Although some stretches of forest, especially near streams, might be tangled, swampy, muddy and slippery, it often also consisted of wooded areas interspersed with open grassland, while wild animals seemed to favor the

11. Hazeu (1901:39) calls Nini Towong the patron saint of kitchens, reminiscent of Nawang Wulan, Tisnawati and Dewi Sri and the behavioral rules they instituted, e.g. excluding men from participating in kitchen activities, and maintaining cleanliness (Purwadi 2004: 137; Rassers 1959: 11).

jungle's edge (see the plates in Nieuwenhuys and Jaquet 1980; Termorshuizen 1993: 40, 72, 80; Chapman 1973:65. 361).

Dewi Sri having been exiled, the scene switches to a farmer and his wife discussing the care of the newly harvested rice crop. Suddenly Dewi Sri appears in their rice-husking mortar (*lesung*). The farmers invite her into the house, but are told to first clean the place. This done Dewi Sri enters the house and drinks a draught of coconut juice. Just as she gets ready to leave, her pursuers arrive, demanding that she come to Pulagra's palace. They quickly overpower the farmer, as Dewi Sri flees from the fight.

Enter the gods Guru and Nerada who quickly assess the situation. Nerada directs Dewi Sri to where her missing brother Sedana is living in the forest of Mendangagung. While Dewi Sri tells Sedana all that has happened, her pursuers once more arrive, demanding that she come along. Sedana refuses to comply and a fight ensues which Sedana wins. The two then decide to found a settlement in the forest of Mendangagung for which Dewi Sri sends Sedana to fetch seeds, coconuts, rice, root crops, eggplant, and spices. To these Sedana adds fencing materials and some labor. The requested supplies soon arrive. Then Dewi Sri sends her brother to fetch the couple who had received her in their home. The farmer, still tied up, is freed, and he and his wife head for the new settlement.

In the meantime, Pulagra's returned emissaries report their misadventures, causing king Pulagra to set off himself, along with all his nobles. As Dewi Sri welcomes her farmer friends, king Pulagra and his men arrive, and a battle royal ensues which king Pulagra loses. Now Guru and Nerada reappear, telling Dewi Sri and Sedana to marry. Both refuse, saying they will only marry if their partner looks like his or her sibling, although they also refuse to marry each other. At this they are separated and the narrative, rather abruptly, ends.

At first glance this last tale doesn't really seem to go anywhere, until one looks more closely at the figures themselves. First of all, as Kats (1916:188) points out, in Indian mythology Sri is the *śakti* (female generative power, also wife) of the god Vishnu, while Sâdhana is one of Vishnu's names.[12] In other tales about Sri and Sedana (Kats 1916:186), both she and her brother came out of two of the eggs that were incubated by Antaboga. As was told above, Dewi Sri was cared for by Dewi Uma, Guru's wife, while Sedana's care-giver was the god Nerada. However, both care-givers erred in the performance of their task, causing their charges to die. Sedana's body then became the source of iron, precious metals, diamonds and the like, while Dewi Sri's body

12. Sâdhana means among other things wealth and money (Zoetmulder 1982, II:1586). Vishnu's wife is Lakshmi or Sri, the goddess of fortune (Dowson 1972:361). Since, therefore, in the realm of the gods Vishnu and Sri are man and wife, the separation of Sri and Sedana is more apparent than real. As Kats (1916:189) points out, this explains the inseparability of the two and the fact that Sri searched everywhere for Sedana.

produced all kinds of seeds,[13] much like was told of Tisnawati's body after her burial. In yet another tale, as Dewi Sri flees from Kalagumarang, she suddenly disappears. At the place where she was last seen, the same plants then grow that earlier were said to have grown from Tisnawati's grave, except that the rice produced by Dewi Sri's body grows on wet fields (*sawah*), while that from Tisnawati's grave needed dry fields (*ladang*, *gogo*) (compare Van der Horst van Doorn 1929:127). Indeed, Kats (1916: 183) writes that Tisnawati and Dewi Sri originally were the same figure.

A final example of the stories about rice is the Sundanese tale of Lutung Kasarung, the clothed monkey.[14] Here Purbasari, the youngest and most favored princess at court is disfigured by Purbararang, her evil, jealous older sister. Purbasari then retreats to a forest hermitage. Alternately Purbararang sent her to the forest to be killed by a woodsman, who took pity on her and built her a small hut where he left her (Van der Horst van Doorn 1929:12-14). In the course of time Guru Minda, the son of the god Sang Hyang Tunggal, comes to earth in the guise of a black monkey to find a young bride who looks like his mother, the rice-mother. Guru Minda, in his monkey guise, is captured to be served at the king's breakfast, but when 'the monkey' cannot be killed Purbararang takes it for a pet. The monkey turns out to be a real nuisance, however, causing Purbararang to send it to Purbasari. There, using its heavenly connections, the monkey has a palace built for Purbasari. Purbararang sets all kinds of impossible tasks for Purbasari to complete, all of which are accomplished through the aid of the monkey and his mother, including bringing rice cultivation to earth. Purbararang, growing more and more frustrated, sets a final challenge: it is to be decided which of them is the most beautiful and has the most handsome husband. At this the monkey reveals himself to be the heavenly Prince Guru Minda, and he and Purbasari ascend to the throne.

In brief, in the first tales related above, the original action, which receives most attention, takes place in the realm of the gods (*kahyangan*; Zoetmulder 1982-1:660-661) or between it and a place 'in the middle of the ocean'(Rassers 1959:14), which I assume to be the underworld. It is only when the actions begin to directly affect Tisnawati or Dewi Sri that the earth and an earthly kingdom become a factor in the search for Tisnawati's desired food and the subsequent pursuit of Dewi Sri by the lustful Kalagumarang, which indirectly led to Tisnawati's death and burial in a clearing in the forest.

13. Sri is said to bring food, while Sedana represents worldly goods (*dunya*). In West Java in 1970, money was regarded as having male attributes. Thus money might be called *kasep* (handsome), a nickname for boys, while rice was referred to as *geulis* (pretty), a common term of address for girls (Wessing 1978:100-101). At the time informants explained that money and rice had to be kept separate, and rice could not be sold for money. Much has changed since then.

14. See Pleyte (1910); Hidding (1929); Eringa (1949); Knappert (1977: 88-98); Van Zanten (2016: 430ff.).

Similarly, in the tale Mahapunggung, Dewi Sri was exiled from the palace to the forest for disobeying her father's orders. In one version of the story, her brother Sedana had fled into the forest for similar reasons (Kats 1916:183). Together the two decided to start a settlement, which would have required them to clear a suitable portion of the forest. Dewi Sri brings in some essential supplies and the founding couple, whom she met while roaming the forest. Then the story ends.

Finally in the tale Lutung Kasarung the princess, having been disfigured,[15] leaves the palace for the forest and eventually returns to the palace. In the process she links up with the rice-mother (thus becoming the rice-daughter), uniting with the forces of fertility, which qualifies her to be queen alongside the king, the rice-mother's son, whose main responsibility is the welfare of the realm as expressed through the abundance of the harvest. In the next section, the roles of the *kahyangan* and the palace are much reduced, and the focus is more directly on the forest and ordinary villagers, though there is, of course, always the potential that the hero will found a princely line.

The Adventures of the Rice-Spirit

The Javanese story of Jaka Tarub and Nawang Wulan (Knappert 1977:35-37; Widyamanta 1963:67-72) has many local variants in which the names of the protagonists differ as well.[16] The tale opens by introducing a young village man, Jaka Tarub, whose antecedents vary. According to Knappert his mother was exiled to the forest because she became pregnant after having been seduced at a pool in the forest. There she gives birth and dies. In Widyamanta's version, Jaka Tarub's mother is Rasawulan, the daughter of the Bupati (regent) of Tuban, who refuses to obey her parents and marry, preferring, like Dewi Sri, to flee into the forest. While bathing at a spring there, she is seen by Seh Maulana, an Arab religious leader. His gaze, which she feels as in a dream, causes her to become pregnant. She searches for and finds the man of her dream, after which she gives birth to a boy and dies.

In both versions a widow at the hermitage of Tarub raises the baby, who grows up to be a handsome lad who likes to roam the forest. There one day he spies some *widadari* (nymphs) bathing at a pool.[17] Curious, he hides one of

15. For a princess, being disfigured is a deviation from the social norm, as is remaining an unmarried virgin like was preferred by Dewi Sri (cf. Wessing 2016:373).

16. Thus Madurese versions speak of Aryo Menak and Tunjung Wulan (Lotus Moon; Robson and Wibisono 2002: 768, 816; Hatib Ws [1963]; Zulkarnaen [1987]) while in a Balinese version the nymph is called Supraba and the male protagonist is left unnamed (Sagimun [1963b]).

17. In a Balinese version (Sagimun 1963b: 107), the young man creates a beautiful garden with a pool, which then attracts the *widadari*. In a sense this is implied in the Madurese version as well, where the pool in which the young man discovers the *widadari* bathing is located in a beautiful *taman sari* (palace garden) (Zulkarnaen 1987). Hatib Ws. even mentions a historical spot called Taman Sarasida located in

their garments, which they need to fly back to their *kahyangan* home. When the *widadari* must dress to leave, the youngest among them, Nawang Wulan, is stranded because her garment is gone.[18] Jaka Tarub convinces her to return home with him, where he marries her. She then becomes pregnant and gives birth to a daughter variously known as Lara Kasihan or Nawang Sih.

With the presence of Nawang Wulan, Jaka Tarub's household flourishes: one grain of rice suffices to fill the rice-steamer (*kukusan*),[19] causing Jaka Tarub's granaries to be filled to overflowing. The food, especially the rice, is also exceptionally tasty (Zulkarnaen 1987). Nawang Wulan has one rule, however: her husband is under no circumstance ever to open the rice-steamer, a rule that is also found in the Sulanjana narration. One day Nawang Wulan has to go to the river, leaving her husband in charge of the cooking fire. Curious, he peeks in the steamer, seeing but a single grain. When Nawang Wulan returns she checks the rice, and finds it not yet done: the magic has gone. Since then she has to cook rice like anyone else, causing the supplies to dwindle. When the granary is nearly empty she finds the *widadari* garment that Jaka Tarub has hidden there. She then returns home to the *kahyangan* where according to some versions she is welcomed and in another version is rejected for having become human. In the latter version she then heads to the sea south of Java, where she incarnates as Nyai Rara Kidul, the Queen of the Southern Ocean (Widyamanta 1963:69).

One significant difference between the tales focusing on the rice goddess and those relating the adventures of the rice spirit, is that the former tell of the coming into being of rice, while in the latter rice fields, both wet and dry, already seem to exist (Hatib Ws 1963:56; Zulkarnaen 1987:35; compare Sagimun 1963b: 113). Instead, the story speaks of a relationship between the rice-spirit and a village man, albeit occasionally with the potential to become a ruler.[20] While rice, therefore, is already known, the nymph that the hero brings home seems to enhance the fertility of his fields: his granaries are filled to overflowing (see also Maxwell 1881: 6). Finally, in these tales, once again, the significant encounter between the hero and a nymph takes place at a pool or spring in the forest, both as the scene of the hero's own romantic encounter with Nawang Wulan, and as the location of his mother's seduction, although in one version of the story (Sagimun 1963b), the pool and the flowers are perhaps a reflection of the forest, much like the *taman sari* at the courts of Java

Sampang (Madura). *Taman sari* were a standard feature of royal residences, places where the ladies of the court could bathe, unobserved by the common gaze. These were often likened to heavenly gardens, inhabited by nymphs (Wessing 1988:173, 175; 1991:9; 2003:226-232). Compare Dewi Sri bathing in a garden of Banjaran Sari.

18. This is a common theme in Javanese tales (Hiding 1929:45).

19. See Tambiah (1970: 352) for a Thai parallel.

20. Thus Zulkarnaen (1987:35) writes that Aryo Menak was just, generous with his crops, and cared for his workers and the needy, all ideal attributes of a ruler.

and Aceh are. At this point I shall leave the rice-spirit for the time being and consider some other apparently human maidens found living in a clearing in the forest or emerging from a bamboo there.

The Maiden in the Forest: Panji Laras[21]

In the story Panji Laras or Panji Kelaras, a never-do-well prince is expelled from the royal palace for excessive cock fighting and gambling. As he roams through the forest he happens upon a clearing where a maiden lives, all alone. The Sagimun (1963a) version of the tale offers no further explanation of why she lives there, or who her antecedents are.

In the East Javanese version (Van der Horst van Doorn 1929) the girl's name is Mukiningsih, who was magically conceived by a barren old woman. The sorcerer who performed the magic tried to claim Mukiningsih when she was grown, but she fled into the forest where she is eventually found by a prince (not a gambler like the one in Sagimun's version) who marries her on the spot. Having married without parental consent, the couple happily settle in the clearing where, as will happen, the maiden becomes pregnant. All this is noticed by a jealous demon who, one day when the prince is absent, attempts to kill Mukiningsih and take her place. Left for dead in a ravine, Mukiningsih is rescued by seven *widadari*s who build her a hut in the forest to live in. Her unsuspecting prince in the meantime lives in their home with the demon-bride, who looks exactly like Mukiningsih. In due course the real Mukiningsih gives birth to a boy whom she calls Panji Laras. After some time the prince is found by the people of the court, who take him and his demon-wife home to the palace.

In both versions, Panji Laras acquires a magical, unbeatable fighting cock, which, moreover, can speak like a human being. When he grows up Panji Laras asks his mother about his father, and is told that it is the cock-fighting prince, who in Sagimun's version has in the meantime succeeded to the throne. At that the boy packs up his rooster and heads for the city to challenge the king's champion bird. Having won, Panji Laras' rooster crows and proclaims Panji Laras identity: he is the king's (or prince's) own son. The king's men follow Panji Laras home, and all is revealed. In Sagimun's version the king recognizes the wife he has abandoned and, love rekindled, he takes her and her son home to the palace. In Van der Horst van Doorn's telling, the demon-wife is killed and Mukiningsih and Panji Laras are installed in the palace.

Alternately, in a tale from the Yogyakarta area (Proyek Penelitian 1981:28-29), a girl becomes pregnant having held a magical knife on the lap.

21. According to Sagimun (1963a) this story originated in Banten (West Java), which is confirmed by the list of publications on the back cover of Zulkarnaen (1987). Van der Horst van Doorn (1929), on the other hand, writes that the story takes place in Dadapan. The *Atlas van Tropisch Nederland* lists several East Javanese places called Dadapan, though the locations of these are rather vague. See note 8.

Embarrassed, she leaves her home and wanders into a faraway village. There she gives birth, not to a child but to a large egg which she places on the ground and covers with a large clay vessel (*jembangan*). From this egg hatches a snake. After the snake is grown it asks its mother where his father is. Told who this is the snake sets out to find him. His father, however, demands proof and, cheating, turns the snake into a magical spear.

Finally, in two Madurese stories (Sutarto, Marwoto, and Saputra 2010) a princess from Jepara in Central Java finds herself pregnant out of wedlock. She is placed on a raft which eventually beaches on a small hill in the middle of the sea, which expands to become the island of Madura. The princess gives birth to a son, Raden Segara (Prince of the Sea), in one version before, and in the other after the raft has beached. As Raden Segara grows up he develops *sekti* (magical) powers. Spotting two fire-breathing dragons on the beach, he defeats them and turns them into magical spears. After this he asks his mother who his father is. In answer she tells him to stand back to back with her. Then she suddenly disappears into the Laut Selatan, which in this case is either the Indian Ocean or the sea south of Madura. In the other version Raden Segara marries a girl from the Laut Selatan, which could be a reference to Nyai Rara Kidul.

To summarize, in the Panji Laras stories we have a maiden living in the forest as focal figure. A young man arrives, this time a prince, and they fall in love resulting in her pregnancy. Then developments whisk the prince away on a side-track. In the alternate tales from Central Java and Madura the girl's strange position results from an exile to unfamiliar, possibly dangerous places, namely a far-away village and a raft out at sea. The danger in strange locations lies in the girl's unfamiliarity with local customs and the eccentricities of the local tutelary spirit (cf**.** Pemberton 1994:237; Wessing 2017: 524), while the danger posed by a raft out at sea, crewed solely by a pregnant princess need not be expanded on. In both, therefore, the danger lies in the unfamiliarity and thus unpredictability of the place of exile. In a final example we find the maiden once more in the forest, but this time locked away in a wondrous bamboo.

The Maiden in the Bamboo

In a version of the tale of Rama and Sita told in Malaysia and Java (Zieseniss 1963, Anonymous 1953), the action opens when king Dasaratha decides to have a new capital city built.[22] His men begin to clear a suitable spot in the forest, where they come upon a large clump of golden-hued bamboo, growing on a hill in the middle of their clearing. Try as they may, they cannot fell this bamboo, which they report to king Dasaratha. The king himself takes a hand, and with one blow fells the bamboo, out of which then appears the beautiful

22. No reason is given, but compare Lombard (1974: 476, 478).

maiden Mandu dari, much like Tisnawati appeared out of a jewel-case in the Mengukuhan story. The king takes Mandu dari to his palace in the new city Mandura puri negara. He marries her, she eventually becomes pregnant and gives birth to prince Rama.

In the meantime, the demon Rahwana has become aware of the beautiful Mandu dari and desires her for himself. Owing to various machinations, she is forced to consent, but slyly manages to clone herself using some dirt from her skin (*daki*). The clone is called Mandu daki. King Dasaratha then has sexual relations with Mandu daki before Rahwana can do so, resulting in Mandu daki's pregnancy with Sita. Later Rama marries Sita and the conflicts described in the *Ramayana* ensue.

Two variants of this story are reported by Proyek Penelitian (1978) and Hervey (1882).[23] In the former a childless old couple dream they should follow their dogs into the forest and to overnight where the dogs stop. At the place indicated by their dogs they find a wondrous clump of golden hued bamboo. When they cut it down a magical baby girl emerges, which they take home. They receive supernatural instructions about the baby's care and preparation for an eventual marriage with a mighty king. The story related by Hervey tells how the Khatib (Islamic preacher) Malim Seleman, a descendant of Alexander the Great, pursuing a beautiful princess, falls asleep in the forest beneath a very large bamboo. During the night the princess appears to him in a dream, but she disappears at dawn, after telling him he will find her in the bamboo. In the morning he attempts to fell the bamboo using various tools, finally succeeding with a *kacip* (scissors for cutting betel nuts): the princess tumbles out of it, they marry, and ride off to Bukit Peraja where they disappear. Both are said to live there invisibly till today, and their horses, in full trappings, may occasionally be seen.

In brief, in this tale the maiden, here a princess, emerges from a magical clump of bamboo in a clearing in the forest. This maiden directly and indirectly gives birth to Rama and Sita, the future ruler and his consort who is in turn associated with rice, as is clear from the stories dealing with the rice goddess.[24] In this connection it is interesting to briefly look at an Indian tale from Mandla (Mahdya Pradesh) relating the origin of rice (Fuchs 1960: 422). This tale speaks of a time when humans did not yet have rice. The only one who has grain is Janki mata[25], also known as king Rama's wife Sita. Janki

23. Other versions are found in Maxwell (1881). Interestingly, in the majority of these a male child instead of a female one emerges from the bamboo. This possibly signals a change in orientation toward Islam.

24. Since as a clone Mandu daki is nearly identical with Mandu dari, Rama and Sita, the offspring of King Dasaratha's relations with the two, could almost be siblings, much like Sri and Sedana were in the story of Mengukuhan.

25. Janki mata is an incarnation of the goddess Sita: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janaki_Mandir.

mata has six fingers on one of her hands, so she cuts off the sixth one and sticks it into the ground. After some time a bamboo grows from the cutting, with many sections filled with all kinds of seeds. One day a domestic pig finds the bamboo and bites a hole in it out of which streams grain. It eats its fill and then returns to its sty, where the next day its owner, Chandu Domar, spots the grain in the pig's feces. Chandu Domar follows the pig's tracks back to the bamboo,[26] which he then opens further, exposing the grain inside which he then takes home. There is enough grain for the whole village, and everyone's granary is filled to overflowing.[27]

Fig. 1. Flowering bamboo (*bambu betong*; *Dendrocalamus asper*). Image courtesy of Flowers of India (https://www.flowersofindia.net/) and reproduced with permission.

This story highlights the connection between Sita and bamboo although, rather than, as in the *Ramayana* tale earlier, Sita emerging from a bamboo, or more accurately from a bamboo-maiden, the grain-containing bamboo is an integral part of Sita's (or Janki mata's) body. This clearly links Sita and grain, just like Dewi Sri and the rice-spirit we considered above. This link is further highlighted in the story told by Hervey (1882) in which the *khatib* finally opens the magical bamboo using a *kachip* (also *kacip*), a betel-nut scissors,

26. Mabuchi (1954:25) relates a tale from Taiwan in which a man from heaven planted gourds and three kinds of bamboo. From the bamboos emerged the pig, millet, and glutinous rice, while ordinary rice came out of the gourd, once more linking bamboo, rice and pigs.

27. Fuchs (1960: 68) writes that bamboo seed is a much relished food.



Fig. 2. Botanical drawing of *bamboo betong* (*Dendrocalamus asper*) (Ochse 1931:309).

betel nut and *sirih* (*piper betle*; Seno-Sastroamidjojo 1962: 322) leaf quid being part of traditional offerings to the rice goddess Sri (Purwadi 2004:137; Wessing 1978: 119; 1999: 652).[28] Finally, Sita is the wife of king Rama, who in turn is an incarnation of the god Vishnu (Dowson 1972: 256), logically making Sita an incarnation of the rice goddess (see also Wessing 1978: 112).

28. A *kacip* is a betel nut scissors, finer examples of which are often decorated with swastika symbols. Jessup (1990: 168, 243-244) identifies the swastika as a sun symbol, but elsewhere (Wessing 1986b: 56) they are seen as a version of the double spiral, a symbol of continuity linking the unborn with the ancestors, the underworld and the sky, and Sri and the ruler. The betel nut which is cut or crushed with this tool, is part of the traditional *sirih* offering to the rice goddess. Note the homophony between Sri and *sirih*. Thus, the *kacip* and its symbols are linked with the rice goddess and with the bamboo from which in the Indian tale the grains originate.

A Local Expression of the Tales

All this neatly comes together in a ritual song, Adulilang,[29] recorded by Mr. Randal Baier in the village Ciptagelar in the Banten Kidul area of West Java. This song, which is accompanied by an *angklung* (tuned, shaken bamboo rattles) ensemble, and the context of its performance, touch upon a number of elements that were present in several of the stories discussed so far. It is played and sung at the full moon, reminding us of the nymph Nawang Wulan Sasih (Nawang of the full moon), who in the story of Sulanjana was the wife of the king of Pajajaran. As explained by Aki Dai, the *adat* elder (leader and judge in matters of custom) of Ciptagelar, the song is also performed at such ritual occasions as greeting the newly harvested rice, its being placed in the granary, its first husking, and its first consumption. The song relates how a person suddenly came upon a beautiful maiden, walking along a quiet path along a stream or in the forest. Not having seen her for a long time, the narrator had longed for her and seeing her, is pleasantly surprised. The maiden is referred to as *kekasih* (beloved).

Fig. 3. *Angklung* instruments. Note that the bamboo's flowers in figure 1 and the decorations on the *angklung* seem to evoke the rice stalk rather than literally depicting it. (Photo: Randal Baier).

29. Probably *Aduh Ilang* which can be freely translated as Alas, how I have missed you. The song and the associated ethnographic material were collected between 2013 and 2018 by Mr. Randal E. Baier, M.A., ethnomusicologist and Arts and Media librarian at Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan. I thank him for generously allowing me to use his observations here. For more information on the village Ciptagelar see https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kasepuhan+Adat+Ciptagelar/@-6.8029236,106.4978655,379m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x2e427fd7e95e48dd:0x26bc5cb0766c1524!8m2!3d-6.8026891!4d106.4982992

While on the face of it, this could refer to any pretty girl one hasn't seen for a while, the association of its performance with the newly harvested rice and the full moon clearly point toward the beautiful rice-spirit (Sundanese: *geulis*, pretty one) who in the narratives was time and again found wandering in a forest or bathing in a pool there. The associated *angklung* accompaniment, favored by the rice-spirit (Baier 1985:9; Garna 1988: 323-325), strengthens this conclusion. One striking feature of these bamboo instruments is a decoration that seems to emerge from the top of the bamboo.[30] This decoration resembles bundles of grain, streaming down and swaying[31] as the instrument is played (see figure 3), reminiscent of the grain that emerged from bamboo in the Mandla tale, in which bamboo is closely associated with Sita and rice.[32] Furthermore, in the *Ramayana* version of the princess from bamboo story, Rama's queen Sita is the daughter of a clone of the maiden that emerged from a miraculous bamboo, once more equating the rice-spirit, bamboo, and the rice itself. The *khatib* Malim Seleman's (Hervey 1882) use of a *kacip* (betel-scissors) to open his bamboo also makes this connection.

To summarize, all the stories considered here involve a relationship with a maiden in a clearing in the forest, and thus indirectly also a relationship between the maiden and the forest-clearing itself. Sometimes, as in the stories dealing with the rice-goddess, she is buried there after being sexually violated or, in the case of Dewi Sri, fleeing from a misalliance. In other stories she is a bathing nymph or just a young woman, sometimes a princess, who for some unexplained reason lives in the clearing or is contained in a bamboo located there, perhaps waiting to be found by the hero. The question that arises then concerns the nature of the relationship between the maiden and the forest-clearing. Before this can be answered, however, the identity of the maiden herself must be clarified.

The Maiden and the Forest

To start with the various stories about rice, these all concern spirit beings responsible for the introduction or the welfare of rice. In the Sundanese tale of Sulanjana these were referred to as *pohaci* or Dewi (goddesses), while in the

30. Mr. Baier informs me that this is a common decoration on *angklung* in West Java. See Baier (1986).

31. *Ayun-ayunan*, rocking, swaying, said of rice standing in the field and struck by the wind. This movement is made by the women attending the performance of the song. While there are differences between individual varieties of bamboo, their flowers are quite similar. See for instance the botanical drawings in Ochse (1931: 309, 319, 324, 325).

32. Elsewhere in West Java a ritual leader actually places rice grains in a bamboo in which he has cut five holes. This is accompanied by *angklung* music, dancing and singing (ASS 1990:34; see also Hefner 1985:122-124 for the Tengger area of Central Java).

Central and East Javanese tales they are commonly called *widadari*s.[33] The difference between them is not always clear. Coolsma (1911: 490) defines *pohaci* as female beings of heavenly origin, also goddesses, to which Hardjadibrata (2003:643) adds faerie. *Widadari*s on the other hand were originally an Indian spirit (Skt. *widyādhari*; Zoetmulder 1982-II:2264), a kind of fairy living in the Himalayas. In Java and Bali this idea was adapted, the *widadari*s becoming seven solely female spirits, like the Sundanese *pohaci* especially associated with rice. Thus in a Balinese reading of the story of Jaka Tarub and Nawang Wulan (Sagimun 1963b: 110), the nymph is called Supraba or Sukurma, who is synonymous with rice (Pigeaud 1968:269; Soebardi 1975:138). Supraba is there said to have seven signs, seven indeed being the number of *widadari*s that Pigeaud mentions, of whom Supraba is said to be the youngest.

Pohaci and *widadari*, then, are readily equated with rice (Satjadibrata 1954: 313; Panitia Kamus 1980:391). *Dewi* also being an India-derived concept, it would be tempting to link *dewi* and *widadari* with greater Indian influence, and the *pohaci* with less Indianization. This is difficult, however, because at least in modern Indonesian, words like *widadari* and *dewi* have become part of the general vocabulary, and do not or no longer reflect degrees of Indianization.

One clue is offered by some of the tales themselves. Thus, Kats (1916: 186-187) writes that while being chased by Kalagumarang, Dewi Sri suddenly disappeared. On the spot where she was last seen the same plants begin to grow that appeared from Tisnawati's grave. Dewi Sri's rice, however, had to be planted on flooded fields (*sawah*), while Tisnawati's could grow on dry fields (*ladang*, *huma*, or *gogo*) (compare Hidding 1929:11; Van der Horst van Doorn 1929:127).[34] If, indeed, rice planted on *ladang* preceded *sawah* agriculture (see e.g. Pleyte 1910: xviii-xxiii), the concept of *pohaci* would have preceded that of *dewi* and *widadari* in Java. However that may be, in the literature *pohaci* and *widadari* or *dewi* were apparently considered identical (Hidding 1929:39; Kats 1916:183, 188).

The rice-spirit's position as either the origin of rice or the enhancer of its productivity, which we saw in the Nawang Wulan stories, emphasizes her role as a spirit or goddess of fertility, to which Kats (1916: 188) adds the ideas of happiness and welfare, which in an economy based on rice agriculture would

33. In Malaysia they are commonly called *bidadari*s.

34. For a Thai account of the origin of wet and dry rice agriculture see Tambiah (1970: 352). It is possible that the Central Javanese courts had better developed irrigation systems than those in East and West Java did, along with the technical and bureaucratic expertise needed to administer such systems (see Holtzappel 1986: 843), though such differences would in any case only have been relative. Sundanese rulers from earliest times were reputed to have created large scale irrigation systems (Wessing 2011: 330). In relatively much drier East Java, *gogo* or *ladang* (dry-field) rice agriculture was a significant factor in Majapahit's economy (Holtzappel 1986: 237).

go hand in hand. As we saw earlier, as Sri she is the wife or *sekti* (female creative energy; Dowson 1972:274; Stutley and Stutley 1977:260) of the God Vishnu, and together they readily incarnate as the ruler and his wife. In fact, this was also clear in the Sri Mahapunggung tale, in which Sri and Sedana (= Vishnu) seem to form an inseparable duo (Kats 1916: 189). Thus, as queen the maiden is the embodiment of the creative powers of the rice-spirit.

Another expression of these formative or creative powers is found in the Panji Laras and the Rama and Sita tales, where she is the generative force behind the rise of a prince to the throne (see Wessing 1990:239). Here, like the exiled Dewi Sri and the rejected Purbasari, she lives alone in a clearing in the forest, removed from human society. Then a prince or a king arrives and intrudes on her life. This intruder is undergoing a transition: Panji Laras has been exiled to mend his ways, while King Dasaratha is in the process of building a new capital city, which is equivalent to a cosmic realignment of the kingdom.[35] In other words, both the prince or the king and the maiden are in a transitional or liminal state during which they discover each other, and either immediately have sexual relations or wait until the maiden is conveyed to either the palace (King Dasaratha) or a village where she is 'married' (Jaka Tarub).

We should be cautious about the idea of marriage, however, as many of these tales are translations, which are bound by the vocabularies of the target language, as well as social sensitivities of the time.[36] The Indonesian, Javanese and Sundanese languages have several words for marriage, namely the polite Islam-based *menikah*, and the refined Javanese *krama* and *rabi* (Sund. *rarabi*, *mirabi*) all of which usually involve religious and/or civil functionaries. In addition there is also the word *kawin*, which in Javanese and Sundanese is considered rude or ordinary, and not suitable for discussing e.g. royal marriages.[37] It is, however, not uncommon (cf. Sagimun 1963a:167;

35. As Heine Geldern (1930, 1942) pointed out, the Indianized state ideally had to be an image or reflection of the cosmos, in which the king's throne was coordinate with Indra's throne on Mount Meru. The more perfect the alignment, the greater the benefit derived.

36. Hidding (1929:39) uses the Dutch *gehuwd met* (married to) to discuss the relationship of the king of Pajajaran with the rice goddess. Elsewhere (1929:45) he uses *trouwen* (to marry) for the relationship between Nawang Sasih and her young man. Here Zulkarnaen (1987: 35) uses the Islamic *menikah*, perhaps unavoidably since it has become part of the modern Indonesian language. Various other tales (Proyek Penelitian 1981: 28; Widyatmanta 1963:67; Van der Horst van Doorn 1929: 12) avoid the word marriage altogether and speak of *jodoh* (match or mate), *diperisteri* and *tot zijn vrouw maken*, which both mean 'to take as wife', even in contexts like Panji Laras' clearing in the forest where civil registry or clergy were conspicuously absent. Other authors simply write that the couple spent the night together (Hervey 1882:103-4), or just state that the girl was pregnant (Sutarto, Marwoto and Saputra 2010).

37. It is classed as *kasar*, or *ngoko*, which is usually translated as rude as opposed to the more *halus* or *lemes* (refined) *krama* or *rabi* (Robson and Wibisono 2002: 396,

Hatib WS 1963:56). One problem with this word *kawin* is that it can also be used to speak of the breeding of animals or of simple human copulation, which is e.g. what befell Tisnawati, and is at least implied in a number of the tales in which the maiden coupled with the prince or the youth without even a mention of clergy or civil bureaucracy (e.g. Hervey 1882:103-4; Sagimun (1963a). The sex in these cases can therefore be said to be irregular, which may be the point of the whole affair because, as Smith and Woodward (2016) discuss, sexual congress with a 'magical woman' is often a path to power, especially it seems, when such intercourse is irregular (cf. Gottowik 2018).[38] Thus Ken Anrok's conquest of Ken Dedes was accompanied by deceit and betrayal (Knappert 1977: 7-9; Smith and Woodward 2016:324), while prior to Senapati's founding the realm of Mataram, he enjoyed three days and nights of passion with the Queen of the Southern Ocean, Nyai Rara Kidul, in her under-water palace (Olthof 1987: 80-83).[39] Women, Smith and Woodward write, are seen as points of access to spiritual powers through sexual relations, which we see realized here through his contact with the maiden in the forest, the source of power and fertility.

Especially important for aspiring rulers or village founders, then, was a relationship with a tutelary spirit, localized at a forest shrine, often in a grove of trees located at the edge of the community or at the boundary of the state (Wessing 1990; 1999; Wessing and Barendregt 2005; Falk 1973: 3; Schnepel 1995: 148)[40]. This tutelary spirit, always female and in India cast as tribal

512, 610). For reasons that would take us too far afield, I prefer a classification of common or ordinary when discussing non-refined language. Cf. Wessing 1974.

38. Sexual behavior can be seen as a form of *rebutan*, struggles, even violent ones, to obtain ritually powerful objects (Robson and Wibisono 2002: 620; see Pemberton 1994: *passim*). This would be true of both irregular and sanctioned sex on e.g. the wedding night, at least as idealized by the court poets (*pujangga*) (see Creese 2004: 172-178). See also Shulman (1980:119-120, 128), who relates a South Indian (Tamil) myth, the central motif of which is 'the revelation of the deity through violence done to his symbol', here his *liṅga*, leading to '…its desired result, the fertility rooted in violence'.

39. Access to fertility through irregular sexual intercourse is not restricted to royalty, but is also seen as a path to increased spiritual power or prosperity by ordinary people. There are well-known locations to which spiritual power (*kasekten*; Anderson 1972) is attributed, where sexual intercourse with a person not one's spouse is practiced for just this reason, married couples sometimes splitting up to each find his or her sexual partner (Gottowik 2018; Smith and Woodward 2016: 318; Sentot Js 1990:28-9, 60-61; see also the essay by Monteanni 2018, published on-line in *Palm Wine*). Also, farmers in several places in Southeast Asia would (in the past?) copulate in their fields, or place images of copulating couples or sexual organs there, in order to bring rain and thus enhance the fertility of their fields (Wilken 1912:41; Wessing 1997: 342, note 38; see figure 4).

40. Parang Kusuma, the location where the sexual union of Panembahan Senapati, the founder of Mataram, and Nyai Rara Kidul, the Queen of the Southern Ocean is commemorated, often through irregular sexual activities (cf. Gottowik 2018: 398), is a beach community that lies on the boundary between the Javanese realm of Mataram and the Queen's under-water realm.

Fig. 4. Image of a copulating couple. Bronze. Purchased in Bali in 1991. (Photo: Steve Wessing).

mother or earth goddess (Schnepel 1995:147-8; Woodroffe 1975:17), was the 'metamorphosis' of a wild forest spirit (Domenig 2014: 35) that now acted as the guardian of the realm and its welfare, i.e. its fertility. At the state level this relationship was often cast as a marriage between the king and the spirit, in which the sexual aspect received special emphasis (Hara 1973). Sexual congress with the spirit could be dangerous for the unqualified (cf. Shulman 1980:122-3), but if successful her female powers of fertility would unite with those of the prince or king, greatly enhancing his cosmic potential.[41] Smith and Woodward (2016: 320-5) indeed consider sexuality 'a fundamental dimension of the acquisition of magico-spiritual power in Java'. The tutelary spirit then, variously in the guise of the rice-spirit or the attractive maiden in a forest clearing, was the source of the king's female creative power, his Sakti (Jav. *kasekten*)[42] and thus his suitability to rule (compare Schnepel 1995;

41. The king's cosmic potential was ritually concentrated at the center, his palace, through a circumambulation or by ploughing a furrow around the capital (Paranavitana 1970: 31-2; Heine Geldern 1942:17). The sexual aspect of this ritual ploughing, which in effect created a vulva around the center, is clearly illustrated in Danasasmita et al. (1977, II; 203-205) in which a man's penis is used as a ploughshare. The *Babad Tanah Jawi*, finally, reports how upon his death, king Mangkurat's penis became erect and emitted a glow. Pangeran Puger noticed this and quickly sucked up the glow, causing the erection to subside. This act transferred king Mangkurat's *kasekten* to Pangeran Puger, and led to Pangeran Puger being designated as king Mangkurat's successor (Olthof 1987: 268).

42. In Sanskrit *śakti* denotes 'power, ability, strength, might, regal power, energy or active power of a deity personified as his wife (Zoetmulder 1982, 2:1607). For modern Javanese Anderson (1972: 7) characterizes *kasekten* as that 'intangible, mysterious,

Barendregt and Wessing 2008: 556). As we saw in the tales, she easily equates with the queen.

Having examined the maiden in her various guises, there remains the question of her relationship with the forest and the clearing in which she is found: she variously lives there, bathes there, flees there to safety, and is buried there. In the stories we consistently found the sequence maiden-clearing-(bamboo)-forest, in which the spirit seemed to be an aspect of the forest itself; they are part of the same symbolic category.[43] This is made clearer if we look at one of the names by which the earth is known in West Java, namely Nyimas Bumi Siti Pertiwi (Skr. Prthivi),[44] which corresponds to Indian usage (Dowson 1972:243). Kinsley (1986: 8-9) points out the goddess Prthivi's maternal and fertility aspects, calling her, like the rice-spirit, 'the source of all plants, especially crops, … [who] nourishes all creatures that live upon her.' She is the sustaining mother and equivalent to the rice-spirit and the *śakti* whom Woodroffe (1975:17) calls 'God as Mother'. In brief, she is at once the earth and, also, through her frequent association with water, the fertility spirit (cf. Andaya 2016), or perhaps better, the forest, the earth and the fertility spirit form a single category, and as such the maiden is a concentrated expression of the energies of the forest, the forest-as-*śakti*.

The maiden, furthermore, often lives in or is buried in or founds a village in a clearing in the forest, which, especially when associated with the palace, can take the form of a garden (see note 17 above). This is the location where the women of the court bathe, off limits to all but the family – or the brave. These gardens can be seen as reflecting the spirit's grove that was set aside for it as part of the original founding agreement (Wessing 1988: 171-6; 2003:223, 230-2; Domenig 2014: chapters 1 and 2; Proyek Penerbitan 1981: 38-42). In Javanese and Sundanese, clearing the forest to start a community is called *mbabad*, while *babad* also means history or chronicle. In other words, clearing the forest (Jav. *mbabad*), like King Dasaratha did, is to begin the history of that particular place.

In order to clear the forest, however, one must penetrate it, which once more draws the attention to the sexual aspect of the relationship. As Falk (1973: 2) writes, the aspirant king penetrates the spirit's nature, subdues her, and makes

---

and divine energy which animates the universe. It is manifest in every aspect of the natural world, in stones, trees, clouds, and fire, but is expressed quintessentially in the central mystery of life, the process of generation and regeneration.' In popular usage, *sekti* indicates having or having access to magical powers (Robson and Wibisono 2002: 661). The meaning of *sekti* and *kasekten*, therefore, can range from cosmic powers to magical ones, depending on whether it is wielded by a king or by a magician. Cf. Work (2018: 8-9).

43. This does not mean, of course, that they are always directly interchangeable. They participate in the same set of meanings and through their interaction can expand this set of meanings.

44. In Java and Malaysia this is also the meaning of *bumi*.

her his wife.[45] In the process, the ruler gains the cosmic powers (*kasekten*) needed to rule (Wessing and Barendregt 2005: 11; Winstedt 1929:460-1; 1945:135-6, 138-9; Hidding 1929:39). It is, therefore, through the penetration of the forest in the form of the maiden's *hutan larangan* that the aspiring ruler gains the necessary powers: he must conquer the female wilderness and bring its powers of fertility, in the form of the maiden, back to his palace.

It might be objected at this point that protagonists like e.g. Dewi Sri and Purbasari, started out as princesses before retreating to the forest and eventually returning to the palace. It must be remembered, however, that these princesses were all in some way poorly fitted to their courtly environment and the rules that governed it: Purbasari was disfigured and Dewi Sri refused to get married when she was expected to. These maidens were clearly out of place, and it was only after their retreat to the forest that their true natures became apparent. They were the rice goddess or rice-spirit, and once this was recognized they could return to the palace in a new incarnation as the consort of the ruler.

Clearly, this could not be done by just any man as there are risks associated with entering into such a relationship and bringing home the powers of the forest. To be successful, one has to be able to deal with these powers. When the peasant Jaka Tarub ventured to bring home Nawang Wulan, things appeared to go well at first, only to be spoiled when Jaka Tarub could not control his curiosity. With just one peek, the magic unraveled and the arrangement collapsed. King Dasaratha, on the other hand, successfully brought home the maiden he found in a clump of bamboo.

Thus, rather than having a strange situation of a maiden living in a clearing in a forest, we see that symbolically the three are closely related and indeed share an identity: the forest is a visible expression of the fertility of the earth (Pertiwi) and the maiden in turn embodies this fertility in human form. The clearing in which her hut, sometimes a bamboo, is located, sets her off from the main body of the forest. It is in this liminal or focused space that the prince unites with her, and by doing so he, or the offspring of their union,[46] acquires

45. One part of the traditional Sundanese wedding activities takes place in a symbolic forest garden (*kebon alas*), during which the bride and groom move a large pestle used to husk rice (*alu*) up and down in the *lulumpang* (mortar), simulating sexual activity. Aki Dai, Mr. Baier's informant, pointed out the parallel between sexual relations and some lines in the song Aduilang that deal with planting rice on a dry field using a dibble stick. Among the Using of East Java the first sexual penetration during the wedding night is called *babad alas melebu guwa* (clear the forest and enter the cave), while the woman's *mons veneris* is called her *hutan larangan* (forbidden forest, sacred grove), the home of the spirit and her powers, which is penetrated on the wedding night. Compare the flaming vulva attributed to Ken Dedes (Smith and Woodward 2016) conquest of which would make the man a king, and the snake that lived in Nyi Rara Panas' vulva, which killed her husbands at first penetration until Sech Durahman outsmarted it and turned it into a *keris* (ceremonial dagger) (Prawirasuganda 1964: 86).

46. E.g. Panji Laras and Rama and Sita.

the forest's powers, especially those of fertility. This power of fertility is acquired through the agency of the forest, which in the tales had been there without being emphasized. It is made visible among other things through the maiden, or, in other contexts, the tiger, the magician (*pawang*), and various spirits among which the rice spirit and the tutelary or guardian spirit (Wessing 1986a; 2006a). The maiden can thus be seen as a kind of guise through which the forest is presented without itself being highlighted.

This is not to say that the forest is the only or even the ultimate source of power (*kasekten*), but rather that it seems to be privileged in matters of fertility, a *non-material* force. *Kasekten* is also found in or adhering to objects, among others *keris* (daggers), *tombak* (lances), swords and other weapons, certain musical instruments, and symbols of authority (Sutarto, Marwoto and Saputra 2010: 22, 43; Prawirasuganda 1964: 85-86; Maxwell 1881: 7) as well as semi-precious stones (*batu akik*), and especially the ruler's throne. This throne is the former stone seat of the realm's tutelary spirit, to the conquest of whom he owes his power (Wessing 2003: 222-224, 233-234). Note that many of these powerful *material* objects derive from the *material* earth and are in the rice mythology associated with the male, Sedana (Vishnu), the rice-spirit's partner and the ruler who marries his realm (Hara 1973).

We have here then a dichotomy between a female-oriented non-material force of fertility and male-oriented material objects, reminiscent of the *lahir-batin* (body and spirit) and *wadah-isi* (container and content) oppositions found in other contexts of life (Wessing 2006a: 79). This dichotomy is rooted in *śakti*, in India said to be nature or the earth itself (Woodroffe 1975: 87).[47] Woodroffe speaks here of the worship of the female force, though this should not blind us to the fact of the necessity of the male aspect. As Ibu Fatma, a farmer's wife in East Java, once laughingly said to me in response to a question about the rice-spirit, 'you can only have fertility if both female and male are involved'.

Returning to the forest, as analysts we must be careful not to attribute agency to it (see Work 2018), even though this seems implicit in the tales and in what informants say, attributing agency either directly to the forest or to denizens within it. The reason for this is probably that in order to deal or interact with the powers of the forest, these must be socialized and preferably named, because agency presumes rationality and a degree of socialization. For instance, people in East Java speak of the Alas Purwo (Ancient or Original Forest) in easternmost Java, as being able to purposely change the paths running through it, causing incautious intruders to lose their way. *Kasekten* seems to be especially concentrated there. Similarly, the Tobelo of Halmahera say that the spirits inhabiting the forests, beeches, and other parts of the landscape that serve as topological markers can 'subvert the familiar

47. Mus (1975: 10) speaks of 'the divinization of the energies of the soil'.

spatial order by changing the course or the current of rivers or the stellar constellations, so that the traveller traversing the forest or sailing the sea loses his way' (Platenkamp 2007:106). More generally, the Batek of Malaysia are described as having 'an intimate relationship of interdependence' with the plants, animals, and spiritual beings in their world, including the forest, with whom the people must maintain harmonious relations (Endicott 1979: 25, 53, 82), implying consciousness and a degree of rationality on the part of these beings. Others speak of spirits owning or occupying the forest, and being the powers of fertility within it (cf. Wessing 2006a). More elaborately, the Chewong of Malaysia (Howell 2016) see the forest as animated and populated by non-human beings that, like humans, have intentionality or agency. While these may appear to us as e.g. elephants, rocks, or plants, for some these are only guises or cloaks that hide their essential humanity. Such guises, as Emigh (1996: 29, 153) noted about masks in Bali, 'facilitate [a] … transference of identity' and 'obscure the identity of the performer' while symbolizing the source of the power being displayed. In the various tales discussed here, the rice-spirit and the maiden seem to act as masks or cloaks that hide or obscure the identity of the forest: which through the guise appears to be the character portrayed by the disguise. As Emigh writes (1996:275), citing Peter Brook [1987: 218]), "a traditional mask is an image of a man without a mask […] an outer casting that is a complete and sensitive reflection of the inner life". This is why our attention is drawn to the character assumed, and we lose sight of the 'silent' entity behind it, in this case the forest, the source of the power expressed by that character. Conversely, focusing intently on a particular entity can lead the observer to see behind it, revealing the source of power, here the forest.

The maiden and the rice-spirit,[48] then, are ways of talking about specific aspects of the forest's and ultimately nature's powers as perceived by our narrators, as are the spirits who are cast as the owners or incarnations of the forest's power. These expressions of power can seem to continually shift shape:[49] men metamorphosing as spirit-tigers, tigers seeming to be men, men turning into women (Enthoven 1914: 124), an old mystic suddenly appearing as beautiful princess (Wessing 1986a, 2016: 382), and a beautiful maiden incarnating as the rice crop and linking the *kahyangan* of the *widadari* with the human world of villages and palaces. Sometimes, as in the Indian myth of Angulimala, its denizens take on the features of the forest, blending as it were with their natural surroundings, the place where they belong. Rather than, as is often thought, being residents that are somehow nearly interchangeable with the forest (e.g. Brancaccio 1999:108-9; 116), they must be seen as differing incarnations or expressions of nature's powers as channeled through the forest.

48. And elsewhere the tiger (Wessing 1986a).
49. Or don or discard a cloak or mask.

The forest, then, is a strange place, a riddle, the deeper meaning of which is to be discovered by those equipped to understand it, the person with the powers of *kasekten* who can cross the boundary between the community and the forest, i.e. the ruler (Winstedt 1945: 135-6). How one sees this depends, of course, on one's assumptions about reality, and it might be that rather than shifting shape the various entities are felt to belong to a single symbolic category, making, as an Using informant explained to me, the form taken depend on the need of the moment. As Howell (2016:58) notes, '[d]etailed explanations upon such ontologies are vital, but particularly difficult given the metaphysical chasm that exists between observer (anthropologist) and observed (people studied).'

Conclusion

Starting with some seemingly disparate tales concerning the rice-spirit and the rise to power of princes, we found a common theme in them of a maiden and her connection with the forest. Placing this focal point in the context of other narratives and information about spirits and goddesses made the nature of the forest, the maiden, and other figures stand out more clearly: they are all specific projections of the power of fertility that seems to find its primary expression in the forest, the further forms its takes depending on the needs of the ongoing narrative. While present silently and unremarked in the tales, these stories and the activities depicted in them reflect an aura of magic that suffused the forest to the Javanese and Sundanese narrators. It is a place of wonder and miracles, of transition and access to great powers (*kasekten*), inhabited by fabulous often malicious beings that, even when not malign, should be treated with respect and circumspection because their possibly unfamiliar customs and expectations (Schefold 1989; cf. Falk 1973: 13-4): shape-shifters, a common idea in Southeast Asia, are innately ambiguous because one can never be sure what one is facing (Wessing 1995: 204).

Much has changed in Java and Sunda in the intervening years. Even in the 17th and early 18th centuries most of Southeast Asia was still covered by majestic forests, but during the colonial era and increasingly since the end of WWII these have been generally threatened by large-scale logging and clearing for agricultural purposes (Solis 2017; Kummer and Turner 1994; Lombard 1974: 474-476). Not much of them remains, and rather than as warily respected places of awe and wonder the remnant forests are now often depicted as horrible, dangerous places suffused by supernatural powers, best avoided (Harimurti 2017: 2)[50]. This has not lessened with the disappearance of the actual forests, which is not always generally acknowledged anyway: the forests are there, some unspecified distance away, and the path through them

50. Maxwell (1881:17-8) cites a Mentawei story in which crops and fruits came to humans through the agency of a spirit, which guarded the crops. It is not clear to me why he claims the spirit was said to be malevolent.

to the next settlement is perceived to be long, leading to feelings of unease (Wessing 1978: 71;1995: 196).

In spite of educational changes and increasing religious pressures that have been taking place in Java, beliefs about spirits persist albeit that they are not always as publicly expressed as they once were (Andaya 2016: 258; Wessing 2013). Even where she is still acknowledged the rice-spirit has had to adapt to new conditions, as the pretty one (*geulis*) is now freely exchanged for the handsome one (*kasep*): rice is sold for cash, and men now sometimes cook if they are so inclined. With increased access to television young people now often know more about Sponge Bob than they do about *wayang* (puppet show) characters or the Queen of the Southern Ocean, Nyai Rara Kidul.

With the forests largely gone, the old cosmological narratives that explained them are fading. These narratives in any case were not immutable. While, as was mentioned earlier, our understandings about our physical and social environment come to us in the form of narratives (Somers 1994: 606, 613-4; Howell 2016:57), these are influenced by both the narrator's purposes (Pullman 2017: 64) and by the preoccupations of the listeners who inevitably shape the information they receive into coherent structures within which they locate themselves (Somers 1994: 614). Pullman (2017: 86), reflecting on Robert Frost's poem 'The Road Not Taken', likens tales to paths through a wood: at every fork in the path a choice must be made. These choices in turn determine how the narrative unfolds: 'anything can happen (and frequently does)'. In Java these forks have come in the form of changing religious convictions and scientific explanations, to which the old narratives have increasingly been adapted (Wessing 2006b, 1995). Yet, as we saw in Mr. Baier's data from South Banten, the old truths have not totally disappeared, and ongoing narratives present the participants with ever changing choices as their paths wind through their particular wood.

Bibliography

Abahalin, Andrew J. (2011).'Sino-Pacifica': Conceptualizing Greater Southeast Asia as a Sub-Arena of World History. *Journal of World History* 22(4): 659-691.

Ajip Rosidi (1973). My Experiences in Recording "Pantun Sunda". *Indonesia* 16: 105-111.

Andaya, Barbara Watson. (2016). Rivers, Oceans, and Spirits: Water Cosmologies, Gender, and Religious Change in Southeast Asia. *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia* 4(2): 239-263.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (1972). The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture. In: Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, pp.1-69. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Anonymous (1953). *Hikajat Seri Rama*. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka.

ASS (1990). Bamboo among the Sundanese. *Voice of Nature* 81(May): 34-37.

Baier, Randal E. (1985). The Angklung Ensemble of West Java: Continuity of an Agricultural Tradition. *Balungan* 2: 8-16.

Baier, Randal E. (1986). *Si Duriat Keueung, the Sundanese Angklung Ensemble of West Java, Indonesia*. M.A. Thesis, Wesleyan University.

Barendregt, Bart and Robert Wessing (2008). Centered on the Source: Hamlets and Houses of Kanekes. In: R. Schefold, P.J.M. Nas, G. Domenig and R. Wessing (eds.), *Indonesian Houses. Survey of Vernacular Architecture in Western Indonesia*, pp. 551-596. Leiden: KITLV Press. [Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 251.]

Becker, A.L. (1995). *Beyond Translation. Essays Toward a Modern Philology*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Brancaccio, Pia (1999). Aṅgulimāla or the Taming of the Forest. *East and West* 49 (1/4): 105-118.

Chapman, F. Spencer (1973). *The Jungle is Neutral*. London: Gorki Books.

Coolsma, S. (1911). *Soendaneesch-Hollandsch Woordenboek*. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff.

Creese, Helen (2004). *Women of the Kakawin World. Marriage and Sexuality in the Indic Courts of Java and Bali*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Danasasmita et al. (ed.) (1977). *Babad Pakuan atau Babad Pajajaran*, 2 vols. Jakarta: Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

De Josselin de Jong, J.P.B. (1935). De Maleische Archipel als Ethnologisch Studieveld. Inaugural lecture on the occasion of his acceptance of the post of professor at the Rijksuniversiteit Leiden. Leiden: Universiteits-boekhandel en Antiquariaat J. Ginsberg.

Domenig, Gaudenz (2014). *Religion and Architecture in Premodern Indonesia. Studies in Spatial Anthropology*. Leiden: Brill. [Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 294].

Dowson, John (1972). *A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, Geography, History and Literature*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Emigh, John (1996). *Masked Performance. The Play of Self and Other in Ritual and Theatre*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Endicott, Kirk (1979). *Batek Negrito Religion. The Worldview and Rituals of a Hunting and Gathering People of Peninsular Malaysia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Enthoven, R.E. (1914). *Folklore Notes*. Vol. I - Gujarat. Compiled from materials collected by the late A.M.T. Jackson. Bombay: British India Press.

Eringa, F.S. (1949). *Loetoeng Kasaroeng. Een mythologisch verhaal uit West-Java*. ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. [Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. VII].

Falk, Nancy E. (1973). Wilderness and Kingship in Ancient South Asia. *History of Religions* 13(1): 1-15.

Fuchs, Stephen (1960). *The Gond and Bhumia of Eastern Mandla*. London: Asia Publishing House.

Garna, Judistira Kartiwan (1988). *Tangtu Telu Jaro Tujuh. Kajian Struktural Masyarakat Baduy di Banten Selatan, Jawa Barat Indonesia*. Thesis, Fakulti Sains Kemasyarakatan dan Kemanusiaan Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi.

Gottowik, Volker (2018). Pilgrims, Prostitutes, and *Ritual Seks*. Heterodox Ritual Practices in the Context of the Islamic Veneration of Saints in Central Java. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 174: 393-421.

HAR (n.d.). *Nyai Roro Kidul*. Bandung: Citra Budaya.

Hara, Minoru (1973). The King as a Husband of the Earth. *Asiatische Studien. Zeitschrift der Schweizerichen Gesellschaft für Asienkunde* 27: 97-114.

Hardjadibrata, R. (2003). *Sundanese English Dictionary*. Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya.

Harimurti, A. (2017). Crowd, Vergadering, and Anticolonial Nationalism: Rampogan Sima and what made it Prohibited in Dutch East Indies. http://www.takusno.com/crowd-vergadering-and-anticolonial-nationalism-rampogan-sima-and-what-made-it-prohibited-in-dutch-east-indies/.

Hatib Ws. (1963). Arjo Menak Kawin dengan Bidadari. In: Urusan Adat-Istiadat dan Tjerita Rakjat Djawatan Kebudajaan Departemen P.D. dan K. (ed.), *Tjerita Rakjat* I, pp. 53-58. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Hazeu, G.A.J. (1901). Nini Ṭowong. *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 43: 36-107.

Heine-Geldern, Robert (1930). Weltbild und Bauform in Südostasien. *Wiener Beitrage zur Kunst- und Kulturgeschichte Asiens* 4: 28-78.

Heine-Geldern, Robert (1942). Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia. *Far Eastern Quarterly* 2: 15-30.

Hefner Robert W. (1985). *Hindu Javanese. Tengger Tradition and Islam*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hervey, D.F.A. (1882). The Mentra Traditions. *Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 10: 189-194.

Hidding, K.A.H. (1929). *Nji Pohatji Sangjang Sri*. Leiden: M. Dubbeldeman. [Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden].

Holtzappel, C.J.G. (1986). *Het Verband tusssen Desa en Rijksorganisatie in Prekoloniaal Java. Een Ontwikkelingssociologische Studie in Historisch Perspektief*. Dissertation Rijksuniversiteit Leiden.

Howell, Signe (2016). Seeing and Knowing. Metamorphosis and the Fragility of Species in Chewong Animistic Ontology. In: Kai Århem and Guido Sprenger (eds.), *Animism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 55-72. New York and London: Routledge.

Jessup, Helen Ibbitson (1990). *Court Arts of Indonesia*. New York: The Asia Society Galleries/ Harry N. Abrams.

Kats, J. (1916). Dewi Çri. *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 57: 177-199.

Kinsley, David (1986). *Hindu Goddesses. Visions of the Divine Feminine in the Hindu Religious Tradition*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Knappert, Jan (1977). *Myths and Legends of Indonesia*. Singapore: Heineman Books.

Kummer, David M. and B.L. Turner (1994). The Human Causes of Deforestation in Southeast Asia. *BioScience* 44(5): 323-328.

Lombard, Denys (1974). La vision de la forêt à Java (Indonésie). *Etudes Rurales* 6: 475-485.

Mabuchi, Toichi (1954). Tales Concerning the Origin of Grains in Insular Areas of Eastern and Southeastern Asia. *Asian Folklore Studies* 23: 1-92.

Maxwell, W.E. (1881). *Two Malay Myths: The Princess of the Foam, and the Raja of the Bamboo*. London: Trübner and Co. Originally published in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 13(4).

Monteanni, Luigi (2018). My Own Private Indonesian Shadow Box. *Palm Wine* 07 [on-line].

Mus, Paul (1975). *India Seen from the East: Indian and Indigenous Cults in Champa*, tr. and ed. I.W. Mabbett and D.P. Chandler. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. [Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 3].

Nieuwenhuys, Rob and Frits Jaquet (1980). *Java's onuitputtelijke natuur. Reisverhalen, tekeningen en fotografieën van Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn*. Alphen aan den Rijn: A.W. Sijthoff.

Ochse, J.J. (1931). *Indische Groenten. Met inbegrip van aardvruchten en kruiderijen*. Batavia: Departement Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel. Volkslectuur.

Olthof, W.L. (1987). *Babad Tanah Djawi. Javaanse Rijkskroniek*. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.

Panitia Kamus Lembaga Basa & Sastra Sunda (1980). *Kamus Umum Basa Sunda*. Bandung: Tarate.

Paranavitana, S. (1970). Ploughing as a Ritual of Royal Consecration in Ancient Ceylon. In: Himansu Bhusan Sarkar (ed.), *H.C. Majumdar Felicitation Volume*, pp. 31-39. Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay.

Pemberton, John (1994). *On the Subject of "Java"*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pigeaud, Theodore G. Th. (1968). *Literature of Java*, vol. 2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Platenkamp, Jos. D. M. (2007). Spirit Representations in Southeast Asia: a Comparative View. In: Frédéric B. Laugrand and Jarich G. Oosten (eds.), *La Nature des Esprits dans les Cosmologies Autochtones/Nature of Spirits in Aboriginal Cosmologies*, pp. 99-129. Québec: Les Presses de L'université Laval.

Pleyte, C.M. (1905). Pa Sakiran, de zanger. In: C.M. Pleyte (ed.), *Soendasche Schetsen*. Bandoeng: C. Kolff and Co.

Pleyte, C.M. (1910). *De legende van den Loetoeng Kasaroeng. Een gewijde sage uit Tji-rebon*. Batavia: Albrecht and Co./ 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. [Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, vol. LVIII, part 3].

Prawirasuganda, A. (1964). *Upatjara Adat di Pasundan*. Bandung: Sumur Bandung.

Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah (1978). *Cerita Rakyat Daerah Kalimantan Timur*. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

Proyek Penerbitan dan Pencacatan Kebudayaan Daerah (1981). *Cerita Rakyat Jawa Timur*. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Proyek Penerbitan Buku Sastra Indonesia dan Daerah.

Pullman, Philip (2017). *Dæmon Voices. Essays on Storytelling*. Simon Mason (ed.). Oxford: David Fickling Books.

Purwadi (2004). *Sejarah Asal-Usul Nenek Moyang Orang Jawa*. Jogjakarta: Tunas Harapan.

Rassers, W.H. (1959). *Pañji the Culture Hero. A Structural Study of Religion in Java*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. [Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Translation Series 3].

Robson, Stuart and Singgih Wibisono (2002). *Javanese English Dictionary*. Hongkong: Periplus.

Sagimun M.D. (1963a). Pandji Kelaras. In: Urusan Adat-Istiadat dan Tjerita Rakjat Djawatan Kebudajaan Departemen P.D. dan K. (ed.), *Tjerita Rakjat I*, pp. 167-172. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Sagimun M.D. (1963b). Tiga Piatu. In: Urusan Adat-Istiadat dan Tjerita Rakjat Djawatan Kebudajaan Departemen P.D. dan K. (ed.), *Tjerita Rakjat I*, pp. 107-130. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Satjadibrata, R. (1954). *Kamus Basa Sunda*. Djakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementrian P.P. dan K.

Schefold, Reimar (1989). De natuur als cultuur van gene zijde: tribale concepten van 'natuur' in Indonesië. *Anthropologische Verkenningen* 7(4): 5-22.

Schnepel, Burkhard (1995). Durga and the King: Ethnohistorical Aspects of Politico-Ritual Life in a South Orissan Kingdom. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 1(1): 145-166.

Seno-Sastroamidjojo, A. (1962). *Obat Asli Indonesia*. Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat.

Sentot Js. (1990). Menjaring Rezeki Lewat Seks Bebas: Gunung Kemukus Semakin Panas. *Liberty* 37 (1734): 28-29, 60-61.

Shulman, David (1980). The Green Goddess of Tirumullaivāyil. *East and West* 30(1/4): 117-131.

Smith, Bianca J. and Mark Woodward (2016). Magico-spiritual Power, Female Sexuality and Ritual Sex in Muslim Java: Unveiling the *Kesekten* of Magical Women. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 27 (3): 317-332.

Soebardi, S. (1975). *The Book of Cabolèk. A critical edition with introduction, translation and notes. A contribution to the study of Javanese mystical tradition*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff [Bibliotheca Indonesica No. 10].

Solis, Thania (2017). Southeast Asia Deforestation Effects RA4. https://history.libraries.wsu.edu/spring2017/2017/01/19/research-assignment-1-3/.

Somers, Margaret R. (1994). The Narrative Construction of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach. *Theory and Society* 23: 605-649.

Stutley, Margaret and James Stutley (1977). *Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism. Its Mythology, Folklore, Philosophy, Literature, and History*. New York: Harper and Row.

Subiyanto Hr (ed.) (n.d.). *Misteri Nyai Lara Kidul*. Solo: Mayasari.

Sutarto, Ayu, Marwoto, and Heru SP. Saputra (2010). *Mutiara yang Tersisa I: Kearifan Lokal dalam Cerita Rakyat Madura*. Jember: Kompyawisda Jatim.

Tambiah, S.J. (1970). *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology No. 2].

Termorshuizen, Gerard (ed.) (1993). *In de binnenlanden van Java. Vier negentiende-eeuwse reisverhalen*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Van der Horst van Doorn, G. C. (1929). *Indische sprookjes legenden en fabelen*. Den Haag: Van Goor.

Van Zanten, Wim (2016). Some Notes on the *Pantun* Storytelling of the Baduy Minority Group. Its Written and Audiovisual Documentation. *Wacana* 17 (3): 404-437.

Wessing, Robert (1974). Language Levels in Sundanese. *Man* 9(1): 5-22.

Wessing, Robert (1978). *Cosmology and Social Behavior in a West Javanese Settlement*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program. [Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 47].

Wessing, Robert (1986a). *The Soul of Ambiguity: The Tiger in Southeast Asia.* Monograph Series on Southeast Asia, Special Report No. 24. DeKalb, IL: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University.

Wessing, Robert (1986b). Wearing the Cosmos: Symbolism in Batik Design. *Crossroads* 2(3): 40-82.

Wessing, Robert (1988). The *Gunongan* in Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Agni's Fire in Allah's Paradise? *Archipel* 35: 157-194.

Wessing, Robert (1990). Sri and Sedana and Sita and Rama: Myths of Fertility and Generation. *Asian Folklore Studies* 49(2): 235-257.

Wessing, Robert (1991). An Enclosure in the Garden of Love. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 22(1): 1-15.

Wessing, Robert (1995). The Last Tiger in East Java: Symbolic Continuity in Ecological Change. *Asian Folklore Studies* 54: 191-218.

Wessing, Robert (1997). A Princess from Sunda. Some Aspects of Nyai Rara Kidul. *Asian Folklore Studies* 56: 317-353.

Wessing, Robert (1999). The Sacred Grove: Founders and the Owners of the Forest in West Java, Indonesia. In: S. Bahuchet, D. Bley, H. Pagezy and N. Vernazza-Licht (eds.), *L'Homme et la forêt tropicale*, pp. 59-74. Travaux de la Société d'Écologie Humaine. Chateauneuf-de-Grasse: Editions de Bergier.

Wessing, Robert (2003). The Kraton-city and the Realm. Sources and Movement of Power in Java. In: Peter J.M. Nas, Gerard A. Persoon and Rivke Jaffe (eds.), *Framing Indonesian Realities. Essays in Symbolic Anthropology in Honour of Reimar Schefold*, pp. 199-250. Leiden: KITLV Press. [Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 209].

Wessing, Robert (2006a). A Community of Spirits: People, Ancestors and Nature Spirits in Java. *Crossroads* 18(1): 11-111.

Wessing, Robert (2006b). Homo Narrans in East Java. Regional Myths and Local Concerns. *Asian Folklore Studies* 65: 45-68.

Wessing, Robert (2007). Dislodged Tales. Javanese Goddesses and Spirits on the Silver Screen. *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde* 163(4): 529-555.

Wessing, Robert (2011). Tarumanagara: What's in a Name? *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42(2): 325-337.

Wessing, Robert (2013). The Osing Agricultural Spirit-Medium. *Moussons* 22(2): 111-124.

Wessing, Robert (2016). Nyai Rara Kidul. The Antecedents of a Cosmopolitan Queen. *Anthropos* 111: 371-393.

Wessing, Robert (2017). The Lord of the Land Relationship in Southeast Asia. In: Andrea Acri, Roger Blench, and Alexandra Landmann (eds.), *Spirits and Ships: Cultural Transfers in Early Monsoon Asia*, pp. 515-556. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Wessing, Robert and Bart Barendregt (2005). Tending the Spirit's Shrine: Kanekes and Pajajaran in West Java. *Moussons* 8: 3-26.

Widyatmanta (1963). Djaka Tarup. In: Urusan Adat-Istiadat dan Tjerita Rakjat Djawatan Kebudajaan Departemen P.D. dan K. (ed.), *Tjerita Rakjat* I, pp. 67-72. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Wilken, G.A. (1912). *De Verspreide Geschriften van Prof. Dr. G.A. Wilken*, vol. 3. Semarang: G.C.T. van Hoeve.

Winstedt, R.O. (1929). The Perak Genies. *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 7(3): 460-466.

Winstedt, R.O. (1945). Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (3+4): 134-145.

Woodroffe, John (1975). *Śakti and Śākta*. Madras: Ganesh and Co.

Work, Courtney (2018). Chthonic Sovereigns? '*Neak Ta*' in a Cambodian Village. *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* https://doi.orh/10.1080/14442213.2018.1553205.

Zieseniss, Alexander (1963). *The Rama Saga in Malaysia. Its Origin and Development*. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute.

Zoetmulder, P.J. (1982). *Old Javanese-English Dictionary*, part 1 (A-O) & 2 (P-Y). 'S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. [Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde].

Zulkarnaen, M. Yusuf (1987). *Aryo Menak. Legenda dari Madura*. Bandung: Pionir Jaya.

Arlo Griffiths[1]

Rediscovering an Old Javanese Inscription: Mpu Mano's Donation in Favor of a Buddhist Dignitary in 888 Śaka

"Tugas seorang ahli epigrafi sekarang ini tidak saja meneliti prasasti-prasasti yang belum diterbitkan, tetapi juga meneliti kembali prasasti-prasasti yang baru terbit dalam transkripsi sementara. Kemudian ia harus menerjemahkan prasasti-prasasti tersebut ke dalam bahasa modern sehingga sarjana-sarjana yang lain, terutama ahli-ahli sejarah dapat menggunakan keterangan-keterangan yang terkandung di dalam prasasti-prasasti itu." (Boechari 1977: 3 / 2012: 5)

1. Introduction

Of the inscription that will occupy us in these pages, so far only the opening paragraphs are known to scholarship in the form of the first of what must have been a set of copper plates on which the inscription, originally issued in 888 Śaka (966 CE), was reissued in the Majapahit period. The remaining plates of this set have never been found, nor has any trace been discovered of the

1. École française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris ; UMR 5189, Histoire et Sources des Mondes Antiques, Lyon ; <arlo.griffiths@efeo.net>. My thanks are due to Henri Chambert-Loir for encouraging me to finally write up some of the results of a decade that I have spent working on Old Javanese inscriptions without publishing much about them. The research for this article has been undertaken as part of the project DHARMA 'The Domestication of "Hindu" Asceticism and the Religious Making of South and Southeast Asia', funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no 809994). See https://dharma.hypotheses.org. I thank my fellow project members Timothy Lubin, Annette Schmiedchen and Marine Schoettel for their comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Nigel Bullough (alias Hadi Sidomulyo) and Jan Wisseman Christie for the useful comments that they furnished as reviewers for this journal.

original inscription that must have been issued on stone or copper-plate in the 10th century.[2]

Although the publication of an edition with translation was announced by H. Kern (1908: 51), this plan never materialized (Kern 1917b: 185 n. 2). Rather, it is among the transcriptions left by J.L. Brandes after his death and edited by N.J. Krom in 1913 under the title *Oud-Javaansche Oorkonden* (*OJO*) that we find the only edition ever published. In that collection, it is item no. LV. To my knowledge, no integral translation has ever been published.

In his introductory note, as editor of Brandes' work, Krom explains that the reading of the inscription had been done on the basis of a set of rubbings. He refers to the *Notulen van de Algemeene en Bestuursvergaderingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (*NBG*) vol. XXXVI (1898), pp. 102, 153, 181, and quotes at length from pages 122–123, where Brandes had summarized the contents of the plate noting its connections with what is known to scholarship today as the Sobhamerta inscription dated to 861 Śaka.[3] A religious master named Mpuṅku i Nairañjana figures in both, as does the term *podgālika*. Brandes also remarked that both inscriptions, dated within 27 years the one from the other in the 10th century CE, show a script form that appears considerably younger than the period to which they are dated, in other words that both would be later reissues of grants originally issued in the 10th century, and refers in this connection to the evidence from the *Deśavarṇana* that reissuing of earlier grants took place on a large scale during the reign of Hayam Wuruk in the 14th century.[4]

Krom (*OJO*, p. 116) states that the plate was said to have been found at Trowulan. It was held by Haji Doolkarim, a resident of Kepanjen near Malang, when it was first mentioned in the scholarly literature in 1898.[5] Subsequently, it came into the hands of a certain Mr. Wiederhold who resided at Malang. While it was in Wiederhold's hands, a reproduction was sent to H. Kern which allowed him to read the inscription and comment on its contents (Kern 1908, 1911). The original plate was shown by Wiederhold to N.J. Krom in 1912.[6]

2. Cases where we do have both are rare. One of them is the Cunggrang inscription, for which we have the original stone and a Majapahit-period reissue.

3. Damais 1952: 60–61, 1955: 60; Nakada 1982: 104–105 (entry no. 142); Titi Surti Nastiti 2007.

4. See Damais 1951: 31–32, essentially repeating Brandes' remarks in *OJO* LV, but adding in a note that the *Nāgarakṛtāgama*, nowadays more appropriately called *Deśavarṇana* by most scholars, "indique expressément que Hayam Wuruk, au cours de son voyage dans l'île, renouvela plusieurs privilèges tombés plus ou moins en désuétude", with particular reference to stanza 73.2.

5. See *NBG* 1898, esp. p. 181.

6. See *Oudheidkundig Verslag* 1912, p. 62: "Door bemiddeling van den Heer van Hinloopen Labberton te Buitenzorg kreeg ik inzage van een drietal koperplaten en afschriften van nog vier andere, de eerste in bezit van den Heer Wiederhold te Malang, de laatste in het bezit van dienzelfden, van Mr. Krüseman en van den Heer Römer te Soerabaja. Eén daarvan, gedateerd 888, bleek de reeds door Dr. Brandes behandelde, in Notulen Bat. Gen. 1898 (p. 102, 122, 153, 181) besprokene te zijn. De overige

After it was seen by Krom, the plate has come to be considered lost, and this is the main reason why it has never been restudied.[7] But my documentation since 2008 of the epigraphic collections of Indonesian inscriptions kept in the Netherlands in the framework of the collaboration between the Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional and the EFEO to compile an inventory of ancient inscriptions of the Nusantaran archipelago[8] has revealed that the plate was acquired in 1975 by the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde (presently called Museum Volkenkunde) in Leiden, from a Mr. A.J. Dirks (of Den Haag), through the intervention of a Mrs. F. Groosbeek-Baretta (of Apeldoorn).[9] The plate has the inventory number RV-4801-1 in the merged collection of the recently formed Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, measures 8.2 × 41.5 × 0.3 cm, and bears five lines of writing on both sides. Good photographs of the plate ordered from the Museum make it possible to check and correct Brandes' reading on several points, and to propose a translation on the basis of the revised edition.

In the spirit of Boechari's words quoted above as motto, the first purpose of this article is to submit this inscription to a fresh study and to offer a translation into English. But my second purpose is to use this inscription to illustrate the significant progress that can be made more generally in the study of the epigraphic material of ancient Java — from the documentation of the physical whereabouts of inscribed artefacts, through the correct decipherment of the texts and the proper interpretation of the grammatical forms and lexical meanings of their words, to their exploitation for historical research.

2. Text

Using Brandes' edition as base text, I offer here a new edition of the inscription, following the transliteration conventions of the ERC-funded research project *DHARMA*,[10] i.e., largely the ISO standard 15919 but with some adaptations, some of which now mean a break with the system that I have used in previous publications,[11] notably the use of capital letters for *akṣara* vowels that I would previously have indicated with a raised circle.

---

waren mij nog niet bekend." The information about Mr. Wiederhold is repeated in *Rapporten van den Oudheidkundigen Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indië* 1915: 185.

7. Damais (1955: 183): "Perdue ? Il n'existe ni photo ni estampage. […] Rien ne semble subsister de cette inscription en dehors de la transcription Brandes. Nous sommes donc dans l'obligation de la reproduire sans changement." Without any apparent source, Nakada (1982: 106–107, entry no. 148) indicates "M[useum] of Malang?" — note the question mark.

8. See Perret, Machi Suhadi & Richadiana Kartakusuma 2003–04. A first installment of the inventory will soon be published online through epigraphia.efeo.fr/nusantara/idenk.

9. This information about the acquisition history is taken from the Museum's inventory card, which also indicates "ex collection Wiederholt" (*sic*).

10. See Balogh & Griffiths 2019.

11. See especially Acri & Griffiths 2014.

Fig. 1. The recto face of plate 1 of Mpu Mano's inscription. Formerly Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden; now Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, coll. no. RV-4801-1.

Fig. 2. The verso face of plate 1 of Mpu Mano's inscription. Formerly Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden; now Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, coll. no. RV-4801-1.

1 recto **(fig. 1)**[12]
(1) // ❀ // namo stu sarvvabuddhăya // ❀ // svasti śakavarṣātīta, 888, śrăvaṇamāsa, tīthī,[13] Aṣṭamī kr̥ṣṇapakṣa,[14] ha, va, ra, vāra, sinta, **(2)** bāyabyastha grahacāra, rohiṇīnakṣatra, prajāpatidevatā, mahendramaṇḍala, harṣaṇayoga, vijayamuhūrta,[15] śaśīparvvaiśa,[16] **(3)** kolavakaraṇa,[17] siṅharāśi, Irika divāśanira, mpu mano, muṇyākən· lmaḥ sīma, kaputrāṅśanira, kalilīranira[18] saṅke kavvitanira **(4)** Ikaṁ[19] harahara, kidul i pomahanira, hīṅanya lor· kidul iṁ pagər· kinalihan·, muAṁ mpu mano, hīṅanya kulvan· Aṅalihī[20] pagər·, muAṁ **(5)** Iṁ paviḍəṅan·, hīṅanya vetan·, Aṅalihi pagər·, muAṁ Iṁ kalampayan·, hīṅanya kidul·, Ikaṁ pagər· lor· saṁke kalimusan·, ya t-

1 verso **(fig. 2)**
(1) ekā[21] pinuṇyakənira Iṁ mpuṅku susuk·[22] pagər·, muAṁ mpuṅku Iṁ[23] nairañjanā, Arthahetoḥ mpu buddhivāla, paknanya gavayənnira kuṭi, dharmma lpa**(2)**s· kapodgālikanani kulasantānānira mpuṅku Iṁ nairañjanā, kunaṁ kramanya, Ikaṁ savaḥ kidul iṁ kuṭi, təmpaḥ, 3, ya ta sinaṇḍā mpuṅku su**(3)** suk·[24] pagər·, muAṁ mpuṅku Iṁ[25] nairañjanā, Iṁ mā kā 2(,)[26] ya ta dharmma mpuṅku,[27] Iṁ susuk· pagər·, muAṁ mpuṅku Iṁ nairagjanā,[28] An· paminta

12. The plate-number 1 stands in the left margin, rotated 90° clockwise vis-à-vis the text.

13. *tīthī*: *tithi* Brandes.

14. *kr̥ṣṇapakṣa*: *śuklapakṣa* Brandes. Damais' suspicion of an error in Brandes reading is thus confirmed. See below, §4.

15. *-muhūrta*: *-muhūrtta* Brandes.

16. *-parvvaiśa*: *-parvveśa* Brandes.

17. *kolava-*: the *taling* stands at the end of line 2 but is repeated at the start of line 3. See another occurrence of this (actually rather widespread) phenomenon indicated in n. 21.

18. *kalilīranira*: *kaliliranira* Brandes.

19. *kavvitanira Ikaṁ*: *kavvitanira, Ikaṁ* Brandes. No punctuation sign is engraved between these words.

20. *Aṅalihī*: *Aṅalihi* Brandes.

21. *ya tekā*: the *taling* stands at the end of line 5 of the recto, but is repeated at the start of line 1 of the verso. See also n. 17 above.

22. *mpuṅku susuk·*: since in most cases we find *Iṁ* between these words, I assume that we must emend *mpuṅku Iṁ susuk·* here and in lines 2–3.

23. *Iṁ*: *I* Brandes.

24. *mpuṅku susuk·*: see n. 22.

25. *Iṁ*: *I* Brandes.

26. *kā 2(,)*: the punctuation sign is very faint; it was not read by Brandes.

27. *mpuṅku,*: the punctuation sign was not read by Brandes.

28. *Iṁ nairagjanā*: *I nairañjanā* Brandes. Brandes did not observe that the plate here shows an error for the spelling of the toponym seen repeatedly in this text. Emend *nairañjanā*.

I**(4)**ka lmaḥ tumpal ika[29] savaḥ lor· damlənira[30] kuṭi, ya ta kăraṇanyan· linbas[31] ikaṁ savaḥ saṇḍanira mpu mano, Iṁ mā kā 3, mapa**(5)**k(na) bhuktyana saṁ hyaṁ kuṭi, saṅka ri gə:ṁnyāmbha mpu mano,[32] yat·[33] dharmma donanya, Apitovin ana riṁ dharmma parṇnaḥ[34] mpu mano, denira mpuṅku Iṁ

3. Translation

(r. 1–3) Homage to every Buddha! Hail! Elapsed Śaka year 888, month of Śrāvaṇa, eighth *tithi* of the waning fortnight, Haryaṅ, Vagai, Sunday, (the *vuku*) Sinta, the *grahacāra* in the Northwest, the lunar mansion Rohiṇī, the deity Prajāpati, the *maṇḍala* in the East, the conjunction Harṣaṇa, the *muhūrta* Vijaya, the regent of the astronomical node being the Moon, the half-*tithi* (*karaṇa*) Kolava, the zodiac sign Leo.

(r. 3–5) That was the time that Mpu Mano made a meritorious donation of *sīma* land that was his patrimony as child,[35] his inheritance from his ancestors, the uncultivated field (*hara-hara*)[36] south of where he resided. Its northern limit is south of the fence (*pagər*)[37] shared with Mpu Mano. Its western limit shares the fence with Paviḍəṅan.[38] Its eastern limit shares the fence with Kalampayan.[39] Its southern limit is the fence north of Kalimusan.[40]

---

29. *tumpal ika*: *tumpalikaṁ* Brandes. I think the *cecak* read by Brandes is actually just a scratch above the *ka*, although perhaps we do need a *cecak* here, if we are to understand *tumpalnika(ṅ).*

30. *damlənira*: *damlira* Brandes.

31. *linbas*: *linbus* Brandes. I do not see the needed *suku*. Emend *tinbus*.

32. *gə:ṁnyāmbha mpu mano*: *gə:ṁnyā, mpuṅku mano* Brandes. Emend *gə:ṁnyāmbhək mpu mano*. The emendation is supported by analogous phraseology in several Parva texts, thought to date to roughly the same period as this inscription. See Ādiparva, p. 97: *saṅka ri gāṅni prabhāvanira*; *Bhīṣmaparva*, p. 84: *saṅka ri gāṅniṅ krodha saṅ bhīmasena*; *Uttarakāṇḍa*, p. 126: *saṅ hyaṅ indra ta jugāgāṅ vəlasny ambəknira*. On the spelling *bh* in the word *ambək*, consistently found in the Majapahit-period manuscript of the *Dharma Pātañjala*, see Acri 2017: 55 / 2018: 40.

33. *yat·*: emend *yan·* or *yar·*.

34. *parṇnaḥ*: *parṇnah* Brandes.

35. On the meaning of *kaputrāṅśan*, see §6.1.

36. On the meaning of *hara-hara*, see §6.2.

37. On the way I translate *pagər*, see §6.3.

38. Zoetmulder (1982) records the word *viḍəṅ* in the meaning "(= yuyu) crab", but cites only one occurrence. If *paviḍəṅan* is derived from that word in that meaning, it would have to mean 'crab farm', or such. But it seems imaginable that the word is to be connected rather with *hiḍəṅ/iḍəṅ* "(subst.) standing still", *iniḍəṅ* "(pf) to make st. the constant object (of meditation, etc.)", *mapahidəṅan* "to stand one's ground, recover, rally" (Zoetmulder 1982). The meaning of *paviḍəṅan* could then be 'place for solitary retreat (for meditation)' or 'rallying ground'. But it can also simply be a toponym, as I assume for the time being. The word does not occur elsewhere.

39. Or *kalampayan* could be a common noun connected with *lampyay ? kalampyayan ?* "a part. kind of plant (creeper)?" (Zoetmulder 1982). The word does not occur elsewhere.

40. In origin, at least, *kalimusan* must be a common noun derived from *limus* "a

(r. 5–v. 2) That is what he made a meritorious donation to the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā, [whose name mentioned here only] for practical necessity [is][41] Mpu Buddhivāla,[42] to serve for the monastery (*kuṭi*) to be made by him (Mpu Mano), a tax-exempt foundation (*dharma ləpas*) that is to be individual property (*kapodgalikan*)[43] of the lineage of the Master of Nairañjanā.

(v. 2–5) As for its details: the wet-rice field south of the monastery (*kuṭi*), [measuring] 3 *təmpah*, had been taken in security by the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā for 2 *kāṭi* of gold. That (field) was the foundation of the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā, who (*an*) requested a border land, the wet-rice field to the north, (to be used) for his (Mpu Mano's) founding of a monastery.[44] That is the reason why the wet-rice field given in security by Mpu Mano was redeemed by him for 3 *kāṭi* of gold, to serve for being used as resource by the Holy Monastery (*kuṭi*), out of the greatness of the intent (*ambək*) of Mpu Mano that (*yan*) Dharma should be striven for by him. The more so as regarding the foundation (*dharma*), the relation of Mpu Mano to the Master of ...

4. Date

The inscription's date has been discussed in exemplary fashion by Louis-Charles Damais (1955: 183). Unable to convert the date with the parameter *śuklapakṣa* as read by Brandes, Damais had to assume an error with regard to the fortnight, because 888 Śrāvaṇa *kr̥ṣṇapakṣa* 8 Haryaṅ Vagai Sunday yielded

part. kind of fruit (mango? cf sund.; GR: = timun)" (Zoetmulder 1982), i.e., 'limus orchard'. The word occurs as the name of a *sīma* in an inscription which I suspect may be a reissue of a grant originally issued in the 11th century (Kalimusan, see Machi Suhadi & Richadiana Kartakusuma 1996: 7). In its two occurrences in the Waringin Pitu inscription (ed. Boechari 1985-86: 125–136, lines 8r2, 11r3), it could be either toponym or common noun, although the former seems a bit more likely, because of the occurrence of the toponyms Malaṅe and Kamalagen in the same contexts. An occurrence of the former in the Balawi inscription of 1305 Saka has been identified by Hadi Sidomulyo (2018: 237) with a village situated about 40 km northwest of Trowulan, but homonymic villages may of course have existed elsewhere; the latter is the name of a *sīma* known from the Kamalagyan inscription of 959 Saka, which mentions it in close association with Variṅin Sapta, none other than the *sīma* which is the focus of the Waringin Pitu charter. (On that charter, see also §6.2.)

41. On the meaning of *arthahetoḥ*, see §6.5.

42. This name appears as Boddhivāla in the Sobhamerta inscription. It seems that a single person called Mpu Buddhibala (or something like that) was master of two establishments, one called Susuk Pagər and the other Nairañjanā, although the text does not consistently mention both affiliations.

43. On the meaning of *kapodgalikan*, see §6.4.

44. An alternative translation might be: 'That (field) was the endowment (*dharma*) for the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā, such that (*an*) he requested a border land, the wet-rice field to the north, (to be used) for his (Mpu Mano's) endowment of a monastery.'

a perfect match with 12 August 966 CE. My new edition of the text confirms Damais' suspicion. In their review of Damais' data emphazing the traditional Indian *pañcāṅga* ('calendar with five elements'), which Damais generally ignored in his approach to date conversion based more on indigenous cyclical elements, Eade & Gislén (2000: 68) confirmed Damais' result:

> There is no kaulava karaṇa on astronomical tithi 8 waxing, though there is one in the second half of 8 waning and Damais indicates (...) that a confusion between waxing and waning is "very easy to make". The diagram's figures for Kaulava (58' 2 I to 18' 38) indicate that it, the nakṣatra, and the yoga are all in place for just over half the civil day (…).



Fig. 3. Diagram showing the dating parameters of Mpu Mano's inscription.

To visualize what is explained here, see my **fig. 3**, a diagram which reproduces and enhances the one given by Eade & Gislén.[45] The only remaining incongruity is that the *wuku* is stated to be Sinta, whereas the combination Haryaṅ Vagai Sunday should be the first day of Landəp as shown in the diagram and in Damais 1955, Appendix 1. On this unresolved issue, see Damais 1955, Appendix 9.

Damais also mentions that some parameters of the dating formula are incompatible with a date in 888 Śaka, which indicated to him that he was dealing with a reissue in the Majapahit period. The idea, not made explicit here by Damais, is that the dating formula would have been expanded, without incidence on the critical parameters, to suit the customs of the Majapahit period by inserting parameters that were never included in earlier periods. The anachronistic parameters in our inscription may be brought out by juxtaposing its dating formula with a few others from inscriptions that are not reissues:[46]

45. I have created the diagram with the application called HIC that can be obtained through http://home.thep.lu.se/~larsg/Site/download.html.

46. I quote the opening passages of the following inscriptions: (1) Hering, (2) Alasantan (ed. Wibowo 1979), (3) Muncang, (4) our inscription, (5) Cane.

1. sakavārṣatīta 859 jeṣṭamāsa tithi saṣṭi śuklapakṣa ha va vr̥ vāra agneyastha pūrbaphalguṇanakṣatra toyadevatā bajrayoga garadhikaraṇa
2. śakavarṣātīta 861 bhadravādamāsa, tithi pañcamī kr̥ṣṇapakṣa, vā, pa, śu, vāra, aśvinīnakṣatra, aśvīdevatā, viṣkambhayoga
3. śakavarṣātīta 866 cetramāsa tithī ṣaṣṭi śuklapakṣa tu pa ā vāra, rohiṇīnakṣatra karṣalaśadevatā, prītiyoga
4. śakavarṣātīta, 888, śrăvaṇamāsa, tīthī, aṣṭamī kr̥ṣṇapakṣa, ha, va, ra, vāra, sinta, bāyabyastha**grahacāra**, rohiṇīnakṣatra, prajāpatidevatā, mahendra**maṇḍala**, harṣaṇayoga, vijaya**muhūrta**, śaśī**parvvaiśa**, kolavakaraṇa, siṅha**rāśi**
5. sakavarṣātīta 943 kārtikamāsa tithi caturthi kr̥ṣṇapakṣa tu va śu vāra landəp pūrṇnavasunakṣatra śubhayoga ariditidevatā **grahacāra**pūrvvastha vavakaraṇa bāyabya**maṇḍala**

As Damais observes in a footnote, our inscription is "le seul document javanais retrouvé de la période s'étendant de la dernière charte de Pu Siṇḍok à la grande stèle de 913 śaka dont le nom royal n'a pas encore été déchiffré",[47] so that we cannot usefully compare the date of 888 Śaka with any date in the following decades until the Cane inscription of 943 Śaka, which does show some new elements vis-à-vis the dates of 859, 861 and 866 Śaka (*grahacāra*, *maṇḍala*), but does not yet show any of the elements that become customary only later (*muhūrta*, *parveśa*, *rāśi*).[48]

5. Palaeography

Both Brandes and Damais were undoubtedly right in arguing on the basis of the inscription's dating formula that they were dealing with a reissue. In Brandes' time, experience with Javanese palaeography was not sufficiently advanced for him to use any palaeographic argument, while Damais was unable to do so because he had access neither to the plate itself nor to any reproduction. Now that the documentary situation has changed, we can observe that the script is clearly different from what we see in original issues of the 10th century CE on stone and copper plate. The Alasantan inscription of 861 (**fig. 4**) may serve as example of the script typical in that period. On the other hand, the script we have seen in **fig. 1** and **2** is entirely compatible with the hypothesis of reissue in the Majapahit period.

It seems that the hand that we see on our plate is particularly similar to, and therefore contemporary with, the one responsible for the engraving of

47. The published reading (*OJO* LVII) of the stele of 913 Śaka is too fragmentary to use for comparison, and none of the dating formula is preserved in the case of the more recently discovered but still unpublished Wwahan (or Bandar Alim) inscription, except the Śaka year 907. On this inscription and its date, see Boechari 1986: 190 n. 33 / 2012: 322 n. 31, Machi Suhadi & Richadiana Kartakusuma 1996: 46 (photo on p. 71), and Boechari 2012: 184. I was able tentatively to confirm the extremely faint reading *907* at the top of the almost entirely effaced front face of this stone during a visit to Pusat Informasi Majapahit in 2015.

48. See De Casparis 1978, Appendix II ("Gradual lengthening of the expression of dates in Old-Javanese inscriptions").

Fig. 4. Alasantan inscription, left half of text on plate 1. Pusat Informasi Majapahit, no. 5-8/Tbg/BJJ/63/BPG. Photo courtesy of Nigel Bullough.

Fig. 5. Gajah Mada inscription. Museum Nasional, Jakarta, inv. no. D. 111. Photo OD OD-741A, courtesy of Leiden University Library.

Fig. 6. Kusmala inscription. Museum Airlangga, Kediri. Estampage EFEO n. 2228. Photo courtesy of the EFEO.

Fig. 7. Canggu inscription, plate 1 recto. Museum Nasional E. 54a. Rubbing kept at Leiden University Library. Photo courtesy of Leiden University Library.

the famous Gajah Mada inscription **(fig. 5)**, dated to 1273 Śaka, or 1351 CE. The force of this comparison is brought out by showing another stone inscription of 1272 Śaka **(fig. 6)** and another copper plate of 1280 Śaka **(fig. 7)**, both of which lack the peculiar roundedness that is common to our plate and the Gajah Mada stone inscription but that I have not found in any other inscription — giving reason to speculate that the same engraver may have been responsible for both. And it is further noteworthy that the script used to reissue Mpu Mano's grant is quite different from that used in the reissue of the textually related Sobhamerta charter.[49] The two grants were probably not reissued during the same century.

6. Vocabulary

6.1 *kaputrāṅśan*

After the dating formula, the object of the grant is described in the following words: *irika divāśanira, mpu mano, muṇyākən lmah* sīma, ***kaputrāṅśanira,*** *kalilīranira saṅke kavvitanira, ikaṅ* ***hara-hara,*** *kidul i pomahanira, hīṅanya lor kidul iṅ* ***pagər*** *kinalihan, muaṅ mpu mano*. While the words *hara-hara* and *pagər* will be discussed in §6.2 and §6.3, we shall first concentrate on *kaputrāṅśan*. In the *Old Javanese-English Dictionary* (Zoetmulder 1982, henceforward *OJED*), we find the following entries:

> **putrāṅśa**, **kaputrāṅśa**, **kaputrāṅśan**
> **putrawaṅśa = putrāṅśa**
> **kaputrawaṅśa, kaputrawaṅśan** apanage, land assigned to a son by the king.

With the exception of two references to the *Navaruci*, all of the textual passages cited by Zoetmulder are epigraphic. When checked against the most reliable editions available, it appears that none of the occurrences actually requires postulation of a form *kaputrāṅśa* or *kaputravaṅśa*, without *-an* suffix.

Including the one in our inscription, we can list the following epigraphic occurrences (cited here in somewhat normalized transcription):

1. Waharu I, reissue of a grant dated 795 Śaka, lines 1r3–4: *parṇnahanya sīma* ***kaputraṅśan****a, kalilirana deniṅ anak putu buyut santāna pratisantāna saṅ hadyan*[50]

49. See Damais (1955: 60 n. 1): "Ainsi qu'on peut le voir dans le fac-similé de *KO*, XXII, l'écriture de cette copie diffère nettement de la plupart des autres copies tardives. Elle leur est probablement antérieure, mais nous n'osons préciser plus pour le moment." See already Damais 1952: 60–61, n. 6. Five of the inscription's seven plates are kept at the British Library, and can be viewed through that institution's online database: http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref=MSS_Jav_106.

50. Ed. Boechari 1985–86: 22–25.

2. Pupus, a reissue, possibly in the same hand as that of Waharu I (no. 1),[51] of an original grant possibly dated to around 800 Śaka, lines 1v2–3: *tatkālanikaṅ van[v]a ri pupus vatək vatu humalaṅ sinīma de rahyaṅta sañjaya lbak vukirnyadohnyaparə lmah kəbvanya tka ri kalaṅ kalagyanya paṅurumbiginya sīma* ***kaputraṅśan*** *de rahyaṅta sañjaya*. Same inscription, lines 2r5–6: *samaṅkana lvāni lmah saṅ hyaṅ sīma i pupus* ***kaputraṅśan*** *rahyaṅta sañjaya*[52]
3. Paradah II, 865 Śaka, front face, lines 9–11: ***putraṅśa***[53] *kaliliraṇa deniṅ anak putu puyut mani antah santāna pratisantāna saṅ śluk dāyanya rikana sa saṅ maputra tiṅkahnikanaṅ*[54] *lmah savah sima pacaru i saṅ hyaṅ dharmma kamūlān blah 1 paṅajyan su ku 1 (?) a .... ka 1* ***putraṅśa*** *tampaḥ 1 .... ikanaṅ lmah gagā ... i tagiṅ tampah blah* ***putraṅśa*** *juga maṅuṅsī i piṅhai panigaran i paraḍah*. Same inscription, back face, lines 28–29: *asiṅ umulahulah ikaṅ lmah savah i paraḍah sīma inarpaṇākan sagluk i saṅ hyaṅ dharmma kamūlān i paraḍah lorniṅ luah muaṅ ... i tagiṅ* ***putraṅśa*** *iṅ dlāha hlam an babatataya ṅunivaih yan davuta saṅ hyaṅ vatu sīma kabuattananya patyananta ya*
4. Kancana, a reissue dated to 1295 Śaka of a grant originally issued in the 10th century CE,[55] 4v4–5r3: *samaṅkana pañaturdeśani lmah saṅ hyaṅ darmmasīma iṅ kăñcana, kavibhajyanikaṅ savah, maprayoga i bhaṭāra, təmpah, 2, iṅ asana uṅgvan aṅśa bhaṭārī, jəṅ, 2, ki, 1, bayai, jəṅ, 5, mapakna mpu sthăpaka, təmpah, 2, iṅ gayanti uṅgvanya, mpu brahmā ta sthāpaka, mpu asthavira,*[56] *jəṅ, 1, pamubur paragi, jəṅ, 1, mariṅ parivāra, jəṅ, 2, gavainiṅ parivāra kinonkon adoh aparək hābniṅ bapra, jəṅ, 2,* ***kaputrāṅśan****, təmpah, 20 dyah imbaṅi, mvaṅ dyah anārgha pramāṇa ikā, tka i santāna pratisantānānikā, tka mne hləm riṅ dlāhaniṅ dlāha*

51. On the Pupus inscription, see Damais (1952: 11 n. 2): "L'inscription de Pupus (*OJO*, LXV) forme un cas à part. Elle a une date complète (c'est à tort que la transcription de Brandes ne donne que quelques mots des lignes 1 et 2 car elles sont presque entièrement lisibles). Le style rappelle nettement les inscriptions de la fin du VIIIe et du début du IXe siècles Saka. Comme cependant le nom du *wuku* s'y trouve indiqué, on pense à une date postérieure. L'écriture, anguleuse, est difficilement datable. Le millésime ne saurait en tout cas être 1022 Saka et Stutterheim a certainement eu tort de partir de cette date pour l'article qu'il a consacré à ce document (*BKI*, 90, 1933, 282-287). Nous n'avons pu jusqu'ici trouver de solution satisfaisante pour l'interprétation de la date et nous en reparlerons ailleurs." Note the similarity of the words used by Damais (1955: 31) when discussing Waharu I: "il s'agit d'une copie, mais non d'une copie tardive car l'écriture est nettement antérieure à la période de Majapahit. Anguleuse, elle est difficilement datable et il s'agit peut-être de ce que nous avons appelé une « copie conforme »." My suggestion that the two copies were made by the same hand is based on inspection of rubbings of the plates (Museum Nasional E. 3 and E. 24) kept in the Kern Institute collection of Leiden University Library.

52. Ed. Boechari 1985–86: 75–77.

53. Emended. Brandes reads *patlaṅśa*, with indication of uncertainty.

54. Emended. Brandes reads *titah nikanaṅ*.

55. On this dating, see §7.

56. Emended. The plate reads *hasthavīra*.

5. The present inscription: *muṇyākən lmah sīma*, ***kaputrāṅśan****ira, kalilīranira saṅke kavvitanira, ikaṅ harahara*
6. Pabuharan, a reissue of a grant originally issued possibly under the reign of Siṇḍok or Airlaṅga, lines 1b2–4: *ika ta makadrabya ikaṅ* ***kaputravaṅśan****, lukat tampah, 1, muaṅ kamūladharmman, lukat, ki, 1, makamukhya savah bhaṭāra kabhaktin, an lukat, jəṅ, 1*[57]
7. Waharu III, a reissue of a grant originally issued possibly under the reign of Siṇḍok or Airlaṅga, line 3r3: *atəhər inanugrahan* ***kaputravaṅśan*** *savah*[58]
8. Wimalasrama, reissue of a grant originally issued possibly under the reign of Siṇḍok or Airlaṅga, Hageman transcript, page 3, lines 2–3: *damlən* ***kaputraṅśan*** *satṅaḥ paniklana susur kapaṅgiha kalilirani vka vetnira mpuṅku muntun*[59]
9. Rameswarapura, 1197 Śaka, lines 6r4–6: *ya teka parṇah* ***kaputrāṅśan****ani santāna pratisantāna śrī brahmarāja, mvaṅ ikaṅ ulihniṅ amabaki, kunāṅ ikaṅ gagā, kubvan, parṇah* ***kaputrāṅśan*** *ika*[60]
10. Sukhamerta, 1218 Śaka, line 11r3: *hana pvekāṅ savah* ***kaputrāṅśan****, irika ta saṅ apañji patipati yan tan ārthakāraṇa*

Besides these epigraphic occurrences, predominantly dating from the 10th and 11th centuries, in the transmitted Old Javanese literature there are the two passages from the *Navaruci* cited in *OJED*, and a further passage not cited there:

11. *Navaruci*, chapter 2, first paragraph (pp. 29–30): *kañcit maṅkat rahaden bhīma. kapuṅkur iṅ gajāhoya. tan kavarṇaa tikaṅ kalagen,* ***kaputravaṅśan****, muvah tikaṅ kaperiṅ mvaṅ kalintaṅan.* 'Immediately Bhīma set out. He had left Gajāhoya behind. The religious establishments (*kalagen*) and *kaputravaṅśan* will not be described, nor will (the places) he passed by and came across.' Same text, chapter 3, first paragraph (p. 34): *aglis maṅkat rahaden bhīma, kapuṅkur ing gajāhoya. aṅlakvani juraṅ səṅka aparaṅ aparuṅ, mārgātrəbis, iriṅ-iriṅ. akveh tikaṅ vanādri bhaya kalintaṅan, muvah śəma, vatəs, pabajaṅan,*

57. Ed. Boechari 1985–86: 13–14. Despite what is suggested by inclusion in Boechari's work, it is unclear to me whether the original plates forming this inscription have ever been actually kept at Museum Nasional. What is certain, is that the British Library now preserves the plates under shelf mark Ind. Ch. 57. Photos are accessible online, enabling me to check published readings of the lines in question: http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref=Ind_Ch_57&index=13.

58. Boechari 1985–86: 89–92.

59. Van Stein Callenfels 1924: 25–26; reading corrected on the basis of my inspection of the manuscript kept at the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris, and further emended.

60. No edition of this charter has been formally published, although there is a reading in an unpublished "Laporan penelitian prasasti di Museum Mpu Tantular dan di Museum Purbakala Trowulan tahun 2003" by Machi Suhadi. I quote from my own forthcoming edition.

peṅənan iṅ avan; gunuṅ pipitu kalintaṅan; mvaṅ kapuṅkur tekang taruk-tarukan, muvah kalagen, ***kaputravaṅśan****, ḍusun, kuluvutan*. 'Immediately Bhīma set out. He had left Gajāhoya behind. He marched through steep ravines with rocks and cliffs. The path was rocky terrain and slopes. On the road, he came by numerous dangerous forest mountains, cemeteries, boundary markers, children's graveyards, demarcations. He came by seven mountains. And he left behind settlements, as well as religious establishments (*kalagen*), *kaputravaṅśan*, and remote villages.'

12. *Rājapatiguṇḍala*, transcribed by Pigeaud (1960–63, vol. I: 88–89) from manuscript LOr 5056: *ikā ta dharma saṅ vikū, mataṅhyan saṅ yogiśvara, hayva hinavara deniṅ jagat, āpan sira tirtthaniṅ bhūvanā, mnəṅ kaṅ pramananiṅ rāt, kāryyanira ṅukuṣakən dupā, riṅ śūklapakṣa, makaṅūni hanadah akinkin dharma, bumi lvirnya, jumput kuluvut, kaṅlaṅ, kalaṅgyān,* ***kaputravaṅśān****, tani, hanālaga dalun, salviraniṅ bhūmi carik, lmah aheṅ, tan salah amūktyakna*. In this passage, *kalaṅgyān* must correspond to the *kalagen* of the *Navaruci* passages.

Clearly, the data reveal that the original and older spelling is *(ka)putrāṅśa(n)*, i.e., from Sanskrit *putra+aṁśa*. Prijohoetomo explains in his glossary (1934: 220) that *vaṅśa* is the Middle Javanese form of *aṅśa* (i.e., *aṁśa*),[61] and translates *kaputravaṅśan* as "inherited land" (*erfland*). This was also the interpretation given by H. Kern and after him by H.B. Sarkar for the occurrence in the Kancana inscription (no. 4), where the former translated "*erfdeel*" and the latter "patrimony for the children".[62] The occurrences listed above do not give clear support for Zoetmulder's more specific interpretation as "apanage, land assigned to a son by the king", because there is only one case of direct involvement of the king (in no. 2). But the idea that the word designates some kind of land is confirmed by its regular collocation with the words *sīma* (nos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and *savah* (3, 4, 6, 7, 10), while Prijohoetomo's idea that we are dealing with inherited land is supported by collocation with such phrases as *kalilirana deniṅ anak putu buyut santāna pratisantāna* (1, see also 3 and 5), which can be read as glosses of *putrāṅśa*.

In his glossary, Sarkar 1971–72, vol. II: 355 cites "sanskrit Putrāṅśa, patrimony of the children" suggesting that it is a common Sanskrit term. It is remarkable, however, that this word, despite being entirely transparent as a Sanskrit compound meaning 'son's (or sons') share', does not seem to occur in Indian Sanskrit sources. It is therefore likely to be a compound of Javanese vintage. But I see no reason not to accept the translation proposed by Sarkar in

61. This claim is not confirmed by the entry *waṅśa* in *OJED* (a dictionary which, despite its title, also covers Middle Javanese). Another way to interpret the form *putra-v-aṅśa* might be to consider the extraneous consonant to serve as hiatus-bridger allowing to avoid vowel sandhi in *putra+aṁśa*.

62. See Kern 1917a: 23; Sarkar 1971–72, vol. I: 147 and vol. II: 355.

favor of the more specific one indicated in the *OJED*. The *ka-…-an* circumfix found in most occurrences can then be interpreted as expressing the status of the lands as *putrāṅśa*.[63]

6.2 *hara-hara*

Ever since Louis-Charles Damais introduced a new nomenclature for Indonesian inscriptions taking text-internal toponyms as basis,[64] and listed this inscription under the designation "Hara-Hara", almost all scholars have adopted this designation which implies that the word *hara-hara* is a toponym, an implication which is sometimes presented as fact.[65] Although she does not state this explicitly, Jan Wisseman Christie (2009: 46, 180) must have considered that such is not the case, because she chooses a different designation, "Mpu Mano inscription". I recommend adoption of this new designation, because *hara-hara* is more likely to be a common noun than any kind of toponym. Indeed, Kern (1911: 199) translates the term as "woeste gronden" and the *OJED* has an entry **hara-hara**, **ara-ara** "treeless and uncultivated field or plain". The dictionary cites only non-epigraphic occurrences, among them two telling stanzas from the *Deśavarṇana* (which I quote in normalized transcription, along with Robson's 1995 translation):

> sampun prāpte kulur mvaṅ bataṅ i gaṅan asəm teki lampah narendra,
> tis-tis hyaṅ sūrya pintən ghatita pitu sirəm kāmukan saṅhub avrā,
> skandhāvāre təṅahniṅ **hara-hara** dinunuṅ śrī narendre kamantyan,
> prāptaṅ vyāpāra sampun panadahira madum sthāna tekiṅ vvaṅ akveh (18.8)
> 'Having reached Kulur and Batang, the King now went on to Gaṅan Asəm; the holy sun grew cooler and at about the seventh hour (4.30 p.m.) was dimmed, veiled by a spreading mist. At a camp in the midst of **a grassy field** the King was presently lodged. Refreshments arrived and after he had eaten we ordinary people each went to our own abode.'

> śīghrān datəṅ i pajarakan pataṅ dina lavas narapatin aməgil,
> ṅkāneṅ **hara-hara** kidul iṅ sudharma sugatāsana makuvu-kuvu,
> mantrī viku haji karuhun saṅ ārya sujanottama parəṅ umarək,
> kapvāṅaturakən upabhoga bhojana vineh dhana paḍākasukhan (32.1)
> 'The King soon arrived in Pajarakan where he stayed for four days; **the grassy field** to the south of the Buddhist foundation was where they set up camp. The officials and King's priests led by the excellent Ārya Sujana came forward to pay their respects. And having offered him refreshments and food they were given money, which pleased them.'

63. See Zoetmulder 1950: 74 (no. 2); Zoetmulder & Poedjawijatna 1992, vol. I: 88–89 (no. 2).

64. Damais 1952: 7–9 (§18–25).

65. See, e.g., *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, vol. II, p. 196, speaking of a "tanah *sīma* … yang terletak di Desa Hara-Hara" (Bambang Sumadio & Endang Sri Hardiati, eds., 2008).

The *OJED* cites no epigraphic occurrences for the word, but besides the one in our inscription, at least one more is known to me:

Waringin Pitu, 1369 Śaka, 10v1–3:[66]

muva hana **hara-hara** kagarbbha riṁ bəron·, paṅṛt vetan·, ḍpa, 83, paṅlari kidul·, ḍpa, 202, paṅṛt kulon·, paṅlari lor·, paḍa lavaṅ vetan kidul· // muva hanālas kabhukti sakiṁ saṁ hyaṁ ḍarmma riṁ variṅin pitu, riṁ pūrvvāsiḍakətan lavan niru, …
'And there is a *hara-hara* falling under Bəron: (its) eastern barrier 83 fathoms, (its) southern length (? *paṅlari*) 202 fathoms, its western barrier (and) northern length equal to the western and southern ones. And there is a forest used as resource from the holy foundation of Variṅin Pitu, at its eastern points it adjoins Niru …'

Here, the parallelism between *muva(h) hana harahara* and *muva(h) hana alas* clearly demonstrates that *hara-hara* must be common noun and not a toponym.[67]

6.3 *pagər*

The problem of whether a given word is to be interpreted as a toponym or as a common noun is indeed confronted very frequently when dealing with Old Javanese inscriptions, the data often being insufficient to make a reasoned choice. Some minor cases have been briefly discussed above in footnotes 38, 39 and 40. I turn here to the more important case of *pagər*.

Hadi Sidomulyo (2010: 22, n. 67), in discussing royal foundations in the ancient region of Jaṅgala (corresponding to modern Sidoarjo regency), took this *pagər* to be a toponym: "It can be added that the name Pagĕr is recorded in a number of very early inscriptions originating from this same region, among them *Kaladi* (909) and *Hara-hara* (966)". In an earlier work, the same author has discussed the toponym at greater length, and referred to the mention made in the Mula-Malurung and Sukhamerta inscriptions, dated respectively to 1177 and 1218 Śaka, of a foundation (*dharma*) at Pagər.[68] There is even a passage, among the inscriptions of that period, where the word undeniably serves as toponym in the determination of land boundaries:

66. Edited by Boechari 1985–86: 125–136. Reverified against my photos of the original.

67. I have found one other possible occurrence, the second set of Ukir Negara plates, a reissue of a grant originally issued in 1120 Saka, 1v4–5, where I read from photos of the plate: *kulvan i humaḥ dagal, 5 juṁ luḍuṁ, 2 juṁ, a(k)ulu (h)ara-hara dṛvya haji ma 1*. I am unable to determine the meaning here, because I do not understand the word *akulu*, if that reading is correct. Machi Suhadi & Richadiana Kartakusuma 1996: 9 read *ahulu*, which I cannot interpret either. Nigel Bullough (pers. comm.) kindly informs me that Issatriadi (1975: 18, 22 — unavailable to me), who likewise reads *ahulu hara-hara*, translates this as "di hulu padang". The reading *ahulu* is perhaps possible, but it seems impossible to me to translate *ahulu* as 'di hulu'.

68. Hadi Sidomulyo 2007: 83–84, with note 187 on page 108.

Rameswarapura, 1197 Śaka, 6v5–6:[69]

Asiḍaktan lavan· blut·, maṅalor amgat· lvaḥ, ḍpa 340, Asiḍaktan lavan· pagə:r·, mlut· maṅetan aṅalor·, ḍpa 80, Asiḍaktan· lavan· soso, maṅalor amnə:r·, tkeṁ paścima, ḍpa 110
'Adjoining with Blut, it goes North cutting through the river, for 340 fathoms. Adjoining with Pagər, windingly (?) it goes North-East, for 80 fathoms. Adjoining with Soso, it goes straight North, and arrives at the West point, for 110 fathoms.'

But if we assume *pagər* is a toponym also in the context of the land demarcation in our inscription, the resulting translation would have to be something like this: 'That was the time that Mpu Mano made a meritorious donation of *sīma* land […]. Its northern limit is the south (side) of Pagər that is shared with Mpu Mano. Its western limit shares Pagər with Paviḍəṅan. Its eastern limit shares Pagər with Kalampayan. Its southern limit is Pagər north of Kalimusan.' This seems to make less sense than if we translate *pagər* as a common noun meaning 'fence'. By contrast, I assume that it is part of a toponym in the combination Susuk Pagər. For the time being, within the limits of my knowledge and the sources available to me, I am unable to propose identifications of any of these toponyms on the modern map.[70]

6.4 *kapodgalikan*

The purpose of the transaction recorded in the inscription is stated in the words *paknanya gavayənnira* ***kuṭi****, dharmma lpas* ***kapodgālikana****ni kulasantānānira mpuṅku iṅ nairanjanā*, which I have translated 'to serve for the monastery (*kuṭi*) to be made by him: the tax-exempt foundation (*dharma*) that is to be individual property (*kapodgalikan*) of the lineage of the Master of Nairañjanā.'

The word *kuṭi* is used quite commonly in Buddhist sources from ancient Indonesia to designate some kind of Buddhist establishment, probably monastic, not clearly distinguishable from and often appearing in collocation with the more familiar term *vihāra*.[71] Indeed, in the Sobhamerta inscription, the object of donation to the same protagonist — the Master of Nairāñjanā called Boddhivāla or Buddhivāla — as the one who figures in the inscription that concerns us here, is called *vihantən*,[72] a *krama*-like derivation from the Sanskrit word *vihāra*.[73] In Old Javanese sources, the word *vihāra* is a

69. See n. 60 above. I quote from my own forthcoming edition and translation.

70. In his article dedicated to toponyms in several Old Javanese inscriptions, van Stein Callenfels (1929: 382) also admitted his inability to identify any of these items. Nigel Bullough (pers. comm.) suggests to me that it is most likely that the toponyms are to be sought in the area between Surabaya and Trowulan.

71. See Griffiths 2014: 216.

72. Ed. Titi Surti Nastiti 2007, lines 2v3, 3v2, 3v5, 4v2.

73. The same form is also found in the Hering inscription that I will cite below. On

sure marker of a connection with Buddhism. While the word is found in all literary and didactic texts preserved to us that have explicitly Buddhist preoccupations, it is, to my knowledge, hardly ever attested in such texts which have other religious affiliations.[74] In epigraphic texts, the context is often insufficient in itself to determine with certainty whether a monastery of Buddhist or some other affiliation is intended, but in all cases where the context does throw light on the matter, it is clear that *vihāra* designated specifically Buddhist establishments.[75] Even if we forget the fact that the Mpu Mano and Sobhamerta inscriptions open with brief Sanskrit expressions of homage to all Buddhas,[76] these other reasons alone would suffice to remove any doubt that we are dealing in both inscriptions with a transaction involving a Buddhist beneficiary.

In this light, it is remarkable that the *OJED* contains the following two entries for words quoted from the same two inscriptions, Mpu Mano and Sobhamerta, but occurring nowhere else in transmitted or epigraphic Old Javanese texts known to me:

podgalika Śiwaite
CSt 22 (939) 1b.4: muaṅ tan paṅjurwa kaliliran i kula santāna mpuṅku tĕka riṅ dlāha niṅ dlā<ha>, parnahanya podgalika.
kapodgalikan establishment of Śiwaites, Śiwaite sanctuary
OJO 55 (966) b2: gawayĕn ira kuṭi, dharma lĕpas kapodgalikana ni kulasantāna nira mpuṅku iṅ Nairañjana.

Now the base word *podgalika*, in the standard Sanskrit spelling *paudgalika*,[77] is a well-known technical term of Buddhist monastic discipline (*vinaya*),[78] and

such *krama*-like formations in Old Javanese, see Damais 1950, Damais 1951: 12 n. 1 and Hoogervorst 2017, table 3. Several examples can be added from epigraphy, among them the toponym *ālasantan*, in the eponymous inscription of 861 Saka, which is the equivalent of the common modern toponym Wonosari (i.e., *vanasāri*, meaning Flower Forest), although in modern Javanese *alas* is the *ngoko*-form while *wana* is the *krama*-form. Damais (1950: 269, 276) has emphasized the importance of *krama*-forms of modern toponyms, and a significant percentage of the *krama*-like forms found in Old Javanese are indeed toponyms or, like *vihantən*, words that designate respected places.

74. See, by way of example, the occurrences in manuscripts of the prose recensions of the Kuñjarakarṇa story (van der Molen 1983: 136–137); in the *kakavin Kuñjarakarṇa Dharmakathana* (1.7, 6.8–9, 11.4, 15.9, 16.2, 32.6); in the *Advayasādhana* part of the so-called *Saṅ Hyaṅ Kamahāyānikan* (Lokesh Chandra 1997: 343); and in the *Deśavarṇana* (93.1, in this text the word *kuṭi* is far more common). Exceptions, always in rather stereotypical lists of various religious establishments: *kakavin Rāmāyaṇa* (3.70); *Agastyaparva* (27.22–29 and 69.8–16).

75. The most noteworthy example is the Wanua Tengah III inscription (Boechari 2012: 484–491).

76. The invocation reads *namo stu sarvvabuddhāya* in Sobhamerta.

77. Representation of the Sanskrit diphthong *au* as *o* in Old Javanese is normal: see Gonda 1973: 369–370 (1st ed. 239–240).

78. See, for instance, Schopen 2001: 111–112.

the corresponding entry in Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (1951) reads as follows:

paudgalika, adj. (Pali puggalika; to pudgala plus ika; in different sense recorded pw 4.302), *individual, personal*, always contrasted with **sāṃghika**, sometimes also **staupika:** sāṃghikāḥ puṣpavṛkṣāḥ…°ka-paribhogena bhuktāḥ Divy 342.19, …*were put to individual, personal* (not *selfish*, with Index) *use*; staupikaṃ sāṃghikaṃ… vittaṃ °kaṃ ca RP 29.8; similarly Sikṣ 63.14; Bbh 166.26; MSV ii.123.19.

Zoetmulder's interpretation of Old Javanese *podgalika* was clearly determined by the meanings ascribed to the word *pudgala* and *podgala* in his dictionary: "(Skt pudgala, a name of Śiwa) Śiwaite, follower of the Śiwaite way".[79] Although Edgerton's dictionary is among the sources consulted by Zoetmulder when he was preparing the *OJED*,[80] his entry for *podgalika* reveals that he failed to observe the clearly Buddhist context of the quoted phrases, and forgot to consult Edgerton's dictionary. In brief, when a second edition of the *OJED* is prepared, the meaning for the entry *podgalika* and its derived form *kapodgalikan* will need to be corrected.

In that perspective, it must be noted that while *paudgalika* is an adjective in Sanskrit, the identification of the word class of Sanskrit words borrowed into Old Javanese is often problematic,[81] so that we may either consider the word *podgalika* to have remained an adjective in Old Javanese, with the meaning: 'belonging to (a Buddhist monk's) individual property', or to have been borrowed as a substantivized noun meaning '(a Buddhist monk's) individual property'.[82] The function of the circumfix *ka-…-an* in the derived form is in any case certainly not to indicate an establishment or sanctuary (as Zoetmulder presumed), but would either be to resolve the ambiguity of its word class, to create an abstract noun, or to indicate a status as in the case of *kaputrāṅśan* discussed above.[83]

6.5 *arthahetoḥ*

The beneficiary of Mpu Mano's donation is identified as follows: *ya tekā pinuṇyakənira iṅ mpuṅku susuk pagər, muaṅ mpuṅku aṅ nairañjanā,* ***arthahetoḥ*** *mpu buddhivāla*. Above, I have proposed the following translation: 'That is what he made a meritorious donation to the Master of Susuk Pagər

79. Gonda 1973: 275 (1st ed. 172).

80. See Zoetmulder 1982, vol. I: XXIII.

81. Gonda 1973: 582–584 (1st ed. 388–390).

82. The latter might be deemed to follow from the juxtaposition of the phrase *parṇnahānya podgālika* in Sobhamerta with such phrases as *parṇnahnya sīma svatantrā* (Turun Hyang) and *kevalā sīmā svatantra juga parṇnahnya* (Garaman, Boechari 2012: 503–512).

83. Cf. p. 122. See Zoetmulder 1950: 73–75 (nos 1, 2, 4); Zoetmulder & Poedjawijatna 1992, vol. I: 87–90 (nos 1, 2, 4).

and Master of Nairañjanā, [whose name mentioned here only] for practical necessity [is] Mpu Buddhivāla.'

The word *arthahetoḥ*, obviously of Sanskrit origin, occurs in a limited number of Old Javanese inscriptions all dating to the 10th century CE:

1. Wurudu Kidul, 844 Śaka, verso, l. 19: *likhita tambra arthahetoḥ ḍaṅ ācāryya i griḥ prāmodyajāta*[84]
2. Kanuruhan, 856 Śaka, l. 6: *irikā divaśa rakryān kanuruhan arthahetoḥ dyaḥ muṁpaṅ umanugraha*[85]
3. Hering, 859 Śaka, face A, l. 23: *i sira arthahetoḥ saṁ prasantamatiḥ*
4. Sobhamerta, 861 Śaka, seven occurrences (1r4–5, 1r6, 1v2, 1v6, 2r1–2, 2v3 3v2), always in the same sequence *mpuṅku i nerāñjanā, arthahetoḥ boddhivala*[86]

If we include the occurrence in the Mpu Mano inscription itself, this amounts to five epigraphic sources, all but one of which (no. 2) were cited in the *OJED* entry *arthahetoh* which is furnished with the gloss 'for the benefit of?'. No non-epigraphic occurrences are cited in this dictionary, but I have identified one and will return to it below.

In all cases, the word stands between the designation of a respected person and his name. The gloss proposed with a question mark by Zoetmulder does not fit in the contexts. And indeed other scholars have proposed different interpretations. Let me first quote from unpublished notes on the Kanuruhan inscription (above, no. 2) by J.G. de Casparis:[87]

> Finally, there is a minor problem concerning the term *arthahetoh* in l. 6. This is a correct Sanskrit compound meaning 'on account of (for the sake of) a purpose (material gain etc.)', but in Old Javanese inscriptions this term is generally used between the title and the name of a person, as in the present case between *rakryān kanuruhan* and *pu mumpang*, where this Sanskrit meaning does not make good sense. It is, in fact, an apposition to the title *rakryān kanuruhan*. Also the translation in the dictionary of Zoetmulder-Robson, s.v. *arthahetoh*, viz. 'for the benefit of?' is unsatisfactory. Stutterheim 1925: 59 f., notes a similar use of the term in *likhitatāmbra arthahetoh daṅ=ācāryya i gĕrih* and translates 'for the sake of financial gain' ('terwille van het gewin'), which does make sense (the scribe who writes the edict for a certain fee), but is grammatically difficult to understand, as the term defines the function of the scribe.[88] I therefore suppose that this term,

84. Edited by Stutterheim (1925: 59–60) and again by Boechari (1985–86: 121–122).

85. Reading by Boechari published in Edi Sedyawati 1994: 325.

86. Edited by Titi Surti Nastiti (2007).

87. This passage is found among the unpublished archives in preparation of a corpus of inscriptions of the reign of Siṇḍok that De Casparis was working on in the years before his death, and that are preserved in the Kern Institute collection at Leiden University Library.

88. I have not been able to trace the publication where De Casparis found the translation "terwille van het gewin". The reference to p. 59 is that of the page where Stutterheim

> originally an ablative formation, has been lifted from a Sanskrit context and used as a noun in the meaning of accountant or treasurer of a monastery or temple. The committees controlling the financial affairs of such institutions must each have had a treasurer for the income and expense, as is well known from the South Indian and Srilankan religious institutions. […].[89] In the present case the R. Kanuruhan not only issues the edict but also keeps some financial control of the new foundation.

In her publication of the Sobhamerta inscription (no. 4), Titi Surti Nastiti (2007: 25, n. 60) noted:

> Seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Christie dalam naskah yang diberikan kepada penulis, di dalam kamus Zoetmulder *arthahetoḥ* berarti untuk kepentingan seseorang, oleh sebab itu Christie membandingkan kata *arthahetoḥ* dalam prasasti Hara-hara (888 S/966 M), prasasti Wurudu Kidul (844 S/922 M), dan prasasti Hriṅ (856 S/934 M). Dalam prasasti Hara-hara disebutkan *arthahetoḥ i Buddhiwala*; dalam prasasti Hriṅ (856 S/934) disebutkan sebagai bagian dari titel sang Prasantamatih yang mengepalai sebuah wihara; dalam prasasti Wurudu Kidul disebutkan *arthahetoḥ ḍaṅ=ācāryya i Grih*. Oleh karena itu Christie tidak menerjemahkan kata *arthahetoḥ*. Sedangkan Boechari menerjemahkan *arthahetoḥ* dengan bernama. Beliau menerjemahkan *mpuṅku i Nerañjanā arthahetoḥ boddhiwala* dengan Mpungku dari Nerañjana bernama Boddhiwala (Sumadio 1984:169).[90] Menurut pendapat penulis terjemahan kata *arthahetoḥ* dengan bernama dapat diterapkan dalam prasasti ini.

But Boechari had on an earlier occasion (1975: 83–84 / 2012: 242–243) interpreted the final phrase of the Wurudu Kidul inscription, *likhita tambra arthahetoḥ ḍaṅ ācāryya i griḥ prāmodyajāta*, as follows: "Rupa-rupanya ada seorang pendeta dari desa Grih yang bernama Prāmodyajāta yang merasa perlu untuk mengutip kedua keputusan itu di atas tembaga" — here, the words "yang merasa perlu" seem to be an attempt to paraphrase *arthahetoḥ*. Sarkar (1970–71, vol. II: 204) translates *arthahetoḥ* in this same sentence as "against the payment of money".

Clearly, none of the quoted scholars was aware of the technical usage of the word *arthahetoḥ* in Buddhist *vinaya* literature. See the long note of Nolot (1991: 388–390) on the expression *arthahetoḥ ... nāma gṛhṇāmi*, conveniently accessible even to a non francophone readership in the English summary of her work (pp. 530–531), from which I cite:

> The phrase *arthahetor nāma gṛhṇāmi* actually means, quite normally, « I mention the name because of the present circumstances », and expresses a pan-Buddhist (and pan-Indian) reluctance to pronounce the name of a revered person […].

(1925) edits the plate in question, but no translation is joined to that edition.

89. De Casparis here inserts a reference without page specification to Gunawardhana 1979.

90. The reference here is to volume II (*Jaman Kuna*), edited by Bambang Sumadio, of *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. I do not have access to the 1984 printing cited by Titi Surti Nastiti, but find the same words on the same page in the *cetakan ke-6*, *edisi ke-4* of 1990.

Among the epigraphic occurrences in Old Javanese listed above, the Kanuruhan inscription (no. 2) contains no explicit trace of religious affiliation, and the fact that it is engraved on the back slab of a Gaṇeśa statue might indicate that the context here is not Buddhist. The Wurudu Kidul inscription (no. 1) is not explicit about any religious affiliation either, but the name Prāmodyajāta is nevertheless a sure indicator that the one who bore it was a Buddhist.[91] The two remaining inscriptions are both explicitly Buddhist. Although the evidence is not entirely unquivocal, it is not incompatible with the hypothesis that the use of the word *arthahetoḥ* in our inscription is another instance of specifically Buddhist terminology, this expression serving to preempt any offense that might be caused by designating a respected Buddhist master with his name.

This hypothesis is only slightly complicated by the occurrence of the same word in at least one Old Javanese literary source, where any direct Buddhist connection is out of the question. The passage is found in the *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* (pp. 64–65):

> *anugraha rahadyan saṅhulun mata sira; makasākṣi rama rahadyan saṅhulun* ***arthahetoḥ namaskāra*** *bhaṭṭāra brahmā an tinarimakən de rahadyan saṅhulun ri sira*[92]
> 'may he be granted eyes by milord; taking as witness milord's father, Lord Brahmā (by name, mentioned only) for the practical purpose of obeisance, (as to the fact) that they have been given by milord to him.'

I imagine that the usage we see in this literary text may have been adopted (and adapted, by insertion of the word *namaskāra*) from the kind of contexts seen in the quoted inscriptions, where the *arthahetoḥ* applies to men of religion who can, in all but one instance, be identified without doubt as Buddhists. We may be dealing with a case of influence from Buddhist scribes on the literary language as a whole. The case would then be analogous to the influence exerted "behind the scences" by Buddhist parties on chancery language in first-millennium India identified by von Hinüber (2013).

7. Relevance to economic history

In the context of debate about the colonial government's agrarian legislation (*Agrarische Wetgeving*) of 1870, Kern (1911) drew attention to

91. See Edgerton 1953, Dictionary, under *prāmodya*.

92. Is it necessary to emend *anugrahana*? Gonda's text edition (1933) gives *arthahetor*, but I have changed this to *arthahetoḥ*, as we find in the inscriptions, because Gonda informs us on p. 247: "*arthahetor*, vgl. Bmḍ. Pur. 1, 13, 58 *abravīd vacanaṃ devī namaskṛtya Svayaṃbhuve*. De beide woorden *arth*° *nam*° zijn m.i. als citaat op te vatten, al is het onzeker welke buigingsuitgang aan *nam*° is toe te kennen. De hss. hebben *arthahetoḥ*". Zoetmulder probably failed to record this occurrence of *arthahetoḥ* in *OJED* because Gonda's edition prints the words *arthahetor namaskāra* as though they were lemmata from the Sanskrit text — comparison with the Sanskrit *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* (1.13.58–66) shows that they are not.

this inscription, even before its text was published, for its relevance to the history of land ownership in Java.[93] A century later, it was used by Wisseman Christie in her "Preliminary notes on debt and credit in early island Southeast Asia" (2009). One of the points of interest of this inscription indeed lies in the light it casts on economic transactions in ancient Java and notably on the role that pawns (*saṇḍa*) played in the endowment of religious establishments The relevant passage must first be quoted again (this time in normalized and emended form):

> ya tekā pinuṇyakənira … pakənanya gavayənnira kuṭi, dharma lpas kapodgalikanani kulasantānānira mpuṅku iṅ nairañjanā, kunaṅ kramanya, ikaṅ savah kidul iṅ kuṭi, təmpah, 3, ya ta **sinaṇḍā** mpuṅku susuk pagər, muaṅ mpuṅku iṅ nairañjanā, iṅ mā kā 2, ya ta dharma mpuṅku, iṅ susuk pagər, muaṅ mpuṅku iṅ nairañjanā, an paminta ika ləmah tumpal ika savah lor damələnira kuṭi, ya ta kāraṇanyan tinəbus ikaṅ savah **saṇḍanira** mpu mano, iṅ mā kā 3, mapakəna bhuktyana saṅ hyaṅ kuṭi …
>
> 'That is what he made a meritorious donation … to serve for the monastery (*kuṭi*) to be made by him (Mpu Mano): the tax-exempt foundation (*dharma*) that is to be individual property of the lineage of the Master of Nairañjanā. As for its details: the wet-rice field south of the monastery (*kuṭi*), [measuring] 3 *təmpah*, **had been taken in security** by the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā for 2 *kāṭi* of gold. That (field) was the foundation of the Master of Susuk Pagər and Master of Nairañjanā, who (*an*) requested a border land, the wet-rice field to the north, (to be used) for his (Mpu Mano's) founding of a monastery. That is the reason why the wet-rice field **given in security** by Mpu Mano was redeemed by him for 3 *kāṭi* of gold, to serve for being used as resource by the Holy Monastery (*kuṭi*), …'

I tentatively interpret the chain of transactions to be intended as follows:

1. Mpu Mano (A) wishes to endow a monastery to become property of the Master of Susuk Pagər and Nairañjanā (B) and his descendants.
2. A wet-rice field south of the monastery had been pawned by A to B against 2 *kāṭi*s of gold.
3. It is used by B to make a foundation of his own.
4. B requests other land to be used for A's foundation of a monastery.
5. A pays B 3 *kāṭi*s to redeem the land he had pawned to B.
6. The whole sum of 3 *kāṭi*s (or at least the difference, so 1 *kāṭi*) is itself made object of donation to serve as resource for the newly founded monastery.

Other scenarios are possible, depending on how the word *an* and some of the instances of the pronominal suffix *-nira* are interpreted. However far we stretch our imagination, it seems to me impossible to be sure about any particular scenario, because the language of the text is simply too ambiguous. But if the *OJED* entry "**anaṇḍa, sinaṇḍa, kasaṇḍa** to take st. in security"

93. "Wanneer iemand woeste gronden, die hij uitdrukkelijk zegt van zijn voorouders als kindsdeel geërfd te hebben, vrijelijk wegschenkt, moet hij toch als eigenaar in den volsten zin des woords beschouwd worden" (Kern 1911: 199).

is reliable, it seems difficult to interpret the transaction as it has been by Wisseman Christie (2009: 47):

> The text records a substantial meritorious gift made by an individual donor to a sanctuary, part of which involved the redemption of land that had previously been pawned for the benefit of that religious foundation. This land, which had been pawned for 2 *kaṭi* (1536 grams) of gold, was redeemed, on behalf of the sanctuary, at the cost of 3 *kaṭi* (2304 grams) of gold, the additional *kaṭi* of gold presumably representing the interest on the loan for which the pawned land acted as pledge.

For this interpretation requires translating *sinaṇḍā* as 'pawned', i.e., 'given in security', which is the opposite meaning of the one indicated by *OJED*. I am therefore a bit skeptical with regard to the conclusions that Wisseman Christie thought she could draw (*ibid*.) from a group of just three inscriptions, including the one that concerns us here:

> Four points of interest arise from this small group of inscriptions. The first is the fact that, in at least one case,[94] the cost of redemption of the land was apparently greater than the original sum loaned to the person who pawned it. This indicates that profit in the form of interest was expected from the loan, over and above that derived from the creditor's right to use the land. The second point is the fact that religious establishments, like individuals and communities, apparently borrowed substantial sums of money. The third point is that a serious argument could be mounted in court over the ownership of land allegedly pawned three centuries earlier. This suggests that the ownership of land in pawn did not automatically lapse after a set period of time. The fourth point is that there were apparently, by the fourteenth century, a number of existing law codes and a considerable body of customary law to be consulted by judges in such disputes.

Renewed study of the juridical texts from which most of the textual evidence underlying the relevant set of entries in *OJED* has been taken by Zoetmulder, as confronted both with the *saṇḍa*-related data from some unpublished texts of the same genre[95] and with new epigraphic evidence still unpublished at this time, may give reason to revise the dictionary and perhaps confirm Wisseman Christie's interpretation. But until such a comprehensive study is undertaken, it seems that any conclusions for economic history based on this inscription should be treated with circumspection.

Let me conclude this discussion by presenting the most important new piece of epigraphic evidence that I am aware of at this time. The passage in question, which requires much more commentary than I can give here, is found in the unpublished Patitihan charter issued by Kr̥tanagara. I cite it from my forthcoming edition, along with a tentative translation that attempts to retain the meanings for forms derived from the base *saṇḍa* as they are indicated in the dictionary:[96]

94. The single case intended here is precisely the one at issue in the present section.

95. For instance, the unpublished juridical text that is often, though erroneously, referred to as *Svarajambu* in the secondary literature (the correct reading is *Svayambhu* but this is not actually the title of the work), currently being edited and translated by Timothy Lubin and myself, contains a substantial passage on *saṇḍa*.

96. A private collector holds four plates of this charter, which in its original state

muvaḥ tu/ru\nyānugraha śrī mahārāja, Irikaṁ baṇigrāma riṁ patitihan·, ri **(5r4)** sḍaṅanyāna **saṇḍa-saṇḍa**nikaṁ baṇigrāma riṁ patitihan salviranya, An titaṁ[97] tahun·, tigaṁ lek·, tigaṁ vṅi kamnā ya ḶḶ**(5r5)**ba, yan tapvan paṅivō maṅisyani kalăntara, ndan mājara taṁ baṇigrāma riṁ patitihan· rumuhun· ri saṁ **masaṇḍa**, yan tan aṅga **(5r6)** saṁ **masaṇḍa** manbusa mvaṁ tan paveha kālăntara, Irika yan· ḶḶba, mvaṁ pivruhakna ta riṁ vvaṅ akveḥ, lāvan· yan hana sa§**(5v1)**ṇḍa katarivăl·, yan mās·, vinujuran[98] savrattya, yan karavaṁ, sinalakan savrattya, yan· ratna həlyana sabatavasa**(5b2)**nanyan **sumaṇḍa**, muvaḥ yan hana drvya Uliḥniṁ maniliḥ salviranya, **saṇḍakna** ta ya denikaṁ maniliḥ, dvaḶn· kunəṁ, sa[ṁ]ka **(5v3)** ri lavasnikaṁ drvya tan muliḥ denikaṁ maniliḥ makadivăśaṁ rvaṁ tahun·, pjaha tekaṁ[99] maniliḥ ṅuni-ṅuni pjahana denika saṁ **(5v4)** panilihan·, tan· ḍampulana tekaṁ drvya, An təbusən sakavvit· denikaṁ panilihan·, kunəṁ yan ahurip ikaṁ ma**(5v5)**niliḥ, sikəpən ta ya de saṁ panilihan·, srahakna ri saṁ patitihan katəmvaniṁ drvya, ḍampulana Ikaṁ drvya, Apan ta**(5v6)**n (ma)liṁ Ikaṁ maṅkana, maṅkana tekaṁ drvya vinkasakən· mvaṁ drvya pinarcchayakən·, salvirnikaṁ drvya siniliḥ lviranya, [… plate 6 unavailable …] **(7r1)** yan hana doṣanika saṁ **masaṇḍā** deniṁ deśa, luṅhā teka saṁ **masaṇḍā**, gumantyāṅisyana takər turun· teka **ma§(7r2)naṇḍā** yan mākārmmātitiḥ …

'And the descent (i.e., concrete form?) of the grant of the Great King to the merchant guild of Patitihan, while the merchant guild of Patitihan holds all kinds of pawns, is that three years, three months, and three nights [should pass] before [the pawns] be forfeit if [the pawner] does not attentively comply with the interest (*kalāntara*).[100] But the merchant guild at Patitihan should first make an announcement about the pawner, that the pawner is both unwilling to redeem and to furnish interest, [and] then that it will be forfeit, and it will be made known to many people. Moreover, that there is a **(5b)** pawn that has been lost; that gold has been sprinkled over (*vinuvuran*) so that it is similar in appearance (*savṛttya*); that filigree (*karavaṅ*) has been silvered so that it is similar in appearance (*savṛttya*); that a jewel is to be replaced equal to its price (*batavasan*) when they took it as pawn.

And if there is property that results from borrowing anything, it may be pawned by the borrower. It may even be sold, on the grounds of the duration of [holding] property that does not revert from (*de*) the borrower for as long as two years. If the borrower should die, and certainly if he should be killed by the lender, that property should not be confiscated so that the whole principal can be redeemed by the lender. And if the borrower lives, [the property] should be seized by the borrower [and] what is found of the property should be handed over to the Patitihan. The property should be confiscated, for one like that is not a thief. Property left behind and property given in trust are like that: all types of borrowed property will be of its kind.

(7a) If the pawer should be at fault vis-à-vis (*de*) the district (*deśa*), the pawner leaves. The pawnee takes over fulfilling the *takər turun* (tax) when he works as fighter (?, *atitih*).

---

would have formed a set comprising at least ten plates. Alas plate 6 is unavailable.

97. Emend *tigaṁ*.

98. Emend *vinuvuran*.

99. Emend *pvekaṁ*?

100. It results from Timothy Lubin's and my research on the text referred to in n. 95, and from consultation of standard Sanskrit dictionaries, that the entry *kālāntara* in *OJED* is in need of correction. The Sanskrit term *kalāntara* (with *ka*, not *kā*!) means 'interest'. This meaning seems to fit in all of the Old Javanese contexts cited in *OJED* and in those known to me from unpublished sources.

8. Excursus on the dating of the Kancana and Kuti inscriptions

In §6.1, I have presented textual material from the Kancana inscription (no. 4) and assigned to it a 10th-century date. In doing so, I have gone against the current *communis opinio*, because I am persuaded by the arguments offered more than a century ago by Krom (1914, Ep. Aant. VIII) concerning the date of this inscription.[101] Recording a grant by king Śrī Bhuvaneśvara Viṣṇusakalātmakadigvijayaparākramottuṅgadeva Lokapālalāñchana and dated to 782 Śaka, this text contains many elements that would be highly anomalous for a grant issued in the Śaka 700s while they would agree well with what we find in original issues of the Śaka 800s. Krom proposes that the king in question can be identified with the Lokapāla, father of Śrī Makuṭavaṅśavardhana, figuring in Sanskrit stanzas VIII through IX of the Pucangan inscription issued by Airlaṅga in 963 Śaka, and tentatively suggests that the year 782 engraved at the start of the inscription could have been an inversion for 872.

I have trouble understanding why Damais (1955: 26 n. 1) felt confident that he could ignore Krom's general arguments in favor of a date in the 10th century CE while also ignoring the possible link with the Pucangan inscription and opposing, against Krom's more specific hypothesis of inversion 782 for 872, only the observation that "Les données ne sont réductibles qu'en gardant le millésime du texte, soit 782 śaka". Damais wanted the date 782 to be correct because he had decided in an earlier publication (1949: 1–6) to include it as an element in his dossier establishing the existence of a king called Lokapāla in the Śaka 700s.

It is possible to retort that the dating elements which Damais took to confirm the date in 782 Śaka may well have been calculated *a posteriori* for that year, and this is precisely the kind of situation that Amrit Gomperts seems to have had in mind when he wrote (2001: 123):

> Calendar conversion of the Old Javanese calendar is essentially nothing more than a computational check on the consistency of all calender and other *jyotiṣa* elements. Indo-Javanese astrologers were mathematical craftsmen skilled in calculating time. They could easily falsify any day from a remote past into a perfectly consistent date in the Indo-Javanese period (A.D. 700–1500), as, for example, may be the case where the copper plates of Kuṭi are concerned (…).

Somewhat surprisingly, the parallelism between the Kancana case and that of the Kuti inscription, mentioned here by Gomperts, seems never to have played a role in the evaluation of the issue of dating the former, and was indeed not used by Krom himself, because he was convinced that the Kuti inscription

101. See also Krom 1931: 221–222, 224.

is spurious.[102] This idea is still found expressed in recent scholarship,[103] even though Damais himself (1955: 19–20 n. 2) had elaborately and convincingly argued against it. Now the Kuti inscription is a grant of king Śrī Lokapāla Harivaṅśottuṅgadeva bearing the date 762, convertible almost as flawlessly as the 782 date of the Kancana inscription. Despite his demonstration that the date is basically convertible, and despite his arguments against rejecting the inscription as spurious, Damais arbitrarily rejects this king Lokapāla as an anachronism (1949: 6, 1955: 20) while he does not reject the similarly named king in the similarly dated Kancana grant.

A clinching argument in favor of Krom's hypothesis regarding Kancana, and for applying the same reasoning also to the Kuti inscription, comes from the passage where the latter mentions the children of king Lokapāla (lines 2v2–3):

> hana tha vkanira pāduka śrī mahāraja, maṅaran sira cañcu **makuṭa**, sira cañcu maṅgala, sira cañcu **makuṭa**, aṅher iṅ kuṭi kulvan, sira cañcu maṅgala, aṅher iṅ kuṭi vetan
> 'His Majesty the Great King had children, the one with the famous name Makuṭa (and) the one with the famous name Maṅgala. The one with the famous name Makuṭa dwelt in Kuṭi West (and) the one with the famous name Maṅgala dwelt in Kuṭi East.'

In my view, it cannot be a coincidence that stanzas VII–IX of the Pucangan inscription clearly state Airlaṅga's ancestor Makuṭavaṅśavardhana to have been the son of Lokapāla. I therefore propose,

1. to consider that the nearly synonymous titles Śrī Bhuvaneśvara Viṣṇusakalātmakadigvijayaparākramottuṅgadeva Lokapālalāñchana (in the Kancana charter) and Śrī Lokapāla Harivaṅśottuṅgadeva (in the Kuti charter) designated one and the same king;
2. to identify this king and his son Makuṭa with the Lokapāla and his son Makuṭavaṅśavardhana of the Pucangan inscription, which situates these two persons respectively three and two generations before Airlaṅga, and from which we learn that Airlaṅga was sixteen years of age in 939 Śaka, which means that he was born around 923 Śaka;[104]

102. Krom (1914: 478, my emphasis): "Dat andere inscripties van soortgelijken opzet, uitvoerige privileges, enz. geen van allen een zoo vroegen datum dragen — *natuurlijk blijft de door Cohen Stuart uitgegevene van 762, waarvan Brandes overtuigend de onechtheid bewezen heeft, buiten beschouwing* — kan aan het toeval te wijten zijn en behoeft dus geen argument te zijn tegen de vroege dateering. Toch verdient het de opmerking, dat in het algemeen alle bekende oorkonden uit de achtste en nog het begin der negende eeuw een veel eenvoudiger karakter dragen."

103. Gomperts (2001: 116): "The contents of the inscription appear fictitious as the *dramatis personae* never appear in Indo-Javanese history again." I will show below that this point about *dramatis personae* seems to be wrong.

104. See already Sarkar (1971–72, vol. I: 84/91, n. 25), on the name Cañcu Makuṭa: "This name reminds us of Mukuṭavangśavarddhana, the son of king Lokapāla, who is

3. to date the original issues of the Kuti and Kancana inscriptions well into the 10th century CE, i.e., after Śaka 850, and to consider the dates 762 and 782 Śaka engraved on the Majapahit-period reissues as spurious.[105]

It does not seem entirely impossible that the original dates would have been altered only for the century, and were precisely 862 and 882, because nothing precludes the hypothesis that our 10th-century king Lokapāla was sovereign ruler over territory independent of that ruled by his father-in-law Siṇḍok — whose latest inscription (Muncang) is dated to 866 Śaka. But it is perhaps slightly more likely that both inscriptions belong to the Śaka 880s, as does Mpu Mano's.[106]

9. Conclusions

I hope to have shown how important it is to go and seek out Old Javanese inscriptions, whether they are kept in Museums or can be found in the field, because the reliability of the historical data that we extract from any inscription depends on a chain of interpretation that is only as strong as the reliability of every step beginning with our decipherment of the text. Several inscriptions considered lost are waiting to be rediscovered, while some others that have simply not been studied at all are waiting to be documented, read and analyzed.

The rediscovery of the plate that has been the focus of this article has made it possible to act upon Boechari's instigation in the quote with which I started. Rereading the Mpu Mano inscription more than 100 years after Brandes' 19th-century reading of it was published has yielded 19 improvements of

referred to in the so-called Calcutta stone-inscription of Airlangga...". The reading in stanza IX of the Pucangan inscription is actually *-**ma**kuṭa-*, not *-**mu**kuṭa-*.

105. It might be objected that the appearance of the name Dakṣot(t)ama immediately after that of the king in two passages of the Kuti inscription contradicts my proposal, for Dakṣa, as is well known, was first Balituṅ's Minister of Hino and then succeeded Balituṅ to reign during the second decade of the 10th century. The first passage (plate 2v–3r) is *dinulur de rakryan· mahāmantri katriṇi, rakryan· mantri hiṇo, dakṣotama, rakryan· mantri halu, pratipakṣasaṅśāya, rakryan· mantri ṣirikan·, mahāmāhino*, while the second (plate 10r) is *yan· hana vvaṁ lumaṅghāṇani Ajñānira pāduka śrī mahārāja, dharmmodaya, mahāsambhū, mvaṁ mahāmantrī dakṣotama, bāhubajrapratipakṣasaṅśaya*. I think we can safely discard both passages in attempting to date the original issue of the Kuti charter, because the text has quite obviously been distorted in the first passage, parts of Dakṣa's well-known titulature (*mahāmantrī hino pu dakṣottama bāhubajra pratipakṣakṣaya*) being redistributed to supply the names of the three Great Ministers. I assume that an attempt was made at the time of the charter's reissue to rewrite the text in order to create the impression that it has originally been issued by Balituṅ, by a person who was apparently unaware or did not care that the date 762 Śaka would be incomptabible with original issue during Balituṅ's reign.

106. It should be noted that I am assuming the authenticity of the year 888 Śaka engraved on it, although we know that other parts of the date of this inscription are the result of manipulation at the time of reissue. See §4 above.

reading, a small handful among them significant.[107] The result is a text in generally clear Old Javanese, unmarked by most of the errors and confusions that one might be led to expect by reading what our predecessors in Old Javanese epigraphy have written with regard to the fidelity of Majapahit-period reissues of earlier grants, called *tinulad* in the Indonesian-language scholarly literature. We often find such qualifications as "erroneous", "revised" or "confused" applied to such reissues.[108] It seems that at least the present inscription was a particularly faithful copy of its original, for evident anachronisms are found only in the dating formula, and evident errors (which might have occurred in the copying process) are rather few. The photos now available have also allowed me to propose an unsually specific paleographic comparison that confirms Brandes' original suggestion that the reissue would have taken place in the 14th century, during the reign of Hayam Wuruk.

The process of translating even this short text has required reconsideration of the meaning of several headwords in the Old Javanese dictionary, and led me to propose revision of the meanings in more than one case. I have shown that the word *hara-hara* in the inscription is not a toponym and recommended that the inscription be designated henceforward after its main protagonist, Mpu Mano. In attempting to interpret the inscription, the fact that Mpu Mano wished to make merit by donating land to a Buddhist beneficiary has been an important guide, while I have tried to adopt a holistic approach to the problems of interpretation, taking into account both epigraphic and non-epigraphic evidence, including evidence in Sanskrit where it is relevant to the local history of Buddhism.

And this leads me to perhaps the most important implication of this study. The meritorious donation made by Mpu Mano is part of a noticeable spike in patronage of Buddhism in the middle and lower Brantas river in East Java during the second half of the 10th century — already noticed by Krom (1931: 219–221), and recently discussed again by Hadi Sidomulyo (2011: 129) — corresponding to the reign of Siṇḍok and his immediate successors, so Mpu Mano's donation must be regarded in this context. Other epigraphical traces of

107. See above, notes 14, 30, 31 and 32.

108. See Damais 1952: 10 n. 2 for a collection of Dutch qualifications used in the scholarly literature; see also Boechari 2012: 9 ("Kekacauan semacam itu sering kali terjadi apabila kita dihadapkan kepada prasasti *tinulad* yang ditulis beberapa abad sesudah prasasti aslinya"), 75 n. 11 ("tetapi prasasti itu jelas *tinulad*; menurut bentuk hurufnya mungkin sekali dibuat dalam zaman Majapahit, sehingga tidaklah mengherankan apabila di dalam prasasti itu terdapat istilah yang biasa terdapat dalam prasasti-prasasti dari masa yang lebih muda"), 93 n. 43 ("Prasasti itu jelas *tinulad*, sehingga pencampurbauran gelar Siṇḍok dan Dakṣa itu sebenarnya tidak perlu dibicarakan, sebab mungkin sekali si penyalin berhadapan dengan prasasti asli yang sudah sangat usang, dan ia menambahkan saja gelar yang terlintas dalam ingatannya (cf. Damais, 1955b:181, catatan no. 3)". See for further references the index entries '*tinulad*' and 'copy' in Boechari 2012.

this spike have been listed in §6.1 (no. 4) and §6.5. In my §8, I have restored two important inscriptions to their rightful place in this dossier.[109] This epigraphic evidence can in turn be linked with other archaeological evidence of Buddhism in this area in the same period, such as the Muteran hoard and the finds at Candi Gentong (both at Trowulan), or the important hoard of bronze sculptures found in the village Candirejo in Nganjuk regency (where the Hering inscription originates as well);[110] and it can perhaps be linked also with the issue of the dating of some of the Buddhist texts transmitted on Bali, associated (albeit unhistorically) in scholarship with the title *Saṅ Hyaṅ Kamahāyānikan*, for mention is made in rare manuscripts of a "noble guru in Vañjaṅ", a *sīma* "which was an offering to this master (*guruyāga*)" by king Siṇḍok.[111] The *Deśavarṇana* (78.8) lists Vañjaṅ as one of the main Buddhist sanctuaries in Java but the site has to my knowledge not yet been identified. Perhaps a problem that future investigation of the history of Buddhism in this period and area will be able to solve!

10. References

Editions and translations of primary sources

Designations of inscriptions are simplified to conform to the spelling of Indonesian (*Ejaan yang disempurnakan*), so I spell, e.g., Sobhamerta instead of Śobhāmṛta, etc. Inscriptions cited without reference to any edition are quoted from editions that can be identified via Nakada (1982). For inscriptions published since Nakada's time, I refer to the relevant edition. The following editions have been used for citing non-epigraphic primary sources:

Ādiparva	Juynboll 1906
Agastyaparva	Gonda 1933a
Bhīṣmaparva	Gonda 1936
Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa	Gonda 1933b
Deśavarṇana	Pigeaud (1960–63, vol. I)
Kuñjarakarṇa Dharmakathana	Teeuw & Robson 1981
Navaruci	Prijohoetomo 1934
Rāmāyaṇa	Kern 2015
Uttarakāṇḍa	Zoetmulder 2006

109. On the grounds that the foundation is called *kuṭi*, I assume that we are dealing in the case of Kuti with a grant in favor of a Buddhist establishment, although the rest of the inscription is silent as to its religious affiliation. Cf. above, §6.4.

110. On the Muteran hoard and its 10th-century dating, see Lunsingh Scheurleer 2005; on the Buddhist finds at Candi Gentong, see Titi Surti Nastiti 2015; on the Candirejo finds, see Fontein 1990: 231–233.

111. I quote from Hudaya Kandahjaya 2016: 93. This author believes the passage is attested in only one manuscript (kept at Leiden), but I have found it also in a transcript of the lontar IIIB. 246 belonging to the collection of the Kirtya in Singaraja, Bali.

Secondary sources

Acri, Andrea. 2017. *Dharma Pātañjala: A Śaiva Scripture from Ancient Java, Studied in the Light or Related Old Javanese and Sanskrit Texts*. Second Edition. Sata-Piṭaka Series 654. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.

———. 2018. *Dharma Pātañjala: kitab Śaiva dari Jawa zaman kuno, kajian dan perbandingan dengan sumber Jawa Kuno dan Sanskerta terkait*. Translated by Arif Bagus Prasetyo. Naskah dan dokumen Nusantara 36. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia; École française d'Extrême-Orient.

Acri, Andrea, and Arlo Griffiths. 2014. "The Romanisation of Indic Script Used in Ancient Indonesia." *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 170 (2/3): 365–78. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17002005.

Balogh, Dániel, and Arlo Griffiths. 2019. "Transliteration Guide for Members of the DHARMA Project." https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02272407.

Bambang Sumadio, ed. 1990. *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. 4th edition, 6th printing. Vol. II. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Bambang Sumadio, and Endang Sri Hardiati, eds. 2008. *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. Edisi pemutakhiran. Vol. II. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka.

Boechari. 1977. "Epigrafi dan sejarah Indonesia." *Majalah Arkeologi* 1 (2): 1–40.

———. 1985–86. *Prasasti Koleksi Museum Nasional, Jilid I*. Jakarta: Proyek Pengembangan Museum Nasional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

———. 1986. "Perbanditan di dalam Masyarakat Jawa Kuna." In *Pertemuan Ilmiah Arkeologi IV, Cipanas, 3-9 Maret 1986*, IV. Manusia-Lingkungan Hidup-Teknologi, Sosial-Budaya, Konsepsi-Metodologi:159–96. Jakarta: Proyek Penelitian Purbakala / Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

———. 2012. *Melacak sejarah kuno Indonesia lewat prasasti / Tracing ancient Indonesian history through inscriptions*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia (KPG); Departemen Arkeologi, Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya, Universitas Indonesia; École française d'Extrême-Orient.

Brandes, J.L.A. 1913. *Oud-Javaansche oorkonden: nagelaten transcripties*. Edited by N.J. Krom. Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 60 (parts 1 and 2). Batavia; 's-Hage: Albrecht; Nijhoff. https://archive.org/details/verhandelingenv601913bata.

Casparis, J.G. de. 1978. *Indonesian Chronology*. Vol. 1. Handbuch der Orientalistik. 3. Abt., Indonesien, Malaysia und die Philippinen 1. Leiden: Brill.

Damais, Louis-Charles. 1949. "Epigrafische aanteekeningen." *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 82: 1–26.

———. 1950. "Les formes de politesse en Javanais moderne." *Bulletin de la Société des études indochinoises* 25 (1): 265–80.

———. 1955. "Etudes d'épigraphie indonésienne, IV: Discussion de la date des inscriptions." *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient* 47 (1): 7–290.

Eade, J.C., and Lars Gislén. 2000. *Early Javanese Inscriptions: A New Dating Method*. Handbuch der Orientalistik. 3. Abt., Südostasien 10. Leiden: Brill.

Edgerton, Franklin. 1953. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. 2 vols. William Dwight Whitney Linguistic Series. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Edi Sedyawati. 1994. *Gaṇeśa Statuary of the Kaḍiri and Siṇhasāri Periods: A Study of Art History*. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 160. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Fontein, Jan. 1990. *The Sculpture of Indonesia*. Washington: National Gallery of Art; Abrams.

Gomperts, Amrit. 2001. "Sanskrit Jyotiṣa Terms and Indian Astronomy in Old Javanese Inscriptions." In *Fruits of Inspiration: Studies in Honour of Prof. J.G. de Casparis, Retired Professor of the Early History and Archeology of South and Southeast Asia at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, on the Occasion of His 85th Birthday*, edited

by M.J. Klokke and K.R. van Kooij, 93–133. Gonda Indological Studies 11. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.

Gonda, Jan. 1933a. "Agastyaparwa, een oud-javaansch proza-geschrift." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 90: 329–419. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90001420.

———. 1933b. *Het Oud-Javaansche Brahmāṇḍa-Purāṇa: proza-tekst en kakawin*. Bibliotheca Javanica 5. Bandoeng: Nix.

———. 1936. *Het oudjavaansche Bhīṣmaparwa*. Bibliotheca Javanica 7. Bandoeng: A.C. Nix & Co.

———. 1973. *Sanskrit in Indonesia*. 2nd edition. Śata-Piṭaka Series 99. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture. (1st edition 1952.)

Griffiths, Arlo. 2014. "Inscriptions of Sumatra, III: The Padang Lawas Corpus Studied along with Inscriptions from Sorik Merapi (North Sumatra) and from Muara Takus (Riau)." In *History of Padang Lawas, North Sumatra, II: Societies of Padang Lawas (Mid-Ninth – Thirteenth Century CE)*, edited by Daniel Perret, 211–53. Cahier d'Archipel 43. Paris: Association Archipel.

Gunawardana, R.A.L.H. 1979. *Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka*. Monographs of the Association for Asian Studies 35. Tucson: published for the Association for Asian Studies by The University of Arizona Press.

Hadi Sidomulyo. 2007. *Napak tilas perjalanan Mpu Prapañca*. Jakarta: Wedatama Widya Sastra bekerja sama dengan Yayasan Nandiswara Jurusan Pendidikan Sejarah Unesa.

———. 2010. "From Kuṭa Rāja to Singhasāri: Towards a Revision of the Dynastic History of 13th Century Java." *Archipel* 80: 77–138. https://doi.org/10.3406/arch.2010.4177.

———. 2018. "Notes on the Topography of Ancient Java: Identifying Four *Sīma* Territories from the Majapahit Period." In *Writing for Eternity: A Survey of Epigraphy in Southeast Asia*, edited by Daniel Perret, 223–41. Études Thématiques 30. Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient.

Hinüber, Oskar von. 2013. "Behind the Scenes: The Struggle of Political Groups for Influence as Reflected in Inscriptions." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 56 (3–4): 365–79. https://doi.org/10.1163/15728536-13560304.

Hoogervorst, Tom. 2017. "Lexical Influence from North India to Maritime Southeast Asia: Some New Directions." *Man in India* 97 (1): 293–334.

Hudaya Kandahjaya. 2016. "*Saṅ Hyaṅ Kamahāyānikan*, Borobudur, and the Origins of Esoteric Buddhism in Indonesia." In *Esoteric Buddhism in Mediaeval Maritime Asia: Networks of Masters, Texts, Icons*, edited by Andrea Acri, 67–112. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Issatriadi. 1975. *Laporan Sementara Penemuan Tiga Buah Prasasti di Daerah Ukir Negara Blitar*. Surabaya: Museum Mpu Tantular.

Juynboll, H.H. 1906. *Âdiparwa: Oudjavaansch prozageschrift*. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff.

Kern, Hendrik. 1908. "Een Oudjavaansche oorkonde gevonden op de helling van den Kawi." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 60: 45–51. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90001908.

———. 1911. "Mededeeling in de Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen op 9 September 1907 over recht van privaateigendom op den grond op Java in de Middeleeuwen." In *Adatrechtbundel I, bezorgd door de commissie voor het adatrecht, uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 198–200. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff.

———. 1917a. "Over eene Oudjavaansche oorkonde (gevonden te Gĕḍangan, Surabaya) van Çaka 782 (of 872)." In *Verspreide Geschriften*, 7:17–53. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff.

———. 1917b. "Een Oudjavaansche oorkonde gevonden op de helling van den Kawi (oost-Java; ±850 Çāka)." In *Verspreide geschriften*, 7:176–85. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff.

———. 2015. *Rāmāyaṇa: The Story of Rāma and Sītā in Old Javanese*. Edited by Willem van der Molen. Javanese Studies 1. Tōkyō: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Krom, N.J. 1914. "Epigraphische aantekeningen, VIII: De dateering der oorkonde van Kancana, IX: De inscriptie van Prapancasarapura." *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 56: 477–89.

———. 1931. *Hindoe-Javaansche geschiedenis*. Tweede, Herziene druk. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff.

Lokesh Chandra. 1995. "Saṅ Hyaṅ Kamahāyānikan." In *Cultural Horizons of India, Vol. 4*, 295–434. Śata-Piṭaka Series 381. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.

Lunsingh Scheurleer, Pauline. 2005. "The Finds from Muteran and Wonoboyo." In *Indonesia: The Discovery of the Past*, edited by Endang Sri Hardiati and Pieter ter Keurs, 52–67. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.

Machi Suhadi, and Richadiana Kartakusuma. 1996. *Laporan Penelitian Epigrafi di Wilayah Provinsi Jawa Timur*. Berita Penelitian Arkeologi 47. Jakarta: Proyek Penelitian Arkeologi Jakarta, Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

Molen, Willem van der. 1983. *Javaanse tekstkritiek: een overzicht en een nieuwe benadering geïllustreerd aan de Kuṇjarakarna*. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 102. Dordrecht: Foris.

Nakada, Kōzō. 1982. *An Inventory of the Dated Inscriptions in Java*. Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 40. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko.

Nolot, Édith. 1991. *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes: le* Bhikṣuṇīvinaya *de l'école Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin — Traduction annotée, commentaire, collation du manuscrit*. Publications de l'Institut de civilisation indienne 60. Paris: Collège de France; Édition-diffusion de Boccard.

Perret, Daniel, Machi Suhadi, and Richadiana Kartakusuma. 2003–04. "Le programme franco-indonésien d'inventaire des inscriptions « classiques » du monde malais." *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* 90–91: 473–74. https://doi.org/10.3406/befeo.2003.3621.

Pigeaud, Th.G.Th. 1960–63. *Java in the 14th Century: A Study in Cultural History. The Nāgara-Kĕrtāgama by Rakawi, Prapañca of Majapahit, 1365 A.D.* 5 vols. Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Translation Series 4. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Prijohoetomo. 1934. *Nawaruci: inleiding, Middel-javaansche prozatekst, vertaling vergeleken met de Bimasoetji in Oud-javaansch metrum*. Groningen: Wolters. https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB05:000034071:pdf.

Robson, Stuart. 1995. *Deśawarṇana (Nāgarakṛtāgama)*. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 169. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Sarkar, Himansu Bhusan. 1971–72. *Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java (Corpus Inscriptionum Javanicarum), up to 928 A. D.* 2 vols. Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay.

Schopen, Gregory. 2001. "Dead Monks and Bad Debts: Some Provisions of a Buddhist Monastic Inheritance Law." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 44 (2): 99–148.

Stein Callenfels, P.V. van. 1924. "Stukken betrekking hebbend op Oud-javaansche opschriften in de Bibliothèque Nationale te Parijs." *Oudheidkundig Verslag*, Bijlage B: 23–27.

———. 1929. "Bijdragen tot de topographie van Java in de Middeleeuwen." In *Feestbundel uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen bij gelegenheid van zijn 150 jarig bestaan, 1778–1928*, 2:370–92. Weltevreden: G. Kolff.

Stutterheim, W.F. 1925. "Transscriptie van twee jayapattra's." *Oudheidkundig Verslag*, Bijlage D: 57–60.

Teeuw, A., and S.O. Robson. 1981. *Kuñjarakarṇa Dharmakathana: An Old Javanese Poem*. Bibliotheca Indonesica 21. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Titi Surti Nastiti. 2007. *Prasasti Sobhāmṛta*. Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Arkeologi Nasional, Badan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, Departemen Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata.

———. 2015. "Miniature Stūpas and a Buddhist Sealing from Candi Gentong, Trowulan, Mojokerto, East Java." In *Buddhist Dynamics in Premodern and Early Modern Southeast Asia*, edited by D. Christian Lammerts, 120–37. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Wibowo, A.S. 1979. "Prasasti Ālasantan tahun 861 Śaka." *Majalah Arkeologi (diterbitkan oleh Lembaga Arkeologi FSUI)* 2 (3): 3–51.

Wisseman Christie, Jan. 2009. "Preliminary Notes on Debt and Credit in Early Island Southeast Asia." In *Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860-1930: From Peonage to Pawnshop, from Kongsi to Cooperative*, edited by David Henley and Peter Boomgaard, 41–60. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Zoetmulder, P.J. 1950. *De taal van het Adiparwa: een grammaticale studie van het Oudjavaans*. Reprint 1983. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.

———. 1982. *Old Javanese-English Dictionary*. 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff.

———. 2006. *Uttarakāṇḍa: teks Jawa kuna*. Bibliotheca purbajavanica 2. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Universitas Sanata Dharma.

Zoetmulder, P.J., and I.R. Poedjawijatna. 1992. *Bahasa parwa: tatabahasa Jawa kuna*. 2 vols. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press.

Merle C. Ricklefs[1]

Music and Dance Go to War in Java

The kingdoms of pre-colonial Java were martial states. Much of the organisation and principles upon which those states rested was designed for war or the threat of war. These were also states where cultural activities flourished, at least in good times. Javanese culture, from pre-Islamic through to Islamic times, has been notable for its wonderful works of literature, multiple forms of *wayang* theatre, music and dance. These were all performance arts. Even literature – not normally thought of as performance art in Western cultures – was not read in silence but sung aloud to a range of poetic metres (*pupuh*).

Performance was central to Javanese arts, and so was war.[2] Readers familiar with Javanese literature or the *wayang* theatre will know the part played by martial skills and the bloody accounts of battle there. They may not, however, be as familiar with the role music and dance played in the real world of Javanese warfare. Here we are to some extent talking about what, in Western military history, is called drill. This is conventionally thought of as the great innovation of the Netherlands' Prince Maurits van Nassau (1567-

1. Merle C. Ricklefs was Professor Emeritus, the Australian National University and Monash University. He passed away on December 29, 2019.

2. I hope that no reader will imagine that this comment is in agreement with Clifford Geertz's historically unfounded, implicitly tautologous and absurd idea of the "theatre state": that pre-colonial Javanese and Balinese states rested on ceremonies and display which were in themselves "what the state was for". I am not the only one to have rejected this idea, but readers interested in my views could look at my long-ago review of Geertz's *Nagara* in the *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14:1 (March 1983), pp. 184-5.

1625), frequently regarded as the greatest European soldier of his age. This constituted professionalisation of warfare which could turn a group of fighters into an effective, unified fighting machine responsive to standardised orders. The pioneering military historian Hans Delbrück said of this, "The decisive point is externally exercising, inwardly discipline."[3] As we shall see from the Javanese sources cited below, the Javanese were prepared to learn whatever European-style drill had to offer. But they also had their own indigenous traditions in this regard. What Europeans called drill, Javanese called dance.

We may note *en passant* that there is a Javanese word *drel,* which also appears as *ĕdrel, ngĕdrel,* etc. The original 1847 edition of the Gericke and Roorda Javanese-Dutch dictionary defined *drel* as "firing continuously in unison with small arms" which is correct. But Gericke and Roorda added etymological speculation that this was "a corruption of Dutch *drillen*"[4] which, like English "drill", can mean, *inter alia,* to drill in the sense of to exercise, as in military drill. In the later 1901 edition, Vreede and Gunning added more speculation, offering two possible etymologies for this word, neither supported by evidence. One was again that it could come from Dutch *drillen*. The second is that it is onomatopoeic in origin.[5] I believe that the second guess was probably correct. The word appears regularly in the sense of firing a salvo.[6] We find this used, for example, when honorary salutes were fired with cannon or infantry weapons, along with *gamĕlan* and other sounds, in celebration of royal or aristocratic weddings, at the great annual court *garĕbĕg* observances, at receptions of distinguished visitors, and so on. I can recall – and can find – no cases where Javanese *drel* means what Dutch *drillen* or English "drill" mean. It must be an onomatopoeic word for the sound of weapons being fired in salvos.

Our earliest surviving source with regard to the use of drill in the sense of training for Javanese soldiers that is known to me is the manuscript *Babad ing Sangkala.* This is a chronogram chronicle, that is to say, a brief account of events which are dated with chronograms (*sangkala/sĕngkala*). The

3. Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* (7 vols. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke, 1900-36), vol. 4, p. 181.

4. J.F.C. Gericke, and T. Roorda, *Javaansch-Nederduitsch woordenboek* (Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1847), p. 234.

5. J.F.C. Gericke and T. Roorda, *Javaansch-Nederlandsch handwoordenboek* (Revised ed.; ed. A.C. Vreede and J.G.H. Gunning; 2 vols; Amsterdam: Johannes Müller; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1901), vol. I, p. 573.

6. There are multiple examples in the Javanese newspaper *Bramartani/Jurumartani.* E.g. see the issues of 18 January 1866, 24 March and 31 March 1870; which can be consulted at http://lampje.leidenuniv.nl/KITLV-docs/open/TS/Bramartani/bramartani.html. There have been some problems with this URL in the past; in such a case, one must search for the database by turning to http://catalogue.leidenuniv.nl and searching for 'Bramartanie Javaansch dagblad'.

manuscript was written in the court of Kartasura in November 1736.[7] Here we find the statement that towards the end of the First Javanese War of Succession (1704-8), during the dry season, i.e. in mid-1707, the Javanese troops "were drilled (*ingĕmbat-ĕmbat*) by Dutchmen".[8] So the Javanese side was evidently prepared to incorporate European training and discipline techniques if they were useful, just as they enthusiastically adopted new European infantry weapons which were useful, notably the early snaphance muskets known in Dutch as *snaphaan* (the origin of the modern Indonesian word *senapan* for rifle), pre-packaged paper cartridges, and the bayonet. But they kept their indigenous weapons as well (e.g. *krisses,* lances, bows and arrows) and had nothing to learn from the Europeans about artillery or fortification construction.[9] In the matter of drill, the situation seems to have been comparable: if the Europeans had a useful idea it would be adopted but the Javanese also had their own traditions of training and unison manoeuvring of military cohorts.

During that same war, the Dutch East India Company's Madurese ally prince Cakraningrat II (r. 1680–1707) was drilling his troops in preparation for battle, according to the later 18th-century text *Babad Kraton,* but there is no indication that this was anything other than established indigenous-style training. The text describes the grand uniforms of the various professional troop companies and the officers' fine outfits, and records that "the order of the Madurese folk/ was as in the past, when at war":

> Every day there was training by him (the prince)
> on the *alun-alun* (the great square before the palace).
> Making a great commotion was the swordplay.
> There were those who fired and were fired upon,
> others practised with short lances (*lĕmbing*)
> and there were those (training with) blowguns (*tulup*).
> A thousand Saragĕni [a troop company]
> were trained to fire in unison.[10]

In the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719-23), the Dutch reported that rebel princes were drilling troops in what appeared to them to be the European fashion, "having their military keep watch and march according

7. British Library MS Jav. 36 (B). Romanised edition, translation and historical commentary are in M. C. Ricklefs (ed. & transl.), *Modern Javanese historical tradition: A study of an original Kartasura chronicle and related materials*. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1978. See further details at the end of this paper.

8. *Babad ing Sangkala,* f. 357v. (III:38); Ricklefs, *Mod.Jav.Hist.Trad.,* pp. 108-9.

9. This is a theme in my book *War, culture and economy in Java, 1677-1726: Asian and European imperialism in the early Kartasura period* (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1993); see especially chapter 8.

10. *Babad Kraton,* ff. 522r.-523r. Published edition vol. ii, p.202. See details at the end of this paper.

to strokes of the clock and beats of the drum in the European way".[11] But it is doubtful that the Javanese or Madurese needed Europeans to teach them such practices. The quote above from *Babad Kraton* indicates that there were indigenous ways of drilling soldiers. Europeans, like the Madurese of *Babad Kraton,* drilled their soldiers in handling sabres, but we may be confident they did not do so with regard to blowguns, a weapon not in use in European armies. And while the VOC certainly drilled using drums and kept watches according to the clock, so far as I am aware its European detachments did not employ music in battle in the way set out in the sources to which we now turn. The evidence that follows supports the view that military training and combat were rooted firmly in Javanese artistic practices, and vice-versa.

Leiden *cod. Or.* 4097 is a manuscript which is closely related to the text of *Babad ing Sangkala.* Whereas the events recorded in *Babad ing Sangkala* end in 1720-1, LOr 4097 continues into the late 1740s, the early stage of the Third Javanese War of Succession (1746-57).[12] In this text we find a description of an episode in the reign of Pakubuwana II (r. 1726-49) which is significant for our topic here, for here we see what seems to be military drill as dance performance.

> In the month of Sura [AJ 1655 / 17 July-15 August 1730], His Majesty took pleasure dancing in the Sri Manganti[13] (with) the Kapĕdhaks[14] and officials, dancing with lances, shields and pike stocks.[15]

It is possible to dance without music, but we may reasonably assume that the king and his close officers took their pleasures, rehearsing jointly formalised movements with these weapons, to the sound of the *gamĕlan* orchestra. Following examples will strengthen that assumption.

We now turn to the most informative sources that survive, two remarkable and large chronicles describing the period of the Third Javanese War of Succession in extraordinarily informative detail. One is the autobiographical *babad* composed by the flamboyant prince Mangkunagara I (1726-95), whose life is the subject of my book *Soul Catcher: Java's fiery prince Mangkunagara*

11. Batavia to Heren XVII, 26 March 1720, in W. Ph Coolhaas *et al.* (eds), *General missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (13 vols; 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff; Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1960-2007) vol. vii, p. 475. This series is also available at http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/generalemissiven/#page=0&accessor=toc&source=1&view=.

12. LOr 4097 is discussed at greater length in my *Mod.Jav.Hist.Trad.,* pp. 245-9. See details at the end of this paper.

13. A part of the court.

14. A class of court servants, in this period evidently young men serving as lifeguards of the king.

15. LOr 4097, p. 63. The text refers to *bĕksa jĕbĕng tameng landheyan.* There is room for some minor discussion about how these terms relate to each other.

I, 1726-95.[16] His chronicle bears the title *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran* and is the earliest autobiography in Javanese so far known. The copy available to us was begun on 17 August 1779, on the prince's 55th birthday in the Javanese calendar, and is 418 ff. long. The other work is *Babad Giyanti*, one of the finest of all Javanese chronicles, which also covers the period of the Third Javanese War of Succession. Its composition is conventionally ascribed to the Surakarta poet Yasadipura I (1729-1803), although there is no unequivocal confirmation of that. It is published in 21 small volumes (over 1500 pp.).[17]

We will look at some of the more informative passages from these two chronicles.

Mangkunagara I was, throughout his life, both a devotee of Javanese arts and a warrior to the tips of his fingers. (He was also, as I note in my biography of this extraordinary man, a great lover of beautiful women and much attached to *jenever,* "Dutch gin".) Regarding the early years of his rebellion, c. 1745, we read his autobiographical account of how, as he marched, the *gamĕlan* Cara Balen (Balinese Style) was taken along.[18] When he established a rebel palace in the forest shortly thereafter, he enjoyed drinking, feasting, performance of the stately and sacred *bĕdhaya* dance, dancing girls and *wayang* theatre performances. War dances in the classical Javanese dance style were frequently performed (*tatayungan*) by the Madurese soldiers who at that stage supported him.[19] Later, in 1747, when Mangkunagara was in alliance with his uncle Mangkubumi, the senior rebel, we also read of their soldiers "marching in battle order, beautiful with their *gamĕlan*".[20]

In 1749, Mangkubumi ordered his lords to "teach war on the *alun-alun*" (the great square before his rebel headquarters). This was a war game, with some of the soldiers, commanded by Mangkunagara, acting as Dutch East India Company (VOC) forces. Cavalry (reportedly 4000-strong on one side, nearly 7500 on the other), infantry (reportedly 33,000) and 56 pieces of large and small artillery engaged. As did musical instruments: *kĕndhang* (hand-struck drums), the great *gong*s, *bĕndhe* and *beri* war-gongs are mentioned, along with European-style trumpets and the *gamĕlan*s known as Kodhok Ngorek (Croaking Frog) and Cara Balen playing while artillery roared. One can imagine the spectacle and the cacophony, said to be like "a collapsing mountain".[21]

16. Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press; Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2018.

17. Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1937-9. Also published at http://www.sastra.org/kisah-cerita-dan-kronikal/70-babad-giyanti. The history of the original MS (the only complete copy of which, in 2338 pp., is held in Perpustakaan Nasional Indonesia) is set out in Ricklefs, *Soul Catcher,* pp. 351-3.

18. *SBPn* f. 74v.

19. *SBPn* f. 81v.

20. *SBPn* f. 139r.

21. *BG* vol. v, pp. 49-52. See also *BG* vol. xii, p. 79. For musical terms used in this

Mangkunagara also described the way in which dance was drill. In early 1751 he was exercising his soldiers with bows and arrows, parrying with pikes and "set to fight with lances, dancing (*běběksan*) in turns."[22]

As in the case cited above of Pakubuwana II doing martial dances with his soldiers, in *Babad Giyanti* we also find such an occasion. Ca. late 1752, Mangkubumi – then still the rebel king – took his pleasure with "the *bědhaya* dance and the soldiery dancing".[23] Similarly, on the occasion of the meeting between Pakubuwana III and the newly minted Sultan Mangkubumi in 1755, after senior appointments to the new Sultanate had been made, "the *tumĕnggung*s all performed the lance-dance (*běksa jěběng*)" along with other entertainments.[24]

Music and dance played roles not only in drill and war games, but also on campaign. In 1750, Cakraningrat II was advised that Mangkubumi was rich in both his soldiers and his music. It was reported that he had 30,000 cavalrymen and over a thousand banners (companies) of infantry and that his commanders took with them many *gamĕlan* orchestras in the styles of Kodhok Ngorek, Cara Balen and Gala Ganjur.[25] In early 1750, Mangkubumi's soldiers prepared for battle the following morning, "along with the *gamĕlan* being played while the soldiers danced (*tatayungan*)."[26]

When battles commenced, the advancing soldiers were often described as being accompanied by the sounds of drums (*tambur, kĕndhang*), great *gong*s and the *bĕndhe* and *beri* war-gongs, as in the war game mentioned above, as well as *saruni* (shawm).[27] *Gamĕlan* played as well.[28] In 1751, Mangkunagara's army marched towards battle with the VOC, "the *gamĕlan* Cara Balen taken along to battle".[29]

Mangkunagara's autobiographical account of the battle that followed is evocative:

> Dark was the smoke from the black gunpowder,
> the musket-shot raining down.
> The light and heavy cannon fired together,
> their sound like a volcanic eruption.

---

paper, consult J. Kunst, *Music in Java: Its history, its theory and its techniques* (3rd ed; ed. E. L. Heins; 2 vols; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

22. *SBPn* f. 251r.

23. *BG* vol. xiii, p. 8. There might be some disagreement with my translation; the text reads *akasukan wau sri bupati, bĕbĕdhayan prajurit tayungan.* Multiple other such references are to be found in the *babad*s.

24. *BG* vol. xvii, p. 70.

25. *BG* vol. viii, p. 28.

26. *SBPn* f. 204v.

27. E.g. *BG* vol. viii, pp. 61, 68, 76; vol. x, pp. 14-15, 30; vol. xvii, p. 8.

28. *BG* vol. viii, p. 74.

29. *SBPn* f. 239v.

The heavens were all darkness
and the earth shook.
Ever more was the battle as if the very sky was roaring,
as if the heavens were collapsing.
The drums, *běndhe* and *beri* gongs,
the (*gamělan*) Cara Balen echoing,
and like rain was the falling musket-shot.
The soldiers who died
toppled from their horses.
Many there were who were wounded,
many who died,
the dust of the earth spattered with blood.[30]

The playing of music during battle probably goes back to pre-Islamic times in Java. In the Old Javanese classic *Bhāratayuddha* by Mpu Seḍah and Mpu Panuluh, written in AD 1057, we find battle scenes with superhuman actors, magical weapons, and unbelievable numbers of fighters. In these imaginary battles, we also read of gongs, cymbals, horns, booming drums, percussion instruments, trumpets and sounding conches which accompany marching armies and battle scenes. The text says that those musicians as well as bearers of banners were to be regarded as immune from attack.[31] In the Old Javanese *Sumanasāntaka* by the 13th-century Kediri poet Mpu Monaguṇa, we also find extravagantly imagined combat scenes, with supernatural weapons, millions of troops and divine beings. We also read there about gongs, drums and cymbals being played during the fighting.[32] Other such examples can be found in Old Javanese *kakawin* texts.

Returning to the real world of battle, we may ask how were these *gamělan* ensembles, with their several performers and instruments, taken to war? The sources known to me do not answer this question for us. In principle, there seem to me to have been three possibilities. (1) The instruments could have been slung between poles (*pikul*) over men's shoulders and carried thus to their assigned locations for the battle, as one may see them carried today. (2) The instruments and performers were possibly transported there in ox-drawn carts (*grobag*). (3) Or, the instruments were mounted on horseback. To speculate among these three, we must have regard to the circumstances of battle. We should recall General Helmuth von Moltke's famous dictum that no battle plan can with any certainty extend beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main force.

30. *SBPn* f. 240v.

31. S. Supomo, (ed. and transl.), *Bhāratayuddha: An old Javanese poem and its Indian sources* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan, 1993), pp. 178-9, 214, 234-5, 237.

32. Peter Worsley, S. Supomo, Thomas M. Hunter and Margaret Fletcher (eds, transls and annotaters), *Mpu Monaguṇa's* Sumanasāntaka: *An Old Javanese epic poem, its Indian source and Balinese illustrations* (Bibliotheca Indonesica vol. 36; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), pp. 365, 375, 387. My thanks to Peter Worsley for reminding me of these references.

Once battle commenced, the disposition of forces, the directions of attack or retreat, whose orders were to be followed and the thousand-and-one other circumstances of battle could transform rapidly. The *gamĕlan* orchestra might find itself too far in the rear of an advance to be heard, or its location might suddenly change from a relatively protected venue to the path of a cavalry charge, a pell-mell infantry retreat, a target of cannon barrage, and so on. I therefore presume that such orchestras must be able to be positioned not only for battle but also for rapid relocation. Men transporting musical instruments on *pikul*s over their shoulders or oxen pulling carts would probably be too slow. Furthermore, wheeled vehicles were poorly suited to active battle fields, which might be broken up by uneven ground, ditches and cannon-ball craters and littered with the bodies of dead and wounded soldiers and animals. I therefore think that (3) above, mounting the instruments on horseback, was probably the preferred way to transport the *gamĕlan* ensembles.

In using horse-mounted *gamĕlan* on the battlefield, Javanese armies would have shared a widely spread military tradition, one particularly familiar in the Islamic world. Deploying music in war is known from very early times, particularly from Middle Eastern states. There are documents recording this at least by the time of Alexander the Great. Firdawsi's *Shah-nama* of the 11th century describes Persian martial ensembles including horns, trumpets, reed-pipes, drums, bells, sonettes and cymbals. The Umayyads and 'Abbasids (7th-13th centuries) are recorded as using "mounted drums", kettledrums mounted in pairs on either side of a horse's or camel's neck. In the time of the Ottoman Sultan Othman I (d. 1324), large kettledrums were sometimes carried by elephants. The Ottoman *mehter* ensemble – consisting of shawms, trumpets, double-headed drums (*ṭabl*), kettle drums (*kös)* and metallic percussion instruments – "played continuously during battle" from a position near the battle standard. Feldman writes that "during campaigns or processions, the musicians were mounted on horses or camels; the *kös* was taken on a camel or an elephant".[33] European martial music from the Middle Ages onwards borrowed from these Islamic cultures. Crusaders adopted the practice of mounted military bands performing in the midst of battle from their Arab enemies, Bruce Gleason writes. While trumpeters and kettle drummers were widely found, so also were "other brass instruments, as well as woodwinds and sometimes even bagpipes".[34]

33. W. Feldman, "Mehter", in H.A.R. Gibb, P. Bearman *et al.* (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New* [2nd] *Edition* (13 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1986-2009), vol. vi, pp. 1007-8; H. G. Farmer, "Ṭabl-Khāna", in *ibid.,* vol. x, pp. 34-8.

34. Bruce P. Gleason, "Arms and men: Mounted musicians in battle and on parade", *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History,* vol. 17 no. 2 (Winter 2005), pp. 80-3; Gleason has published a fuller discussion in "Cavalry and court trumpeters and kettledrummers from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century", *The Galpin Society Journal,* vol.62 (April 2009), pp. 31-54, 208. He observes there that in artillery units,

Dance also played a part in the conduct of battle itself, providing a form of discipline which was rooted in the dance-drill in which the soldiers were trained. Ca. May 1745, Mangkunagara went into battle with Madurese allies against VOC forces. The Madurese "all danced (*tayungan*) in unison, their pikes near, dragged along the ground as they advanced" towards Company fire.[35] In 1748, in an engagement with the Company's troops, Mangkubumi's infantry again advanced "dancing (*tayungan*) and shouting".[36]

Thus it was that in pre-colonial Java, music and dance accompanied the celebrations and joys of life. They also accompanied bloodshed and death on the field of battle, echoing across the blood-spattered ground.[37]

Manuscripts cited

- British Library Jav. 36 (B), *Babad ing Sangkala.* Written in the court of Kartasura in November 1738. Romanised edition, translation and historical commentary are published in M. C. Ricklefs (ed. & transl.), *Modern Javanese historical tradition: A study of an original Kartasura chronicle and related materials* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1978). The *Babad ing Sangkala* text occupies ff. 349v.-373v. of the MS, which is available digitally at http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=mss_jav_36_fs001r
- British Library Add. MS 12318, *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*. Mangkunagara I's autobiographical account of his years in rebellion, in a copy dated September 1779. 418 ff.
- British Library Add. MS 12320, *Babad Kraton.* Written in Yogyakarta in AJ 1703–4 (1777–78 CE) by R. Tg. Jayengrat. Available in digitised form at http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=add_ms_12320_fs001r. The published edition referred to is the transliteration in I.W. Pantja Sunjata, Ignatius Supriyanto and J.J. Ras (ed. and translit.), *Babad Kraton*, 2 vols. [Jakarta:] Djambatan, 1992.
- Leiden *cod. Or.* 4097. This seems to be a later version of the *Babad ing Sangkala* textual family which was acquired by a European sometime in or after 1760. The text is turned from verse to prose, but inexpertly such that some passages are still readily recognisable as verse despite being written on the page as if prose. The manuscript is discussed in detail in Ricklefs, *Mod.Jav.Hist.Trad.,* pp. 245-9.

Abbreviations

BG *Babad Giyanti*
SBPn *Sĕrat Babad Pakunĕgaran*

---

kettledrums could be transported in wheeled chariots (just as the guns were transported on wheeled limbers) rather than on horseback, but I do not picture that being done in the midst of battle.

35. *SBPn* f. 78v.

36. *SBPn* f. 166r.

37. Readers may be interested also in the discussion of 19th century and later musical developments in Sumarsam, 'Past and present issues of Javanese-European musical hybridity: *Gendhing Mares* and other hybrid genres', pp. 87-107 in Bart Barendregt and Els Bogaerts (eds.), *Recollecting resonances: Indonesian-Dutch musical encounters* (*Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* vol. 288; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014). My thanks to Ben Arps for bringing this to my attention.

G. Roger Knight[1]

An 'Indies' Couple: Colonial Communities and Issues Surrounding Identity in the Dutch East Indies, ca. 1890-1930s

In the early 1900s, the Dutch writer Cornelia Margaretha Vissering (1859-1942)[2] paid a lengthy visit to her brother and his family in Batavia, the capital of the erstwhile Dutch East Indies. As an author whose travel writings had been appearing in various magazines since around the turn of the century, Vissering evidently wanted to see more of the Indies than Batavia and its immediate environs and in September 1907 she and her female travelling companion found themselves in the East Java hill station of Sukapura in the mountain range that contained the highest of Java's many volcanoes. It was at Sukapura that she paid a call one evening on a woman, her children and their governess, who were staying in a villa nearby the one in which she was lodged. She included a brief account of the visit in her subsequently published narrative of *A Journey through East Java* (1912) from which, although she is not named, it is possible to identify the woman concerned as Johanna Elizabeth Bezoet de Bie (1874-1957), wife of the *administrateur* or general manager of a sugar factory down on the plain. [3] The 'campaign' or manufacturing season had not

1. Visiting Research Fellow, Department of History/School of Humanities, University of Adelaide, South Australia 5005. Email: roger.knight@adelaide.edu.au.

2. Vissering was born in the Dutch university town of Leiden, where her father Simon Vissering (1818-1888) was a former university professor whose career also embraced journalism and a period as Minister of Finance in The Hague. She was the elder sister of Gerard Vissering (1865-1937), who had qualified as a lawyer before taking up a career in banking. She disembarked in Batavia in March 1907 and sailed back to Europe in April 1908.

3. C. M Vissering, *Een Reis door Oost-Java*, Haarlem, Boon, 1912: 78 (its publication

yet ended there, so that while his family had been able to retreat to the cool of the hills, her absent husband would have had to remain at his post.

Her host that evening, Vissering told her readers, was a creole – that is say, colonial-born – woman, and since (as she remarked) women of this ilk were often disparaged in the Netherlands, she was at pains to set the record straight: 'surrounded by her children, [she] received us with that certain easy friendliness which is characteristic of the refined class [to which she belonged], her personality distinguished by/expressed through [*munt uit door*] the particular beauty of her countenance, her stateliness of posture, the elegance of her dress and her good manners.' Nonetheless, the woman concerned might have been less impressed by Vissering's apparent assumption that she was not only colonial-born but also of mixed ethnicity: in describing the family's governess – a blond English woman – she drew an explicit contrast between her and the 'darker' complexion of her employer and 'the dark eyes and almost jet-black hair' of her offspring'.[4] In fact, in a reversal of the more usual situation among the colonial Dutch, while she herself laid claim to be a 'full-blood' European (as colonial terminology would have it), it was Bezoet de Bie's *husband,* Alexander MacNeill (1871-1937), who was Eurasian: an individual of part-Scots ancestry who had been christened in tribute to his Highlander grandfather.

Taking its cue from the implications of Vissering's vignette of early twentieth century colonial life, the discussion that follows concerns the way in which that Scottish heritage was refracted through the lens of what the Dutch invariably referred to as 'the Indies'. The paper begins with a brief reconstruction of the background of the married couple concerned and their life at a factory near the East Java town of Probolinggo around the turn of the twentieth century. It continues by elaborating on aspects of creole community life in the Indies, and in particular on the characteristic pervasiveness of regular family formation and sociability: 'Being Dutch in the Indies'[5] – and on the key island of Java in particular – was very much at odds with the transient expatriate-ness often associated, however problematically, with European 'sojourner colonialism' elsewhere in Asia. The argument turns, however, on the extent to which the couple sought to differentiate – even distance – themselves from an archetypical *Indisch* environment. Literally 'of the Indies' and redolent

had been preceded by *De Kust van Smaragd*, Bohn, Haarlem, 1910). Vissering subsequently published a further book about the Indies: *Het Land Van Jan Pieterszoon Coen*, Den Haag, Van Stockum, 1925. See also: https://dbnl.org/auteurs/auteur.php?id=viss135 *accessed 9-7-18.*

4. Vissering, *Oost-Java*: 178.

5. Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500- 1920*, Singapore, NUS Press, 2008 (originally in Dutch as *De Oude Indische Wereld [The Old Indies World] 1500-1920*, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2003).

of an 'Old Indies World' that was part-myth and part-social reality, *Indisch* was heavily imbued with hybrid social and cultural meanings and, as such, a designation that is the beginning of an exploration rather than its terminus.[6] In so doing, it underscores the complexity and fluidity of diasporic identities that, as Georgina Tsolidis has remarked, 'carry a sense of somewhere else into multiple migration, destinations and ways of being', while at the same time challenging 'the monogamy of place' and 'de-stabilising our understanding of "home"'.[7] As such, they are – and were – a constant work-in-progress**.**

Inter alia, that 'work-in-progress' is multi-faceted, and dependent on a variety of media. In the particular case of Bezoet de Bie and MacNeill, however, the paucity of contemporary letters, memoirs and the like throws into stark relief issues surrounding the charting of identity through the medium of photographs, a great many of which have been happily preserved in the family's 'archive'.[8] Ego documents of this particular kind are, as Susie Protschky has suggested, 'often the only autobiographical material that …people have left to posterity' and tend to take on 'a life of their own'.[9] Indeed, it makes sense to talk quite emphatically about the agency of photograph, which are far from being 'mere' illustrations of lives predominantly delineated by other media. In this context, of course, as Elisabeth Edwards reminds us, the apparent 'beguiling realism' of the photograph can all too easily lead to the conclusion that 'photographic inscription' is somehow unmediated and sufficiently self-evident as to render interpretation superfluous, whereas, in reality, 'the threads wrapped around, entangling photographs and making histories… are as much to "think with" as they are evidential, empirical inscriptions'.[10] As such,

6. For a sampling of the very extensive literature here, see Vincent J. Houben, 'Boundaries of Race: Representations of *Indisch* in Colonial Indonesia Revisited', in Harald Fischer-Tine & Susanne Gehrmann (eds), *Empires and Boundaries. Rethinking Race, Class and Gender in Colonial Settings*, New York and London, Routledge, 2009:66-85.

7. Georgina Tsolidis, 'Introduction', in Georgina Tsolidis (ed.), *Migration, Diaspora and Identity. Cross-National Experiences*, Dordrecht & Heidelberg, Springer, 2014: 3-4.

8. The present story draws heavily on the family's photographic 'archive', amounting to several informal collections of photographs, located in both the Netherlands and Australia. Supplemented by a rich trove of written documentation authored by subsequent family members late in the twentieth century, it is in the possession of present day MacNeill family descendants In The Hague and in Melbourne, to whom the author is profoundly grateful both for the generous provision of access and for their convivial support.

9. Susie Protschky, 'Tea Cups, Cameras and Family Life: Picturing domesticity in Elite European and Javanese Family Photographs from the Netherlands Indies, ca.1900-1942', *History of Photography*, 36, 1 (2012): 44 & 47; Susie Protschky, 'Photography, Modernity and the Governed in Late Colonial Indonesia,' in Protschy (ed.), *Photography, Modernity and the Governed in Late Colonial Indonesia*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2015: 11-40.

10. Elizabeth Edwards, *Raw Histories. Photographs, Anthropology and Museums*,

they play a key role in what has been termed 'the imaginative geography' of empire[11] – and in the construction of diasporic identity among empire's colonisers. That construction is crucially enmeshed, in short, not only with the archive created by the written word – important as it is to the narrative that follows – but also with the photographic one.[12] Unsurprisingly, what latter-day commentators have termed the 'colonial gaze' is an unmistakeable dimension of photographs that are 'saturated' – as are most of its kind – with the 'asymmetry [inherent] within colonial relationships'.[13] Among other things, that gaze largely circumscribed the material foundations – in this case the work of thousands of Indonesian men, women and children in sugar fields and factory – of colonial life. Yet, it would be perverse to concentrate solely on what is absent in the photographs at the expense of what is so richly present, and of what they have to tell us about the social framework in which – and for which – the photographs in question were created.

A Creole Couple: Johanna Bezoet de Bie and Alexander MacNeill

Both MacNeill's and Bezoet de Bie's fathers were well-to-do business people, who had made their fortunes in the Indies, married locally and established families there before relocating to the metropole at the beginning of the 1890s.[14] Subsequently, both settled in The Hague, the Dutch city most favoured by 'returnees' on account of its rich Indies associations and presence of hundreds of other *Indischgasten* or Old Indies Hands as well as scores of

Oxford, Berg, 2001: 7-10; Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Hart, 'Introduction: photographs as objects', in Edwards and Hart (eds), *Photographs Objects Histories*, New York & London, Routledge, 2004: 1-15.

11. James R. Ryan, *Picturing Empire. Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire*, London, Reaktion Books, 1997: 11-27. For a recent, insightful development of this argument, see Sophie Junge, '*Groet uit Java*: Picture Postcards and the Transnational Making of the Colony around 1900,' *History of Photography*, 42,2 (2018): 168-184.

12. For classic published collections of photographs relating to the Dutch communities of nineteenth and early twentieth century Indonesia, see E. Breton de Nijs, *Tempo Doeloe*, Amsterdam, Querido, 1961; Nieuwenhuys, *Komen en Blijven,* Amsterdam, Querido 1982; Nieuwenhuys, *Baren en Oudgasten*, Amsterdam, Querido, 1981. For more recent compilations and (revisionist) commentary, see Liane van der Linden et al., *Toekang Potret. 100 Jaar fotographie in Nederlands Indie*, *1839-1939/100 years of photography in the Dutch Indies*, Amsterdam, Fragment, 1989 and Liesbeth Owehand, *Herinneringen in Beeld: Fotoalbums uit Nederlands-Indie*, Leiden, KITLV, 2009.

13. Protschky, *Photography, Modernity and the Governed*: 19.

14. Supporting genealogical data relating to the MacNeill-Bezoet de Bie family, friends and associates in the pages that follow can be located by entering the names concerned on the Dutch genealogical websites *Open Archief*, *Genealogie Online*, *Wie was Wie* and similar sites, including that of the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie in Den Haag. Exceptions are indicated in the footnotes, as are the sources of newspaper data available through the Netherlands Royal Library's DELPHER website.

Fig. 1. Johanna Bezoet de Bie and Alexander MacNeill, The Hague, 1897.

temporary leave-takers.[15] Hence, when the couple sailed for the Indies after their wedding in the city in February 1897, unlike many such newly-weds for whom, 'going out' to the colony was a venture into the relatively unknown, they were returning to familiar territory, where both had spent their early years. Indeed, Bezoet de Bie had remained in the colony until her sixteenth year, before moving with the rest of her family to the Netherlands, while MacNeill had been sent there once he reached his teens to continue his education at the *HBS* (*Hoogere Burgerschool* or Senior High School) at Arnhem in the east of country.

On a number of other counts, however, the couple's family background was strikingly contrasted. The bride's father, Hermann Bezoet de Bie (1844-1915), scion of a mercantile family established in the great Dutch commercial and shipping centre of Rotterdam, had been taken by his parents to the Indies as a youth of around sixteen early in the 1860s.[16] Reaching adulthood in Surabaya and following the premature death there of his father in 1865, he set up in business in the city in the wholesale import-export trade: indeed, he evidently made enough of a success of it to marry an Indies-born woman, Sara Sijthoff (1848-1934), the daughter of an Indies government official who had spent most of his life in the colony and his Indies-born wife. Despite this strongly creole background, Johanna Bezoet de Bie nonetheless laid claim to genetically totally Dutch parentage: Indeed, late in life she reportedly spoke disparagingly (they were 'unpleasant') of those among her cousins who were both Indies-born and indubitably of mixed ethnicity.[17]

Her husband's father, Richard MacNeill (1842-1915) came, however, from precisely that background, though it seems likely that such things were invested with more significance by later generations than they were at the time. The son of a migrant Scots trader based in the major port of Semarang on the north coast of Central Java and a Javanese woman – known to us only

15. Maarten van Doorn, *Het leven gaat er een lichten gang. Den Haag in de Jaren 1919-1940*, Zwolle, Waanders, 2002: 39-52; Coos Versteeg, 'Er is maar een echte Indische buurt', *in* Esther Captain et al., *De Indische Zomer in Den Haag*, Leiden KITLV Uitgeverij, 2005: 23-40; Suzanne de Graaf, '*Iets van een Vreemde Vrucht': Indische Verlofgangers in Nederland, 1919-1939*, Masterscriptie, Universiteit Leiden, 2009.

16. Peter Christiaans, 'Bezoet de Bie', *De Indische Navorscher: Jaarboek* 2008: 134-140.

17. Personal communication Mevrouw Elizabeth del Court Konig van Essen, The Hague, June 2017. (Johanna Bezoet de Bie-Mac Neill was Mevrouw del Court's great-aunt). For aspects of the disparagement of creole *women* of mixed ethnicity in general, see Petra Boudewijn, '"You Must Have Inherited This Trait from Your Eurasian Mother": The Representation of Mixed-race Characters in Dutch Colonial Literature', *Dutch Crossing*, 40:3 (2016), 239-260 and Boudewijn's extended treatment of the subject in Petra Boudewijn, *Warm Bloed. De Representatie van Indo-Europeanen in de Indische-Nederlandse Letterkunde (1860-Heden*), Hilversum, Verloren, 2016.



Fig. 2. Bezoet de Bie family tree.

as 'the free Javanese woman Sienok'[18] – with whom he had co-habited during his lengthy sojourn there, Richard MacNeill had been taken to Europe by his repatriating father late in the 1840s. Returning to the Indies almost a decade later – and to a job in his father's old firm in Central Java – he subsequently relocated in the mid-1860s from Semarang to the East Java 'sugar town' of Probolinggo. Once established there, he cemented his position in colonial society by marrying Wilhelmina Couperus (1849-1874), the likewise Eurasian daughter of *Resident* Petrus Theodorus Couperus (1815-1872), whose posting to Probolinggo had concluded a long career in the Indies government service that had taken him from his Indies birthplace in Batavia to various parts of the outlying island of Sumatra before terminating in the *Oosthoek* (the Dutch term for Java's Eastern Salient) in 1862.[19]

18. Haagsgemeetearchief /Huwelijksacte Richard Mac Neill- Johanna Margaretha Augusta Hubner, 20.10. 1906 via Openarchief [OA]. 'Sienok' is most probably a variant of 'Si Nok, Sinok', a Javanese term of endearment for a little girl, something like 'la petite', 'the little one'.

19. W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, 'De Indische Tak van de Familie Couperus,' *De Indische Navorscher* 5 (1992): 1-8.



Fig. 3. MacNeill family tree.

‘In the Sugar’: the *Tuan* and *Nyonya Besar* of Oemboel

Although they came from rather different backgrounds, Johanna Bezoet de Bie and Alexander MacNeill belonged, as the *tuan besar* [‘big man’] and as the *nyonya besar* (the Indies equivalent of the famed *memsahib* of British India), to a creole elite that was heavily represented among the owners and managers of the Java sugar industry – from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s the foremost branch of colonial export production in the Indies. By the time he married, in 1897, MacNeill himself had been employed in this industry for some seven years, following no doubt in the footsteps of his maternal uncle, John Couperus (1855- 1889), who appears to have spent most of his adult life at sugar factories in the *Oosthoek*[20]. Latterly, MacNeill had been a *tuinemployee* (a kind of plantation-overseer),[21] a position that gave him responsibility for supervising, through a team of Indonesian *mandur* or foremen, the large numbers of Indonesian labourers of both sexes, casually employed on day wages and of varying degrees of skill, who comprised the great bulk of the industry’s field workforce.

20. Wijnaendts van Resandt, ‘Familie Couperus’: 6.
21. *De Locomotief*, 08.01.1898.

Supervisory positions of this kind usually went to locally-born creoles, pre-eminently Eurasian, rather than to 'raw' expatriate Dutchmen who had little familiarity with the rural Javanese environment and less still with its language: young MacNeill, brought up in the locality during his early years and no doubt speaking at least some rudimentary Javanese – 'kitchen Javanese' best describes it – that he would have learnt from his *babu* or nurse and the other, numerous servants in his parents' household, would notionally have been well suited to the job. Local knowledge was critical. For example, a similarly placed man working at an adjacent factory was said to be particularly adept at managing the labourers under his control because of his 'outstanding command of Madurese', the native tongue of many of the seasonal workers who streamed across the strait from their home island during the sugar campaign in the *Oosthoek*. For the most part, such supervisors had only modest formal qualifications – this man had basic primary education [*lagere school*] and a diploma of sorts from one of the 'sugar schools' that the industry ran in East and Central Java – and quickly reached the limits of their promotability.[22]

In MacNeill's case, however, the Eurasian individual concerned was able to cross the boundary into the industry's managerial elite by virtue, it can safely be assumed, of his European education and his (Eurasian) father's wealth and position in industry circles, something that enabled the latter to secure for his son a position, at the tender age of twenty-seven, as *administrateur* or general manager of a sugar factory on the outskirts of Probolinggo, in which he had a major financial stake. Broadly speaking, only the *resident* and *assistent-resident* stood above the *administrateur* in the colonial pecking-order in the countryside, though the *bupati* (aka the *regent*), the highest ranking of the hierarchy of local-level Javanese officials, may have laid claim to a similar, superior status. MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie's prestigious position, in turn, placed them at the helm of an enterprise whose history was embedded in the very fabric of Dutch colonialism in Java.

Known as Oemboel, the factory in question had already been in existence for more than sixty years when MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie arrived there early in 1898, and had a history that reflected a variety of transnational diasporic experiences. Building on foundations laid by Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs who were very active in this part of the *Oosthoek* in the opening decades of the nineteenth century,[23] during the 1830s newly arrived European concessionaires effectively took possession of the industrialised manufacture of sugar in the area. Backed by the Indies Government and (so it might appear) by the

22. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [hereafter NA]: 2.20.02.03, Archief Cultuurmaatschappij Wonolangan.

23. Claudine Lombard-Salmon, 'The Han Family of East Java. Entrepreneurship and Politics (18th-19th Centuries)', *Archipel* 41 (1991): 53-87.



Fig. 4. Oemboel sugar factory, Probolinggo, ca. 1910.

Surabaya 'sister house' of the Maclaine Watson mercantile concern in which Alexander MacNeill's father and grandfather had both been partners,[24] they had set up Oemboel and two other factories in the *Oosthoek*, one situated, as was Oemboel itself, just outside the town of Probolinggo and known as Wonolangan and a second, Wringin Anom, situated further along the coast in neighbouring Besoeki Residency. Most such concessionaires were either Dutch or Sino-Indonesian, but in this case they were British people by the name of Etty. Though originally from Yorkshire in the north of the UK, the Etty 'clan' – the term seems appropriate given the sheer number of kin variously located – were also to be found in British India, the Indies and the Netherlands. One family member was the noted mid-Victorian painter William Etty (1787-1849), most of whose adult life was spent in London, while in the Dutch province of Gelderland the money from sugar bought his Netherlands-domiciled cousins and their descendants a fine villa on the outskirts of the city of Nijmegen as well as a grand house in the suburbs of nearby Arnhem.[25]

Back in the Indies, where they had significant presence over three or more generations, the Java domiciled members of the Etty family could lay claim to being 'pioneers' who owned and ran a sugar-manufacturing business that was first of its kind in Java to have installed innovatory apparatus for 'boiling' cane juice into sugar by steam in a partial vacuum (and thereby contributing to the

24. NA, Archief Ministerie van Kolonien 2697, Besluit GG 2.8.1847/5; Anon, 'De Cultuurmaatschappij Wonolangan (1895-1925), *Indie. Geillustreerd `Tijdschrijft voor Nederland en Kolonien*, 9/19 (December 1925): 306-340.

25. Ulbe Bosma, *Indiegangers*, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 2010: 87. https://www.geldersarchief.nl/.../archieven/?mivast; www.molenbeke.nl/wp-content/uploads/.../Molenbeker-Editie-3.pd.

both the quantity and quality of their output). By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, however, the whole Etty enterprise was rather outdated: during Alexander MacNeill's tenure as *administrateur,* however, Oemboel (together with the two other 'Etty' factories) was extensively re-equipped (and re-financed) by McNeill père – inter alia with up-to-the-minute machinery from the celebrated German Hallesche *Maschinenfabrik*. Technological improvements of this kind no doubt help explain why, under MacNeill's management, productivity at Oemboel rose by at least one third. Gross output, meanwhile, had been boosted by the buying-in of substantial quantities of cane from peasant growers to supplement that produced on the factory's own plantations.[26]

Integral to these developments was a major reconstruction of ownership, very much under Richard McNeill's guidance it must be assumed, which transformed hitherto family proprietorship into a publicly-listed, limited liability company (the Dutch term is NV or *Naamloze Vennootschap).* Along with the two other 'Etty' sugar factories, Oemboel became part of the Wonolangan Plantation Company (Wonolangan *Cultuurmaatschappij*) with a head office in the Netherlands and a board of Netherlands-based directors among whom the elder MacNeill was prominent. Also on the board, however, were members of the old proprietor's family (who included the board's first chairman),[27] so that the Etty connection with Oemboel was far from extinguished by the manifestation of new-style business 'modernity' and (notional) metropolitan control that was typical of virtually the whole of the Java industry by the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

Indeed, and very much in line with these 'survivals', from a social perspective, it was not what was *new* at Oemboel but what was *old* that was fundamental to an understanding of its location in the colonial world. During the Etty's long tenure there, twenty members of the family – husbands, wives and children – were domiciled at one or other of their three factories. Nine members of the family were married there, predominantly to locally born men or women; seven were born there; and five died there.[28] The women of the Etty family were prominent in this history. Some eleven lived there at various times as wives and daughters over a period extending from the 1830s to the 1890s, and women were also among the owners of the enterprise.[29] It

26. *Koloniaal Verslag*, 'Gravenhage, Landsdrukkerij, 1900, Bijl.TT & 1911, Bijl. JJ.

27. See: *Soerabaijasch Handelsblad* [hereafter *SHB*] 17.10.1895; *SHB* 17.12.1897; *Het Locomotief* 31.12.1901; *Handboek voor Cultuur-en Handelsondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indie,* Amsterdam, De Bussy, 1888-1940 [hereafter *HCHO*] 22 (1910): 809.

28. 'Pedigree of Etty', at https://cyc.sdp.sirsidynix.net.uk/client/en_GB/search/asset/1018300; P.C. Bloys van Treslong Prins, *Genealogische en Heraldische Gedenkwaardigheden betreffende Europeanen op Java*, 4 vols, Batavia, Albrechts/Koninklijke Drukkerij de Unie, 1934-9, 1: 370-371.

29. *HCHO* 6 (1893-4): 222, 434, 44; *SHB* 17.10.1895; Anon, 'Wonolangan': 306-340;

was a granddaughter, moreover, of one of the enterprise's founders, Elisabeth Adriana (Annie) Etty (1863-1949), who maintained the family connection with the Wonolangan Company well into the twentieth century, through her husband Johan Albert Cornelis Sleijster (1862-1912) and his fellow board member, business-associate and distant kinsman Herman Louis Woltersom (1851-1920).

Fig. 5. The Sleijster-Etty couple In Molenbeek (Arnhem), ca. 1900.

Women were also memorialized in the history of the ``Etty' factories in other ways. As identified by a contemporary commemorative plaque, was a 'Miss A. Grant' – most likely a descendent of founder Charles Etty's wife, Elisabeth Grant née Leal or Lyall (1782-1868) – who paid for the construction in 1893 of a substantial swimming pool inside the factory compound at Oemboel.[30] It was evidently a social centre for the European personnel of the surrounding district – and remained such for decades. In the mid-1930s, for example, an item in a colonial newspaper recorded the setting up of a 'club' to keep the pool open after the factory itself had closed down. In the past,

Leonard Robinson, (with a Foreword by Tom Etty) *William Etty: the Life and Art*, Jefferson [North Carolina] and London, Macfarland & Co, 2007: 310.

30. Bloys, *Genealogische en Heraldische Gedenkwaardigheden* 1: 259.

it was noted, Oemboel's European staff and their guests had made full and much appreciated use of the facility. Indeed, another such report (two years earlier), told of the attendees at a staff party held to celebrate the opening of the campaign at the still-open Wonolangan factory driving over to the pool at Oemboel for afternoon tea and a swim.[31]

Creole Domesticity: Husbands, Wives, Marriage and Family

MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie belonged to a social and cultural milieu strikingly different from that of the social world of young single males, open domestic arrangements, Indonesian *nyai* or 'native' housekeeper-concubines, and the social isolation of European women married to senior managers said to be typical of similar, commodity-producing and western-owned enterprises in more recently settled parts of the Indies. In the latter, a markedly expatriate ethos prevailed. Inter alia, the younger personnel were prevented by company regulations from marrying until they had obtained a significant degree of seniority, something which in turn worked against them finding marriage partners among the creole population of the Indies (instead, they were encouraged to take a 'native housekeeper') – and promoted the (eventual) search for a similarly expatriate wedded partner while on leave in the Netherlands.[32]

At old-established enterprises like Oemboel, however, a profoundly different social ethos prevailed. Bezoet de Bie herself would have experienced a degree of family sociability in East Java broadly comparable to that she would have enjoyed at 'home' in the Netherlands. Of her five sisters, two had likewise married 'into the sugar' and were settled in East Java; a third married the owner-manager of a steam-driven rice-mill on the not-so-distant island of Lombok; while another had wed a junior army officer who subsequently took his bride with him to the Indies.[33] Nor was this a final count. Over at the nearby Wonolangan factory the *administrateur*, the Netherlands-born Johannes Sluiter (b. 1869) was also very much 'family', since his wife – the couple had married in Surabaya in 1895 – was Georgette MacNeill (1868-1964), Alexander MacNeill's elder sister. Indeed, one of the most delightful of the images in the 'archive' is of children's bath time at Oemboel, soon after the turn of the century depicting three infants and their mothers among whom is certainly the *njonja* and her first-born, and (most probably) two of her sisters who had also started their families in the Indies.

31. *Indische Courant* [herafter *IC*], 16.4.1935; *SHB* 11.05.1933.

32. E.g., Laura Anne Stoler, 'Re-thinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (1989): 144-5.

33. Christiaans, 'Bezoet de Bie': 136-7.

Fig. 6. Children's bath-time at Oemboel, early twentieth century.

Fig. 7. Johanna Bezoet de Bie and her three children.

Creole domesticity and sociability, enshrined in regular family formation, was the order of the day not only in the case of the MacNeill-Bezoet de Bie couple but also, and more generally, among Oemboel's European staff of managers, supervisors, engineers and technicians, people referred to in the Dutch sources as the *personeel* (personnel).[34] The majority were creoles born in the Indies, many of whom were married, usually to other creoles. At the close of the 1920s, for example, a complete account of the European personnel of all three of the Wonolangan Company's sugar factories – including Oemboel – showed that of the one hundred and four individuals currently employed, around two-thirds [67] had been born in the Indies (of the remaining third [37] all but four individuals heralded from the Netherlands). At the same time, a clear majority [60] of the personnel were married men, of whom creoles accounted for two thirds [41].[35] Moreover, The total number of the three factories' European personnel would, no doubt, have included a number of very young men (or youths) who were, in effect, below marriageable age, thereby inflating the numbers of 'unmarried' men among the *personeel* as a whole. For example, Alexander MacNeill himself would have been barely eighteen when he was sent back to Java to a junior position at an East Java factory early in 1891.

We need to move beyond the immediate confines of the Oemboel factory, however, to grasp more fully the settled character of the colonial community in which MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie were embedded during their lengthy sojourn in Probolinggo. In terms of origin and ethnicity, let alone social standing, that community generally was a diverse one. Nonetheless, some clues to the anatomy of at least its social and economic elite is provided by what we know of the membership of the town's *Veritas* Masonic Lodge, into which Alexander MacNeill (following in the footsteps of his grandfather who had been a leading member of the Lodge in Semarang in the 1840s) was initiated soon after his arrival at Oemboel at the close of the 1890s. MacNeill's fellow Masons would most likely have been the people among whom the *administrateur* of Oemboel and his wife circulated in and around Probolinggo – and most of them (on the evidence of name and occupation preserved in the Lodge's membership lists) were people who, whether colonial-born creoles or not, could best be classified as 'settlers' rather than as 'expatriates' or, in contemporary Dutch parlance, *trekkers*: they were people, that is to say, for whom the Indies was, predominantly, a place of permanent domicile.[36] In

34. See e.g., G. Roger Knight, 'A Sugar Factory and its Swimming Pool: Incorporation and Differentiation in Colonial Java', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24 (3), 2001: 451-471.

35. NA, 2.20.02.03, Archief Cultuurmaatschappij Wonolangan, file 156, Conduite Staten 1929-31.

36. The writer is deeply grateful to Mijnheer Jac. Piepenbrock of Het Cultureel Maconniek Centrum 'Prins Frederik', Den Haag, for kindly facilitating access to

Fig. 8. The Thal Larsen family, Probolinggo ca. 1914.

short, while it might be assumed that the lower social and economic strata of Probolinggo's colonial community was likely to be composed of creoles for whom the Indies was patently 'home', the same would also appear to be largely true of its upper echelons.

To be sure, there were no doubt individuals who fitted into the '*trekker*' or transient mould. The majority, however, seem to have been individuals of a rather different stripe. Among them were members of the Larsen family, proprietors of the oldest established (c. 1867) European mercantile concern in the town.

Danish in origin, the *pater familias* Rasmus Samuel Thal Larsen (1837-1928), together with his Amsterdam-born wife, Johanna Bernardina Levert (1842-1926), had settled in the *Oosthoek* in their twenties and died there in their eighties, as did the leading coffee planters at Loemadjang in Probolinggo's mountainous hinterland, the step brothers Jean Guillaume Renardel de Lavalette (1828-1918) and Gerrit Christiaan Renardel de Lavalette (1849-1926). The MacNeill-Bezoet-de-Bie couple are likely to have known them well, as MacNeill's aunt – his late mother's younger sister – was married to the estate's *administrateur*.[37] The elder of the two Lavalette brothers had married an Indies-born woman, Sie Poddie (d.1909) – she was presumably of Sino-Indonesian origin – and their only child, Margaretha Johanna Cornelia Renardel de Lavalette (1849-1939), had herself married locally to an

archival materials relating to the historic membership of the *Veritas* lodge and to Dr. Tom van den Berge of the KITLV, Leiden, for his sage advice and assistance.

37. Wijnaendts van Resandt, 'Familie Couperus': 6.

'expatriate' Dutchman and – like him – spent the rest of her life in the colony. Others had even more pronounced settler credentials. The sugar factory *administrateur* Robert Erland Nicolai Soesman (1868-1919), for example, was a long-term *'blijver'* whose forebears had first arrived in the colony in the 1820s.[38] How well MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie fitted into this broad pattern of settler colonials is something to which we can now turn.

Slippery Identities in the Diaspora

In discussing the history of the Dutch colonial communities in eighteenth century Java, Jean Taylor used the phrase 'slippery identities',[39] and although the context and circumstances differed significantly at locations like Oemboel a hundred years or more later, the concept itself remains valid. In the specific case of the MacNeill-Bezoet de Bie couple, moreover, 'identity' was further complicated by their combined Celtic-Dutch-Indies heritage. Possessors of a Scots family name but only partial Celtic ancestry, the MacNeill couple were also the product of a colonial environment in Asia in which heterogeneity and hybridity were prominent features. What stands out, nonetheless, is the extent to which the couple sought to differentiate – even distance –themselves from the *Indisch* environment of the Indies colonial world in which they found themselves. Such at least is one implication of some of the photographic evidence in the family's 'archive'. Nor, as we shall see, does that evidence exist in isolation. Of course, this was not a simple 'either/or' determination, any more than was the case throughout the upper echelons, at least, of the Indies' creole communities in general, where multiple identities predominated. Even so the *Indisch* hybridity of the two individuals concerned – both of them Indies-born and one of them the offspring of a Eurasian mother *and* father – offered only imperfect clues to how the couple perceived their place in the colonial environment from which both of them stemmed.

A number of the photographs in the 'archive' do indeed contrive to transport the viewer to the Indies – and to do so in a manner broadly congruent with what one pioneering writer on the subject suggested was the quintessential function of such image making, in which colonial subjects are represented in certain conventional, subordinate ways.[40] One shows the MacNeill's two sons in a

38. For Renardel de Lavalette see e.g.,: https://www.geni.com/people/Paul-Antoine-Renardel-de-Lavalette/6000000060824446927; http://www.uwstamboomonline.nl/passie/sites/template.php?pid=12291108; *daktari.antenna.nl/gebhard.htm. For Tal Larsen, see e.g.,: Indische Courant* 11.01.1928. For Soesman, see e.g., https://gw.geneanet.org/mmeisenbacher?lang=en&n=soesman&oc=0&p=abraham+eliza.

39. Jean Gelman Taylor, 'Slippery Identities: Race, religion and destiny in 17th and 18th century Java,' in Joost J. Coté and Loes Westerbeek (eds), *Recalling the Indies. Colonial Culture and Postcolonial Identities*, Amsterdam, Askant, 2005: 29-46.

40. Ryan, *Picturing Empire*: 11-12. The only surviving photograph in the family's collection to show Indonesians outside the servant class depicts a *wedono* or district head – a key Javanese official of the colonial state on whom the Oemboel factory would

Fig. 9. The MacNeill-Bezoet de Bie couple's two sons in a barouche, with coachman.

Fig. 10. Johanna Bezoet de Bie and a friend seated on a balustrade, with Indonesian servant squatting.

horse-drawn barouche or open carriage, complete with Javanese coachman, while another records two European women – one them Johanna Bezoet de Bie herself – seated on a balustrade with an Indonesian *babu* squatting quite literally at their feet; while others are less concerned with colonial 'subjects' per se than with the suggestion of 'exotic' situations and circumstance far removed from those of the metropole – and in this sense, very much of their time.[41] Generally speaking, for example, monkeys do no disport themselves around the tea tables on the lawns of the Haagse bourgeoisie, as they do in one of the photographs that MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie sent back to the Netherlands to delight their relatives.

Yet images of this kind are few and far between. Instead, what emerges from the generality of the photographic 'archive' is something rather different: an environment that had little or no significant reference to Indonesia's 'native' inhabitants and, in the context of colonial settlement, an attenuated sense of belonging to the Old Indies World. Identity in such circumstances was, of course, multidimensional and the family's situation was not without its

have relied heavily for the influence which he was able to exert in the surrounding countryside. Together with his wife, the *raden ajoe*, their child and an accompanying younger man, identified as a *mantri* or administrative assistant, all four of them are posed in front of what may have been the *wedono*'s 'audience hall' or *pendopo*. Clearly, he and his wife were not part of the Oemboel social circle.

41. Junge, 'Groet uit Java': 171.

Fig. 11. Monkeys on the lawn.

ambiguities and complexities. Nonetheless, there remains a distinct sense of the extent to which they sought to build identities in which the dominant motif was at some remove from the locality into which they had both been born.

Photographs of the interior of the MacNeill's house at Oemboel are arguably revealing in this respect**.** The predominant effect is to convey – and was surely meant to convey – the way in which the spaciousness and *luxe* of the interiors enjoyed by the bourgeoisie in the West could be replicated in even as 'remote' an 'outpost' as Probolinggo. There was a (covered) piano with a music stand next to it and other rich furnishings included paintings in ornate frames as well as on easels, carpets on tables and floors, a plethora of jardinières with potted palms, what appear to be gasoliers (perhaps the gas manufactured to light the factory for its 24-hour operation during the campaign was also piped into the *administrateur*'s house) and other ornate lamps, and a table set for dinner. That dinner, of course, might have revolved around the famed *rijst-tafel*, an *Indisch* meal based on the offering of a multiplicity of miscellaneous side-dishes – European as well as 'Asian' – served on a bed of rice, but there is no visual reference to it, nor to the small bevy of household staff required for its service. Canned and otherwise preserved food imported from Europe had not yet become – as it did in the inter-war decades – *de rigueur* for socially elevated creoles like the MacNeills.[42] Figuratively speaking, however, the table was already set for its arrival.

Fig. 12. Interior of *administrateur*'s house at Oemboel. Note the piano and music stand in the background.

Fig. 13. Oemboel interior.

Identity, of course, was manifest not just in the way a house might be furnished or in what the household consumed at meal times, but also in outward appearances. One informal portrait of Johanna Bezoet de Bie present in the archive shows her seated, reading a newspaper or possibly a magazine – and clad in the 'traditional' informal female attire of colonial Java, the

42. Susie Protschky, 'The Colonial Table: Food, Culture and Dutch Identity in Colonial Indonesia', in *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 54, 3 (2008): 346-357.

Fig. 14. Oemboel interior.

sarong and *kebaya* – a long-sleeved lace jacket worn over a length of batiked cotton folded around the body like a skirt. Of Javanese inspiration, it would have looked exotic indeed to those unacquainted with the Indies. Indeed, one (rare) North American visitor to Java in the late nineteenth century had professed herself shocked at the daytime state of *un*dress of the colonial women she saw in her hotel.[43]

As its foremost historian has noted, however, from the opening of the twentieth century onward, what a colonial woman might wear in the home was in state of flux, within the context of a discourse, still by no means uncontested in the early years of the century, about the danger of 'going native' and the resultant urge for 'modernisation', not least in matters of women's clothing. Eventually, this meant that, by the inter-war decades, Western-style summer dresses had relegated *sarong* and *kebaya* to the old-fashioned, to the backwoods and to the lower orders among Indies' colonial communities.[44]

The MacNeill couple, it may safely be assumed, wanted to make it quite clear that they were not located among any such 'backwoods' (or, of course, among creole subalterns). Hence the potential significance what Bezoet de Bie and her female companions are wearing in another photograph, in this instance of a small daytime gathering – presumably at Oemboel and probably sometime just after the turn of the century.

Whatever the precise occasion, it was evidently an informal one: seven women and four men are on the back patio, mostly on rocking chairs that the (invisible) servants would no doubt have carried from inside the house. An event of some kind is being toasted with what looks like champagne cups filled with drink from the tureen that sits on the table; two individuals appear to have left their chairs at the back of the group and are positioned on the edge of the veranda, the better to be included in the picture; another chair is empty, presumably the seat of the person – most likely Alexander MacNeill himself –

43. Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, *Java: The Garden of the East*, 1897 [reprinted New York: Century, 1907]: 25-6.

44. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, 'Summer Dresses and Canned Food: European Women and Western Lifestyles', in Locher-Scholten, *Women and the Colonial State*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2000: 120-131.

Fig. 15. Bezoet De Bie in *sarong* and *kebaya*, reading a magazine.

Fig. 16. Party Scene with friends.

who is behind the camera. As if to confirm a family event caught on the wing, one of the women appears to have rocked on her chair (?) during the second of exposure – and is hence lost to posterity. Not so Bezoet-de-Bie herself, however, whose presence is unmistakeable (third from the left). Of *sarong* and *kebaya*, there is no sign: what has taken its place is a pairing of a long-sleeved cotton blouse (the lace has gone) with a long ankle-length skirt of heavyish material and of European design. It is a costume that would scarcely been out of place among their contemporaries in The Hague.

In the case of the MacNeill couple, however, the celebration of family life also partook of a quite formal character, as befitted their exalted station in the community, in the shape of photographs made in the prestigious surroundings of the Kurkdjian studio in Surabaya. Ohannes Kurkdjian (1851 - 1903), an Armenian émigré who had arrived in Java in 1886, had an international reputation. Any work done in his atelier, which employed up to thirty-five staff and, among others, nurtured colonial Indonesia's first female professional photographer, Thilly Weissenborn (1883-1964), and long survived Kurkdjian's own demise, would have come at a premium price. [45]

45. For Kurkdjian, see e.g., Vigen Galstyan, 'Ohannes Kurkdjian's Duality', in Gael

Ironically enough, given that the studio itself was most famed for its depictions of Javanese landscapes, the MacNeill photographs are so totally divorced from any obviously Indonesian context that they could just as well have been made in the Netherlands. Such photos were, no doubt, the outcome of regular trips from a provincial town to the East Java metropolis that were integral to the life-style of a well-to-do sugar factory *administrateur* – but arguably also reflect something of the couple's determination, conscious or otherwise, to present themselves and their offspring in a European frame, in which their hybrid identities were deliberately downplayed.

Connecting to 'Home': An *English* Governess

Cornelia Vissering's brief encounter with Johanna Bezoet de Bie and her two young sons (her baby daughter had presumably been put to bed prior to the arrival of the evening visitor) up in the Tengger mountains in 1907 made mention (as we have already seen) of the presence of the family's 'slender blond' [*tengere blonde*] English governess.[46] If the MacNeill couple were indeed concerned to present themselves in a frame more redolent of Europe itself than of the Indies, then the education of their children was a perhaps crucial pointer. It was thoroughly in character for Java's creole families to send their offspring, the boys in particular, for schooling in the Netherlands once they approached their teens. Evidently, however, MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie also took care of their children's pre-teen upbringing by employing a governess. Moreover, presumably in order to preserve the family's *British* (Scots) heritage, they employed for the purpose a woman born in the UK rather than in the Netherlands. The woman in question can be identified as the thirty-seven year old Eugenie Jackson (b.1867). The daughter of a prosperous shopkeeper from the Thames valley town of Maidenhead, prior to joining the MacNeill-Bezoet de Bie family, she had been employed as a children's nurse (the Dutch term was *kinderjuffrouw* and it was used in her application to the colonial authorities in Java for a residence permit) in the well-to-do household of the Town Clerk of Croydon, in the Surry suburbs immediately to the south of London.[47] It is not clear how she subsequently came to be employed by the MacNeills, but what is certain is that she accompanied them to the Indies when they sailed back to Java in March 1904 (after an eight month sojourn in The Hague)[48] – and that she remained in their service for the next seven years. There are at least two photographs in which she is identified: the first

Newton (ed.), *Garden of the East. Photography in Indonesia 1850s-1940s*, Canberra, National Gallery of Australia, 2014: 70-73; private communication 10.5.2018, Dr. Alexander Supartono, Edinburgh Napier University.

46. Vissering, *Oost-Java*: 178.

47. NA, Oost-Indische Besluiten, 2.10.30, no. 8377, 1906; Census UK 1871 and Census UK 1901 [from Ancestry.com].

48. *Bataviasche Nieuwsblad* [hereafter *BN*] 13.7.1903 & 05.04.1904.

Fig. 17. Kurkdjian studio photo of Bezoet De Bie, MacNeill and children c. 1905.

Fig. 18. Eugenia Jackson (left) in the swimming pool at Oemboel.

shows her in the swimming pool at Oemboel and the second sitting with the mistress of the house and the couple's two sons, in company with a pair of house guests. The social position of the governess in many metropolitan colonial households was often ambiguous: at Oemboel, however, there appears no doubt that she was 'one of the family'.

Fig. 19. Eugenia Jackson at the breakfast table (right) with Bezoet De Bie, her two sons and unidentified visitors (MacNeill is absent from the photograph).

In the year following her arrival, Jackson accompanied the family to the fashionable Tosari Hotel-and-Sanitorium complex high in the Tengger mountains[49] – at nearly 1,800 metres, it advertised itself as having a 'European' climate – and stayed there for around a month at the end of sugar campaign in 1905.[50] Vissering herself went there a couple of years later toward the close of her tour of East Java, and commented, not altogether favourably, on its wealthy clientele of elite families from Surabaya, sugar factory managers and the like.[51] In MacNeill's case, however, it may have been less a social occasion than a necessary restorative for his health after the rigours of managing the year's campaign. Jackson subsequently sailed together with the family when they made another voyage to the Netherlands late in 1908,[52] a journey perhaps designed to show off the couple's recently born daughter, Alexandra MacNeill (1907-1981) to their relatives in The Hague – and certainly to deposit their two boys, Richard MacNeill Jnr (1898- 1963) and John Alexander MacNeill (1899- 1979), to continue their education 'in patria': the elder boy was subsequently enrolled (1916) in the Nederlandsche Handels- Hoogeschool in Rotterdam.[53] Late in 1909 their parents went back to Java with Jackson and their daughter,[54] but returned to the Netherlands some two years later toward the close of 1911. This time, however, Jackson did not accompany them on the voyage and instead appears to have remained at Oemboel, presumably as governess to successive managerial families at the factory until the close of the 1920s, at which point she disappeared from the public record.[55]

Governesses were, of course, a fixture of metropolitan and colonial life for middle and upper class Europeans throughout the 'long' nineteenth century, and for single women such positions afforded the possibility of 'genteel' employment commensurate with either their actual or perceived social standing. In case of the United Kingdom, by the late nineteenth century significant numbers not only of 'impoverished gentlewomen' but also their counterparts in the lower middle classes hoped to find employment not only within Britain and its Empire but also in other parts of the world that placed a premium on a command of the English language.[56] They might even be seen as

49. *SHB*, 23.01.1902.

50. *SHB*, 21.10.1905 & 18.11. 1905.

51. Vissering, *Oost-Java*: 203-215.

52. *SHB*, 31.10.1908.

53. H.C. de Roo-Schouman, 'Album Studiosorum Roterodanum 1913-1953', *Indische Navorscher* 9 (1996): 122.

54. *BN*, 09.11.1909.

55. *Nieuw Adresboek van Geheel Nederlandsch-Indië*, Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1903-1930.

56. A. James Hammerton, *Emigrant Gentlewomen. Genteel Poverty and Female Emigration*, 1830-1914, London, Croom Helm, 1979: 148-186; Kathryn Hughes, *The Victorian Governess*, London, The Hamledon Press: xv-xvi.

'missionaries', possessed, as one contemporary propagandist expressed it, of 'a splendid opportunity of serving the Empire by instilling British principles into the minds of the children'.[57]

In the case of the MacNeill family – and somewhat more mundanely – a *British* governess would have provided an opportunity for perpetuating the links with a 'home' that was in the UK as well as in the Netherlands. It did so, moreover, at a delicate time for *British* loyalties in a Dutch colony, given the ill feeling in the Netherlands – as well as in the Indies – about the treatment of Dutch communities in southern Africa during the only recently terminated Boer War.[58] In terms of 'identity', that is to say, the import of the couple's employment of Miss Jackson meant that their offspring would be conversant with English as well as Dutch (in addition to the Javanese that they would have learnt from their *babu*). But is it too fanciful to see it as also implying that that couple were aiming to locate their offspring in a similar cultural milieu to that of their British cousins, members of the (legitimate) branch of the family that patriarch Alexander MacNeill Snr had established in the UK after his return there at the end of the 1840s?[59]

A Sojourn In 'Patria': The Hague 1911-1928

'These people led interstitial lives', one recent student of the Indies colonial elite has remarked, and 'were always in some kind of transition.'[60] Up to a point, this was indeed the case with the McNeill-Bezoet de Bie couple, whose repeated voyaging between Asia and Europe was characteristic of the Indies colonial elite in general.[61] Their lives entered a new phase late in 1911, however, when the husband retired from his position as *administrateur* at Oemboel, and the couple left Java for the Netherlands. They sailed to Europe in company – on the upper deck, of course – with several other sugar factory *administrateur*s who were evidently taking advantage of the end of the sugar campaign to take a vacation. [62] For the MacNeills, however, this was no vacation but an ostensibly permanent relocation in 'patria' that saw them settled by

57. Hammerton, *Emigrant Gentlewomen*: 165.

58. Heather Street-Salter, *World War One in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017: 95.

59. Several of those cousins were present in Java, working for the Maclaine Watson Concern, contemporaneously with Alexander and Johanna MacNeill's sojourn at Oemboel between 1898 and 1911. What is unknown, however, is what kind of contact the two branches had – if, indeed, they had any contact at all.

60. Caroline Drieenhuizen, 'Objects, Nostalgia and the Dutch Colonial Elite in Times of Transition ca. 1900-1970', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 170 (2014): 509.

61. Ulbe Bosma, 'Sailing through Suez from the South. The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815-1940', *International Migration Review* 41/2 (2007): 511-36.

62. *Nieuws van den Dag*, 25.10.1911.

January of the following year in a house on the Statenlaan,[63] in a relatively new elite district of The Hague, within walking distance of Alexander's father's mansion on the Koninginnegracht, the canal-side boulevard that connected the city centre to the seaside resort of Scheveningen. The family was to remain in The Hague, at various addresses, until the late 1920s.

Once established there, among other things, they appear to have gravitated toward the city's renowned artistic circles – circles that were at some remove, it might be supposed, from those conventionally associated with the retired *administrateur* of a sugar factory and his *nyonya besar*. MacNeill himself may well have had some aspirations as a painter (as stories passed down in the family would have it), and the couple evidently became associated (though documentation is slender) with the dominant figure among Hague-based artists, the painter Floris Arntzenius (1864-1925). Arntzenius did portraits – still extant – of both MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie.

Fig. 20 & 21. Portraits by Arntzenius of Johanna Bezoet De Bie and Alexander Macneill.

More revealing of the social links between the MacNeills and Arntzenius, which obviously extended beyond their patronage of a famous artist, was the fact that one of the latter's daughters, Claudine Albertine Arntzenius (1904-1982) – younger sister of the celebrated painter, ceramicist and photographer Elise Claudine Arntzenius (1902-1982) – married MacNeill's nephew Wilhelm van der Weijde (1896-1957) at the beginning of the 1930s. To be sure, these

63. Haags Gemeente Archief, Den Haag, Bevolkingsregisters, Burgerlijke Stand 1895-1913 [via Open Archief].

pre-occupations did not mean a complete break with the Indies, since the painter himself was also of Indies birth, and counted many similarly Indies-born individuals among his artistic associates in the Netherlands.[64] Moreover, simply living in The Hague in the opening decades of the twentieth century meant being immersed in a society at all levels of which the Indies was a pervasive presence.[65] Even so, Arntzenius had been taken from his native Surabaya to the Netherlands as a boy of eleven, and never returned there. Nor, it might be supposed, did the MacNeill couple intend to do so after there own relocation to the Netherlands.

It can be assumed that part of the purpose in leaving Oemboel had been to re-unite in the Netherlands with their sons – and with their own, aging parents. Richard MacNeill, founder of the Dutch branch of the family, died in The Hague in 1915, within a very few months of the death of Johanna MacNeill's own father, Herman Bezoet de Bie. His widow, Sarah Sijthof-Bezoet de Bie (1849-1934) however, survived her husband by almost two decades, and lived in The Hague only a few streets away from her daughter, as did other members of the extensive Bezoet de Bie family. It may have been around this time that Bezoet de Bie herself (as a report handed down in the family has it) developed an interest in the Christian Science movement, whose church in the Hague, built during her sojourn there by the eminent, pioneering modernist architect and artist H. P. Berlage (1856- 1934) – famous, above all, for his Bourse building on Amsterdam's Damrak and, in the penultimate stage of his career, for the Gemeentemuseum (Municipal Museum) in The Hague itself – was a testimony not only to the congregation's advanced taste but also to the depth of its pockets.[66]

Her offspring, meanwhile, ostensibly at least, adapted to their adopted country by marrying into solidly Dutch bourgeois families who were devoid of any direct Indies connections. Richard (aka Dick) MacNeill Jnr, the elder of the couple's two sons and a world-class footballer during his younger years in the Netherlands, married a keen sportswoman, Alide Schoute (1901-1952), the hockey-playing daughter of a well-known Dutch cocoa and chocolate manufacturer and his likewise Netherlands-born wife.[67] Dick MacNeill went on to forge a career in banking, living in the elite 'dormitory' town of Heemstede and working in Amsterdam – a short train ride away – for the prominent firm

64. Dolf Welling, *Floris Arntzenius*, Den Haag, Heemhave Holding BV/ Van Voorst van Beest Gallerie, 1992:16.

65. E.g., van Doorn, *Het leven gaat er een lichten gang*: 39-66.

66. She was not, however, formally a member of the congregation in The Hague (I am grateful on this point for information kindly supplied by email by Mijnheer Wally Eman, Church of Christian Science in the Netherlands, 29.7.18).

67. Except where stated, the information in this and the following paragraphs comes from the late Dirk MacNeill's extensive type-written notes on his father and uncles and grandmother. Copies in the possession of Mevrouw Elizabeth del Court Konig van Essen, The Hague.

of Albert de Barry & Co. By the 1930s, with offices on the prestigious 'golden bend' in the city's Herengracht, De Barry was almost entirely German-owned and closely connected with the Deutsche Bank, one of the financial pillars of the Third Reich. As such, its assets were confiscated post-Liberation in May 1945, a move that may also have cost Richard MacNeill his job.[68] In any event, after the War he relocated to Antwerp, where he found employment as a bank manager, but the onset of what proved to be his wife's fatal illness brought the couple back to the Netherlands, where she died in 1952. Her widower subsequently remarried – and acquired two step-children – but himself died suddenly in Heemstede in 1963, in his substantial semi-detached house in an elite part of the town, aged scarcely sixty-five.

Meanwhile, his younger brother, John Alexander MacNeill, also pursued a Netherlands-based business career in finance, as secretary to a mortgage company and – like his siblings – married into metropolitan business circles. At the same time, the extent to which he was embedded in Dutch society was underscored by the fact that at an earlier stage in his career, in the mid-1920s, he had been an officer in the *Koninklijke Landmacht (the Royal Dutch Army)*, and evidently kept up his connections with its officer corps after he had returned to civilian life.[69] His wife, Johanna Augusta Eugenia Josephina de Poorter (1903-1997), whom he married in The Hague in 1927, was the daughter of a man whose career had been in commerce [*handelsagent/ koopman*], while her mother, Elisabeth Anna Berlage, came from an Amsterdam (originally German) mercantile family. Though MacNeill himself appears to have spent some time across the Atlantic – in New York – in the period immediately before his marriage, thereafter the couple spent their entire lives in The Hague, where they had a house on the Frederik Hendriklaan, in the heart of the middle class Statenkwatier, between the city centre and the sea.

The third and last of Alexander and Johanna MacNeill's offspring to wed was their only daughter, the twenty year old, Java-born, Alexandra Wilhelmina Johanna MacNeill (1907-1981). The marriage took place in The Hague early in 1928 and her husband, Johannes de Crane (1903-1968), four years her senior and born in the Netherlands, worked in insurance (as had his father), where he was employed for much of his life by the prominent Amsterdam-based firm of Blom & Van der Aa. Although the firm did considerable business in the Indies and China prior to the Second World War, De Crane and his wife remained living in the Low Countries, in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

68. Founded 1919, the Bank had, from its inception, strong ties with German banking circles, and, subsequently, with Deutsche Bank in Berlin (which held 90% of its shares by the 1930s). Confiscated as a German asset by the Dutch Government in 1945, De Barry's German connection endured when De Barry was returned to private hands in 1954. See 'Geschiedenis van H. Albert de Barry en de Deutsche Bank', in www.amsterdamsegrachtenhuizen.info/grachten/hge/.../hg18448/*?. Accessed 30-3-18.*

69. *Haagse Courant*, 17.11.1937; NA 2.13.05/2.13.04, Collectie Officieren Landmacht Nederland: Stamboekregistraties 1813-1924.

The Inescapable Indies: Credentials and Cash

Nonetheless, despite the extent of the MacNeill's domestication in the Netherlands, the Indies proved reluctant to let go of its own. Hence when Dick MacNeill, the football-playing, internationally renowned young sportsman of the family, proved particularly valiant in defence of his metropolitan team's goal, he was hailed in the colonial press as one of their own – 'an *Indischman* by the name of Mac Neil'.[70] For his parents, moreover, the Indies proved quite literally inescapable. If the couple, as seems probable, had intentions of spending the rest of their lives in the Netherlands, in company with their children and grandchildren, then they were disappointed. While living in The Hague, they must have drawn on their savings and on whatever share they had in the Wonolangan Plantation Company and kindred enterprises that MacNeill's father had been the prime force in establishing late in the preceding century. Early in the 1920s, moreover, Alexander MacNeill himself had parlayed his lengthy experience in the sugar industry into a job of sorts in promoting the sale in Java of a well-known British manufacturer's diesel-engine ploughs for work in the island's sugar fields. Indeed, it was this that took him to the Indies on at least a couple of occasions prior to his final relocation there later in the decade.[71] The times were against the success of the venture, however, not least because from the mid-1920s onward cheap labour began to pour into the Java sugar industry on a scale that had not been known for decades, largely obviating the need to mechanise fieldwork.[72]

This seems likely to have left the couple in straitened financial circumstances, with the upshot that, in April 1928, once all three of their children were married and 'off their hands', MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie sailed back to the Indies. Some eighteen months later, at the close of 1929, the Wall Street Crash – and subsequent onset of Inter-War Depression – must have confirmed the wisdom of their choice. Inter alia, it brought about the near-collapse of the Java sugar industry on which so many Dutch families (like theirs) had come to depend for an income, and created a situation in which numbers of ex-colonials returned to the Indies, since they calculated it was much cheaper to live there than in the Netherlands in their reduced financial circumstances. By then, however, MacNeill and Bezoet de Bie themselves had already been settled back in their native country for a couple of years or more.

70. *Sumatra Post*, 03.06.1920.

71. A. MacNeill, 'Mechanische grondbewerking met den Kabelploeg der firma John Fowler & Co., met illust. '*Archief voor de Suikerindustrie NI*, 1923, 1: 343-67. The Leeds (UK) firm of John Fowler & Co were leading British manufacturers of traction engines and ploughing implements and equipment. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Fowler_%26_Co. Accessed 14-6-18.

72. E.g., Roger Wiseman, 'Three crises: management in the colonial Java sugar industry 1880s-1930s', PhD Dissertation, University of Adelaide, 2001: 431-2 (available at http://hdl.handle.net/2440/21822).

Instead of returning to their old location in the *Oosthoek*, the couple had opted to settle on the edge of the mountains of Central Java, at Bandungan in the neighbourhood of the town and military cantonment of Ambarawa, some forty kilometres south of the port-city of Semarang where MacNeill's Scots grandfather – also Alexander MacNeill – had started out in business almost a century earlier. Literally and metaphorically, they were at some considerable distance from their former life at Probolinggo, more than 400 kilometres away to the east, and set about forging a new and different colonial identity, one in which Johanna Bezoet de Bie-MacNeill was much to the fore.

Her previous colonial persona as the *nyonya besar* of a sugar factory's general manager would not have left her idle: quite the contrary, since her likely position as the family's (chief) letter writer – her husband being largely consumed by the business of the *fabriek* – would have placed her at the centre of the communications network that linked the Indies colonial elite to its metropolitan counterpart, while at the same time maintaining the vital web of ties between 'family' in the colony itself.[73] Her new role, however, as the marital partner of an ailing retiree – Alexander MacNeill died in March 1937 within a decade of the couple's return to the colony – was no longer a 'behind the scenes' one. Instead, she became the driving force in small venture that produced strawberries and other cool climate crops for sale to the resort hotels in Ambarawa as well as in Semarang itself. The photographic 'archive' – as well as stories handed down in the family about a woman who lived into the 1950s – is revealing here. The couple's residence was evidently a modest one in comparison with what they had known at Oemboel, and one of the few photographs of its interior (a photograph to which the passage of time has not been kind) shows a corner, more *gezellig* (cosy) than grand, and has written on the back the revealing remark (dated 13.4.1936) that this was ' the nicest part of the house'.

The most rewarding of the contemporary photos, however, show Bezoet de Bie-MacNeill in her market garden, accompanied by a small group of other European women in various poses – but dressed in a fashion that makes it clear that they are not involved, of course, in field work. As before, Indonesians – the people who would actually have planted and tended the crops – are themselves absent from the scene.

Fig. 22. 1930s: The Couple's House at Bandungan, Central Java.

73. See, e.g., Henk Schulte Nordholt (ed.), *Het dagelijks leven in Indië 1937-1947: brieven van O. Schulte Nordholt-Zielhuis*, Zutphen, Walburg Pers, 1999: 9-11.

Fig. 23. 1930s: Johanna Bezoet De Bie and friends in her market garden.

After her husband's death, Johanna Bezoet de Bie did not remain long in the Indies. Indeed, she sailed back to the Netherlands two months later, in May 1937,[74] and was re-united there with both sides of her family. It may well have been a happy return: leastways, a year or two later, sometime toward the end of the 1930s, a street photographer, poised with his camera in the centre of The Hague, near the medieval *Gevangenpoort* (Prison Gate), shot a picture of an elegantly dressed older woman and three boys in their early teens – her grandsons, Dirk, Alexander and Richard MacNeill – in joyful, even exuberant mood. The Second World War, the German invasion of the Netherlands and the subsequent 'loss' of the Indies, all of which would further re-shape the MacNeill family's trajectory, were only a very few years away, but in this photograph, at least, that corner had yet to be turned….

Conclusion: The Multiplexity of Diaspora

The immediate context of the story of Johanna Bezoet de Bie and Alexander MacNeill is the nexus between the extensive creole Dutch communities

74. *Indische* Courant, 20.5.1937.

Fig. 24. Back in The Hague ca. 1938: Johanna Bezoet de Bie and her grandchildren.

of the Indies and their counterparts in the metropolitan Netherlands. In this particular case, it has been suggested, the two individuals concerned experienced the Indies, not as a place to settle but as the foundation for a 'return' to the metropolis after a necessary *sojourn* in what was, nonetheless, the country of their birth and childhood. The couple's story is located, however, in an altogether broader frame, one that embraces not only Dutch diasporic communities but also the history of the *Scots* of the diaspora who found their way to 'the East' during the course of the 'long' nineteenth century. Bezoet de Bie, it has to be remembered, was married to an individual whose ethnic and cultural identification with the Indies and the Netherlands existed alongside a Scottish one. It was, moreover, a Scottishness that ranged across the generations and was not only maintained but also re-invigorated by his and Bezoet de Bie's descendants. Indeed, the grandchildren whom we have just seen in the photograph with their *oma* [grandmother] taken in The Hague late in the 1930s subsequently set about a rigorous reconstruction of the record of their Scots ancestry as reflected in extensive memoranda and the like that accompany the photographic 'archive' of the family's Indies years

drawn upon in the preceding pages. As such, the Bezoet de Bie-MacNeill story adds a further – and very necessary – dimension to an understanding of the sheer multiplexity of diaspora: their story forms part of a fabric that had many threads – and to neglect it would be to miss one of those intersections in social history at which the purely quantitative must cede some space to the 'merely' qualitative.

Syamsul Rijal[1]

Performing Arab Saints and Marketing the Prophet: *Habaib* and Islamic Markets in Contemporary Indonesia

Introduction[2]

Post-Soeharto Indonesia has witnessed the proliferation of young Hadhrami Arab preachers along with their sermon groups (*majelis taklim* and *majelis dzikir*). They are popularly called *habib* (sing.) or *habaib* (pl.) indicating their genealogical link to the Prophet.[3] The *habaib* generally wear white turbans (*imamah*) and long robes (*jubah*), and some hold a walking stick in their hand emulating the Prophet's appearance. They usually deliver sermons on stage with a number of other *habaib* and local preachers accompanied by a group of traditional Arab musical performers (*hadhrah*). Popular preachers such as Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf, the late Habib Munzir b. Fuad Al-Musawa, Habib Syech b. Abdul Qadir Assegaf, and Habib Noval b. Muhammad

1. The Faculty of *Dakwah* and Communication, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.

2. This article is a revised and improved part of my PhD thesis submitted to the Australian National University in 2016. I would like to thank my former thesis supervisor, Associate Professor Greg Fealy, and my advisors, Associate Professor Marcus Mietzner and Associate Professor Ronit Ricci, for their invaluable feedbacks and enduring support during the earlier formation of this draft. I also thank the reviewers of *Archipel* in Paris for their constructive feedbacks on improving my article draft. Finally, I am indebted to Thuy Pham for her kind assistance in correcting and polishing my article draft.

3. In Indonesian use, *habib* (sing.) or *habaib* (pl.) refer to an honorific title given to religiously learned men of Hadhrami-Arab descent who claim a genealogy to the Prophet Muhammad, while sayyid (lord) refers to a social status for the descendants of the Prophet who have lived in Hadhramaut, Yemen, and other countries.

Alaydrus have gained a high profile among traditionalist Muslims in urban areas, most notably in Jakarta, Central Java, and East Java. Their public sermons usually attract thousands and frequently create traffic jams as people and vendors of religious merchandises crowd onto nearby streets. This phenomenon indicates two important aspects: the popularity of Arab-*sayyid* culture in public preaching and the rising demand for public preaching among Indonesian Muslims.

Several celebrity preachers have been rising in Indonesia with their own distinctive styles and approaches. Many preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym), the late Jefrie al-Buchori (Uje), Yusuf Mansur, the late Arifin Ilham, Maulana Nur, Mamah Dedeh, Abdul Somad, and Adi Hidayat have turned into celebrities due to their roles on national television and social media. Due to the demands for entertainment and information, many TV stations offer more opportunities for preachers who have media literacy and good mass communication skills (Muzakki 2008: 210). Each celebrity preacher has his own trademark of religious entrepreneurship: Aa Gym uses simple everyday language in his preaching concentrating on 'heart development' or what he called '*Manajemen Qalbu*'; the late Arifin Ilham had a skill in leading mass gatherings reciting prayers and chants; Yusuf Mansur has a preaching style that promotes the power of philanthropy, especially alms giving (*sedekah*) for achieving prosperity; the late Uje had been skilled in using 'street talk' (*bahasa gaul*) and singing Islamic songs (Fealy 2008: 25-26); while other preachers such as Maulana Nur and Abdul Somad employ humour in their preaching. A study by Hew Wai Weng also points to the rise of Chinese Muslim preachers who capitalise on their Chineseness while using a mixture of different performing styles to lift their popularity (Hew 2018: 120-158).

Several scholars have studied the shift of religious authority from the traditionally trained preachers to lay preachers who have created what Hoesterey calls "innovative claims of religious authority" (Hoesterey 2008: 97). According to Julian Millie, the rising Muslim televangelists in Indonesia, most of whom lack formal religious qualifications, "break the mold of the classic or old-style religious scholars (*ulama*)" (Millie 2012: 123). While most scholars have focused their attention on the new preachers who broke away from tradition, this study discusses new preachers who style themselves as traditionalist *ulama*s and saints (*wali*). In recent years, there has been a growing number of traditionalist preachers in urban areas, especially in Jakarta, thanks to a variety of new media technologies and marketing strategies. Focusing on *habaib* preachers and their sermon groups, I will take the case of Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf and analyse how he has emerged as a popular preacher by examining his profile and autobiography, sermons, *dakwah* performance styles, and his religious branding. This article argues that *habaib* rely more

on performance and entertainment than oratorical competence in attracting followers. Their appeal lies in their distinctive appearance, which combines symbols of traditionalism, sainthood, and Arabness. The *habaib* perform as traditionalist scholars and Arab saints, a classical style that makes them look charismatic and authoritative to audiences. This study confirms Hilary Kalmbach's analysis of new religious intellectuals in Egypt that "performance plays a key role in the legitimation of Islamic authority" (Kalmbach, 2015, p. 163). This notion implies that having a traditional education and religious capital (as *habib*) is not sufficient to gain popularity; a preacher also needs to perform as traditionalist scholar and saint to meet the expectation of his audiences.

The major data in this article is based on my fieldwork that I undertook for nine months in Jakarta in 2013 with some update observations in 2019. My fieldwork included a number of interviews and informal conversations with *habaib*, sermon groups' staffs, and their followers, as well as participatory observations in numerous religious events organized by various sermon groups in Jakarta, most notably the Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah. Besides, I also accessed and analysed self-marketing books, Islamic magazines, and various merchandises that have been sold and circulated within traditionalist Muslims, especially when public sermons have been held in a particular venue. This study, therefore, employs a qualitative research that combines ethnography and textual analysis to understand the behaviour of religious elites in preaching and marketing.

The first part of this article provides a brief discussion on *majelis taklim* and analyses its connection with socio-political context and religious market in Indonesia. The second part discusses Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf along with his sermon group in Jakarta. It analyses how he founded and developed his sermon group as well as popularised his *dakwah* among Jakartan Muslims. The third part looks at the growing popularity of *habaib* along with their *majelis* by underlining three aspects of their commodification: the performative aspect of sainthood and Arab ethnicity; the role of new media and musicality in popularising their *dakwah*; and the reference to the Prophetic symbols in their branding.

Majelis Taklim, Religious Market and New Media

Majelis taklim is a popular venue for Indonesian Muslims to receive Islamic knowledge by listening to a single preacher or several preachers. Abaza defines it as "a meeting, sitting or council where the process of *ta'lim* (education) takes place" (Abaza 2004: 179). *Majelis taklim* is often associated with Islamic study groups, religious learning forums, preaching gatherings, private gatherings for religious teaching, and as salon-style religious discussion groups (Winn 2012). In the Muslim world, *majelis taklim* is quite similar with *halaqah*, a common term for Islamic study circle. However, the

term and form of *majelis taklim* is distinctive and only found in Indonesia. While it is informal and open to the public, *majelis* is usually convened in mosques, houses, meeting rooms in hotels or offices, or in public area. Many preachers or organizers of *majelis taklim* usually provide a special large room in their houses with mats on the floor (Abaza 2004: 179). There is no clear history on the origin of the *majelis* in Indonesia, yet some *habaib* refer to the Majelis Taklim Habib Ali Kwitang in Jakarta as the pioneering *majelis* in Indonesia. The *majelis* was founded by Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman al-Habsyi (popularly called as Habib Ali Kwitang) at the end of the 19th century and has been continued by his descendants up to the present. Many local *kiai*s and large number of participants attended the *majelis* throughout history (Alatas 2011: 57). In the past, *majelis taklim* such as Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang were led by a senior *habib* whose religious knowledge was acknowledged by local communities. Their popularity with the Muslim public was apparently due to their charisma and their mastery of traditional Islamic knowledge.

Majelis taklim gatherings had received national media attention from the 1990s onwards at the time when Islamic revival shaped the social and cultural spaces of Indonesian Muslims (Winn 2012). *Majelis* has been more popular among middle-aged and married Muslim women who not only want to study Islam but also to spend time with their friends and neighbours. According to Phillip Winn (2012), "participation in *majelis taklim* attracted considerable legitimacy as a vehicle for religiously engaged contemporary Muslim women to contribute to national life". Due to its popularity, *majelis* spread in many provinces. According to the directorate of Islamic education, there were 153,357 *majelis taklim* in Indonesia in 2006 (Winn 2012). As the number of participants increased, 735 *majelis taklim* agreed to establish the Body for Contacts among *majelis taklim* (*Badan Kontak Majelis Taklim*, BKMT) in Jakarta in 1981. It was chaired by the late Prof. Tutty Alawiyah (1942-2016), a daughter of the late Jakartan *ulama*, K.H. Abdullah Syafi'i (1910-1985). According to its website, the special objective of BKMT is "to increase the ability and role of *majelis taklim* in enhancing the greatness of Islam (s*yiar*) and developing the intellectual capacity of the *umma*.[4]

Although in its development *majelis taklim* was largely associated with the domain of Muslim women, there were a few *majelis taklim* which had male-only followers or mixed sex meetings. The oldest *habaib majelis* in Jakarta, Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang, for instance, consists of male and female audiences who are segregated during the sermon. Another old *majelis*, such as Al-Kifahi Al-Tsaqafi, in Bukit Duri, Jakarta, also has both men and women as followers, but each of group has a different schedule. The common characteristic of *majelis* audiences in the past is that they consisted predominantly of older people and very few youths and teenagers.

4. See more details at http://bkmt.or.id/index/sejarah-bkmt/ (accessed 8 October 2019).

The booming popularity of young *habaib*-led *majelis taklim* among young Muslims has become a new phenomenon in post-Soeharto Indonesia. While the older generation of *habaib* prefer to keep a low profile, the new generation actively promote themselves. There are several points that distinguish them from earlier generations of *habaib* preachers. Firstly, most of the new preachers are young, ranging from 20 to 30 years at the start of their preaching career. Many of them graduated from Hadhramaut, Yemen, while some graduated from traditional Islamic schools (*pesantren*) in Java. Secondly, the new preachers tend to establish their own *majelis taklim*, becoming the pivotal figure in their organisation, and utilising advertising and the internet to promote their sermons. The newly established *majelis* often have a logo or brand, flags, a headquarters, official website, and religious merchandise. They also have a multimedia team, young staff members and volunteers to help organise their events. Thirdly, many young *habaib* preachers emphasise their distinctive status by wearing a white turban, a long white dress, and a shawl (mostly green) on their shoulders. Finally, most of the participants in this type of *majelis* are young people, both men and women, ranging from 12 to 30 years and mostly coming from the traditionalist Muslim families. Participants usually wear the uniform jackets of the *majelis* showing their commitment and their linked identity to the *majelis*.

The resurgence of *habaib dakwah* cannot be isolated from the context of competing authority among Muslim groups. In the evolving public sphere and increasingly deregulated market, we have witnessed the rapid expansion of various Muslim groups that compete for followers (Meuleman 2011). They actively organise public activities, sell religious products, and spread their religious messages through the new media. Various interpretations of religious messages, ranging from puritanical to liberal ones, have been disseminated in print media and the internet. The advanced development in technology and communication as well as globalization has allowed the flow of ideas from overseas. Several new Muslim movements rooted in the Middle East have expanded their ideology through *dakwah* and education in Indonesia. Among the new Islamic movements, Salafi groups are prominent in preaching Islamic purification through sermons, education and new media.[5] They also denounce the beliefs and rituals of traditionalist Muslims which they regarded as unlawful innovation (*bid'ah*). Traditionalist Muslims, who constitute the Muslim majority in Indonesia, believe that Salafi *dakwah* has been a challenge to their tradition. The community became increasingly concerned when several incidents appeared to threaten their position, such as the taking over of traditionalist mosques, the denouncing of unlawful innovation (*bid'ah*) in

5. For a good account on the early and contemporary development of Salafi in Indonesia, see Hasan (2006), Wahid (2014), Jahroni (2015), Sunarwoto (2016), and Chaplin (2018).

their religious practices, and Salafi 'penetration' into Muslim organisations (Nuhrison 2010, Saparudin & Emawati 2018).[6]

In a situation where traditionalist Muslims were under the perceived 'threat' of Salafi and other new Muslim groups, there was a growing demand for *dakwah* and religious marketing within the traditionalist community. Religious marketing in this sense refers to "a competition for followers who can be captured on the basis of strong public presence and seducing and convincing rhetoric, performance, and imagery" (de Witte et. al. 2015: 120). In this sense, *dakwah* and religious markets are a medium for preachers and religious groups to attract followers. This resonates with Pattana Kitiarsa's view (2008 and 2010) which counters secularisation theory emphasising the triumph of market over religion. He contends that "market and media make religions more accessible to the public and convert religions into popular cultural practice in modern societies…" (Kitiarsa 2010: 579). This point of view is adopted by the majority of *habaib* preachers who seek to popularise their traditionalist Islam through new media and markets. Realising the growing demand for *dakwah* from traditionalist communities, *habaib* have responded by conducting *dakwah* through sermon groups (*majelis taklim*) in urban areas. They called on Muslims to strengthen their Sunni belief through regular participation in *majelis taklim* so that they can protect themselves from the influence of Salafi and other 'deviant' groups.

The increasing competition for followers led *habaib* to creatively brand their traditionalist *dakwah* and fashion it in order to meet the aspirations of urban Muslim youth. *Habaib* are determined to establish sermon groups (*majelis taklim*) that are totally different from conventional ones. The new sermon groups are structured in such a way as to offer young Muslims a venue to express their aspirations through *dakwah* activism and identity expressions. The *habaib* fashioned their *majelis taklim* to be like a public performance and entertainment that give followers active roles. As a result, the *majelis* is no longer seen as a serious place for religious learning, but rather a pleasurable place for socialising, chanting, and singing praises of the Prophet accompanied by traditional musical performance.

Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf and His Sermon Group

Habib Hasan, founder of the Majelis Nurul Mustafa (Council of the Light of the Chosen One), was born in Bogor, West Java, in 1977. He grew up in a *sayyid*

6. Some *habaib* whom I interviewed and observed in 2013 worried about the expansion of Salafi *dakwah* activities in Indonesia. A popular young preacher in Solo, Habib Noval b. Muhammad Alaydrus, has criticized Salafi-Wahhabism and defended traditionalist Islam through his sermons and his books. See, for instance, his book (2011), *Ahlul Bid'ah Hasanah: Jawaban Untuk Mereka Yang Mempersoalkan Amalan Para Wali* (*The Doers of Good Innovation: The Answers for those who question the practices of saints*).

family that attached great importance to their children's religious practice and education. Habib Hasan has a genealogical connection to a charismatic *sayyid ulama* in Bogor, Habib Abdullah b. Muhsin Al-Attas, through his mother Syarifah Fatmah b. Hasan. He spent his childhood in the village of Keramat Empang where the grave of his grandfather, Habib Abdullah, is located. The grave has been venerated and visited by many *ulama*s both from Indonesia and other countries because Habib Abdullah is revered as a *wali* (saint) (Mauladdawilah 2010: 38). Most of Habib Hasan's education was shaped by Indonesian *ulama*s, both Hadhrami and non-Hadhrami. He received his early education from his father, Habib Ja'far b. Umar Assegaf, who was familiar with the practices and rituals of *tariqa Alawiya* (the spiritual path of Alawi ancestors). Habib Hasan also studied with local Hadhrami *ulama*s such as Syeikh Usman Baraja, Abdul Qadir Basalamah, and Syeikh Ahmad Bafadhal (Mauladdawilah 2010: 39).

Fig. 1. Photo of Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf
Source: www.pecintaassegaf.wordpress.com.

Habib Hasan spent his formal education in traditional religious schools (*pesantren*) in Malang, East Java, starting with the Pesantren of Darul Hadith Al-Faqihiyyah, a traditional school established by Habib Abdul Qadir b. Ahmad bil-Faqih. Many *habaib* and *kiai*s sent their children to that *pesantren*

because of the high reputation of its founder who was well known for his expertise in Islamic studies, especially in *ulum al-hadith* (Science of Prophetic Tradition). After two years, Habib Hasan transferred to Pesantren Darut Tauhid, a *pesantren* that was also established and run by an Indonesian Arab Syeikh, Abdullah b. Awadh Abdun (*alKisah*, February 24, 2008). He also had the opportunity to study at the Tarbiyah Faculty of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel (now State Islamic University of Malang) (Zamhari and Howell 2012: 56). After two years in Darut Tauhid, Habib Hasan returned to Bogor to accept his grandfather's offer to send him to study in Hadhramaut. Sadly, this plan came to nothing when his grandfather died. Instead of travelling to Hadhramaut, he continued to gain Islamic knowledge through informal study clubs (*majelis taklim*) of *habaib* in Jakarta, such as the *majelis taklim* of Habib Abdurrahman b. Ahmad Assegaf and of Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman Assegaf. Besides, he also studied with local *kyai*s such as KH. Syafii Hadzami, KH. Dimyati in Banten, KH. Maman Satibi in Cianjur, KH. Buya Yahya in Bandung, KH. Muallim Shaleh in Bogor, and other *ulama*s in Jakarta (Mauladdawilah 2010: 48).

Habib Hasan started his religious teaching and preaching activities in Bogor in 1998 after gaining inspiration from what he claimed were his 'spiritual experiences'. When staying in Bogor, Habib Hasan isolated himself from social life, a phase which he called *'uzlah'* (self-seclusion from people). He claimed that for a year and three months, he spent all his time on three main acts of religious devotion: regular visits to the grave of his grandfather, Habib Abdullah b. Muhsin Al-Attas; conducting congregational prayers in a nearby mosque; and regular contemplation and *wirid* (reciting passages of praise and prayers to God). He recalled that it was through these acts of devotion that he gained inspiration and guidance (*bisyarah*) to undertake religious teaching and preaching to Muslims (Mauladdawilah 2010: 53). With the request from his father and support from local *kyai*s and *ustadz*, Habib Hasan began religious teaching and preaching by moving from one village to another until he could set up a *majelis taklim* in his parents' house. The *majelis*, which he named Al-Irfan (wisdom), succeeded in drawing about two hundred attendees. However, his father, Habib Ja'far Assegaf, opposed Habib Hasan's *majelis* being based in the regency where his grandfather had been famous. He suggested that Habib Hasan should establish his *majelis* in another regency where he could build his own reputation (Mauladdawilah 2010: 53-54). Following a visit to the grave of the charismatic *ulama* Habib Ahmad b. Alwi Al-Haddad (well known as Habib Kuncung) in South Jakarta, Habib Hasan had a dream in which Habib Kuncung asked him to move to the capital in order to continue his religious preaching (Zamhari and Howell 2012: 57).

Moving to South Jakarta, Habib Hasan started his *dakwah* among a small congregation of followers (*jemaah*). As a new preacher in the area, he visited local *kyai*s and local figures to gain support for his *majelis*. Initially, the preaching activity took place in the houses of his students. As the number of participants began to increase to hundreds of people, however, Habib Hasan was forced to move his *majelis* to several mosques in Cilandak, South Jakarta (*alKisah*, February 24, 2008). Soon the number of participants grew too large even for the mosques; therefore, Habib Hasan decided to hold public preaching in open areas such as roads and fields (Mauladdawilah 2010: 91).

As the *majelis* gained more participants, Habib Hasan changed the name of his *majelis* from Al-Irfan (wisdom) to Majelis Nurul Musthofa (the Light of the Chosen man) in 2001, following a consultation with two charismatic *habaib*, Habib Umar b. Hafiz of Tarim, Yemen, and Habib Anis b. Alwi Al-Habsyi of Solo, Central Java, who made a visit to the *majelis* that year (Mauladdawilah 2010: 91, 96, 97). The term "Musthofa" (the Chosen One) refers to a name of the Prophet Muhammad, evidence that the *majelis* was using the Prophet as their symbol. This name change was considered to be a kind of 'spiritual authorisation' (*ijazah*) for Hasan to lead his *majelis* (Mauladdawilah 2010: 97; Zamhari & Howell 2012: 58).

To promote his *majelis*, Habib Hasan formed a management team in 2002. The crew's main task was to help Habib Hasan in managing and promoting the *majelis* to a wider audience and, more importantly, creating new strategies for attracting young Muslims (*alKisah*, February 24, 2008: 125). To that end, Habib Hasan and his crew have employed a wide variety of publicity strategies. Several days before the *majelis*, for instance, the crew would erect long banners, billboards, and flags of their *majelis* along the streets near the advertised location of the coming event. The photos of Habib Hasan with his brothers and guest preachers featured prominently in the advertisement. The crew was also in charge of the production of religious merchandise such as jackets, key holders, stickers, posters, DVDs and books with the *majelis* logo or Habib Hasan's photo on them. On the day, a convoy of vehicles and motorcyclists would be organised to escort Habib Hasan to the location of the *majelis*. Habib Hasan would be riding at the front in a sedan guarded by police officers on motorcycles. There would also be fireworks to entertain young participants.

The leadership of the Majelis Nurul Musthofa rests with Habib Hasan and his brothers. Previously, Habib Hasan was the sole leader of the *majelis*, yet after his three brothers completed their studies, he called on them to play a greater role in the *majelis*. His brothers are Habib Abdullah b. Ja'far Assegaf, Habib Musthofa b. Ja'far Assegaf, and Habib Qasim b. Ja'far Assegaf. Habib Abdullah completed his senior high school in the Pesantren Dar al-Lughah wa al-Da'wa in Pasuruan, while the other brothers studied for

some years in Hadhramaut. The presence of two of Habib Hasan's brothers who graduated from Hadhramaut has strengthened the religious authority of the *majelis* by connecting it to the centre of saints (*wali*) in Hadhramaut, Yemen. The growing demands of public preaching prompted Habib Hasan to divide the *dakwah* areas among his brothers. Their *dakwah* areas are known collectively as Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). Habib Abdullah, for instance, is assigned to help Habib Hasan in South Jakarta; Habib Musthofa is assigned to be the leader of the *majelis* in Bogor, Ciawi, and Cibinong, while Habib Qasim is responsible for East Jakarta and surrounding areas such as Bekasi and Pondok Gede.[7] Habib Hasan regularly invites local senior preachers such as KH. Abdul Hayyie Na'im[8], KH. Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi'i[9], Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman Assegaf[10], Habib Muhammad Rizieq b. Syihab[11], KH. Adnan Idris[12] and the late Ustadz

7. Interview with Abdullah Assegaf, Jakarta, 13 June 2013.

8. Son of Jakartan *Ulama*, KH. Muhammad Na'im (1912-1973), Abdul Hayyie studied at Pesantren Tebu Ireng, East Java, before going to Mecca to study at Dar al-'Ulum under the guidance of Syeikh Yasin Al-Fadani. Returning to Jakarta, he led the *madrasah* al-Nur and actively gave sermons in various *majelis taklim* in Jakarta. His short biography is available at https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/66695/kh-abdul-hayyie-naim-santri-pengelana-di-jazirah-arab- (accessed 13 January 2019).

9. He is a popular preacher among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the son of the charismatic *ulama* KH. Abdulah Syafi'i (1910-1985), who was the founder and leader of Perguruan Syafi'iyah (Islamic studies academy) that offered Islamic education from kindergarten to higher education level in Jakarta. Abdul Rasyid himself established an Islamic boarding school for Qur'anic studies, the Pesantren Al-Qur'an Asy-Syafi'iyah, in Sukabumi, West Java. His lineage to Abdullah Syafi'i has given him Islamic authority and popularity in Jakarta.

10. He is a popular *habib* among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the son of the senior *ulama* Habib Abdul Rahman b. Ahmad Assegaf (1908-2007), who has established a center of informal Islamic education, the Madrasah Tsaqafah Islamiyah, an Islamic school that has been well known among traditionalist Hadhrami communities in Indonesia. Following his father's example, Habib Ali has established the Majelis Taklim Al-'Afaf, in Bukit Duri, South Jakarta.

11. Habib Rizieq is notorious for his leading role in Islamist activism and his harsh opposition to Indonesian government. He was the founder and supreme leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), an Islamist organisation that was established in 1998. Habib Rizieq was jailed several months for inciting hatred and violence. His reputation has been rising among Indonesian conservative Muslims in 2016 after his successful campaign, through the 212 movement, to prosecute the Christian Governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (well known as Ahok) on blasphemy charges. As a result, Ahok lost in the Gubernatorial election and ended in jail. In May 2017, Habib Rizieq fled to Saudi Arabia after being charged by Indonesian police for violating the pornography law and refused to return to his country. Although he is seen as an Islamist, Habib Rizieq is in fact traditionalist in his religious orientation and has often criticized Wahhabi teaching in his sermons. For good discussion on his *dakwah* movement, see Mark Woodward et.al (2012).

12. He is also a popular preacher among traditionalist Muslims in Jakarta. He is the leader of the Majelis Taklim Thursina, in Cilandak, South Jakarta.

Jeffrie Al-Bukhari (1973-2013)[13] (Mauladdawilah 2010: 90). The presence of these popular preachers adds variety and entertainment to performances that often last for three hours. Habib Hasan sometimes invites guest speakers from Hadhramaut who happen to be visiting Indonesia at the time. Preaching in the Arabic language, these guest speakers help to enhance the image of the *majelis* through their connection to the Middle East – the origin of Islam – as well as providing the *majelis* with religious legitimacy.

Nurul Musthofa has established itself as one of the biggest *majelis* with a large following among Muslim youth. In 2005, the *majelis* was transformed into a *yayasan* (foundation) and was formally registered as "Majelis Shalawat and Zikir Nurul Musthofa" with the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The foundation is headed by Habib Hasan's brother, Habib Abdullah. Nurul Musthofa focuses on public preaching that takes place almost every night. Based on my observation, the public preaching of the *majelis* can attract tens of thousands of participants and in some occasions, especially at National Monuments, it can draw up to fifty thousand people. The *majelis* now has its own permanent building that functions as a centre of organisational operations as well as a place for regular preaching and praying. It is located behind the house of Habib Hasan in Ciganjur, South Jakarta. All equipment such as musical instruments, loud speakers, audio system tools, and banners are kept in that building. Some staff members live in that building and make all necessary preparations for the *majelis*.

Performing Arab Saints (*Wali*)

One distinctive aspect of the *dakwah* of new *habaib* is the promotion of sainthood (*kewalian)*. Both *sayyid* status and the Arab ethnicity are expressed in the performance of a *habib* preacher. Sayyidness here refers to the genealogical link to the Prophet marked by the title "*habib*" (beloved) attached to the name of the preacher. In addition, particular clothing and visual attributes also represent outward marks of a *habib*. Their appearance also expresses their Arabness as they originated in Hadhramaut, Yemen. Many of their followers also remark favourably upon what they see as typical Arab traits, such as long sharp noses, beards, and dark complexion. Besides, several *majelis* use Arabic words on their banner on the stage.

The lineage to the Prophet endows the *habaib* with a special position in the Muslim community. Several books and posters sold in the *majelis taklim* as well as the stories told by the *habaib* preachers describe some *sayyid ulama*s in Indonesia's past as Muslim saints (*wali*) who not only played a major role in Islamisation but also possessed extraordinary spiritual powers.

13. He was a celebrity preacher who often gave sermons on national TVs. He was famous for his good singing voice and youth-style approach in preaching. He died in 2013 in a motorbike accident.

The *wali*'s graves are considered "*keramat*" (sacred) by many and have the power to give blessings to their visitors. According to Sumit Mandal, calling a specific burial place "*keramat"* is a form of respect from the community for the deceased because of "his outstanding spiritual piety, learning, historical accomplishments or some other notable distinctions" (Mandal 2012: 357). During my fieldwork in Jakarta and Java, I visited several sacred graves that attracted many visitors. The graves of popular saints in Jakarta, for instance, include those of Habib Ali b. Abdulrahman Al-Habsyi in Kwitang Jakarta, Habib Hasan b. Muhammad Al-Haddad and Habib Husein b. Abubakar Alaydrus in North Jakarta, and Habib Ahmad Al-Haddad in Kalibata South Jakarta. These graves have become popular destinations for young *habaib* preachers who include saint veneration in their *majelis*' regular program. Their visit is meant to bring blessings (*baraka*) from the dead saint and the hope that their prayers are answered by God due to the mediating role of the saints.

For traditionalist Muslims, *habaib* are considered as having inherited blessings (*baraka*) through their blood connection to the Prophet. The *baraka* for traditionalist Muslims can bring success and happiness or a way out of the problems in their lives.[14] It is therefore not surprising to see Muslim participants in the *majelis* stand up when they meet a *habib* and flock to shake and kiss his hand hoping to get blessings from him. Some participants also bring a bottle of water and request the *habib* to recite prayers that would give the water healing powers or the power to solve any problem that might be troubling the participant.

A clear indication of descent from the Prophet is the attribution of title "habib" or "al-habib" before the name. In colonial times and early independence, the title "sayyid" (lord) was more popularly used in print rather than "habib". This is based on my reading of old newspapers and internal publications of Majelis Habib Ali Kwitang in Jakarta. Several *habaib* told me the usage of *habib* title is now more popular than *sayyid* in Hadhramaut and Indonesia. According to the chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah (the Alawi Union), Sayyid Zein b. Smith, the tittle of *habib* cannot be attributed to all descendants of the Prophet. He stated that every *habib* is *sayyid*, but not all s*ayyid*s can become *habib*. The recognition of *habib* has to come from a community with several requirements. To be a *habib*, a *sayyid* needs to be of mature age, erudite and learned in Islamic knowledge, implementing religious knowledge in practice, showing sincerity, fearing God (*takwa*), and applying Islamic ethics (*akhlak*). However, as mentioned above, the title is now increasingly used by many young *sayyid*s for doing *dakwah* despite their limited knowledge of Islam and their lack of ethical qualities (*Republika*, 11 October 2014). This suggests that the new preachers realise the marketing value of the title in enhancing their

14. For further discussion on holy men and *baraka* in Islamic tradition, see Meri (1999) and Takim (2006).

authority. This is also the case with the title "kiai"[15] which is now routinely attributed to new preachers. The commodification of *habib*'s title is clearly apparent from the advertisement media and websites that promote a new preacher figure of *majelis taklim*.

The *sayyid* communities have a family organisation, Rabithah Alawiyah that issues a genealogical book (*buku nasab*) for their members. Founded in 1928, the organisation serves to strengthen solidarity among *sayyid*s with a primary concern for improving education and *dakwah*. One of its roles is to maintain genealogical records and formally issue a genealogical certificate. For those who want to obtain an official certificate of *sayyid/sharifa*, they need to apply to the Rabithah office and bring proof of their family connection in the line of their father. Some Rabithah staff worry that the booming popularity of *habaib* preachers leads to the commodification of *habib* status.[16] They remark that some preachers in Jakarta and South Kalimantan use fake titles in order to promote themselves in the preaching market. However, they have not taken any action against this. Instead, they call on *sayyid* community to preserve their cultural and religious tradition. One of the ways is to apply for the genealogical book through Rabithah office. By having the book, the *sayyid*s can show the proof of their lineage. This is important especially for maintaining the *kafa'ah* (equality in marriage) tradition within *sayyid* community, in which a female *sayyid* (*sharifa*) is required to marry a *sayyid* man who can prove his sayyidness through the genealogical book.[17]

Given the importance of genealogy for building religious legitimacy, many *habaib* preachers display the poster of their genealogy prominently in their houses or offices. The poster shows the names of male family descendants back to the Prophet Muhammad. Most *habaib* preachers I met claim they are the 38th to 40th generation descendants of the Prophet. According to Alwe Al-Mashoor, the family names of Alawiyyin total about 180 and those also reflect their *sayyid* identity (Al-Mashoor 2011: 175). Several family names of popular preachers in Indonesia include Al-Aththas, Al-Saqqaf, Shihab, Al-Habsyi, Al-Aydarus, Al-Kaff, b. Jindan, Al-Musawa, b. Yahya, Jamalullail, and Al-Jufri.

Apart from title and family name, dress is also important in expressing sayyidness. The *habaib*'s clothes follow the old style of traditional *ulama* and saints (*wali* or *sunan*) in Indonesia. *Habaib* preachers often wear those as identity markers. Moreover, some preachers also bring *siwak* (tooth-cleaning stick made from tree twigs) in their pockets and use them before conducting a

15. *Kiai* simply means a traditional religious leader and scholar. In the past, it generally referred to a religiously learned man who both had the intellectual capacity to access Arabic books and led a traditional Islamic school (*pesantren*).

16. Interview with Muhammad and Ghazi Alaydrus, Jakarta, 18 June 2013.

17. Interview with Muhammad and Ghazi Alaydrus, Jakarta, 18 June 2013.

Fig. 2. A poster of the genealogical tree of Habib Hasan b. Ja'far Assegaf at his headquarter in South Jakarta.[18]

prayer. *Habaib* consider their style of clothing as imitating the clothes worn by the Prophet during his lifetime. I observed a popular *habib* preacher in Malang who suggested that his male followers should wear turbans as a symbol piety. He argued that the Prophet, his companions, and many *ulama*s in the past wore turbans during their lifetimes.

The traditional dress of *habaib* also replicates the appearance of Muslim saints who have been imagined through Indonesian movies and popular culture. They are portrayed wearing long robes and white turbans. The famous

18. This image is available at https://www.facebook.com/1817079845185959/photos/a.1817428108484466/1817428111817799/?type=1&theater (accessed 13 January 2020).

Muslim saints in Java called 'the nine saints' (*wali songo*) are credited with spreading Islam in Java. While there are various versions of the origin of the saints, most *habaib* and a few Hadhami scholars (Alatas 1995; Shihab 2001) claim that the nine saints were originally from Hadhramaut and migrated to Southeast Asia for religious proselytising and trade. The tendency to claim sayyidness for 'the nine saints' is popularised in *habaib* owned magazines, most notably the *alKisah* magazine, and also in sermons. The *habaib* preachers often narrate their ancestor's struggles in Islamisation, their ethical principles, their spiritual exercises and miracles. By connecting with the past, the *habaib* seek to emphasise the important roles of their ancestors and their spiritual qualities to the congregation. On some occasions, preachers recount their dreams to their followers describing how they meet the Prophet and dead saints and receive messages and advice from them. The story of the late Habib Munzir's dream, for instance, was widely circulated among his followers after his death in 2013. Long before his death, Habib Munzir had told his followers that he saw the Prophet in a dream. In the dream, the Prophet suggested Habib Munzir take a rest from *dakwah* and promised that he would meet the Prophet at the age of forty. This dream was later interpreted as a prediction of Habib Munzir's death at the age of forty. This story was often related with pride by his brother, Habib Nabiel b. Fuad al-Musawa, and other *habaib* preachers, alluding to the miracle (*karama*) of Habib Munzir. Miraculous stories like this are common in Sufi literature, which bestows special status on Muslim saints. The dream narratives have been used by several preachers as a way of building their spiritual authority with Muslim followers.

Mediating Spirituality with Musicality

Many young *habaib* preachers have used new communication technology as an instrument in promoting their *majelis* and disseminating their messages to a wider audience. The use of new media, especially the internet, and advertising was started by the two largest *majelis* in Jakarta, namely the Majelis Nurul Musthofa and the Majelis Rasulullah. Both *majelis* began their *dakwah* expansion in 1998 in Jakarta. The *majelis* website is critical in promoting the *habib* leader or main preacher and his *majelis*. The home page of the Nurul Musthofa website, for instance, shows images of the *habib* appearing pious in traditionalist costume, praying or preaching to the congregation. The page provides various options such as a *majelis* profile, *majelis* programs and schedules, documentations of *dakwah* events, Islamic songs (*qasidah*) and prayers, social media links, Radio Live, YouTube channel and live streaming YouTube, and so forth. More recently, in 2019, the page also advertises pilgrimage travels to Mecca and Medina under the guidance of Habib Hasan and his brothers. The options in the website not only give information on *majelis* and religious messages, but also encourage audiences

to engage in and support their *dakwah* through donations. On the website and social media, the sermons of *habaib* are accessible and people can watch live streamed preaching and listen to musical prayers. Besides, they provide online spaces for Muslim audiences to follow the ongoing activities of the *majelis* and take part online by posing questions and making comments related to the *majelis* program or theological matters.

Fig. 3. The website of Nurul Musthofa.

The new media has enabled the creation of informal networks that link the followers of *majelis taklim*. The most popular media for young followers are mailing list, online communities in social media, and chat groups through smart phone. Some *habaib* fans have created community pages in social media to strengthen the bond among followers. Through online communities, followers can discuss and share their stories and impressions of their *habib* as well as sharing information on the forthcoming activities of the *majelis*. Moreover, they can mobilise their peers to attend *majelis* religious programs or social gathering. The followers of Majelis Rasulullah, for instance, have mobilised their fellows to attend public preaching or to organise solidarity meetings called "Kopi Darat" (Meet to know each other) in the house of their fellow volunteers. For the latter activity, they often invite the second rank *habib* and some staff of the Majelis Rasulullah to give a sermon at their own

gatherings.[19] The host of the meeting feels blessed due to the presence of a *habib* and believes that the recital of the Prophet's praises in his or her house can bring them more good fortune and prosperity.

The young *habaib majelis* emphasises ethical improvement and practical Sufi practices rather than black and white legal doctrine. This is very different from global Muslim movements, most notably Salafi, which emphasize a strict set of Islamic theology and Islamic law in their study groups. *Habaib* preachers in most events appeal to people to be pious through religious rituals and good deeds and avoiding sins. Their *majelis* provide more ritualistic activities than serious learning of particular religious texts (*kitab*). Many informants feel that they obtain tranquillity and peace when attending the *majelis*. One female follower of Majelis Nurul Musthofa stated:

> I don't know why I was attracted to the *majelis* at first. The main thing is that when I come to the *majelis*, I feel peaceful and secure. I also feel free from any burdens and problems that I face in my life. What is more, when I join singing *salawatan* (sending praises to the Prophet), my tears cannot stop dropping.[20]

The distinctive part of the young *habaib majelis* is the recital of *dzikir* (remembrance of God) and *salawat* (praises to the Prophet) that can constitute up to half of the sermon activity. It is common for the participants to recite the prayers with great emotion, and some of them are moved to tears. During the recital participants usually hold in their hands the *majelis*' booklet containing a series of hagiographies of the Prophet, *dzikr* and *salawat* that are to be read during the preaching activity. Each *majelis* has produced its own recital booklet with their preacher's photo and logo on it. The Nurul Musthofa uses the hagiographic text written by the late Habib Ali b. Muhammad Al-Habsyi entitled *Simth al-Durar* (Chains of Pearls), while the Majelis Rasulullah uses the hagiographic text by the Yemeni Habib 'Umar b. Hafiz entitled *al-Dhiya al-Lamiy* (the Shimmering Light).

Arab traditional music (*hadhrah*) accompanies the chanting and preaching activities. The *majelis* has crew members assigned for chanting *dzikir*, *salawat*, and *maulid* texts, and singing Islamic songs. In Nurul Musthofa, the sermon is alternated with musical performance in order to avoid boring the congregation. The crew at the back play traditional musical instruments, such as tambourines and drums, with several vocalists singing the prayers and songs. The musical performance has become an important attraction for young participants to *majelis*. The leader of Nurul Musthofa has composed a number of religious songs which he adapted from popular Indonesian songs.[21] The music has created an extravaganza that stimulates emotion and excites

19. Interview with Ahmad Fauzi, Jakarta, 5 October 2013.
20. Interview with Siska, Jakarta, 13 February 2013.
21. Interview with Muhiddin, Jakarta, 20 October 2013.

the crowd. During the performance, some young followers wave their *majelis*' flags or swing their hands to the right and left while singing and enjoying the music as if they were in a music concert.

The leaders of *majelis taklim* have become superstars for Muslim youth due to the effect of their own media, advertisements, and performance. Self-promotion through websites, books, billboards, and merchandises have helped to bolster the profile of *habaib* among their audience and the general public who access such media. The participants, who engage with *habaib* and are awed by their performance, religious messages, and pleasing personality, help to spread their image to the wider community. Some participants relate their experiences to friends and family in the social media, and this helps to spread the *habaib*'s fame. Many followers of the *majelis* depict their preachers as holy men (*wali*), humble, pious, but also cool (*keren*). 'Coolness' in this sense means that *habaib*, although wearing a traditional garb, understand youth slangs and fancy style of speech and dress. Habib Hasan and his brothers in the Nurul Musthofa, for instance, often fascinate young participants by using the local dialect of Jakarta and slangs and wearing sunglasses. The *sayyid* status, self-promotion, and stylish performance have turned young *habaib* preachers into new idols for Muslim youths.

Marketing the Prophet

Young *habaib* have created a niche within the growing *dakwah* movements in Indonesia by identifying their movements as serving devotees of the Prophet Muhammad. Many of them have named their *majelis taklim* to emphasise the link with the Prophet: "Nurul Musthofa" (The Light of the Chosen One), "Majelis Rasulullah" (Assembly of the Prophet), "Ahbabul Musthofa" (The Lovers of the Chosen One), and "Waratsatul Musthofa" (the Inheritor of the Chosen One) to name but a few. The Majelis Rasulullah and Waratsatul Musthofa use the image of the Prophet's grave for their logo. They declare that their main concern of *dakwah* is to invite people to love the Prophet. They argue that in order to make people commit to the faith, young Muslims must first recognise and love the Prophet. To attract people to their religious sermon, *habaib* try to introduce Muhammad as a man through stories and Islamic songs instead of preaching about strict religious subjects. By introducing and preaching about Muhammad the Man, *habaib* hope that the congregation will make the Prophet the role model in their earthly lives.[22] This missionary method resembles the new evangelical churches in the USA, which preach discipleship of Jesus by following His teachings and examples (Stassen 2012: 51).

22. Interview with Alwi Al-Kaff, Jakarta, 12 March 2013.

Fig. 4. Logo of Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah.
Source: www.nurulmusthofa.org. and www.majelisrasulullah.org.

The love of the Prophet in *habaib majelis* is expressed in religious rituals and festivities that serve for remembering and sending praises to the prophet. The religious rituals associated with the Muslim traditionalists such as reciting praises to the Prophet (*salawatan*), celebrating the Prophet's birthday (*maulid*), and visiting saints' graves (*ziarah*) are framed as prophetic practices. This is different from reformist and Salafi groups which insist on the strict emulation of the Prophet in terms of religious practice and oppose unlawful innovations (*bid'ah*) that venerate the Prophet in the forms of *maulid* festivals and reciting praising texts to the Prophet. In several *majelis taklim*, the ritual of reading *maulid* texts usually precedes the preaching activities. Each *majelis* often celebrates the festivity of *maulid* in open area with thousands of participants. For *habaib* preachers, the *maulid* rituals are seen as a means to pleasing the Prophet. Some *habaib* and participants believe that the Prophet's spirit is present when *maulid* texts are recited. By reciting the praises of the Prophet, the congregation believe that they will get blessings for themselves and their families as well as gaining special help (*shafa'at*) from the Prophet in the hereafter regardless of their numerous sins.

Habaib use the symbols of the Prophet as branding in their religious marketing. According to Mara Einstein (2007: 70), branding is about "giving consumers something to think and feel about a product or service beyond its physical attributes". In Indonesia, various preachers and spiritual trainers have referred to the specific stories and sayings of the Prophet "in ways that resonate with the civic concerns, consumerist desires, and aspirational piety of the Muslim middle class" (Hoesterey 2012: 38-61). Aa Gym, for instance, when giving seminars and training on entrepreneurship, framed the Prophet as the role model of ethical entrepreneur who exemplified piety, trustworthiness, and initiative for achieving prosperity. This frame sought to show the Prophet as the measure of Muslim cosmopolitanism (Hoesterey 2012: 46). The *habaib,* however, brand their products as avenues for recognising and imitating the Prophet's personality and appearance. They argue that recognising the Prophet will lead people to deepen Islam and carry out its teachings. The

religious products with various prophetic symbols (*nabawi*) are attractive to the followers of *habaib*. The retail outlet of Majelis Rasulullah (MR) calls itself "Kios Nabawi" (the Prophet's Kiosk). It sells books on how to follow the Prophet's ethics and prayers. There are also several books by Hadhrami scholars on *maulid* texts containing poems and praise to the Prophet. The MR staff argue that the marketing of the merchandise is a form of *dakwah* and the income is used for supporting the circle of *majelis* activities.[23] By consuming these products, people identify themselves as the followers of *habaib* (*muhibbin*) and pious Muslims who help to ensure the survival of the Prophet's *dakwah*.

Considering that *habaib* are the family of the Prophet, the Prophet's branding can enhance the authority of *habaib* preachers. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of the *habaib*'s sermons are related to the Prophet Muhammad. Many *habaib* draw attention to the compassion and moral virtues of the Prophet. By connecting the Prophet to their *dakwah*, *habaib* send the message that they are closer to the Prophet and that they are the legitimate heirs of the Prophet in preaching Islam. To strengthen their legitimacy before the *umma*, some *habaib* declare that they have met and received guidance from the Prophet through dreams and visions.

In the growing competitive market of *habaib*'s *dakwah*, each *majelis* competes to provide a distinctive product that attracts young Muslim consumers. Habib Munzir of the Majelis Rasulullah, for instance, was a charismatic preacher who used literary, heartfelt, and heart-rending style (*dari hati ke hati*) in his sermons. His *majelis* is also the largest in terms of merchandising. Many followers claim that they have received knowledge and enlightenment after attending Habib Munzir's sermon. His experience of studying in Yemen and his attachment to Habib 'Umar of Yemen enhanced his authority among audiences. In the case of Habib Hasan of Nurul Musthofa, his strength lies in his accommodation of young people's aspirations and their strong liking for entertainment. The chanting and prayer singing of the lyrics composed by Habib Hasan are appealing to young followers, especially teenagers. Habib Hasan usually modifies Indonesian popular songs by changing their lyrics into religious ones. For his followers, the musical performance in the midst of sermons is more colourful and helps them avoid boredom when listening to preachers. Therefore, it is no wonder that many of his young followers are more amazed by the variety of fun and entertainment in the *majelis* than its sermons.

The popularity of *majelis* has enabled their leaders to develop a mutual interest with the state officials and politicians. Having a connection with the state officials is part of the social capital that *habaib* use in maintaining and advancing their *majelis*. On the one hand, the cooperation between the

23. Interview with Syukron Makmun, Jakarta, 9 October 2013.

majelis and the state officials and politicians helps funding and facilitating the activities of the *majelis* as well as enhancing its image for Muslim audiences. *Majelis* staff admitted that there have been donations from various politicians and businessmen. The donations include money, cars for *habaib* and *majelis* operations, and rent payments for *majelis* headquarters.[24] Both Nurul Musthofa and Majelis Rasulullah included former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and other government officials as advisory board members in the *majelis*. SBY himself established a *majelis taklim*, called Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam (The Light of Peace), which worked as a political venue for building his religious credentials among the *umma*. His own *majelis* also connected him to the networks of *majelis taklim* in Indonesia. During his presidency, his *majelis* often conducted a joint public preaching with *habaib majelis*, especially the Nurul Musthofa. The Nurul Musthofa staff stated that the joint activity with SBY's *majelis* was needed in order to gain support from the state in obtaining permission for public preaching as well as funding assistance for the development of the *majelis*.[25] They claimed that their close connection to the state officials and local government has resulted in easy access to public areas, especially the Monas area, for organising particular events. Moreover, due to such a close relationship, the Nurul Musthofa often received invitations from SBY to deliver sermons or recite prayers in both his palace in Jakarta and his house in Cikeas, West Java. The closeness of *habaib* with the President and some ministers was also used by *habaib* to promote their *majelis*' name. For example, the pictures of important political figures often appear in the *majelis*' profile and banners.

On the other hand, the state officials and politicians use these events as a means to polish their religious image, especially before an election. Borrowing Kertzer's perspective on ritual, politics, and power, religious events serve as a ritual for "aspiring political leaders… to assert their right to rule, incumbent power holders seek to bolster their authorities" (Kertzer 1988: 1). Former President SBY often attended and delivered a speech at the Prophet's birthday festivals (*maulid*) held at the national monument in Jakarta. His attendance reinforced the image of a president who cared about Muslim aspirations. Apart from SBY, some ministers, politicians, and presidential candidates also attended the *habaib majelis taklim*. During the 2014 presidential election, many presidential candidates, such as Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar), Hatta Rajasa (PAN) and Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB), tried to woo Muslim voters who constitute the largest majority in Indonesia by attending *majelis* in Monas quarter in 2013. In the religious events, *habaib* usually mentioned their guests' names, praised their attendance, and asked the congregation to pray for their success in their political career. Although *habaib* did not declare their political support

24. Interview with Syukron Makmun, Jakarta, 9 October 2013.
25. Interview with Mahdali, Jakarta, 3 June 2013.

for any particular candidate, the *habaib*'s prayers and good wishes during the religious events were interpreted by their audience as political support.

The growing demand for public preaching in urban areas and the high financial rewards have benefitted religious preachers. Several studies have confirmed the success of preachers and trainers in capitalising their Islamic knowledge in big cities (Muzakki 2007; Hoesterey 2008 & 2016; Howell 2008; Rudnyckyj 2010; Kailani 2015). As the centre of business and national media, Jakarta has enabled the creation of overnight celebrity preachers. Although all preachers claim their work is for the sake of *dakwah*, they have enjoyed financial rewards from the *umma*. Based on my observation and interviews in Jakarta, there are four sources of income of *habaib* in *dakwah*: honoraria from hosts, donations from the participants during public preaching, funding assistance from state officials and generous donators, and the income from selling their merchandise. Staff of Nurul Musthofa said that they charge about $600-900 USD for public preaching for local areas (Jakarta) and more than that amount for areas outside Jakarta. They argue that this money is used for paying the preachers, *hadhrah* players and staff, as well as for providing the stage, speakers, musical instruments, and advertisements such as banners and billboards. Habib Abdullah of the Nurul Musthofa claims that in one *dakwah* performance he often gets about $40-90 USD, an amount that he considered small after being shared with his three brothers and staff members. He rejected the rumours that their *majelis* requires tens of millions for *dakwah.*[26] Despite this claim, his *dakwah* performance in Nurul Musthofa has made him popular among Jakartan Muslims. This popularity provides him with many personal invitations (outside his formal *majelis*) to give sermons at events in Jakarta such as wedding ceremonies, *pengajian* (religious study gathering), and other religious events.

Conclusion

This article has discussed sermon groups of young *habaib* as a new religious market in contemporary Indonesia. Focusing on Nurul Musthofa and relating it to other sermon groups, it has analysed the approaches *habaib* use in marketing tradition within expanding Islamic preaching industries in urban areas. While the emerging trend shows that most preachers use public speaking skills in religious markets, *habaib* also utilise performance in enhancing their religious authority and marketability. Their performance expresses a combination of traditionalism, sainthood, and Arabness. Using the internet and popular culture, the *habaib* promote themselves as living saints by capitalising on their *sayyid* status and emphasizing their ancestor's roles in Islamisation. In this regard, the using of *habib* titles, distinctive dress, and family names are of significance in expressing their status and Arab ethnicity.

26. Interview with Habib Abdullah Assegaf, Jakarta, 13 June 2013.

By branding their *majelis* as the devotees of the Prophet, *habaib* have offered a new model of traditionalist piety among Muslim youths. Such branding implies that their *dakwah* is closer to the Prophet's mission, and therefore is more authentic and authoritative than other *dakwah* groups.

The case of *habaib* preachers suggests that tradition can be mediated and marketed in urban areas. This complements previous studies that largely focused on the modern *dakwah* expression within urban settings. The urban *dakwah* is usually tailored to appeal to a broad Muslim constituency. Furthermore, it tends to accommodate the modern tastes of the Muslim middle class and minimise traditionalist appearance and rituals. The *habaib dakwah*, however, is different and confronts this general pattern. Instead of being accommodative, their *dakwah* is targeted at a particular Muslim group. It promotes traditionalist Islam (*aswaja*) that only appeals to traditionalist Muslim communities culturally linked to the Nadhlatul Ulama. The *habaib dakwah* emerged at the 'right' time when there was a growing demand from traditionalist communities. *Habaib* have identified a market gap and moved into it, promoting devotional practices which meet the needs and aspirations of urban traditionalists. By using new media and religious markets, *habaib* not only succeed in popularising tradition, but they also gain elevated religious standing, fame, and financial rewards from the *umma*.

References

Abaza, M. (2004). "Markets of Faith: Jakartan Da'wa and Islamic Gentrification. *Archipel*, 67 (1), 173-202.

alKisah No. 04, February 11-24, 2008.

alKisah No. 20, September 30-October 13, 2013.

Al-Mashoor, A.A. (2011). *Sejarah, Silsilah & Gelar 'Alawiyin: Keturunan Imam Ahmad bin Isa Al-Muhajir.* Jakarta: Maktab Daimi-Rabithah Alawiyah.

Alatas, IF. (2008). *Securing Their Place: The Habaib, Prophetic Piety and Islamic Resurgence*. MA Thesis. National University of Singapore.

Alatas, IF. (2011). "Becoming Indonesians: The Ba'Alawi in the Interstices of the Nation". *Die Welt des Islams*, 51, 45-74.

Alatas, S.F. (1997). "Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora: Problems in Theoretical History". In U. Freitag and W. Clarence-Smith (eds.), *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s* (pp. 19-34). Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill.

Al-Musawa, I.F. (2014). *Meniti Jalan Pemuda Nabawi: Biografi Pendiri Majelis Rasulullah Saw Habib Munzir bin Fu'ad Almusawa*. Jakarta: Majelis Rasulullah.

Badan Kontak Majelis Taklim (BKMT). (2019). *Sejarah BKMT*. Retrieved 2 October 2019, from http://bkmt.or.id/index/sejarah-bkmt/

Chaplin, C. (2018). "Salafi Activism and the Promotion of a Modern Muslim Identity: Evolving Mediums of *Da'wa* amongst Yogyakartan University Students". *Southeast Asia Research*, 26(1), 3-20.

De Witte, M., de Koning, M., & Sunier, T. (2015). "Aesthetics of Religious Authority: An Introduction". *Culture and Religion*, 16 (2), 117-124.

Einstein, M. (2008). *Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in Commercial Age*. London and New York: Routledge.

Fealy, G. & White, S. (eds.). (2008). *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Guntur & Tim Majelis Rasulullah. (2013). *Habib Munzir Menanam Cinta untuk Para Kekasih Rasulullah*. Jakarta: Qultum Media.

Hasan, N. (2006). *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Program.

Hew, Wai Weng (2018). *Chinese Ways of Being Muslim: Negotiating Ethnicity and Religiosity in Indonesia*. Copenhagen K, Denmark: NIAS Press.

Hoesterey, J.B. (2012). "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism: Islam, Pop Psychology, and Civic Virtue in Indonesia". *City and Society*, 24(1), 38-61.

Hoesterey, J.B. (2016). *Rebranding Islam: Piety, Prosperity, and A Self-Help Guru.* California: Stanford University Press.

Howell, J. (2008). "Modulations of Active Piety: Professors and Televangelists as Promoters of Indonesian Sufism". In G. Fealy & S. White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (pp. 63-85). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Jahroni, J. (2015). *The Political Economy of Knowledge: Salafism in Post-Soeharto Urban Indonesia*. PhD thesis, Boston University.

Kailani, N. (2015). *Aspiring to Prosperity: The Economic Theology of Urban Muslims in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD thesis, University of New South Wales.

Kalmbach, H. (2015). "Blurring Boundaries: Aesthetics, Performance, and the Transformation of Islamic Leadership". *Culture and Religion*, 16(2), 160-174.

Kertzer, D.I. (1988). *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Kitiarsa, P. (Ed.). (2008). *Religious Commodification in Asia: Marketing Gods*. London and New York: Routledge.

Majelis Rasulullah. (n.d.). *Profil Majelis Rasulullah.* Available at http://majelisrasulullah.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=26 (accessed 15 April 2013).

Mandal, S.K. (1994). *Finding Their Place: A History of Arabs in Java under Dutch Rule, 1800-1924*. PhD thesis, Columbia University.

Mauladdawilah, A.Q.U. & Mauladdawilah, A.Q.A.. (2010). *Dakwah Pemuda Ibu Kota.* Malang: Pustaka Basma.

Meri, J.W. (1999). "Aspects of Baraka (Blessings) and Ritual Devotion Among Medieval Muslims and Jews". *Medieval Encounters*, 5(1), 46-69.

Meuleman, J. (2011). "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development". *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 167(2/3), 236-269.

Millie, Julian. (2012). "Oratorical Innovation and Audience Heterogeneity in Islamic West Java". *Indonesia*, 93, 123-145.

Muzakki, A. (2008). "Islam as a Symbolic Commodity: Transmitting and Consuming Islam through Public Sermons in Indonesia". In P. Kitiarsa (ed.), *Religious Commodifications in Asia: Marketing God* (pp. 205-219). London and New York: Routledge.

Nuhrison, M.N. (2010). "Gerakan Paham dan Pemikiran Islam Radikal Pasca Orde Baru (Gerakan Dakwah Salafi di Kec. Lembar, Kab. Lombok Barat, Nusa Tenggara Barat)". In W. Sugiyarto (ed.), *Direktori Kasus-Kasus Aliran, Pemikiran, Paham, dan Gerakan Keagamaan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI Badan Litbang dan Diklat Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan.

Republika. (2014). "Salah Kaprah Sebutan Habib di Masyarakat". Available at http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/14/10/11/nd9vk0-salah-kaprah-sebutan-habib-di-masyarakat (accessed 15 December 2014).

Rudnyckyj, D. (2010). *Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Saparudin & Emawati (2018). *Masjid dan Fragmentasi Sosial: Pencarian Eksistensi Salafi*

di Tengah Mainstream Islam di Lombok. Pusat Penelitian dan Publikasi Ilmiah Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram.

Sunarwoto. (2016). "Salafi *Dakwah* Radio: A Contest for Religious Authority". *Archipel*, 91, 203-230.

Shihab, A. (2001). *Islam Sufistik: Islam Pertama dan Pengaruhnya Hingga Kini di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan.

Stassen, G.H. (2012). "God's Vision for the Church-Kingdom Discipleship". In Gushee, D.P. (ed.). *A New Evangelical Manifesto: A Kingdom Vision for the Common Good* (pp. 50-56). St. Louis, Mo.: Chalice Press.

Takim, L. N. (2006). *The Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Wahid, Din. (2014). *Nurturing The Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantren in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD dissertation, Utrecht University.

Winn, Phillip. (2012). "Women's Majelis Taklim and Gendered Religious Practice in Northern Ambon". *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific*, 30, November 2012. Available at http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue30/winn.html (accessed 10 March 2015).

Woodward, M. et. al. (2012). "Ordering What is Right, Forbidding What is Wrong: Two faces of Hadhrami Dakwah in Contemporary Indonesia". *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 46(2), 105-146.

Zamhari, A. & Howell, J.D. (2012). "Taking Sufism to the Streets: Majelis Zikir and Majelis Salawat as New Venues for Popular Islamic Piety in Indonesia". *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 46(2), 47-75.

LECTURES CRITIQUES

Jean-Louis MARGOLIN[1]

1965 : L'Heure de l'histoire ?

Douglas Kammen & Katharine McGregor, *The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965-1966*, Singapour, NUS Press, 2012, 305 p.

Katharine McGregor, Jess Melvin & Annie Pohlman (eds.), *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965: Causes, Dynamics and Legacies,* Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 386 p.

Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*, Abingdon/New York, Routledge, 2018, 319 p.

Geoffrey B. Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2018, 429 p.

Vannessa Hearman, *Unmarked Graves: Death and Survival in the Anti-Communist Violence in East Java, Indonesia*, Singapour, Asian Studies Association of Australia & NUS Press, 2018, 272 p.

Soe Tjen Marching, *The End of Silence: Accounts of the 1965 Genocide in Indonesia*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2017, 219 p.

Dr. Baskara T. Wardaya SJ (ed.), *Truth Will Out: Indonesian Accounts of the 1965 Mass Violence*, Clayton (Victoria), Monash University Publishing, 2013, 224 p. (Traduit de l'indonésien par Jennifer Lindsay).

Kurniawan et al., *The Massacres: Coming to Terms with the Trauma of 1965*, Jakarta, PT Tempo Inti Media Harian, 2015 (publié en indonésien en 2012 sous le titre *Pengakuan Algojo 1965*).

Tout au long des trois décennies de la présidence Suharto (1967-1998), il fut pratiquement impossible de faire l'histoire de ce qui fut, avec les ravages de l'occupation japonaise (1942-1945), la plus grande tragédie du XXe siècle indonésien : les massacres de communistes et assimilés, en 1965-1966.

1. L'auteur est historien de l'Asie orientale; < florval@yahoo.com>.

Impossibilité en Indonésie même, tant on aurait couru de risques à remettre en cause la version officielle faisant du bain de sang une manière de sauvetage national face à un adversaire démoniaque, et justement puni. Impossibilité plus étrange dans le reste du monde, les dictatures pro-occidentales n'ayant pas précisément bonne presse dans les milieux de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche. Mais les sources étaient peu accessibles, et la crainte était légitime de se voir interdire l'accès à ses terrains de recherche en cas d'investigations poussées sur la « scène primitive » du régime d'Ordre Nouveau. Plus profondément, on impliquera le malaise de beaucoup face à ces victimes qui s'étaient si peu défendues, qu'on avait pu massacrer « comme des moutons à l'abattoir » : le « guérillero héroïque » vietnamien ou le garde rouge chinois, cela présentait mieux. *Vae victis*.

C'est ainsi que le seul ouvrage sérieux tentant un point complet sur la question demeura longtemps celui dirigé par l'historien australien Robert Cribb.[2] D'autres ouvrages évoquaient en passant les « événements », et quelques articles (tels que ceux de Benedict Anderson & Ruth McVey[3] et de W.F. Wertheim[4]) tentaient de les décrypter, mais avec une information insuffisante et, parfois, de pesants parti-pris. L'explosion de liberté d'expression – et de liberté de la recherche – qui suivit la chute du dictateur permit enfin de revenir sur 1965, en faisant fond sur une collaboration nouvelle entre universitaires occidentaux et indonésiens. Le premier grand ouvrage à manifester que l'heure de l'histoire sérieuse avait enfin sonné fut celui de John Roosa, en 2006.[5] Pas mal d'autres suivirent, y compris des livres collectifs de valeur, manifestant qu'une certaine masse critique était en train d'être atteinte, qui permettait d'avancer rapidement sur plusieurs thèmes et plusieurs régions simultanément. Beaucoup reste à faire, mais le moment est sans doute approprié de dresser une manière de rapport d'étape, à l'aide de huit ouvrages parus dans les années 2010 (un neuvième, celui de Kuncoro Hadi, est recensé par JJ Rizal à la suite de ceux-ci) ; trois sont des historiques d'ensemble, quatre essentiellement des recueils de témoignages, et celui de l'historienne de Yale Jess Melvin se situe quelque part entre ces deux blocs – une étude monographique de la province d'Aceh (au nord de l'île de Sumatra) en constitue le coeur, mais les conclusions se veulent généralistes.

2. Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966*, Clayton (Victoria), Monash University Press, 1990.

3. Benedict R. Anderson & Ruth T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, Interim Reports Series, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971.

4. W.F. Wertheim, "Whose plot ? New light on the 1965 events", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 9 n°2 (1979), pp. 197-215.

5. John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.

Les Équipes du Renouvellement

Le plus ancien des livres examinés est celui dirigé par Douglas Kammen et Katharine McGregor ; il demeure sans doute le plus fondamental, car celui qui a le plus renouvelé notre connaissance des massacres. Onze auteurs (les coordinateurs revenant plusieurs fois) se partagent dix chapitres. La majorité de ceux-ci concernent une région précise (Java-Centre, Java-Est, Bali, Sumatra-Nord, Sulawesi-Sud), trois sont synthétiques, et un mémoriel.

L'introduction des deux coordinateurs insiste sur le caractère de « contre-révolution » qu'aurait eu l'Ordre Nouveau post-1965 : rupture avec une « participation populaire de masse » à la vie politique (pp. 11-12), que la guerre d'Indépendance (1945-1949) avait introduite. C'est négliger le fait que la « Démocratie Dirigée », semi-dictature instituée par le président Sukarno à partir de 1959, constituait déjà une claire rupture avec le parlementarisme démocratique institué après 1949 et était davantage révolutionnaire en paroles qu'en actes, se montrant dans les faits incapable de mener à bien la réforme agraire tout autant que de gérer le vaste secteur nationalisé de l'économie. La « participation populaire de masse » se limitait pour l'essentiel aux partis bien en cour auprès du président, et se déroulait sous leur étroite direction. Il serait bon de s'interroger davantage sur les éléments de continuité entre la période de pouvoir personnel de Sukarno et le règne de Suharto.

John Roosa, dans un chapitre consacré aux « apories du 30 septembre », reprend les conclusions du livre précité. Il dévoile l'existence et le rôle d'un Bureau Spécial secret au sein de la direction communiste, mais s'efforce ensuite d'en minimiser l'importance, dans le but de disculper au maximum le PKI. Le 1er octobre n'aurait vu que « a small, covert action that had involved only a handful of the top Politburo leaders ».[6] On reviendra sur les limites de ce raisonnement.

Bradley Simpson traite de la dimension internationale des violences. Comme la quasi-totalité des auteurs, depuis les années soixante, il insiste sur la sympathie immédiatement ressentie par les responsables américains et britanniques pour l'armée indonésienne d'après le 1er octobre, et sur la contribution anglo-saxonne tant politique que militaire et économique à la consolidation du nouveau pouvoir. Pourtant, son chapitre, remarquablement informé, présente de multiples indices d'une plus grande complexité, dont il ne tire pas lui-même un plein parti. Ainsi, si Suharto avait été d'origine « l'homme des Américains », pourquoi l'ambassade US aurait-elle eu besoin de transmettre sa biographie à Washington le 20 octobre 1965 ? Il reproduit une dépêche de son chargé des affaires politiques qui, le 1er février 1966, conclut : « There is in fact every reason to believe that the Indonesian military government is dedicated to a totalitarian form of government. » (p. 60). Dans

6. John Roosa, "The September 30th Movement : the Aporias of the Official Narratives", in Kammen & McGregor, op. cit. p. 40.

la bouche d'un diplomate américain, sous administration démocrate, difficile de prendre cela pour un compliment… Quant à l'aide soviétique (au moins dix fois supérieure à l'aide américaine depuis le début des années soixante), elle se poursuivit pendant les massacres, y compris par des envois d'armes (p. 63). Il est vrai que le PKI était aligné sur Pékin. En réalité, pour Washington et plus encore pour Londres (engagé militairement contre l'Indonésie aux côtés de la Malaysia et de Singapour), ce qui importait surtout était l'infléchissement de la politique étrangère, qui ne pouvait plus passer que par le renversement de Sukarno ; ainsi que le règlement de ce qu'ils considéraient comme des spoliations – la nationalisation sans contrepartie des considérables avoirs de leurs entreprises en Indonésie. L'élimination du PKI était surtout vue comme un moyen d'y parvenir (p. 61 et 64-67). Cela explique que les robinets de l'aide anglo-américaine n'aient laissé passer qu'un filet d'eau pendant l'essentiel des massacres, et ne se soient ouverts en grand qu'après le transfert des pouvoirs présidentiels à Suharto, le 11 mars 1966 – alors même que les pires violences commençaient à s'atténuer.

David Jenkins et Douglas Kammen dressent un tableau assez complet du rapport de forces militaire en octobre 1965 à Java et Bali. Le plus frappant est la faiblesse des effectifs engagés, des deux côtés. Les objectifs décisifs constitués par la radio nationale et le centre de télécommunications n'étaient ainsi gardés, le 1er Octobre, que par une poignée de jeunes communistes (p. 75), tandis que le fer de lance de la répression, les paracommandos du colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (RPKAD), ne comptaient guère que 800 hommes, dont quelques dizaines sympathisaient avec le PKI et ne semblent guère en avoir été sanctionnés (pp. 81-82). Quant aux troupes stationnées à Java-Centre (division Diponegoro), elles étaient majoritairement passées du côté du Mouvement du 30 Septembre et furent pour une bonne part envoyées par la suite à Bornéo, sur le « front » de la Confrontation avec la Malaysia (pp. 78-79). C'est donc au centre de Java, bastion communiste, que le RPKAD commença le 19 octobre (à Semarang), une véritable opération de reconquête, tout de suite marquée par des milliers d'arrestations souvent suivies de mises à mort (p. 83). C'est dans cette seule région que le PKI fut en mesure de riposter (grèves et meurtres de quelques dizaines – Edhie parla de 200 – de ses opposants), du moins pendant quelques jours. Sans la formation accélérée de nombreux miliciens locaux, essentiellement choisis dans les rangs des jeunesses (Ansor) du mouvement musulman Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), jamais l'armée n'eût pu parvenir à éliminer les communistes aussi facilement et rapidement (pp. 88-94). Le RPKAD passa à Bali le 7 décembre, et son alliance avec le Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) local, ainsi que l'irruption de nombreux tueurs du NU venus de Java, permirent une répression immédiate encore plus sauvage qu'à Java (pp. 99-102). A Java-Est, par contre, ce sont les garnisons (division Brawijaya) qui organisèrent les plus vastes tueries de l'ensemble de l'Indonésie (sans doute

200 000 victimes) ; l'appui de dizaines de milliers de miliciens musulmans compensa leur faiblesse numérique (pp. 97-99).

Greg Fealy et Katharine McGregor précisent le rôle du NU à Java-Est, son bastion par excellence. Dès le 1er octobre, sa direction « accommodationniste » proche de Sukarno fut remplacée sur le terrain par des militants prêts au combat. Les *kiai* (prédicateurs) et les *pesantren* (écoles islamiques) qu'ils contrôlaient furent les organisateurs des massacres, toujours conçus et réalisés en collaboration plus ou moins étroite avec l'armée. On fit de l'égorgement (mode de mise à mort le plus fréquent) des communistes une obligation religieuse, car il s'agissait de créatures quasi-diaboliques. Courant décembre, l'armée commença à freiner des massacres tournant souvent au règlement de comptes, et s'affronta dans quelques cas avec les milices (p. 125). On reviendra sur ces atrocités.

Quatre autres régions font l'objet de chapitres spécifiques. Tous présentent l'avantage de replacer les massacres dans une chronologie plus longue : montée des tensions et reconfiguration de la scène politique avant octobre 1965, effets de long terme. Yen-ling Tsai et Douglas Kammen se concentrent sur la métropole de Sumatra-Nord, Medan, qui est aussi le cœur de la principale zone de plantations du pays. Les ethnies sumatranaises s'y mêlent à une forte immigration de travailleurs javanais et à de nombreux Chinois. Ces deux groupes constituèrent les bases locales les plus solides du PKI, dont c'était le bastion principal en dehors de Java et de Bali. Cela rend compte d'un redoublement des affrontements politiques en massacres ethniques, davantage que partout ailleurs (sauf à Kalimantan-Ouest). Les tueries les plus importantes eurent lieu sur les plantations, aux dépens des Javanais fortement syndiqués. Les drames les mieux connus, car les plus visibles, eurent cependant lieu en ville, où s'illustrèrent tristement les miliciens plus ou moins gangsters (les *preman*) du *Pemuda Pancasila*, formé par le général Nasution, ministre de la Défense. Deux grands pogroms eurent lieu, le 2 novembre et les jours suivants contre les communistes, le 10 décembre contre les Chinois. Ceux-ci (pourtant assez souvent favorables à Taiwan) pâtirent du refus du consulat de la RPC d'abaisser le drapeau en signe de deuil le 5 octobre, jour des obsèques des généraux assassinés à Jakarta. L'armée laissa attaquer (mais non prendre) le consulat, et ensuite la foule se lança à l'assaut du quartier aux cris de « Tuons les Chinois ». Fin mars 1966 eut lieu une seconde vague d'attaques, des bandes de jeunes s'emparant de la plupart des bâtiments communautaires, et réclamant l'expulsion des Chinois (dont une bonne partie n'étaient alors pas des citoyens). L'armée assura un peu mieux sa mission de protection, mais c'en était trop pour beaucoup de Chinois, gravement discriminés depuis 1957 (fermeture des quatre cinquièmes des écoles chinoises), et dont la plupart, rejoints par les rescapés des violences d'Aceh, subsistaient péniblement dans quatorze camps de réfugiés : quatre navires en « rapatrièrent » des milliers en RPC.

Taufik Ahmad (son chapitre est le seul à être traduit de l'indonésien) rend compte des événements en Sulawesi-Sud, et plus particulièrement à Makassar. Le PKI n'y était guère puissant, et s'était attiré de solides inimitiés en se portant à l'avant-garde du centralisme indonésien, ressenti comme d'essence javanaise par le Darul Islam et le Masjumi, qui y étaient solidement implantés. Le PKI avait demandé et obtenu en 1958 l'interdiction du Masjumi (et du petit Parti socialiste indonésien). Les pogromistes et tueurs s'y recrutèrent largement et s'en prirent là encore aux migrants de Java, même non communistes. Les communistes éprouvèrent le manque de solidité de leur mouvement, certains membres du BTI (leur « syndicat » paysan) participant à leur répression. Les assassinats (un millier au moins) eurent surtout lieu lors de l'assaut d'une prison en novembre, et lors de la remise de communistes détenus par l'armée aux émeutiers, en décembre. Il n'empêche que les détenus survivants furent environ dix fois plus nombreux que les morts. Une partie fut enfermée dans le camp de Moncongloe, où le travail exténuant fut celui d'esclaves (agricoles ou domestiques) d'officiers corrompus et vindicatifs, et ce jusqu'à la fin des années soixante-dix. Mentionnons seulement l'important chapitre de Vannessa Hearman sur le Blitar-Sud, son livre développant le même sujet étant examiné ci-dessous.

L'exposé de Mary Ida Bagus, qui porte sur l'ouest de Bali, offre quelques caractéristiques similaires à d'autres régions : ciblage des Chinois (bien plus souvent pillés ici qu'assassinés), rôle fondamental des commandos d'Ansor dans les tueries de masse. D'autres aspects sont plus spécifiques : place du PNI, principal rival local du PKI, entre autres parmi les enseignants – ce qui conduisit à des règlements de compte meurtriers dans les écoles ; lutte des castes recoupant les luttes politiques, mais à fronts en quelque sorte renversés, les hautes castes étant souvent privées de terres, et par là proches du PKI, auquel adhérait également la famille royale de Negara – celle du gouverneur de Bali Suteja, qui sera tué avec tous ses proches ; arrestations de masse (sans résistance) des communistes dès fin octobre, mais début des massacres le 30 novembre seulement. Les morts furent très vite très nombreux, certains villages étant pratiquement rayés de la carte. Ce chapitre est le seul dans ce livre à développer les souffrances spécifiques des femmes, surtout de celles qui avaient perdu la protection de leurs maris, leurs pères et leurs fils, tous tués parfois : viols, enlèvements, remariages forcés qui impliquaient le reniement complet de leurs parents et de leur passé. Le chapitre conclusif de Katharine McGregor porte sur le traitement des charniers dans l'Indonésie d'aujourd'hui (sachant qu'une grande partie des victimes n'y eut même pas droit : cadavres laissés à l'abandon avec parfois l'interdiction d'y toucher, ou jetés à la rivière). Les tentatives de réinhumation dans des cimetières se heurtent souvent aux autorités, ou aux organisations musulmanes, qui, à Kaloran (Java Central) en 2001, brûlèrent les cercueils et les maisons des familles concernées.

Le second ouvrage recensé est par bien des côtés une suite du premier. Deux auteurs sont communs, à commencer par McGregor, une des coordinatrices des deux livres. Signe de l'évolution de la recherche, on passe de trois à cinq auteurs nés en Indonésie (en y incluant Vannessa Hearman). Autres témoignages de l'évolution historiographique entre 2012 et 2018 : le poids accordé aux questions mémorielles, au sens large (un chapitre sur dix dans le premier ouvrage, huit sur dix-sept dans le second), l'irruption de la caractérisation comme *génocide* des massacres de 1965-66 – on retrouve le terme dans le titre de l'ouvrage et dans ceux de trois chapitres, alors qu'en 2012 il s'agissait de *mass violence*[7] ; et enfin l'apparition d'un chapitre sur les violences sexuelles, trop peu évoquées précédemment. Par contre, et c'est dommage, seuls trois chapitres évoquent les violences dans un cadre local (deux sont consacrés à Bali, un à Surabaya), alors que le volume de 2012 montrait l'importance des variations spatiales.

Le chapitre introductif, signé par les trois coordinateurs, semble avoir été surtout rédigé par Jess Melvin, aux arguments de laquelle je répondrai plus loin (en particulier sur la question du génocide). D'emblée, suivant une stratégie académique bien connue, cette introduction met en relief la nouveauté des apports de l'ouvrage en caricaturant la bibliographie existante : « the Indonesian killings have not, until recently, been understood as a case of state-sponsored violence. Instead, the killings have been explained as a result of spontaneous violence which arose out of Indonesian society (…); until very recently it was a matter of serious scholarly contention as to whether or not the military had ordered the killings as part of a national, centralized campaign » (p. 2). Je ne connais pourtant pas d'ouvrage ou d'article réputé sérieux qui corresponde à ce portrait, et qui ait douté de la centralité de l'armée dans l'instigation et l'organisation des massacres. Pour ma part, ne faisant que synthétiser la littérature disponible, et m'appuyant en particulier sur l'ouvrage déjà mentionné de Cribb, j'écrivais en 2001 : « Ce sera à peu près le même schéma partout : encouragements (aux milices) venant des militaires, protection, entraînement et soutien logistique accordé là où le PKI est puissant (Java Centre, Java Est, Sumatra Nord). C'est en particulier l'intervention du corps d'élite des paracommandos, proches de Suharto, qui va faire pencher la balance en faveur des anticommunistes, et leur permettre le massacre sans risque de leurs adversaires. (…) Il n'y a pas lieu d'atténuer les responsabilités d'une armée qui a délibérément poussé à son paroxysme un climat d'hystérie (…) Les chefs militaires ont au minimum laissé faire et encouragé les massacreurs, des semaines durant, quand ils ne le leur ont pas prêté la main, en leur procurant armes légères, moyens de communication,

7. L'éditeur a sans doute poussé à cette évolution, puisque l'ouvrage est publié dans la collection *Palgrave Studies on the History of Genocide.* Mais on retrouve le terme dans l'intitulé de plusieurs autres livres récents sur le sujet.

formation accélérée et, le plus décisif, garantie d'impunité."[8] *A vaincre sans péril, on triomphe sans gloire…* De manière moins discutable, et à la différence d'autres ouvrages, l'introduction met en valeur la gravité d'une situation économique dont Sukarno était le premier responsable (p. 7), et l'intensité de l'alignement de la politique extérieure sur la Chine, à partir de 1963 (p. 9).

Après un chapitre où Annie Pohlman et Jess Melvin justifient à nouveau le diagnostic de génocide, on passe, si j'ose dire, aux travaux pratiques, avec une autre contribution de cette dernière : « The Road to Genocide : Indonesian Military Planning to Seize State Power Prior to 1 October 1965 » (pp. 51-70). La question est en partie reprise du livre qu'on étudiera plus loin, mais avec quelques éléments originaux sur les prodromes de l'explosion. Ainsi peut-on estimer que plusieurs des mesures adoptées par Sukarno pour mieux contrôler l'armée, probablement à l'instigation du PKI, se retournèrent en fait en faveur des militaires : création d'un nouveau commandement « de front » (*Mandala*) destiné à préparer l'« écrasement » de la Malaysia, et confié (en théorie) à l'allié du PKI, le maréchal de l'Air Omar Dhani ; institution d'une « double commande » (*Dwikora*) destinée à faire s'interpénétrer dans les provinces responsables militaires et civils (ces derniers étant souvent communistes), mais qui facilita en réalité la mise rapide des autorités civiles au service de l'armée, après le 1er octobre (pp. 56-57). Celle-ci, à Sumatra, sous prétexte de préparer la population à se défendre contre une bien improbable invasion malaysienne (!), avait formé et entraîné (*Operasi Singgalang*) de très nombreuses unités paramilitaires au niveau du village. Elles comptaient – sur le papier au moins – la bagatelle de 148 000 hommes dans la seule province d'Aceh, soit le tiers de la population masculine âgée de 15 à 54 ans (pp. 59-60). Tout cela permit au général Mokoginta, commandant en chef du Mandala I (région militaire de Sumatra)[9], de déclencher dès le 2 octobre l'opération Berdikari, qui avait été conçue en cas d'attaque étrangère, et qui servit à détruire le PKI et ses alliés. Rien ne prouve néanmoins que « The military's seizure of state power and attack against the PKI was pre-planned » (p. 65). Tout au plus peut-on affirmer que Mokoginta, comme Suharto, surent réagir rapidement et, de leur point de vue, opportunément.

Akihisa Matsuno (Osaka) dévoile l'importance peu connue du Mouvement du 30 Septembre à Bali, à partir d'archives judiciaires originales et d'entretiens. Plusieurs dizaines de militaires, presque tous des Javanais, en liaison avec le PKI, tentèrent d'imposer un Conseil de la Révolution provincial, mais furent immédiatement plongés dans le désarroi par l'échec rapide du coup à Jakarta. Les 76 arrestations subséquentes ne donnèrent pas lieu à des tueries

8. Jean-Louis Margolin, « Indonésie 1965: un massacre oublié », *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, vol. 8 (« L'utilisation politique des massacres »), n°1, printemps 2001, pp. 59-92.

9. L'autre région à statut spécial de ligne de front (Mandala) était Kalimantan.

avant le mitraillage dans leur cellule de douze mutins, le 29 novembre. A partir du milieu de ce mois, les organisations communistes s'étaient pour la plupart résignées à s'auto-dissoudre, et à transmettre aux autorités la liste de leurs membres. Bien mal leur en prit, car ceux qui s'étaient en quelque sorte rendus furent massacrés à grande échelle à partir du 2 décembre, l'arrivée du RKPAD, le 7, accélérant le processus. Dès le 25, l'armée pouvait annoncer l'élimination de 90% des communistes balinais, les victimes étant en 1967 officiellement évaluées à 50 000 (p. 87).

Toujours à propos du cas balinais, Roro Sawita (association Taman 65) insiste pour sa part sur la dimension sociale d'affrontements trop souvent réduits au politique ou au religieux. On décèle en effet une forte proportionnalité entre intensité des luttes pour la réforme agraire (qui à Bali remettait en cause le partage du fruit des récoltes entre propriétaires et fermiers, davantage que la répartition des terres) et radicalité des massacres. Ces derniers, essentiellement menés par les *tameng* (commandos de tueurs) du PNI localement lié aux propriétaires terriens, ne laissent parfois subsister que des veuves et des enfants dans les villages « rouges ». La tuerie inaugurale, à Tegal Badeng, fit quelque 600 victimes (p. 106). Robbie Peters (Sydney), à propos de Surabaya, développe une approche originale. Se plaçant du point de vue des squatters et autres petites gens des *kampung* urbains, il explique d'abord comment, après 1945, se constitua ce milieu anarchique et dynamique, largement autogéré, et symbolisé par la figure si populaire du clown du *ludruk* (théâtre local). Peters n'idéalise pourtant pas ce système, fondé sur la précarité, la lutte pour la vie (on prend la place de ceux qui ont fui ou sont emprisonnés), la violence comme but en soi, la masculinité envahissante… La Démocratie Dirigée et la montée de l'emprise du PKI constituèrent un premier retour à l'ordre et à la discipline, tout en appuyant les squatters contre les propriétaires immobiliers soutenus par le NU. Mais la grande rupture fut octobre 1965. La terreur fut caractérisée par des décapitations à échelle industrielle, que Peters analyse comme un théâtre du démembrement sociétal, à l'inverse de la cohésion apportée par le *ludruk* : « it was not the act of killing but the bodies it produced that communicated. (…) it was through the pedagogy of broken bodies and the potent embodied spectacle of severed corpses that the anarchic energy of the revolution and the society and bodies it produced was finally destroyed. » (pp. 151-152)

Suivent trois études d'ordre thématique, quoique ancrées géographiquement. Annie Pohlman (Brisbane) relate l'odyssée de deux militantes du Gerwani (organisation féminine du PKI), gestionnaires de crèches, dans les prisons de la dictature militaire. Les hommes de leurs familles ayant pour la plupart été tués ou emprisonnés, elles sont enfermées avec leurs enfants. Les violences sexuelles commises par les gardiens mâles sont constantes et sinistres : déshabillage et parfois viols dans la cellule collective, ou enlèvements au

milieu des cris et des pleurs ; assignations de certaines au service sexuel régulier d'un officier, ou occasionnel d'un visiteur ; absence totale d'intimité, y compris au bain ou aux toilettes ; rapt fréquent des bébés résultant des grossesses en détention. Il s'agit bien, comme le démontre l'auteur, d'esclavage sexuel organisé, ce qui relève du crime contre l'humanité. Abdul Wahid traite un sujet plus mince, moins dramatique et cependant très révélateur : la purge au sein de son université, Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta). Celle-ci, auto-proclamée « université socialiste d'Indonésie » en 1961, avait été le théâtre de durs affrontements politiques avant octobre 1965, qui avaient fini par conditionner toute la vie universitaire (à commencer par les nominations). Là comme ailleurs, c'est le PKI qui, par son ardeur militante mais aussi son intolérance des contradicteurs, tendait à sortir vainqueur. La revanche fut sévère : 115 enseignants et administrateurs exclus (sur 1500), de même que plus d'un millier d'étudiants (sur 16 000). Des salles de détention et de torture fonctionnèrent des mois durant, desservies par des étudiants et enseignants.

Vannessa Hearman (Darwin), enfin, évalue le mouvement de conversion au christianisme de nombreux militants de gauche, mais aussi de Chinois, après 1965. Les effets furent parfois macroscopiques : augmentation de 126% des catholiques de Semarang entre 1964 et 1973 (p. 181). Il fallait certes échapper à l'incrimination potentiellement mortelle d'athéisme, mais pourquoi ce choix, venant de personnes souvent d'origine musulmane, nominalement au moins ? De plus, les églises protestantes avaient souvent été soumises à la vindicte des communistes, du fait de leurs liens avec les Etats-Unis. Un soutien initial à la répression du PKI s'ensuivit naturellement (synode protestant du 1er décembre 1965), mais les autorités catholiques enjoignirent assez rapidement à leurs fidèles de ne pas participer aux violences – consigne qui ne fut pas toujours suivie. Ce qui fut décisif fut l'assistance humanitaire aux détenus (y compris la transmission clandestine de courrier aux familles), ainsi que l'aide à la réinsertion à la sortie de détention. Beaucoup de communistes avaient été enseignants ; définitivement exclus du secteur public, ils purent parfois retravailler dans les écoles privées catholiques. Des orphelinats accueillirent quelques-uns de ceux dont les parents avaient été éliminés. Par contraste, beaucoup d'organisations musulmanes cherchaient, et cherchent toujours, à maintenir les anciens détenus dans la position de suspects discriminés.

On sera plus rapide sur les huit chapitres « mémoriels », malgré leur intérêt : notre sujet, déjà bien assez vaste par lui-même, est la nouvelle historiographie de 1965. Andrew Conroe (Singapour) étudie la trajectoire des *anak korban*, les enfants des victimes. Discriminés légalement par hérédité jusqu'à la chute de Suharto, en 1998, ils souffrent surtout aujourd'hui du rejet qu'une grande partie de la société persiste à leur manifester. Face au silence assez général de leurs parents et familles, ils peuvent cependant accéder aujourd'hui à une connaissance à peu près libre du communisme et des massacres. Mais l'effort

Installation de Dadang Christanto, « Heads from the North », en mémoire des victimes de 1965-1966, dans le Jardin des sculptures de la National Gallery of Australia, Canberra. Avec l'aimable autorisation de l'artiste.

est difficile. Ken Setiawan (Melbourne), fille d'Hersri Setiawan, qui y fut interné[10], examine les sites mémoriels – peu nombreux et modestes – de l'île moluquoise de Buru, où furent déportés, en général pour une décennie, plus d'une dizaine de milliers de communistes. Le moins insignifiant est une « salle des arts », construite par les prisonniers eux-mêmes (mais dont les piliers de bois furent ensuite refaits en béton). Il s'agissait pour l'armée de démontrer le caractère « humanitaire » de la déportation : appel aux femmes et enfants à rejoindre les maris et pères enfermés (seuls 3% obtempérèrent), formation en 1972 d'un semblant de village pour les familles… En réalité, tous étaient traités en détenus par l'administration. Katharine McGregor évalue l'un des très rares monuments commémorant 1965 – en l'occurrence à la National Gallery de Canberra. Il fut érigé le 1er octobre 2004 par le sculpteur australo-indonésien Dadang Christanto. Il est composé de 66 têtes à demi-immergées dans un marécage, regardant vers le nord – vers leur cruelle patrie, qui acheva en 1966 de les mettre à mort, typiquement en jetant leurs corps (les têtes étant fréquemment séparées) dans l'eau des rivières. Le père de Christanto, d'origine

10. Voir dans ce même numéro l'article de Vannessa Hearman, « Buru Island: Still Much More to Reveal ».

chinoise, fut tué en 1965 à Java, la maison de famille incendiée quelques mois plus tard par les bandes du NU. Mais l'oeuvre se veut hommage à toutes les victimes de persécutions dans le monde.

Marianna Lis (Varsovie) considère la manière de traiter le passé tragique du pays adoptée par le Papermoon Puppet Theatre de Yogyakarta. L'angle est original : il s'agit de l'histoire vraie de Pak Widodo Soewardjo, bloqué en 1965 à Moscou où il faisait ses études, privé de sa nationalité comme des milliers d'autres, et condamné à une longue vie d'errance (à Cuba en particulier). Rentré pour la première fois en Indonésie en 2001, il finit par y retrouver son amour perdu, qu'il avait rencontrée à Paris en 1965, et maintenant grand-mère épanouie. Ce qui est passé est passé. Ana Dragojlovic (Melbourne) démontre l'importance des films de Joshua Oppenheimer (*The Act of Killing*, *The Look of Silence*) dans la prise de conscience d'enfants d'Indonésiens exilés de 1965. La transmission directe dans les familles se fait bien mal (un leitmotiv dans plusieurs des chapitres ou ouvrages considérés ici), comme cela avait déjà été le cas deux décennies plus tôt pour d'autres réfugiés : les citoyens néerlandais (parmi lesquels beaucoup d'Eurasiens) rescapés des camps japonais et des terribles violences du *Bersiap* (1945-46), infligées par de jeunes nationalistes indonésiens plus ou moins gangsterisés. Stephen Miller (Darwin) traite de l'insuffisance criante de la prise de conscience mémorielle dans l'Indonésie de l'après Suharto (un autre leitmotiv), malgré la bonne volonté d'un Abdurrahman Wahid, autour de 2000. Il s'inquiète en particulier de l'influence croissante des groupes anti-communistes, qu'il n'hésite pas à qualifier de néo-fascistes. Pourtant, l'expression s'est beaucoup libérée, on peut lire et discuter les œuvres de Marx et les études sur 1965. La présidence Jokowi est à la croisée des chemins…

Nukila Evanty (Jakarta) et Annie Pohlman insistent elles aussi sur le blocage rapide et durable des considérables avancées du début des années 2000, dont l'apex fut peut-être la loi instituant, en 2004, une commission Vérité et Réconciliation, sur le modèle sud-africain. Cette loi fut annulée en 2006 par la Cour Constitutionnelle, saisie bien maladroitement par une coalition d'ONG scandalisées par la possibilité offerte à la commission d'amnistier des bourreaux, ainsi exemptés de poursuites judiciaires. Comme si souvent dans l'histoire indonésienne, le maximalisme de la Gauche avait renforcé la Droite. Enfin, Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem (Depok) évalue les initiatives locales contournant parfois ce blocage. Dans deux milieux bien différents (Solo au centre de Java, Palu à Sulawesi), le projet « vérité et réconciliation » a pris corps à partir de 2011. On vise la prise de conscience et la réparation (modeste) des souffrances, pas la punition des auteurs de ces souffrances, décédés ou fort âgés désormais. Les choses sont plus aisées au centre de Sulawesi (où l'on dénombra 1200 victimes, dont 800 du travail forcé) qu'à Solo, dans une province où l'on releva une centaine de milliers d'assassinats. Le rôle des

maires (pourtant eux-mêmes au passé trouble d'associés du gangstérisme) est décisif dans cette quête. Mais, à Solo, les organisations anti-communistes et musulmanes extrémistes ont souvent tenté d'enrayer le processus douloureux de la réconciliation. Dans l'épilogue de l'ouvrage, Jemma Purdey (Melbourne) se félicite de l'épanouissement d'une « seconde génération » d'historiens (souvent jeunes, souvent des femmes) de la tragédie de 1965. On ne peut que l'approuver.

Deux Ouvrages (Trop ?) Engagés

L'ouvrage signé par Jess Melvin entend faire date : il se présente comme le premier à être fondé sur des archives de l'armée (relatives à la province d'Aceh), tant originales qu'abondantes (plus de 3 000 pages), trouvées au KITLV (Leyde, Pays-Bas) pour la pièce principale (un journal d'opérations couvrant la période des massacres), et aux Archives publiques de Banda Aceh pour les autres. C'est assurément la grande force et le grand intérêt de l'ouvrage, quoiqu'on puisse s'étonner que l'auteure ait besoin de nous le répéter toutes les quelques pages. Elle prétend, en toute modestie, avoir mis la main « not just (on) a proverbial smoking gun but (on) a 'smoking arsenal' » (p. 22). Elle ajoute : « They fundamentally change what is knowable in terms of both chronology and accountability » (p. 22), présupposant d'ailleurs, sans véritable argumentation, que la situation en Aceh puisse être extrapolée à l'ensemble de l'Indonésie. Mais le tout n'est pas d'exhumer d'importants documents. Encore faut-il savoir les lire. Et c'est là où le bât blesse, gravement.

Melvin fait en effet ce qu'on enseigne à nos étudiants à ne pas faire : aborder des sources avec tant d'idées préconçues qu'on finit par n'y relever que ce qui va dans notre sens, en négligeant tout le reste ; et solliciter à tel point les « évidences » qui arrangent qu'on les interprète parfois à contre-sens. Les exemples sont malheureusement nombreux. Ainsi, faisant le récit de l'étonnante réunion de l'après-midi du 1er octobre dans le bourg sumatranais de Langsa, où, par hasard, le vice-président du conseil (et leader de l'aile pro-communiste du PNI) Subandrio, le haut responsable communiste Njoto et le général commandant la garnison d'Aceh, Djuarsa, reçurent ensemble les sensationnelles nouvelles de Jakarta, elle voit dans l'attitude de ce dernier (qui annule le meeting populaire prévu ensuite et demande la dispersion des responsables par différentes routes) les premiers signes de la grande offensive préméditée de l'armée contre le PKI. Pourtant, le bon sens le plus élémentaire amène à conclure que, dans ce cas, deux adversaires aussi considérables et dangereux que Subandrio et Njoto auraient au minimum été arrêtés par les troupes de Djuarsa. Elle reproche également à ce dernier d'avoir alors agi « without endorsement from the President » (p. 116) et le présente comme un quasi-mutin. Ce qui est assez comique, sachant que Sukarno était alors théoriquement aux mains du Mouvement insurrectionnel, et que la plupart

des supérieurs de Djuarsa venaient d'être assassinés… En pareil cas, c'est l'inaction qui aurait été coupable.

Toute à son ardeur à démontrer que la prise du pouvoir par l'armée, préméditée, fut immédiate (dès le soir du 1er octobre) et que la chasse aux communistes débuta alors, Melvin lit à sens unique l'appel du 4 octobre des autorités civiles et militaires (*Pantja Tunggal*) d'Aceh. Elle souligne (en caractères gras) le second point : « **It is mandatory for the People to assist in every attempt to completely annihilate the Counter Revolutionary Thirtieth of September Movement along with its Lackeys**. » (p. 126). Elle traduit : il s'agit d' « instructions for civilians to murder other civilians ». Le texte est bien plus flou : les adversaires ciblés ne sont pas désignés clairement, et « annihilate » (on y reviendra) ne signifie pas obligatoirement tuer (des arrestations auraient pu suffire). Surtout, elle néglige complètement le troisième point, qui infléchit pourtant considérablement son interprétation : « Maintain calm and an environment of orderliness while always building the unity and integrity of National Progressive revolutionary forces that give spirit to NASAKOM, while (…) increasing (…) the Confrontation with Nekolim[11] and its lackeys. » On reste donc en pleine ambiance idéologique sukarnoiste, et les communistes (le KOM de NASAKOM, cette alliance en place depuis 1961 entre nationalisme, religion et communisme) demeurent alors légitimes. De plus le calme et l'ordre évoqués sont peu compatibles avec un appel au pogrom…

Autre incompatibilité avec le « grand récit » proposé : le lendemain, 5 octobre, jour des Forces Armées, le PKI se joignit, drapeau rouge à faucille et marteau en tête, au défilé officiel de Banda Aceh (p. 127). Le même jour, les autorités d'Aceh Timur votèrent une résolution incluant un message de sympathie pour les généraux assassinés et un appel à la condamnation et à la répression de ceux « involved in treachery towards to (*sic*) the Nation and revolution along with its ideology, the Panca Sila. » (p. 153) Le PKI signa comme les autres ! Le vrai tournant eut lieu le 6 octobre : lors de la réunion des huit partis (dont le PKI) composant le *Front Nasional*, il fut demandé au Président d'« immediately disband the PKI and the Mass Organisations that are grouped beneath its banner ». Seuls les représentants communistes votèrent contre cette résolution (p. 130). Le 11 octobre, dans une réunion des diverses autorités du district d'Aceh Barat, un pas supplémentaire est franchi : appel à ce que les complices du Mouvement soient « punished with the Revolutionary Law » (p. 147). A ce moment, effectivement, on peut évoquer un appel au meurtre (et le PKI est nommément désigné), cette « loi révolutionnaire » souvent invoquée par Sukarno (et par le PKI !) étant par nature exorbitante du droit. Où l'on voit à quel point la Démocratie Dirigée avait facilité la tâche des massacreurs de 1965, en faisant disparaître toute notion de contre-pouvoir et d'Etat de Droit.

11. Nekolim : acronyme pour Néo-colonial et impérialiste.

Le 13, relève Melvin, 56 membres du PKI avaient demandé la protection de Djuarsa (p. 171), alors que l'auteure fait de ce dernier le concepteur et grand organisateur, dès le 2 octobre, de leur extermination, le peuple n'agissant que sur ordre et avec l'encadrement des militaires. Ces militants étaient-ils donc si peu capables de percevoir ces réalités ? Cela ne prouverait-il pas plutôt la capacité d'initiative meurtrière des milices liées aux groupes musulmans, ce qui expliquerait aussi l'apparition à Banda Aceh d'affiches anticommunistes grossièrement manuscrites (p. 171) ? La question ne sera pas posée, car elle contrevient aux présupposés de Melvin. C'est en tout cas par de vastes meetings populaires appelant à pendre Aidit et les communistes que les violences débutèrent, le 8 octobre dans la capitale provinciale, les 12-14 octobre ailleurs. Il s'agit encore de meurtres sélectifs, et l'attitude des militaires est ambiguë : on laisse faire, mais certains meetings sont dispersés, et un couvre-feu imposé (qui servait aussi bien à limiter l'action des émeutiers qu'à permettre aux militaires d'arrêter les communistes sans entrave). C'est alors aussi que sont mis en place les regroupements de milices, de jeunes surtout, sous l'appellation de *Front Pembela Pantja Sila* (Front de défense du Pancasila). Ils appellent à la condamnation à mort de tous ceux impliqués dans le Mouvement, et développent un discours incendiaire.

Le 14 octobre, Djuarsa institue un *Ruang Yudha* (traduit par Melvin en « War Room »), et les violences décuplent, touchant parfois des familles entières, enfants compris (pp. 193-195). Néanmoins, même à ce stade, les militaires refusent parfois de remettre aux tueurs des milices des communistes arrêtés ou « protégés » (p. 197). Le 20 octobre, Djuarsa suspend toutes les activités communistes et assimilées, exclut les membres du PKI de toutes les administrations et les assigne à résidence, après enregistrement obligatoire auprès de la police militaire (p. 198). Beaucoup plus tard, à partir du 18 avril 1966, le déchaînement de violences anti-chinoises (pillage et incendie de boutiques, arrestations sauvages, brutalités et meurtres, exigence d'une expulsion immédiate de tous les Chinois non nationaux) indique encore une fois les divergences entre l'armée et les émeutiers (essentiellement des étudiants) assoiffés de sang de la coalition KAMI-KAPPI. L'un de ces derniers est même abattu le 18 à Lhokseumawe, et d'autres sont placés en détention, tandis que le général Mokoginta, commandant en chef à Sumatra, dénonce le « racisme ». L'armée récupère une partie du butin des pillages dans les locaux du KAPPI. A partir du 8 mai, une dizaine de milliers de Chinois (dont des citoyens indonésiens) sont contraints de fuir Aceh pour Medan, en un long convoi que l 'escorte militaire protège péniblement contre les attaques. Jusqu'en novembre, 4 000 d'entre eux s'embarquent de Medan pour la Chine, malgré la tentative des KAMI-KAPPI d'empêcher les navires d'accoster (pp. 260-264).

Cette chronologie, au positif, montre la grande richesse documentaire de l'ouvrage. Mais il faut le lire « contre le grain » des pages[12] pour en comprendre le sens : beaucoup d'incertitude les premiers jours chez tous les acteurs ; un rôle complexe de l'armée, qui joue sans cesse à la fois du frein et de l'accélérateur, et non pas seulement de ce dernier comme l'affirme l'auteure ; une *agency* à l'évidence autonome du « peuple anticommuniste », souvent encadré par d'anciens guérilleros du Darul Islam, insurgé au long des années cinquante – même si, bien entendu, rien n'aurait pu être fait sans l'assentiment et le soutien, non seulement de l'armée, mais aussi des autorités et partis non communistes. Les assertions trop univoques ou erronées de Melvin (il y en a bien d'autres) vont toutes dans le même sens : justifier à tout prix l'incrimination centrale de « génocide », en tentant de démontrer à la fois la préméditation et la planification (critère d'intentionnalité) de l'extermination la plus complète possible des communistes (critère d'effectivité), en déniant toute autonomie véritable aux acteurs civils, afin de ne pas brouiller la désignation du *mastermind*. Secondairement, il est sans doute intolérable à l'auteure, pour des raisons idéologiques, de penser que le Mal puisse aussi résider dans le Peuple – selon elle, celui-ci ne peut mal faire que s'il y est contraint, ou au minimum conditionné par la propagande de l'Etat. Enfin, et même si ce n'est pas vraiment le sujet du livre, compte tenu de la période étudiée, il s'agit de disculper de toute responsabilité dans la montée des tensions un PKI, réduit au rôle de victime, juste un peu imprévoyante et maladroite dans ses réactions.

Geoffrey B. Robinson partage manifestement les mêmes présupposés, quoique insistant moins sur la qualification de génocide. Son livre constitue une synthèse claire et bien informée de la tragédie de 1965, et représente assurément une lecture de choix pour quiconque veut en acquérir une première connaissance. Il est d'autant plus regrettable que ses partis-pris empêchent qu'on puisse le considérer comme un ouvrage suffisamment fiable. De plus, il n'utilise pas de sources nouvelles d'un intérêt comparable à celles révélées par Jess Melvin. De ce point de vue, l'ouvrage sur les massacres à Bali, qui l'a fait connaître, demeure son grand œuvre.[13]

Le livre comprend onze chapitres, clairement organisés. Les trois premiers mettent en place le cadre contextuel et explicatif, l'un d'entre eux revenant longuement sur le 1er octobre et ses suites immédiates. Les quatre suivants se concentrent sur la période des atrocités, et accordent autant d'importance en nombre de pages aux incarcérations qu'aux massacres. C'est là aussi que le rôle des interférences étrangères est examiné. Enfin, les trois derniers

12. Je fais allusion ici à l'ouvrage de cette grande spécialiste des archives coloniales des Indes néerlandaises qu'est Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain. Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.

13. *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995

chapitres se penchent sur la longue traînée des exactions, sur les plans du droit et de la justice, de la politique et de la mémoire. Le contexte de 1965 est bien posé, tout particulièrement le caractère désastreux de la situation économique, la montée de la corruption et des trafics en tous genre,[14] ainsi que la montée de l'intolérance en politique. Le PKI a là une responsabilité particulièrement lourde, dans la mesure où il constitue la force montante, qui écrase (interdiction du Masjumi et du PSI, à son instigation) ou tend à marginaliser les partis concurrents. Les communistes inspirent les décisions majeures de Sukarno, surtout à partir de 1964 : « Nasakomisation » à tous les niveaux, armée comprise (ce qui ressemble à l'imposition de commissaires politiques du PKI), confiscation sans indemnité des plantations et entreprises anglo-américaines, campagne visant à détruire la Malaysia, retrait de l'ONU (un cas unique dans les annales de l'organisation), appel à la constitution d'un axe Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Pékin-Pyongyang, et finalement constitution d'une « 5ème force » militaire, formée d'ouvriers et de paysans, encadrés par les communistes (p. 49-51). Ni la nasakomisation généralisée, ni la 5ème force n'eurent le temps d'être mises en place, mais cela inquiéta fort l'armée et les mouvements non communistes.

Le chapitre suivant (« Pretext », comme dans le titre de l'ouvrage de John Roosa), convainc beaucoup moins. Robinson présente longuement et assez honnêtement toutes les thèses divergentes sur le sens à donner au Mouvement du 30 Septembre, mais retient en fin de compte à la fois la thèse classique de Wertheim (le PKI serait tombé dans un piège tendu par Suharto et par les services secrets anglo-saxons) et celle plus neuve de Roosa (seul un petit groupe de dirigeants communistes était en contact avec le Mouvement, le PKI par lui-même ne porte aucune responsabilité). L'auteur ne présente à l'appui aucun argument solide, et fait beaucoup de suppositions gratuites, telles que celle-ci, à propos de la conduite du n°1 communiste Aidit : « Was he really so politically careless that he would have risked the party's strongly favorable position on such a gamble ? » (p. 80). On reviendra plus longuement sur ces points dans la dernière partie, mais répondons déjà que, pour Aidit, le pari ne paraissait sans doute pas si osé (les erreurs de calcul sont monnaie courante dans l'histoire) et qu'il y avait chez lui un sentiment d'urgence, du fait de la crise multiforme dans laquelle le pays était en train de plonger, qui pouvait se retourner contre un PKI co-responsable du pouvoir et de ses errements.

Le chapitre consacré au contexte international (« Cold war ») est tout aussi discutable. En sus des mesures anti-occidentales et déstabilisatrices de l'ordre mondial que nous venons de voir, Sukarno, en peu de temps, rejeta

14. Ainsi Melvin rapporte le mécontentement de nombre d'Achinais au sujet de la rupture des liens commerciaux avec la péninsule malaise toute proche, provoquée par la campagne *Ganyang Malaysia* (Ecrasons la Malaysia), dont le PKI avait été le fer de lance (p. 92).

violemment l'aide américaine, laissa incendier l'ambassade du Royaume-Uni, attaquer les consulats américains de Medan et de Surabaya, reconnut le Nord-Vietnam en rompant avec le Sud, et se lança dans une guerre de basse intensité contre les forces britanniques et australiennes basées en Malaysia. Simultanément, l'aide soviétique devenait massive (elle fournissait en 1965 80% de l'équipement de la Marine, 90% de celui de l'Aviation), puis Jakarta se rapprocha spectaculairement de Pékin, qui promit d'envoyer armes légères et médecins. Face à ces actes d'hostilité manifeste, que peu de pays se permirent jamais à ce degré avec une grande puissance, les USA (qui avaient certes sous Eisenhower, dans les années cinquante, imprudemment soutenu les rébellions du PRRI) firent preuve d'une patience quasi-angélique : soutien de Kennedy à l'annexion de la Nouvelle-Guinée occidentale (néerlandaise) par l'Indonésie en 1962, maintien d'une certaine aide militaire par Johnson en 1964 alors que le Congrès avait voté son interruption, envoi à Jakarta en avril 1965 de l'émissaire présidentiel Ellsworth Bunker pour tenter d'aplanir les différends. A ce propos, les commentaires de Robinson sont renversants : « The mission failed, in large part because Bunker was unable to promise a significant change in US foreign policy. » (p. 90). Ses autres remarques vont dans le même sens : « The actions of the United States and its allies, for example, confirmed Sukarno's worst suspicions about the imperialist objectives of the West. (…) The United States was seen as complicit in the neoimperialist plot because, despite its public claims of neutrality, it clearly took the British and Malaysian side, and insisted on an end to Confrontation as a condition for US aid. » (p. 89). Il met sur le même plan, celui des ingérences occidentales, les bombardements sur le Nord-Vietnam et « the British creation of Malaysia in 1963 » (p. 116) Bref, toutes les provocations contre les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni sont par nature légitimes, et toutes les réactions de ceux-ci d'intolérables agressions.

Ce discours suranné de Guerre Froide (côté communiste) étonne chez un universitaire de 2018. Peut-on simplement rappeler que, pour défier à ce point des grandes puissances, il faut soit être très inconscient, soit disposer de moyens considérables ? Car la riposte est inévitable, et l'on doit être prêt à y faire face. Somme toute (peut-être par manque de temps avant le 1er octobre…) celle de Washington fut très modérée. Mais que les Américains aient entamé ce que Robinson dénomme pompeusement une « psywar » (p. 106) contre Sukarno et le PKI, qu'ils aient aspiré à un changement de régime, puisque le changement de politique se faisait impossible, qu'ils aient tenu à garder le contact autant que faire se pouvait avec quelques-uns des 2 800 officiers qu'ils avaient formés ou entraînés entre 1950 et 1965 (p. 98), quoi d'étonnant, et quoi de scandaleux, sauf à regarder le monde de manière totalement unilatérale ? Et en tout cas, quoique l'auteur en dise, rien de tout cela ne prouve une participation quelconque des Occidentaux aux événements du 1er octobre. Par contre, on

verra ci-dessous qu'il est prouvé que la Chine y prit part, Robinson fournissant d'ailleurs, à son corps défendant, des informations décisives en ce sens. Il est donc incompréhensible (ou trop compréhensible…) que sa conclusion soit la suivante : « Although China and to a lesser extent the USSR played some role, the most consequential and fully documented interventions by far were those pursued by the United States. » (p. 92)

Le chapitre sur les massacres (« Mass Killing ») est mieux venu. Les divers modes de mise à mort, le jeu des divers acteurs, les variations régionales, l'atmosphère d'hystérie idéologique et complotiste, tout ceci est bien rendu. Mais, après les trois recensions qui précèdent, il n'y a pas grand-chose de neuf à ajouter. On contestera quand même, à leur lumière, l'assertion quelque peu lénifiante qui suit : « It is certainly true that the majority of killings were committed by Muslims (…). The more important point is that adherents of all major religions – notably Catholics, Protestants, and Hindus – joined in the killing, and deployed religious symbols and authority to incite or justify the violence » (p. 132). Nous avons vu (et nous reverrons) que c'était en large partie faux : les chrétiens ne prirent part qu'avec réticences aux violences ; à Bali, dans la partie occidentale, les musulmans d'Ansor tinrent le couteau, et dans l'est plus exclusivement hindou, ce furent les laïcs du PNI. Seuls l'islam militant et une grande partie de son clergé se lancèrent dans une extermination qui dépassa souvent les attentes des militaires.

Le chapitre traitant du rôle de l'armée montre que celle-ci, face aux massacres, était loin d'être unifiée. Ainsi, à Java-Ouest, le général Adjie, commandant régional, procéda à des arrestations de masse, mais habituellement non suivies de meurtres. Fidèle de Sukarno, il craignait aussi de remettre en selle les djihadistes du Darul Islam, péniblement maîtrisés quelques années plus tôt. A Flores, il fallut attendre le déplacement du lieutenant-colonel Soetarmadji, en février 1966, pour que les violences meurtrières se déchaînent. Et on a évoqué le cas de Bali, où les autorités civiles autant que militaires étaient pro-communistes jusque début décembre. Cela prouve à la fois, *a contrario*, que l'armée fut partout le facteur déterminant des tueries, mais aussi qu'il serait très difficile de déceler à la tête des forces armées un plan préconçu de prise du pouvoir et d'élimination physique des communistes. Quant aux rapports entre militaires et miliciens, ils sont présentés de manière nuancée et globalement convaincante. Les premiers fournissaient des objectifs aux seconds, souvent des listes d'arrestation. Ils opéraient fréquemment (mais pas toujours) en soutien des milices, en cas de résistance des communistes. Puis les militaires triaient sommairement les détenus (catégorie A : à exécuter ; catégorie B : à emprisonner ; catégorie C : à relâcher, sous surveillance), et livraient à la foule enragée ceux promis à la mort (quand ils ne les tuaient pas eux-mêmes). Il arriva aussi, plus souvent qu'à son tour, que *tous* les interpellés soient massacrés, parfois dès leur capture. L'évolution de la recherche infirme en

tout cas l'idée d'une armée à la remorque des émeutiers, et cherchant toujours à les modérer (cf. en particulier p. 160).

On retrouve dans le chapitre 7, consacré aux réactions et manigances des Occidentaux après le 1er octobre, les partis-pris précédemment décryptés. Robinson cite un rapport de la CIA du 7 octobre : « The US Embassy comments that there is danger the Army may settle for action against those directly involved in the murder of the Generals and permit Sukarno to get much of his power back. » (p. 179). Et il le commente ainsi : « In other words, embassy officials favored broad, arbitrary attacks against PKI members rather than targeted police action against those who might actually have been guilty of a crime. » On est ici en plein faux sens. Le texte est pourtant suffisamment limpide : ce que la CIA craint, ce n'est pas que l'armée s'arrête aux portes du massacre, mais qu'elle épargne Sukarno. Car lui dénier la capacité à se maintenir au pouvoir (ou au minimum celle de l'exercer sans partage), pour les raisons indiquées précédemment, est devenu le premier objectif des Américains et plus encore des Britanniques, plus directement engagés sur le terrain militaire. Quitte à choisir entre détruire le PKI et renverser Sukarno, il me paraît certain qu'ils auraient préféré la seconde option – qui aurait d'ailleurs, à leur sens, entraîné un très fort recul de l'influence des communistes. Aucune dépêche d'ambassade ou des services secrets citée ne mentionne un enthousiasme particulier pour le grand massacre des communistes, même si ce dernier est accueilli froidement, sans indignation, et comme une bonne nouvelle dans la mesure où il sape définitivement le régime de Sukarno, tout en impliquant au minimum une neutralisation de l'Indonésie, considérée comme essentielle à l'heure où la Guerre Froide devient très chaude en Asie du Sud-Est. Où, dans le vaste monde, d'ailleurs, les Occidentaux ont-ils préconisé ou contribué à un massacre généralisé de militants de gauche non armés ? Leur but était de contenir l'expansion du communisme, non de détruire les individus qui s'en réclamaient.

Robinson est à la peine quand il tente de fournir les preuves matérielles d'une aide occidentale directe aux militaires. On a droit à la sempiternelle liste de cinq mille noms de communistes à éliminer que les Américains auraient fournie à l'armée (p. 203) – comme si les anticommunistes locaux pouvaient ignorer la composition d'un PKI légal, et très actif en terrain public. Il évoque l'envoi de riz à la mi-octobre, *via* la Thailande et le Japon, pour en faire baisser le prix et rendre les militaires populaires, mais les détails manquent (p. 199), ainsi qu'un *possible* financement de groupes anticommunistes militants (p. 204). Tout ceci ne devait pas être bien considérable, ni bien effectif, puisque, le 2 novembre, le Département d'Etat, pour armer les Indonésiens qu'il entend soutenir, en est réduit à compter sur les… Soviétiques : « We have already commented on possible need for small arms in another message. It is conceivable that Soviets might supply such items, even while Army is

attacking PKI, if Moscow believes this is best way to keep Chicoms[15] out » (p. 201).

On ne peut donc que se montrer très sceptique devant la conclusion du chapitre : « (the US and UK) helped to ensure that the campaign against the Left would continue unabated and its victims would ultimately number in the hundreds of thousands. » (p. 207) Les quatre derniers chapitres portent sur les incarcérations, les sanctions au long cours (comme celles qui frappaient les détenus libérés, exclus du secteur public et peu à même de bénéficier d'un prêt bancaire), et les tentatives de faire émerger la vérité sur les massacres, que ce soit par des actions en justice, par le lobbying politique, les initiatives internationales ou la culture. Du bel et du bon, dans l'ensemble, mais ce sont des sujets déjà largement abordés ici, et qui le seront encore. On terminera en mentionnant les trois spécificités que Robinson distingue dans les massacres d'Indonésie : absence de base ethnique ou religieuse, mais motivation avant tout politique ; absence d'un contexte de guerre ; absence de toute utopie chez les bourreaux (p. 298). Cela suffit à en faire un cas probablement unique.

Humiliés, Offensés, Pourchassés, Assassinés

Le livre de Vannessa Hearman est à mi-chemin de l'étude de cas (Java-Est, et plus spécialement le Blitar-Sud) et du recueil de témoignages, recueillis oralement. On suit 24 communistes ou sympathisants qui tentèrent de survivre dans le maelström sanglant qui frappa Java-Est, où périrent sans doute 40% de la totalité des massacrés du pays (200 000, pour 22 millions d'habitants alors). Neuf auteurs de violences anticommunistes sont également interrogés. Hearman utilise en outre 34 entretiens enregistrés par l'Institut d'histoire sociale de Jakarta.

L'ouvrage témoigne de la complexité de la situation à Java au long des trois premières semaines d'octobre. SOBSI (les syndicats communistes) tente une contre-attaque après l'échec du 1er, et des entreprises sont saisies par leurs ouvriers, qui élisent de nouveaux directeurs. Mais rapidement, plus aucune directive ne leur parvient, et l'armée commence à les enlever sur le chemin du travail (p. 74). Le PKI hésite à plonger dans la clandestinité, mais ses Jeunesses (*Pemuda Rakyat*) le font rapidement (p. 75). Comme à Aceh, les tueries à une certaine échelle commencent le 13, mais une vague d'attaques de boutiques chinoises avait déjà eu lieu. Et le NU – en coordination avec certains bataillons de l'armée, mais pas tous – joue d'emblée un rôle moteur, réactivant en particulier le traumatisme laissé en 1948 par la tentative insurrectionnelle du PKI à Madiun. Un *kiai* déclare que le sang communiste est *halal* (p. 78), ce qui fait penser à la consommation du sang de leurs victimes révélée par certains bourreaux dans les films d'Oppenheimer. On prétend également un

15. Chinese communists.

peu partout que le PKI a préparé des listes d'assassinats, que les fosses sont déjà creusées, que des commandos sont prêts à incendier les villes rétives... Un système complexe d'échange de tueurs est mis en place, afin que leurs victimes leur soient le plus possible étrangères (p. 92). Les premières semaines, les corps sont laissés sur place, au regard de tous, ou jetés à la rivière, pour terroriser l'entourage et signifier que les communistes sont hors de l'humanité. Les mutilations sont monnaie courante : on pend ainsi des colliers de pénis autour des lupanars de Kediri, ce qui détourne les clients (p. 99).

Fort peu de cas de résistance ou même de fuite sont relevés. La principale difficulté, pour des tueurs contents d'eux et sans remords, semble avoir été « l'invulnérabilité » d'origine magique de certains communistes, qui rend leur meurtre long et complexe (p. 106). A peu près en même temps qu'à Aceh, le 22 octobre, le PKI et ses dix organisations de masse sont « suspendus » dans la région, et leurs adhérents contraints de pointer deux fois par jour à la police. Les fonctionnaires communistes sont révoqués, de même que huit régents (*bupati*) et maires de grandes villes, dont Surabaya. Les entreprises occupées sont reconquises, par l'armée ou par les syndicats du NU (p. 83). Le système de surveillance mutuelle introduit par les Japonais en 1942 (*tonarigumi*) est réactivé (p. 92).[16]

Mais ce qui marque vraiment la période, c'est d'abord l'errance, la fuite éperdue vers un très relatif havre de sécurité, et les échecs successifs subis, souvent conclus par une arrestation, par dénonciation ou au gré des contrôles routiers sur les bus. Surabaya est souvent le premier refuge, car c'est dans les bourgades et les villages que les tueries sont les pires. Le PKI avait obtenu 41,8% des voix dans le grand port en 1955 ; il contrôle la municipalité, comme celles de bien d'autres villes de la région. Malgré l'intensité croissante de la répression, l'organisation continue tant bien que mal à fonctionner dans la clandestinité, fournissant cachettes, nourriture et faux papiers aux cadres en danger. L'expérience est douloureuse pour ceux-ci, car la situation impose généralement la séparation d'avec la famille, parfois pour de nombreuses années, ou pour toujours. Et, quand fin novembre le nouveau maire par intérim, Sukotjo (un militaire) remplace presque tous les représentants élus de la population par des hommes de l'armée, l'atmosphère devient progressivement irrespirable. Il y a heureusement des rivalités entre militaires : un cadre du PKI se cache plusieurs mois dans un immeuble de la Marine (p. 122). Mais la situation s'aggrave encore quand un très proche de Suharto, le général Jasin, remplace en avril 1967 l'ancien sukarnoiste Sumitro à la tête de la division Brawijaya, qui est purgée, au prix de centaines de désertions, parfois

16. Cela, additionné au rôle politico-militaire et à la brutalité de l'armée (notés par Robinson comme reliquats de l'Occupation), et même à l'utilisation de sabres de samourai pour les décapitations, devrait inciter à s'interroger davantage sur les origines japonaises des atrocités de 1965.

avec armes et bagages, parfois au profit des communistes. Et les milices des diverses bourgades de la région sont invitées à affluer à Surabaya, afin d'aider à y repérer les fuyards. Il faut fuir, fuir encore…

Les arrestations s'étalent sur de nombreux mois, et même sur des années (on peut ne commencer qu'en 1969 une détention d'une décennie). Elles sont souvent arbitraires, et l'on peut être arrêté de nouveau pour le même « délit », après une première incarcération. Dans les prisons régulières ou dans d'innombrables bâtiments réquisitionnés, l'entassement et le manque de nourriture rendent la détention très pénible, et rapidement meurtrière, quoique à partir de 1967 les colis alimentaires des familles soient réceptionnés. Les geôliers, corrompus et prévaricateurs, font souvent payer les familles pour ce service – et se servent au passage dans les colis. On en vient parfois à cacher les décès dans les cellules, pour continuer un moment à recevoir leurs rations. Les écoles chinoises, fermées de force, deviennent des prisons annexes (p. 89). On n'est guère alors « relâché » (nuitamment en général) que pour être exécuté, sans que famille et entourage ne soient prévenus (p. 91).

Le dernier refuge des militants et dirigeants communistes encore vivants et libres, à partir de février 1967, fut le district isolé et misérable du Blitar-Sud, face à la côte sauvage de l'océan Indien. On espéra encore y faire survivre et renaître le PKI, sous la forme d'une « base rouge » de type maoïste, d'où un jour se relancer à l'assaut du pouvoir. L'explosion de la Révolution Culturelle en Chine (été 1966) et l'extension constante de la guerre au Vietnam participaient aussi à cet espoir nouveau. Ce fut en réalité un piège, et – à ce jour – le chant du cygne du communisme indonésien.

Le choix du Blitar-Sud s'imposa du fait de la très forte implantation qu'y avait depuis longtemps le PKI, et de la quasi-absence de purge après octobre 1965. L'administration et l'armée y étaient peu présentes. Les villageois semblent avoir bien accueilli ces militants modestes, qui vivaient avec eux et comme eux, ainsi que les conseillers agronomiques et techniques dans leurs rangs, qui améliorèrent un peu leur quotidien. Suite à quelques liquidations malencontreuses d'assassins de communistes hors de la zone, l'existence de la base fut révélée, tant au NU (qui déploya une dizaine de milliers de miliciens) qu'à l'armée, qui envoya six bataillons (5 000 hommes) et encadra de près les premiers. Ce fut l'opération Trisula, lancée le 31 mai 1968. L'administration civile et les chefs de village furent remplacés par des militaires. Dès le départ, les communistes en furent réduits à se cacher dans des forêts et des grottes, dont l'une fut traitée au lance-flammes (p. 159). Et rapidement, une grande partie des cadres furent tués ou capturés, et parfois retournés. La base s'écroulait, en quelques semaines, et l'opération s'acheva le 7 septembre. Le triomphe avait été aisé : seuls 34 armes à feu furent récupérées, alors que 2 000 communistes (ou supposés tels) avaient été tués, les pertes de l'autre côté étant faibles (7 militaires et 26 civils tués). A la différence de 1965, la plupart des cadres

capturés ne furent pas ensuite assassinés, mais passèrent en procès, parfois de nombreuses années après (certains furent condamnés à mort).

Dans une manière de *remake* des pires travers de 1965, l'armée et ses soutiens traitèrent avec une brutalité démesurée les villageois, accusés globalement d'être gangrenés de communisme. Douze camps de regroupement furent mis en place, où les cris des torturés étaient retransmis par haut-parleur (p. 173). Les fugitifs étaient souvent abattus. Beaucoup d'hommes furent contraints de participer aux opérations militaires, soit comme gardes statiques, soit comme fossoyeurs, soit même comme exécuteurs, à la barre de fer (p. 175). Certains villageois furent déportés à Buru. Les hommes, dans certaines localités, avaient à ce point disparu que l'auteure peut évoquer des « villages de veuves » (p. 178). Beaucoup furent battues, dénudées pour mettre en évidence la « marque des Gerwani » – tout comme en notre XVIIe siècle on scrutait la « marque du Diable » chez les prétendues sorcières. En l'absence de parents mâles capables de les protéger, ces femmes devenaient un gibier pour les militaires : viols, prostitution forcée, en recourant au chantage sur les frères ou les enfants (p. 178-181). Les centaines d'orphelins furent souvent enlevés à leurs oncles ou grands-parents, et placés dans des orphelinats hors de la zone (pp. 187-188). On déracina une partie des ruraux en les envoyant dans des nouveaux villages plus aisés à contrôler. Et, pour regagner les âmes, des dizaines de lieux de culte musulmans furent bâtis ou restaurés. Dans les années 2000 encore, la zone était placée sous surveillance étroite par l'armée. Et la mémoire des exactions reste totalement enfouie. On ne peut que remercier Vannessa Hearman de l'avoir en partie remise au jour. Cette enquête minutieuse sur le Blitar-Sud, sans précédent ni équivalent, est le point le plus fort de ce livre poignant .

L'ouvrage de Soe Tjen Marching, à la différence de celui qui précède, revendique dès son sous-titre le terme de « génocide ». Dans les deux cas, les auteures ne fournissent guère d'explication à leur choix en matière de terminologie. Quant aux contenus, ils sont assez différents : Soe[17], la longue introduction historique passée, juxtapose dix-neuf témoignages à la première personne, alors qu'Hearman les intégrait dans un récit pour l'essentiel chronologique. Le plan est, là encore, fondé sur une chronologie, mais c'est celle de l'éloignement par rapport à l'événement. En effet, les deux premières parties regroupent cinq longs récits d'acteurs (et victimes) de la répression du 1er octobre. La troisième fait intervenir deux frères d'assassinés, tandis que la quatrième interroge des enfants de communistes (parmi lesquels l'auteure elle-même). La cinquième, assez brève, donne la parole à des petits-enfants. La visée du livre est par conséquent autant mémorielle qu'historique. C'est ce qui fait aussi son intérêt.

17. Soe est son nom de famille, placé à la manière chinoise. Son prénom, Marching, évoque la Longue Marche de l'Armée Rouge chinoise (1934-1935).

Soe, qui sait de quoi elle parle, souligne à quel point la peur fut internalisée par les familles des disparus de 65. Ces vaincus ne commencèrent à pouvoir timidement relever la tête que plus de trois décennies plus tard, après 1998. Entre temps, on avait résolu de ne pas parler, même en privé, d'éviter autant que possible la vie publique, et de surtout ne pas faire de politique ; dans la communauté chinoise, qui se sait bouc émissaire désigné d'avance en cas de crise, ces interdictions ont davantage encore eu force de loi.

Les témoignages des acteurs fournissent énormément d'indications originales. Leo Mulyono relate un épisode de racisme anti-chinois : au moment de Noël, en détention, les gardes font se battre des Chinois par paires ; celui qui ne porte pas de coups assez violents est tabassé, et dans un cas jeté sur une clôture barbelée (pp. 44-45). Certains Chinois, par la suite, tenteront d'apparaître le plus javanais possible… L'affamement volontaire est tel qu'on attend avec impatience la mort de compagnons de détention, car les gardes fournissent alors une noix de coco pour les libations sur la tombe ; on peut ensuite se partager la chair de la noix. Certaines prisons peuvent être moins rudes. Ainsi, à Ambarawa, hommes et femmes peuvent se voir et communiquer par signes, et des idylles naissent. Deux tailleurs peuvent exercer leur métier, et se fournir en tissus à l'extérieur. Un *dalang*[18] sans matériel anime les soirées en faisant de sa bouche un orchestre entier. Et d'assez nombreuses libérations ont lieu en 1968, appréhendées au départ par les détenus, car ils se demandaient si l'on n'allait pas en réalité les tuer, comme en 1965. Mais certains libérés revinrent voir leurs compagnons d'infortune, désormais soulagés (pp. 48-49). Oei Hiem Hwie, davantage sukarnoiste que communiste, fut néanmoins retenu 13 ans en prison, puis à Buru. A son retour, il partit pour Surabaya et y fonda une petite bibliothèque publique (p. 67). Antonius Pudji Rahardjo fut d'abord détenu à Surabaya dans le local confisqué à un syndicat ouvrier. On y torture, et il est contraint de signer sa déclaration sans avoir le droit de la lire. Dans la grande prison de Kalisosok, on en est réduit à manger lézards et sauterelles.

Les femmes apportent parfois un supplément alimentaire, mais à leurs risques et périls : un gardien, pour parvenir à ses fins, fait torturer le mari d'une épouse à son goût – c'est à peu près le synopsis de l'opéra *Tosca.* Un autre, rentrant chez lui après son élargissement, doit constater que sa femme a épousé le soldat qui l'avait arrêté et battu ; il le tue, et est renvoyé en prison… (pp. 72-73) Un commandant, à Buru, prend pour concubine la conjointe d'un détenu ; un autre détenu, pris comme domestique par l'officier, court lui signifier de s'éloigner quand ce dernier veut voir sa femme, dûment rémunérée (p. 74-76). Au début des années soixante-dix, la nouvelle de la venue d'une délégation de la Croix Rouge internationale entraîne de spectaculaires améliorations : livres dans la bibliothèque, produits dans les boutiques, construction d'une nouvelle clinique. Mais, ensuite, tout revient à l'état antérieur, et la clinique reste vide (p. 78)…

18. Marionnettiste du théâtre d'ombres.

Des témoignages de frères de victimes, on retiendra l'intervention d'Adi Rukun, personnage principal de *The Look of Silence*, le second film d'Oppenheimer. On apprend ainsi que de nombreux villageois prirent part à la mise à mort de son frère aîné (chef local du BTI, l'organisation paysanne du PKI), et pas seulement les tueurs du *Komando Aksi* comme le dit le film: « They gathered around, as if watching an animal in a circus, and started laughing and ridiculing him. Some even threw stones at him. » (p. 115) – et ce alors que, laissé pour mort, il essaye péniblement de ramper et demande de l'aide. Omission significative d'Oppenheimer ? Ce dernier ne dit pas non plus qu'Adi se réclame du communisme, tout en étant secrétaire de sa mosquée de quartier à Medan. La victimisation de la famille ne s'arrêta pas au frère : sa sœur de 14 ans eut le crâne tondu, et son père subit des extorsions d'argent répétées de la part du chef de village. Etrangement, la tombe du frère massacré (mais après avoir deux fois survécu à ses bourreaux) est devenue un lieu de pèlerinage mineur, des pouvoirs surnaturels d'invulnérabilité lui étant attribués.

La mémoire des enfants et petits-enfants évoque bien entendu davantage l'après-65 que l' « *annus horribilis* », telle que la dénomme l'un d'entre eux (p. 128). On saisit à quel point la vie fut difficile pour la descendance des ET (*Eks Tapol*, ex-prisonniers politiques), dont la mention figurait sur les papiers d'identité. L'un d'entre eux fut licencié de la télévision nationale en 1989, quand on découvrit sa « mauvaise origine » (pour reprendre la terminologie de la Chine de Mao). Et, en 1996, il fut arrêté et questionné six jours durant pour s'être rendu aux obsèques d'un vieux communiste (p. 125). Le témoignage de la fille du dirigeant communiste Njoto (exécuté sans jugement, dans des circonstances toujours inconnues) est particulièrement intéressant. Quoique vivant en famille, elle n'apprit l'identité de son père que dans les années quatre-vingt. Exclue de l'enseignement pour cette raison, elle s'est consacrée aux ONG (y compris dans les secours aux victimes du tsunami de 2004) et à la difficile réhabilitation des victimes de 1965. L'ostracisation par les autres villageois, même dans un village « rouge » de Bali, fit fuir un autre témoin ; les membres rescapés de sa famille souffrirent après les massacres de maladies chroniques, et plusieurs moururent prématurément. Comme les meurtriers relevaient localement du PNI, son village se mit à soutenir le Golkar, pourtant le parti de la dictature suhartiste (pp. 144-146).

On découvre que les prisons de Java, les mieux connues, n'étaient sans doute pas les pires : à Sumatra, on entasse à tel point les détenus qu'ils se piétinent à mort ; et les privations de nourriture (de surcroît souvent pourrie) autant que d'eau potable entraînent une mortalité terrible ; on peut rester cinq mois dans des cellules sans lumière, avant d'obtenir le droit à la promenade (pp. 159-160). Sari Marlina (une contraction de Marx-Lénine), devenue athée, doit cependant aujourd'hui porter le jilbab pour éviter les ennuis (p. 162).

Les errances sont souvent cahotiques : la famille de la mère de Rito Aji avait pris part aux tueries, le père, communiste, devint plus tard catholique (le cas est courant) ; lui-même, victime de vexations incessantes et de coups comme « enfant de PKI » par les gamins de son quartier, fuit pour vivre avec les enfants des rues (eux ne le discriminent pas), vend des résultats d'examen (il se montre excellent élève) et, ne pouvant entrer dans la fonction publique, réussit comme proxénète. Quand Suharto « dégage » en 1998, il préparait un attentat à la bombe contre lui.

Quant à l'auteure, sa famille, chinoise et progressiste (mais officiellement non communiste), eut comme tant d'autres à souffrir. Son grand-oncle avait été assassiné en 1947 à Blitar, au cours d'une émeute raciale. Sa mère, enseignante, perd son poste en avril 1966 (toutes les écoles chinoises sont alors fermées, du jour au lendemain). A son dernier cours, elle fait étudier « La dernière classe » d'Alphonse Daudet[19]. On cache pendant des mois à la maison un ami communiste, qui devient ensuite activiste catholique pour dissimuler son identité. Le père est arrêté fin 1966, puis relâché sans plus de raison en 1969 (et ré-enfermé six mois peu après). Impécunieuse, la mère ouvre un commerce de douceurs, où l'on afflue, mais beaucoup de ses clients sont ensuite emprisonnés ou tués. Le père, sans doute très mal traité en prison (son corps en porte d'affreuses traces), a en partie perdu la raison : il s'amuse à torturer des rats, et parfois des chiens. Il y avait beaucoup de secrets et de silences dans cette famille : ce n'est qu'en 2013 que sa mère lui avouera que son père était en réalité membre de la direction du PKI à Surabaya.[20] Le cas de Haidir Svj est unique : son grand-père fut l'un des rares libérés de Buru (en 1976) à décider de rester et faire souche sur l'île. Le petit-fils est heureux et fier d'y être né et d'y vivre (d'où son étrange patronyme : Svj, pour Savanajaya, le village des familles regroupées après 1972). Il se plaint surtout de la faiblesse des infrastructures scolaires, et milite avec d'autres de sa génération pour la mémoire de l'île-camp. Mais la plupart des grand-pères évoqués furent assassinés, dans la plus grande des brutalités. Ainsi Diah Wahyuningsih Rahayu (Sumatra-Nord) n'apprit qu'après la chute de Suharto le sort du sien, dont on avait tranché les oreilles dans sa chambre pour lui faire avouer son appartenance au PKI (il était du PNI), avant de l'emmener à la mort. Elle avait remarqué auparavant les étranges rites funéraires menés dans cette pièce, transformée grâce aux oreilles (enterrées là) en tombe de substitution (p. 202).

19. Le thème en est l'annexion de l'Alsace-Moselle par l'Allemagne après la défaite française de 1871. Les instituteurs francophones doivent renoncer à l'enseignement. La nouvelle, très lue en France, a fait pleurer des générations d'écoliers.

20. L'auteure ne le dit pas, mais cela pourrait expliquer et l'afflux dans la boutique maternelle (qui reçoit alors une aide matérielle inexpliquée) et les arrestations subséquentes : elle pouvait avoir une place dans les réseaux communistes clandestins, dont on a vu l'activité à Surabaya.

Témoins et Bourreaux

L'ouvrage de Baskara T. Wardaya est l'un des deux de notre liste à être traduit de l'indonésien. Cela explique, selon la traductrice, une certaine prudence de ton, la volonté de se distancier des divers acteurs, et l'utilisation du mot « tragédie » de préférence à massacres dans la version originale. Cela, dirons-nous, n'en rend que plus accablantes les atrocités évoquées, page après page. On a là l'avantage de percevoir l'état du débat en Indonésie, et la manière tortueuse mais, espérons-le, inexorable par laquelle la vérité se fait jour. De ce point de vue, que la parole soit très largement donnée à des « témoins », classés par religion, et pour plusieurs d'entre eux plutôt sympathisants des bourreaux, fait mieux comprendre le poids des résistances, non seulement à l'établissement des faits, mais aussi à la réconciliation. Que l'auteur soit un Jésuite n'est évidemment pas étranger à ses préoccupations, et sa condition de religieux le protège un peu des foudres des anticommunistes acharnés. Cela introduit aussi un biais, certes secondaire : la conversion au christianisme presque systématique des victimes interrogées, qui ne fut bien entendu point si généralisée. Le plan est simple : des témoignages répartis en deux grandes parties (la première : les témoins des violences ; la seconde : les victimes), suivies d'une étude monographique sur l'attitude des catholiques dans l'archidiocèse de Semarang (qui comprend Yogyakarta) lors des « événements ».

On apprend beaucoup à la lecture de ces pages. D'une certaine façon, la polyphonie assumée (tueurs cependant exclus) des voix ici retransmises en fait le recueil le plus complet sur la période (plusieurs témoignages débutent bien avant 1965). Ainsi, un témoin, retraité de l'armée, souligne que l'armée indonésienne, d'origine révolutionnaire, a toujours eu des ambitions et un rôle autant politiques que militaires. Les relations patron/client (que l'auteur dénomme *bapakism*), très pesantes, donnent lieu à un sentiment de trahison inacceptable en cas d'infidélité – ce qui aurait suscité l'énergie cruellement vengeresse de Suharto face à l'attitude de son ex-subordonné Untung, chef nominal du Mouvement. Plus globalement, on est surpris des explications presque exclusivement psychologiques données au comportement des uns et des autres, et même aux inflexions majeures de 1965-66. Les vieilles hiérarchies comptent par ailleurs beaucoup : pour notre témoin, Omar Dhani ne *pouvait* pas être communiste, puisqu'il était de famille aristocratique, et qui plus est de belle prestance… De la gigantesque répression, le témoin regrette surtout que de bons musulmans en aient souffert, parce que leur employeur était communiste, et donc visé. Il rejette pour finir le principe de la « double fonction » (*dwifungsi*) de l'armée, la période révolutionnaire étant révolue.

Le récit d'un pilier de la Muhammadiyah de la région de Yogyakarta confirme la radicalité de la rupture du 1er octobre. Jusque-là, les frictions entre jeunes, communistes et musulmans, étaient fréquentes, mais avec très peu de

violences physiques. Dès l'annonce du Mouvement, par contre, on commence, côté musulman, à dresser des listes de communistes à neutraliser. Ce que dit une militante catholique est également significatif. Entraînée par la direction du parti de sa communauté (qu'elle s'imagine en harmonie avec l'Eglise elle-même), elle participe aux mouvements étudiants réclamant l'interdiction du PKI (elle considère aujourd'hui avoir été manipulée). Dans les jours suivant le 1er octobre, elle avait elle-même dû se cacher d'inquiétantes visites à domicile de commandos du Pemuda Rakyat. Mais elle estime rapidement que la répression va trop loin, en particulier quand elle s'attaque à des organisations de bienfaisance, essentielles en une période où tous ne mangent pas à leur faim : « The arrest of my neighbourhood friends who had joined Gerwani really disturbed me. Two women who were active Gerwani members and had worked with me in the Kampung Cooperative were also arrested. I was extremely angry and could not accept this. So I emboldened myself to defend them, even though I then had to become the target of the officers at the Military Police headquarters in Yogyakarta. » Elle sera interrogée deux jours durant. Elle dénonce aussi l'accaparement de terres de leurs victimes par les militaires, ainsi que le démantèlement durable des associations de femmes. Elle adhérera plus tard à la théologie de la libération, et aux forums sociaux mondiaux.

Passons aux victimes survivantes. La plus âgée (née en 1926) est un activiste qui s'illustra dans tous les combats militaires puis politiques à partir de la guerre d'Indépendance, et, quoique hostile au départ au PKI, finit par faire fusionner son organisation paysanne (SAKTI) avec le BTI communiste, dont il devint le secrétaire-général. Cela ne l'empêcha pas de se retrouver complètement isolé des dignitaires du PKI dès le 1er octobre (dont il dit n'avoir pas été informé à l'avance). En fuite, il fut arrêté fin 1965. Il semble avoir été livré par un cadre communiste, qui participera à ses interrogatoires, et se montrera « even crueller than the police ». Plusieurs autres témoins évoquent ces militants de gauche retournés, qui, pour sauver leur peau, participent aux atrocités contre leurs camarades, et semblent parfois s'être pris au jeu. Scène surréaliste : ses interrogateurs un peu las l'amènent un jour dans un restaurant, et ils se congratulent, pleurent ensemble autour d'un bon dîner. Le repas fini, les tortures reprennent… Un autre survivant décrit l'étrange régime de la prison de Wirogunan à Yogya. D'un côté presque rien à manger, de façon à extorquer dix kilogrammes de riz par prisonnier et par mois aux familles soucieuses de la survie de leurs proches, qui sans cette dîme n'étaient autorisées ni à leur rendre visite, ni à leur fournir de nourriture (elle-même pillée…) ; de l'autre, une vie culturelle intense (*ketoprak*, théâtre…), que les gardiens apprécient beaucoup. Il fait ensuite de Buru un tableau point si noir, du moins par comparaison avec les prisons : assez grande autonomie des déportés, qui peuvent conserver le produit de leurs récoltes, et bientôt dormir hors des baraquements ; possibilité,

au bout de quelques années, de contacts avec les autochtones, sur lesquels il présente une véritable étude ethnographique. Mais tout se gâte avec l'arrivée d'un cruel nouveau commandant.

Un témoin, d'origine chinoise, et à ses dires peu politisé, fut arrêté, en 1969 seulement, apparemment pour avoir participé à un séminaire de formation de cadres en 1963-64, impulsé par l'entourage de Sukarno. L'inconsistance de ce « délit » ne l'empêcha pas d'être expédié à Buru de 1971 à 1979. Un autre témoignage mentionne la fusillade de nombreux prisonniers au bord de la Begawan Solo, en plein jour, au vu et au su de tous, en décembre 1965. Une informatrice fut arrêtée en 1965 à 14 ans, en lieu et place d'une homonyme. Elle passa quatorze années en détention et ne reçut jamais ni excuses, ni indemnisation. En 1966, un père qui refusait de se joindre au gamelan du village pour une représentation de ketoprak fut emprisonné treize ans sur demande du chef de village ; sa famille sombra dans la misère et souffrit continuellement de vexations, vols et violences de la part de ses voisins. Lors d'une absence, sa maison fut même consciencieusement démolie, brique après brique. Une jeune étudiante catholique, arrêtée semble-t-il par erreur en 1965, fut rapidement relâchée et munie d'un certificat d'élargissement. C'est au vu de ce document qu'elle fut cependant appréhendée à nouveau en 1968, cette fois pour une décennie. Elle est la plus explicite à propos des violences sexuelles si régulièrement subies par les prisonnières, beaucoup se retrouvant enceintes : ainsi, lors d'interrogatoires, elle devait effectuer une fellation sur les hommes présents. Touche amusante : lors d'une inspection de sa prison par Amnesty International, les détenues purent dévoiler la réalité de leurs souffrances en langues étrangères, sans que leurs geôliers monolingues ne puissent comprendre.

L'ultime ouvrage pris ici en considération, celui de Kurniawan et al., est par certains côtés le plus surprenant et – espérons-le – le plus important : non par son contenu, qui recoupe beaucoup d'autres études tout en apportant nombre d'informations nouvelles (par exemple sur la situation à Flores en 1966, particulièrement dramatique), mais par son retentissement en Indonésie même. Le magazine *Tempo*, qui l'a d'abord publié dans son numéro du 1er octobre 2012 sous la forme d'un supplément, y jouit en effet d'une aura sans commune mesure avec celle des divers auteurs précédemment recensés, même si le « glorieux ancêtre » des études sur 1965 qu'est Robert Cribb a fourni à ce supplément une courte étude sur le chiffrage des victimes. Plus que tout ouvrage, il convient d'admettre que les deux documentaires (déjà mentionnés) de Joshua Oppenheimer ont eu la capacité de faire bouger les consciences de beaucoup d'Indonésiens. Ils font d'ailleurs l'objet de plusieurs articles vers la fin de ce recueil, y compris un entretien avec le cinéaste. Et c'est par un portrait du sombre héros de *The act of killing*, Anwar Congo (décédé fin 2019) qu'il commence. Plusieurs des intervenants des ouvrages précités



L'ouvrage de Kurniawan et al. publié par PT Tempo Inti Media Harian en 2015.

admettent d'ailleurs que c'est le visionnage de ces films qui les a décidés à rompre le silence, à questionner leurs familles, à s'informer par eux-mêmes, et à prendre la parole. Est-ce la marque de l'influence de la « méthode Oppenheimer » ? La parole, ici aussi, est largement laissée aux ex-bourreaux, dont les récits, saupoudrés dans certains cas d'un repentir fort modéré pour les crimes commis, complètent judicieusement les témoignages de victimes sur lesquels les travaux qui précèdent étaient fondés.

L'introduction (« Requiem for a massacre ») rompt, et pas seulement par son titre, avec l'habitude indonésienne d'extrême prudence à l'égard d'événements encore si brûlants que les risques pris à les évoquer de manière critique sont évidents. C'est encore davantage le cas avec la nouvelle préface (« From the killing fields ») écrite après la publication du supplément de 2012. Elle appelle avec solennité au travail de mémoire : « Readers, no matter how painful, the mass killings of 1965-1966 must be laid bare. Remembering is better than forgetting. The perpetrators must prepare themselves mentally before they can truly understand their wrongdoings and ask for forgiveness. » (p. 12). Certes, comme étonné de sa propre audace, le rédacteur croit bon d'y opérer une restriction : « The events that transpired from 1965-1966 cannot be judged by today's norms and values. » (p. 11) – ce qui est à la fois évident et discutable, les principes normatifs concernant le meurtre, la torture ou le viol n'ayant pas tant changé que cela depuis 1965.

Il faut dire que la pression est forte, venant de puissants secteurs de la population indonésienne. Le supplément ayant suscité un grand mécontentement parmi les *ulama* de Java-Est à propos de la mise en lumière du rôle funeste de NU en 1965, la direction de *Tempo* dut rencontrer celle de la grande organisation musulmane. Cette dernière laissait entendre que le

magazine « had a particular agenda on publishing the report » (p. 9) – une menace à prendre au sérieux, d'autant qu'il était ajouté par un *kiai* : « *Tempo* does not live in a vacuum, I hope they act cautiously. The writing of history must be accurate. » (cité p. 10). Concession à cette pression ? La préface s'achève par un rappel d'atrocités commises par le PKI en 1948 à Magetan, lors de l'insurrection de Madiun : « villagers were massacred by the PKI and thrown down wells. Seven such wells linked to the PKI have been identified, spread throughout the villages of Magetan Regency. » (p. 13).

Les milices des organisations musulmanes n'ont pas le beau rôle – ce qui constitue d'ailleurs une constante dans les ouvrages ici recensés. Suivant un de leurs anciens membres, opérant alors dans la région de Kediri (Java-Est) : « Tens of members of Banser (Ansor's multipurpose unit), including myself, had gathered at a large field in Mojoduwur village, Mojowarno district. This group was led by two *kiai* (religious teachers) who were well-respected, because they knew how to develop powers of invincibility and carried special amulets. First our physical condition was hardened. After this, our mental strength was improved, including being "filled" with the powers of invincibility. On the final day, we were all given rattan canes about as wide as a forefinger, and about a meter long. Whoever held this rattan would have powers of invulnerability. » (p. 31). Et les exactions à l'encontre des communistes sont sanctifiées : pour un vétéran de Banser (à Rengel, Java-Est), « this conflict with the PKI was not just over ideological difference, but was a holy war. It was kill or be killed. If the PKI were not killed right away, the next day they would kill us. They had attacked our faith. » (p. 40). Un ulama du NU profère ce commandement terrifiant: « A person is not a real Muslim if he does not want to exterminate PKI members. It is *haram* to kill a gecko if you have not yet killed these infidels. » (cité p. 38).

Il serait cependant erroné de culturaliser ou communautariser exagérément les massacres. Le présent ouvrage confirme en effet à quel point c'est l'armée qui a voulu ces derniers, et les a gérés de bout en bout. Les milices d'Ansor sont formées et équipées (parcimonieusement) par les militaires : « the morning formation was initially the request of commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Sam, to the NU chairman in Kediri. The request was also an explicit expression of military support for the NU to take action. In fact, Sam gave a Luger to the Ansor chairman in Kediri and trained him how to shoot » (pp. 16-17). Puis les apprentis tueurs que sont devenus les élèves des *pesantren* sont généreusement convoyés : « The military picked up and transported students in military trucks to send them to pockets of PKI members who were the targets of operations in all areas of the Kediri Residency. In the field, the military placed the students on the front lines and made them the executioners. » (p. 19).

Et l'opération ne se fait pas au hasard: « We were given the list of people who were to be killed that night, not knowing who made the list. Clearly the targets were top administrators of the local PKI central committees, especially the chairmen and their secretaries. So in each village there were one or two people targeted. » (p. 32). On pourrait sourire de ces « hauts responsables » de chaque village, qui devaient bien souvent être de simples militants de base. Ce type de scène semble se répéter à l'infini, toujours avec ces listes aussi précises que sans provenance mentionnée, dont certains indiquent cependant qu'elles étaient fournies par les militaires. Tout paraît solidement organisé : « The executioners worked on different levels. (…) some coordinated the executioners, others worked at inciting public sentiment, but still others prepared the list of suspected PKI members, who were to be killed, and determining the operation times. Not surprisingly, the roundups and executions turned out to be very efficient and calculated. » (p. 28).

On est tout aussi loin d'émotions populaires désordonnées à Flores, dans le Grand Est indonésien : « in Sikka, the state's operations were carried out by the Armed Forces (…) at a time of clashes between residents from different backgrounds: based on political party, religion, ethnic group and culture. (…) "The killings were always witnessed by representatives of the parties", said (Father) Hubert. To intensify the terror, the killings were carried out in every subdistrict. When no PKI member could be found in the area, the victims were brought in from regions and killed there. Throughout Sikka regency, there were around thirty execution sites » (pp. 68-69). Le goût du sang est moindre qu'à Java ou Bali, et il est plus difficile pour l'armée de s'adjoindre suffisamment d'auxiliaires en tueries. De plus, il convient de respecter la diversité ethno-religieuse de l'île. On va donc chercher des bourreaux, pas toujours volontaires, chez les catholiques, les protestants et les musulmans : « The executioners were also taken from these groups. They were ordered to kill while the soldiers and police stood guard, and supplied them with weapons. If one of the detainees escaped, two executioners considered neglectful were to substitute for the victims. » (p. 69).

Mais il est plus pratique parfois d'aller recruter les tueurs parmi les assassins condamnés des prisons. C'est ce que narre l'un d'entre eux : « In February 1966, we were summoned to gather at the Kodim. We were equipped with three spades, three hoes and four harrows. Each executioner was given a machete. After that we were taken to the killing fields chosen by the commander of the Security and Order Restoration Operation Command (Komop). There, we were told to dig a hole three meters deep and five meters wide. » (pp. 72-73). Notre homme est généreusement récompensé: remise du reste de sa peine (neuf ans), cinq sacs de riz et 150 000 roupies. Par contre, un activiste des commandos (*Tameng*) du PNI balinais ne reçoit ni salaire, ni même remerciements à la fin de ses quelque trois mois d'activité. Il semble en

demeurer légèrement amer aujourd'hui : « Suddenly it was over and we were told to go home. That was that. The important thing was that I helped secure the country. » (p. 65).

Courageux est celui qui manifeste la moindre réticence face à ces massacres. Dans les villages où cela se passe, chacun s'enferme chez lui, tremblant de peur qu'on le prenne pour un « suspect », avant d'aller, au petit matin, jeter les cadavres épars à l'eau ou dans une grotte. Un religieux est en principe mieux protégé, et ne peut être suspect d'adhésion au communisme athée. Néanmoins, quand le vicaire Romo Pede, d'une paroisse proche de Maumere (Flores), entreprend de faire libérer ses ouailles arrêtées le 6 mars 1966, au point de se rendre au QG de Maumere, non seulement n'obtient-il rien, mais tout son courrier est désormais filtré par la censure. Et, peu après, l'évêché reçoit ce sévère coup de semonce : « Every interference into and negative contribution against the efforts of the Komop (…) is identical with protecting the Gestapu-PKI and its henchmen. » (p. 70) ; le déplacement du vicaire « fautif » est exigé. L'évêché obtempérera…

Les arrestations fatales ont souvent lieu la nuit et dans le silence. Mais les assassins ne craignent pas non plus la publicité bruyante : « The extermination of communist sympathizers was openly announced by a district employee : "Carrying a loudspeaker, he would tell the public that PKI members had to be eliminated", he recalled » (p. 46). Les procédures de mise à mort sont parfois complexes et éclectiques, quand il y a un tant soit peu de résistance : « I ran to the embankment near the river to take a cassava stalk about three fingers wide and returned to the house. I recited the (Arabic) *asmak* I learned from Kiai Munjahid. Then I hit the man from behind. He staggered, then I cut off his head with my samourai sword. » (p. 23).

Il convient de ménager les nerfs des tueurs, afin de conserver intacte leur force de travail. A cette fin, on essaye de ne pas leur faire rencontrer des victimes trop connues d'eux. A Bali : « On the beach, the PKI prisoners were separated based on their home villages. While waiting, they were asked to squat on the sand. Then the members of the (Mahraenis) Shield were asked to change places, so that they would not have to kill a neighbor or a relative. After that, using whatever weapons they had – short swords and machetes – hundreds, maybe thousands, of PKI cadres were beheaded. » (p. 63). Le problème est plus aigu encore si l'on a un frère communiste : « He was killed by an associate because I didn't have the heart to do it. Despite being a brother, the ideology was non negotiable and could not be compromised. » (p. 20) Hors Java et Bali, les tueries semblent bien avoir parfois été encore plus cruelles et systématiques, quoique portant sur des effectifs bien moindres. On défénestre d'une prison improvisée en plein Medan, et dans l'île de Kemaro, proche de Palembang, on ne fait pas de prisonniers : « After three nights, the number of prisoners there fell from hundreds to just seventeen people. The bodies were taken by motorboat and thrown into the river. » (p. 103).

A ces scènes plus déprimantes les unes que les autres, il est nécessaire d'opposer une perspective positive. C'est le rôle joué par l'effort de réconciliation locale auquel préside le maire de la ville de Palu, Rusdi Mastura, qu'on a déjà évoqué : « Rusdi said he was 16 years old and a high school student at the time of the mass killings. As a member of the Boy Scouts, he was ordered by the school principal to guard detention sites. The suffering he witnessed carrying out this task has haunted him. Now as mayor, Rusdi has pledged free medical care to the families of victims and scholarships for victims' children. A monument has also been erected at the site of a PKI forced labor camp. Rusdi's example is worthy of emulation. » (p. 13).

Sortir des Mythes

Dans cette dernière partie, on reviendra sur certains des points qui, dans la bibliographie existante, portent le plus à controverse. Beaucoup sont liés aux incertitudes factuelles persistantes. Mais d'autres relèvent de profondes divergences d'analyse, et en fin de compte d'oppositions d'ordre idéologique. Y intervenir frontalement, en ayant conscience de ne pouvoir être suivi par certains, et même de les choquer, cela me paraît néanmoins indispensable. Si le débat peut en être approfondi, y compris à mon détriment, j'en serai le premier satisfait.

L'Amorce d'un Parti-État

Faire si souvent débuter les historiques de 1965-66 dans les tout derniers mois précédant le 30 septembre, et dans la perspective presque exclusive de la mise en relief des prodromes des atrocités qui suivirent, empêche de saisir la réalité du contexte de l'Indonésie sukarnienne finissante. Beaucoup d'ouvrages évoquent trop peu la catastrophe économique qui frappait le pays (très forte inflation, incapacité à gérer les nombreuses entreprises étrangères brutalement nationalisées, budget de l'Etat utilisé sans contrôle par le « porte-parole des masses » au service de sa grande politique nationaliste) et les conséquences sociales dramatiques qui s'ensuivaient.[21] Beaucoup d'auteurs ne donnent également de l'action du PKI et de ses organisations de masse qu'une version euphémisée : soutien aux squatters des villes et aux paysans sans terre des campagnes, encouragement à une véritable effervescence de théâtre et danse populaires, alphabétisation à grande échelle – ce que facilitait la très forte adhésion des enseignants au communisme –, soutien à l'émancipation des femmes face à la double oppression familiale et religieuse. Tout ceci constitua une réalité incontestable, et largement positive.

21. Jess Melvin expédie le sujet en une note de quatre lignes (n. 188, pp. 286-287).

Mais, de ce point de vue, le PKI ne se distinguait guère de ses « grands frères » soviétique et plus encore chinois. Le parti de Mao Zedong acquit par des mesures semblables une large part de sa popularité, ainsi que l'estime d'une grande partie des visiteurs étrangers de la Chine, avant comme après 1949, bien au-delà de l'extrême-gauche. On mentionnera par exemple le général américain (proche de la droite républicaine) Joseph Stilwell, devenu après 1941 chef d'état-major du président Chiang Kai-shek : dans ses carnets, il n'a pas de mots assez durs pour dénoncer la dictature corrompue et chaotique de ce dernier, alors que les communistes sont des parangons de vertu, de patriotisme, de dévouement et d'efficacité.[22] Derrière cette façade plus que présentable, celui qui voulait voir distinguait pourtant clairement les indices d'une volonté de contrôle total des corps et des esprits, d'une entreprise d'arasement totalitaire. Comme le disait la politologue Annie Kriegel, l'histoire du communisme est inextricablement composée d'ombre et de lumière. Il est dommage qu'aujourd'hui encore bien des historiens de la période ne s'interrogent pas, ou pas suffisamment, sur ce point, s'agissant d'un PKI qui avait déjà certaines caractéristiques d'un parti au pouvoir, certes dans l'ombre de Sukarno. Cela contribuerait pourtant à expliquer (ce qui n'est en rien justifier, ou excuser, faut-il le rappeler ?) la violence du *backlash* qui suivit le 30 septembre.

La littérature consacrée au communisme indonésien brièvement triomphant est courte, et généralement ancienne. Elle fournit cependant de remarquables éclairages. Ainsi, le tentaculaire Institut de culture populaire (LEKRA), qui dépendait du PKI, préconisa-t-il en 1959 d'« encourager la prévention et l'élimination de l'indécence et des autres symptômes de la décadence en musique et en danse », et prôna, aux côtés d'un Sukarno ravi, le renforcement de la « culture nationale »[23], en bannissant pêle-mêle le rockn'roll, la pop music « impérialiste », les Beatles et la chansonnette indienne. Il s'agissait cependant d'un nationalisme ouvert, du moins à certaines influences bien précises. Un chant fut ainsi composé pour célébrer la visite de Kim Il Sung à Sukarno en avril 1965. Quelques semaines plus tard, le clou de la célébration du 45ème anniversaire du PKI fut constitué par les portraits géants de Sukarno et du numéro un communiste Aidit, composés par 10 000 étudiants sous la direction d'instructeurs nord-coréens. Sur le modèle soviétique ou est-allemand, des chorales aux textes lourdement politiques fleurirent un peu partout. Et les ouvrages étrangers traduits en indonésien venaient de plus en plus souvent de Moscou, de Pékin ou de Prague. Les échanges étaient réciproques : dès la seconde moitié des années cinquante, les deux plus considérables tournées

22. Joseph Stilwell & Theodore White (eds.), *The Stilwell Papers*, Boston, Da Capo Press, 1991.

23. Cité in Jennifer Lindsay & Maya H.T. Liem (eds.), *Heirs to World Culture, 1950-1965 – Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, Leyde, KITLV Press, 2012, p. 425.

culturelles officielles (principalement des musiciens et des danseurs) furent réservées aux pays communistes.

A la Conférence nationale de l'art et de la littérature révolutionnaires (août-septembre 1964), Aidit singea les Causeries sur l'art et la littérature de Mao Zedong à Yan'an (1942), qui avaient été suivies d'une vaste campagne de « rééducation » (entendez : domestication, et parfois élimination) des intellectuels chinois membres ou proches du PC, en disqualifiant tout artiste ne se plaçant pas strictement au service du Peuple – c'est-à-dire du Parti. Lors de l'anniversaire de ce dernier (mai 1965), une immense pièce dansée et chantée (*Gloire au parti et au pays*) présenta la geste de l'Indonésie révolutionnaire, sur le modèle du tout récent *L'Orient est rouge* de Pékin. L'histoire était corrigée et expurgée : plus de Mohammed Hatta en 1945, une dénonciation de tous les accords avec les Pays-Bas ou les Etats-Unis, ainsi que du Masjumi, et l'exaltation tant du PKI, dont l'action se serait confondue depuis 1920 avec l'aspiration nationale indonésienne, que de son chef Aidit. Or une partie majoritaire de la presse nationale encensa l'œuvre. Quant à la langue de bois, il sera difficile de faire mieux que Sudharnoto, l'un des dirigeants de LEKRA, dans un discours de novembre 1964, certes inspiré par la bouillonnante inventivité en matière de néologismes du président Sukarno : « au rythme de Djarek[24] et de Resopim[25], avec les mélodies du Takem[26] et du Gesuri[27], avec l'harmonie du Manipol[28] renforcé par l'arrangement glorieux de Tavip[29], les musiciens progressistes fracasseront la culture américaine impérialiste, le Manikebu[30], et feront fleurir une musique à identité nationale. » [31] On le sait, tout totalitarisme passe par un remodelage en profondeur de la langue.[32]

Une Tragédie de la Faiblesse : le Coup du 1er Octobre

Venons-en aux événements toujours si controversés du 1er octobre. Il est étrange (et révélateur) que la piste chinoise n'ait pas été davantage investiguée, l'historien sino-américain Taomo Zhou étant en 2013 le premier à le faire vraiment. A Mao, qu'il rencontrait pour la dernière fois, le 5 août

24. Acronyme signifiant La voie de notre révolution.

25. Acronyme signifiant Révolution, Socialisme et Leadership.

26. Acronyme signifiant L'année de la victoire.

27. Acronyme signifiant Le tocsin de la révolution indonésienne.

28. Acronyme signifiant Manifeste politique.

29. Acronyme signifiant L'année de tous les dangers (*Tahun vivere pericoloso*, en sabir sukarnoiste italo-malais). On notera l'inspiration très nietzschéenne de la notion.

30. Acronyme signifiant Manifeste culturel.

31. Lindsay & Liem (eds.), op. cit., p. 436.

32. Voir par exemple Viktor Klemperer, *LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii : carnets d'un philologue*, paru en allemand en 1947, mais aussi bien entendu le *1984* de George Orwell.

1965 à Pékin, et qui s'inquiétait de la détérioration de l'état de santé de Sukarno, Aidit exposait un plan d'action (non daté) : "[W]e plan to establish a military committee. The majority of that committee would be left wing but it should also include some middle elements. In this way, we could confuse our enemies. Our enemies would be uncertain about the nature of this committee, and therefore the military commanders who are sympathetic to the right wing will not oppose us immediately. If we show our red flag right away, they will oppose us right away. The head of this military committee would be an underground member of our party, but he would identify himself as a neutral. This military committee should not last for too long. Otherwise, good people will turn to bad people. After it has been established, we need to arm the workers and peasants in a timely fashion."[33] Même si le document chinois ne le précise pas, un tel exposé devant celui que le PKI reconnaît comme le chef de file de la révolution mondiale ne peut correspondre à une simple déclaration d'intention. Le plan n'est à l'évidence pas finalisé, mais il vaut engagement. Et Mao lui a forcément accordé son blanc-seing, sinon il ne figurerait même pas dans le compte-rendu écrit de la rencontre (ce ne sont pas de simples minutes). Vers le 20 octobre, le très officiel *Quotidien du Peuple* de Pékin publia d'ailleurs un tardif article de soutien au Mouvement.[34] Mao, qui tenait Aidit en haute estime (il devint le premier membre honoraire étranger de l'Académie chinoise des sciences sociales et fut invité à prononcer une conférence devant l'école centrale des cadres du PCC), écrivit à la nouvelle de sa mort un poème à sa mémoire.[35]

On aura remarqué la grande similitude entre le plan exposé le 5 août et le Mouvement du 30 Septembre, à cette immense différence près : il n'était pas question de tuer les chefs militaires de droite, mais de les neutraliser en les désorientant. On en revient donc à ce mystère majeur, non résolu : qui donna l'ordre de les exécuter ? Car il y eut forcément un ordre, ce que vient confirmer l'exécution à peu près simultanée de deux officiers supérieurs à Yogyakarta. Il est étonnant que de nombreux auteurs de gauche aient pu plaider la thèse de l'« accident » (en série !). On en est réduit aux conjectures. Il est assez peu probable que ces neuf meurtres (dont sept à Jakarta, sans y inclure la blessure mortelle reçue par la petite fille du général Nasution, ministre de la Défense) aient fait partie du plan initial (celui exposé en août à Mao). Il était bien plus logique de réduire à l'impuissance des généraux dont plusieurs (à commencer par le chef d'état-major, Achmad Yani) n'étaient, selon les Américains eux-

33. "Chairman Mao meets the delegation of the PKI", *Chinese Communist Party Central Archives*, 5 août 1965. Cité in Taomo Zhou, "Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965", *CWIHP Working Paper* n° 67, août 2013, p. 20. A noter que Robinson (2018) cite le même texte (p. 114), mais son long commentaire vise à lui dénier toute importance.

34. Robinson (2018), op. cit., p. 188.

35. Zhou, op. cit., p. 18.

mêmes, pas particulièrement connus pour leur anti-communisme, puis, avec l'aide de Sukarno, de leur faire entériner la suprématie du Conseil de la Révolution, finalement annoncé à 14 h le 1er octobre.

Risquons une hypothèse, fondée en particulier sur la brochure publiée en 2013 par le magazine indonésien *Tempo*[36]. Sjam Kamaruzaman, était le directeur du très secret Bureau Spécial du parti, constitué pour maintenir le lien avec les officiers communisants et plus récemment chargé par la direction du PKI de préparer le coup de force. Il était par ailleurs très proche, depuis 1949, du président du parti, D.N. Aidit, dont il avait été d'abord l'assistant, et avec lequel il fonctionnait en binôme dans la gestion du Mouvement. Sjam dut constater, dès le soir du 30 septembre, que plusieurs des unités militaires prévues pour l'opération ne s'étaient pas mobilisées, ce qui empêchait de s'emparer simultanément de tous les leviers du pouvoir et compromettait gravement le succès de l'entreprise. Plus profondément, il semble que Sjam ait exagéré auprès du parti sa capacité à mobiliser un important réseau de militaires, de même qu'il avait exagéré auprès de ces derniers la capacité du PKI à les appuyer.[37] Selon Hamim, qui fut très proche de Sjam, ce dernier assurait qu'il n'était point besoin « to follow the example of China or Vietnam, that we had our own generals who were pro-communists. »[38] Or une seule compagnie avait répondu présente au soir du 30, deux autres unités (les bataillons 530 et 454, dont un de chars) ayant fait défection.[39] Pour Hamim, le coup était tout simplement prématuré : « We trained and prepared for it in only two months : August and September. ».

Le soutien politique n'était pas davantage assuré : « The PKI did not have the support of the masses that were ready to go to war. At the time, PKI members were only prepared to stage demonstrations, hold general meetings, demand pay rises, protest against the United States. But going to war was another thing. The stakes were far bigger – like death. To train people to go to war, one or two months was not enough. »[40] Du coup, il avait fallu confier aux jeunes communistes des tâches qui les dépassaient, y compris le renforcement des escouades chargées d'enlever ou tuer les généraux.[41] Cela rend peut-être compte de la bizarrerie trop peu analysée d'un « Mouvement du 30 Septembre » dont l'action se déclenche en fait aux premières heures du 1er octobre : on avait attendu plus qu'il n'était résolu. Mais le constat de sa propre

36. Wahyu Dhyatmika et al., *Sjam Kamaruzaman : A Ghost in the G30S Machine*, Jakarta, Tempo Publishing at Smashwords, 2013. La brochure contient en particulier un entretien avec Hamim, dernier survivant du Bureau Spécial du PKI.

37. Ibid., p. 12.

38. Ibid., p. 20.

39. Ibid., p. 13 & 35.

40. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

41. Ibid., p. 7.

faiblesse pousse soit au renoncement, soit à la radicalisation. Comme Sjam (et très probablement Aidit) n'entendait pas renoncer (« Nothing can be done. We cannot back out now », aurait-il dit en conclusion d'une réunion des conjurés, à 3h15 le 1er octobre)[42], il lui parut nécessaire de passer de l'intimidation prévue à la terrorisation, et donc aux assassinats au sommet de la hiérarchie militaire.

Décision bien entendu désastreuse, car totalement contre-productive. Elle empêcha probablement l'obtention du blanc-seing de Sukarno au Conseil Révolutionnaire, qui initialement n'entendait pas remettre formellement en cause son pouvoir. Cela rend sans doute compte de la seconde (et ultime) annonce faite par le Conseil : la destitution du gouvernement, majoritairement sukarnoiste, et dont beaucoup d'éléments étaient pourtant assez proches du PKI. Mais cette fuite en avant aboutit le soir même à la fuite tout court des conjurés, et à l'annulation des « manifestations d'enthousiasme spontané » qu'ils avaient planifiées (il y en eut pourtant quelques-unes, comme à Yogyakarta), suivant un schéma assez proche de celui du coup de Prague de 1948.

Les exécutions, par simple réflexe de survie, galvanisèrent la résistance au coup de force de tous ceux des officiers qui, n'étant pas ralliés au PKI, ne se sentaient plus la tête très stable sur les épaules.[43] Ils se regroupèrent par conséquent presque comme un seul homme derrière le général Suharto, le vainqueur final du 1er octobre, comme on se raccroche aux branches d'un arbre. Et ils entérinèrent massivement l'idée qu'il convenait désormais de mettre définitivement le PKI hors d'état de (leur) nuire, ce qui leur fit approuver, et parfois devancer (comme à Aceh) les mesures féroces bientôt prises par le nouvel homme fort. Surtout, les assassinats furent non seulement le prétexte (comme l'avance John Roosa dans un livre aussi discutable que fondamental)[44], mais la justification constante et encore actuelle, aux yeux de beaucoup d'Indonésiens, des massacres de 1965-66, aussi bien que de la sévère législation anticommuniste toujours en vigueur.[45] Ces meurtres contribuèrent en particulier à rendre crédibles les accusations fantaisistes lancées par les militaires ou les *kiai* contre le parti : les communistes auraient établi des listes

42. Ibid., p. 8.

43. La seconde proclamation du Mouvement du 30 Septembre, à 14 h le 1er octobre, ne pouvait qu'encore aviver leurs craintes. Y était en effet annoncée une mesure plutôt ubuesque : les militaires ralliés se voyaient garantir une promotion de deux grades (signe supplémentaire de l'isolement des conjurés), cependant que les autres étaient menacés d'une rétrogradation équivalente. L'armée indonésienne se serait retrouvée fort dépourvue en généraux…

44. Roosa, op. cit.

45. La vie politique indonésienne, depuis l'indépendance de 1949, était certes agitée et violente, mais sans massacre d'une certaine ampleur (même à l'occasion des multiples rébellions des années cinquante), et surtout sans éliminations physiques dans l'élite jakartanaise. Le meurtre des généraux constitua par conséquent une rupture, une première transgression, bientôt suive d'une myriade d'autres.

de personnes à éliminer, leurs tombes seraient déjà creusées, les musulmans et leurs institutions (*pesantren* en particulier) seraient un peu partout déjà attaqués, ou à la veille de l'être…[46]

Il est facile, un demi-siècle plus tard, de déceler ces enchaînements, et de décréter la décision du duo Sjam/Aidit tellement suicidaire qu'elle en serait invraisemblable. Mais, dans la touffeur de la nuit jakartanaise, et avec déjà un tel nombre de personnes informées de la manœuvre en cours qu'il pouvait sembler plus dangereux encore de reculer que de tout risquer, on commence à saisir la logique de l'ordre fatal. Seuls ceux qui n'ont pas observé de près la chair de l'histoire s'imaginent que ses acteurs, même les mieux informés, font toujours preuve d'un comportement réfléchi et rationnel. L'aléatoire, l'erreur de calcul, et plus encore l'impitoyable pression de l'instant tiennent en réalité une place majeure, et irréductible.

Le PKI est-il Coupable ?

L'ensemble du PKI pouvait-il à bon droit être considéré comme complice du coup de force[47] et s'en voir sanctionné en conséquence ? Les auteurs des ouvrages ici considérés, quand ils évoquent la question, penchent pour le non, et en font un argument central en faveur de l'accusation de génocide : on aurait massacré dans des proportions considérables un groupe humain (les communistes et assimilés) non pas pour ce qu'il faisait, mais pour ce qu'il était. Les choses apparaissent cependant un peu moins simples. Certes, l'immense majorité des communistes n'était pas dans la confidence, beaucoup n'apprirent l'existence du Mouvement qu'après son échec, ou même le confondirent avec ce « Conseil des généraux » dont la propagande du PKI prétendait depuis quelque temps qu'il préparait un coup d'Etat anti-communiste. Les militants et la plupart des cadres du Parti comme des organisations de masse (*ormas*, en novlangue indonésienne) ne sauraient donc être tenus pour individuellement (et donc judiciairement) responsables du meurtre des généraux. Le sort atroce qui fut réservé à tant d'entre eux ne peut par conséquent y trouver la moindre justification. Il en va cependant différemment du PKI en tant qu'institution.

Dire, comme la plupart de nos auteurs, que le parti n'était pas impliqué puisque n'avait pris part à la conjuration qu'un tout petit groupe, autour du président du PKI, Aidit, le reste des instances dirigeantes n'étant même pas préalablement informé, c'est aller vite en besogne. Dans tous les partis

46. Multiples références à ces *fake news* dans les ouvrages recensés.

47. Je préfère « coup de force » à « coup d'Etat ». En effet, malgré la grande confusion des proclamations du Mouvement, il ne s'agissait pas de se substituer entièrement au pouvoir existant (Sukarno, en particulier, aurait vu sa fonction confirmée), mais bien plutôt d'y gauchir suffisamment le rapport des forces pour qu'à terme – mais pas immédiatement – le PKI puisse paisiblement s'emparer de la totalité des leviers de pouvoir. Ce n'est pas une vue de l'esprit : ce scénario m'a été présenté oralement par d'anciens cadres du PKI, et n'est guère éloigné des analyses de John Roosa, même si ce dernier éprouve quelque peine à en tirer toutes les conséquences.

communistes de la grande époque, le « Numéro Un » concentrait de très larges pouvoirs, dont il usait souvent de manière discrétionnaire, mais c'étaient les instances régulièrement (plus ou moins régulièrement…) élues par les militants – Comité Central (CC) et Politburo issu de ce dernier – qui l'avaient placé à ce poste. En outre, il aurait été plus que risqué de demander leur avis sur le projet de coup de force aux adhérents de base, ou même au pléthorique Comité Central : la police et l'Etat en auraient été informés sur l'heure. Le souci d'efficacité impose parfois le resserrement du processus de décision. Mais c'est le parti dans son ensemble qui en porte la responsabilité, de même qu'il en aurait bénéficié en cas de succès. Tous partageaient d'ailleurs alors un discours très guerrier, une vision très offensive de l'action politique, fondée sur une analyse binaire (« Nous et eux ») du sociétal.

Du point de vue de la république indonésienne de 1965, et de celui de tous ceux attachés à ce qui lui restait de stabilité, on ne peut donc contester la légitimité juridique de mesures sévères contre un parti fourvoyé dans l'aventure putschiste, et contre ses principaux dirigeants. Reste que cette sévérité (terme qui en l'occurrence est malheureusement un euphémisme) s'étendit à plus d'un million de personnes (si l'on ajoute aux meurtres les emprisonnements d'une certaine durée), dont l'immense majorité n'avait même pas cherché à se défendre et ne portait aucune responsabilité personnelle dans le coup de force[48]. Dès la première quinzaine d'octobre, le parti était presque partout sur la défensive, ses militants laissés sans consigne se trouvaient totalement désorientés, et ses moyens militaires étaient dérisoires. Rien n'obligeait donc ses adversaires déjà triomphants à englober tant de gens dans leur vindicte, bientôt convertie en frénésie massacreuse.

La Seconde Tragédie de la Faiblesse : les Massacres

Il convient donc d'expliquer cette dernière de manière autonome, puisque la déflagration (choc, contre-choc…) du 1er octobre n'y menait pas obligatoirement. Elle ne s'est d'ailleurs nulle part déclenchée immédiatement. Les explications culturalistes ne tiennent guère, quoiqu'elles aident en particulier à comprendre la hargne des pogromistes, dont la grande majorité furent des musulmans. Sur ce point, les analyses des divers auteurs considérés sont convergentes, et convaincantes. J'émettrai davantage de doutes quant à l'idée (aujourd'hui presque une vulgate) d'un programme exterminateur de l'armée, ou de certains de ses secteurs, préétabli avant même la fracture du 1er octobre.

48. Pour achever de me faire comprendre, osons cette analogie (qui n'est pas une comparaison) : le parti national-socialiste allemand fut déclaré « organisation criminelle » par le tribunal de Nuremberg. Cependant, ses membres ne furent jugés, et éventuellement condamnés, qu'en fonction de leur responsabilité *individuelle* dans les crimes commis. Et, comme on le sait, seule une très petite minorité de ces membres furent exécutés.

D'abord, on n'a nulle part découvert de *smoking gun*, contrairement à ce que s'évertue à nous faire croire Jess Melvin. A propos du discours prononcé au soir du 1er octobre à Medan par le général Mokoginta, chef des forces armées à Sumatra, elle assure qu'il constitue « the earliest document to be recovered throughout Indonesia to order 'all members of the Armed Forces (to) resolutely and completely annihilate this counter-revolution and all acts of treason down to the roots'. This statement is evidence that from day one the military leadership launched an offensive military campaign aimed at physically exterminating those who had been "involved" with the 30 September Movement. » Or, dans le vocabulaire révolutionnaire et guerrier complètement banalisé lors des dernières années du règne de Sukarno, « écraser » (la Malaysia, par exemple) ou « annihiler » (tout particulièrement le Nekolim) constituent des passages obligés dans tout discours public. Ces termes grandiloquents relèvent de l'intention, de la conviction, non d'un projet précis, et encore moins d'un plan d'anéantissement d'une masse d'individus. Qui peut, par exemple, prétendre que Sukarno aurait formé le projet d'exterminer la population malaysienne ? Melvin commet donc un contresens. Un peu plus loin, elle va même jusqu'à travestir les paroles de Mokoginta, en affirmant qu'il n'entend plus désormais obéir qu'au général Suharto, alors que, avant ce dernier, il a assuré adhérer « to the Decree, Command, instructions and speeches (*amanat*) of Sukarno » ; et son discours s'achève de manière fort orthodoxe : « Independence ! Long Live Bung Karno ! Long Live the Indonesian revolution. »[49] Melvin reconnaît quand même, à l'instar des autres auteurs, n'avoir trouvé aucun document antérieur au 1er octobre laissant entrevoir un projet de prise du pouvoir par les militaires ou d'extermination des communistes.

Deuxièmement, l'armée d'avant le coup de force (et même d'après, au moins durant quelques semaines) est tout sauf une force unifiée. Issue pour partie des troupes auxiliaires armées par l'occupant japonais (la PETA, le Heiho), pour partie des révolutionnaires de 1945-49, pour partie enfin de l'armée coloniale, son aile gauche (sukarnienne ou communisante) représentait selon certains auteurs au moins le tiers de ses effectifs, officiers compris. Et l'armée de l'Air, certes limitée en effectifs, était dirigée par des généraux proches du PKI (à commencer par son chef, Omar Dhani). Garder le contact avec les officiers sympathisants était la mission première du Bureau de Sjam.

Enfin, expliquer les massacres par la volonté de massacrer relève de la tautologie, sauf à imaginer un plaisir sadique à faire le mal comme moteur de cette histoire (cela vaut au niveau individuel, jamais au collectif). Suharto lui-même paraît animé par un cynisme manipulateur et une volonté de puissance bien plus que par un fanatisme d'ordre idéologique. Alors ? L'explication de la dérive sanglante de l'armée est probablement la même – mais à une toute autre échelle – que celle qu'on a donnée de la dérive meurtrière du Mouvement

49. Cité in Melvin, op. cit., p. 118.

du 30 Septembre : la faiblesse. Suharto et ses fidèles, dans les premiers jours d'octobre, pouvaient en effet s'épouvanter de la tâche à accomplir : les militaires étaient assez peu nombreux par rapport à la population (rappelons les 800 para-commandos du RKPAD...) ; ils devaient se défier de nombre de leurs collègues penchant à gauche ; leur Commandant Suprême – le Président – les lâchait en déclarant publiquement que la mort des généraux n'était qu'« une ride sur l'océan de la Révolution » (phrase d'une rare insensibilité de la part d'un chef d'Etat) ; en outre, quoi que prétendent beaucoup d'auteurs, ils se sentaient assez isolés sur la scène internationale ; et surtout, ils avaient en face d'eux la rutilante façade d'un parti communiste surpuissant, doté d'innombrables ramifications dans tous les secteurs de la société et tous les espaces de l'Archipel.

Il fallait donc user d'une brutalité inouïe, propre à stupéfier et paralyser l'adversaire, tout en montrant tout de suite à l'ensemble de la population – et au Président – où était la force qui détenait les leviers de commande et était prête à en abuser sans scrupule ni limite. Que les choses se soient en fin de compte révélées plus aisées que prévu (le PKI s'effondrant tel un château de cartes, Sukarno ne parvenant jamais à reprendre la main, la Chine ne pouvant et l'URSS ne voulant pas venir en aide aux communistes locaux, l'Occident envoyant rapidement de multiples signaux de soutien) ne dissipa que progressivement la peur initiale. Il fallait empêcher définitivement tout retour en force du PKI – comme il avait réussi à le faire après l'échec des tentatives révolutionnaires de 1926 et de 1948 (Madiun) – et donc massacrer, enfermer, massacrer encore… Le goût du sang pour certains, la rapide transformation du meurtre en routine pour les autres (« il n'y a que le premier pas qui coûte ») firent le reste.

Un Génocide ?

On en vient enfin à la question du génocide. La notion s'applique-t-elle au cas examiné, comme le pensent désormais la plupart des auteurs (les titres et sous-titres des livres ici recensés en portent témoignage) ? On peut en douter. Rappelons que la définition canonique du crime de génocide (qu'on trouve dans la Convention internationale adoptée à ce propos en 1948 par l'ONU) impose deux critères essentiels : l'intentionnalité de la destruction en totalité ou en grande partie d'un groupe humain ; et le caractère national, racial, ethnique ou religieux du groupe-victime considéré. Ce qui exclut en particulier les groupes politiques et sociaux, exclusion motivée par le fait que leur définition autant que leur stabilité dans la durée sont bien plus problématiques que pour les premiers : on naît et on meurt le plus souvent dans une même nation ou une même religion, ce qui est fort loin d'être le cas pour une appartenance politique ou sociale. On a le droit de contester cette définition et en particulier ces limitations, ce que fait en particulier le code pénal français, qui laisse en

quelque sorte à la charge du génocidaire le soin de définir le groupe-victime, si aberrante que soit cette définition. Il est cependant frappant qu'aucune autre définition que celle de 1948 ne soit parvenue à s'imposer au plan international.

Nos auteurs tentent par conséquent de faire coller au texte de la Convention leur caractérisation des massacres de 1965-66. Pour les uns (à la suite de Robert Cribb), on reconnaît la difficulté posée par une extermination à base principalement politique, mais on y remédie en faisant des communistes et de leurs *ormas* – des millions de personnes, très souvent des familles, voire des villages entiers – un quasi-groupe ethnique (ce que Cribb dénomme la « pilarisation » de la société indonésienne, en reprenant une notion forgée à propos de la société néerlandaise du XIXe siècle). C'est quand même oublier que le PKI et assimilés, presque inexistants jusqu'en 1945, et qui ne connurent leur grande croissance qu'à partir du milieu des années cinquante, peuvent difficilement être considérés comme des groupes stables : la très grande majorité des adhérents et militants l'étaient de fraîche date, ce qui explique sans doute par ailleurs la rapidité et la radicalité de l'effondrement après 1965.

Pour Jess Melvin, il faut prendre au sérieux l'assimilation faite sous l'Ordre Nouveau entre communisme et athéisme. Entreprendre la destruction du communisme reviendrait par conséquent à tenter d'exterminer le groupe des athées, dont certains pays font une quasi-religion. On rentrerait donc dans le cadre de la Convention de 1948… Il y a plusieurs failles dans le raisonnement. D'abord, tout indique que nombre de sympathisants communistes n'étaient pas athées. Melvin évoque d'ailleurs, assez contradictoirement, un « Islam Rouge », fondé par Haji Mohamad Misbach (1876-1926), figure de l'aile gauche du Sarekat Islam, et passé au premier PKI. Ensuite, il est difficile de faire d'une absence de croyance une croyance, un minimum unifiée théoriquement et dotée de rites d'appartenance spécifiques. L'athéisme militant et institutionnalisé a surtout caractérisé les pays communistes de la grande époque, et s'est effondré avec eux. On remarquera enfin que la dénonciation des communistes comme *kafir* (mécréant, en arabe), plus fréquemment encore que comme *atheis*, servit surtout d'élément mobilisateur dans les mouvements musulmans, alors que l'armée insistait davantage sur d'autres aspects.

Certains auteurs, Melvin de manière plus systématique que les autres, insistent aussi sur le ciblage des Chinois par la répression – en tant qu'ethnie, et pas seulement pour la participation de certains à l'association Baperki, pro-Pékin et pro-PKI.[50] Sur ce point, elle prend ses distances avec les conclusions de Robert Cribb.[51] Elle dévoile à Aceh le déroulement de véritables pogroms (pour reprendre sa terminologie) anti-chinois. Et l'on se souvient du sinistre

50. Melvin, op. cit., pp. 241-262.

51. Robert Cribb & Charles Coppel, "A genocide that never was: explaining the myth of anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia, 1965-1966", *Journal of Genocide Research, 11-4*, pp. 447-465.

Anwar Congo, dans *The Act of Killing* de Joshua Oppenheimer, se vantant d'avoir poignardé au hasard une pléiade de Chinois lors du pogrom du 10 décembre 1965 à Medan.[52] On ne peut minimiser pareilles atrocités. Il faut cependant rappeler qu'il est presque coutumier en Indonésie de s'en prendre aux Chinois comme éternels boucs émissaires, lors des crises graves. Même les émeutes qui conduisirent à la chute de la dictature de Suharto, en 1998, s'accompagnèrent de pillages, de viols et de meurtres de Chinois. La tradition remonte peut-être au grand massacre des Chinois de Batavia, en 1740, fomenté par le gouverneur néerlandais Valkenier. D'autre part, les violences anti-chinoises ne paraissent pas avoir été généralisées en 1965. Et l'immense majorité des victimes n'en releva pas. Il est donc difficile de parler de génocide ciblant les Chinois d'Indonésie en général. On passera sur la tentative effectuée par l'*International People's Tribunal,* réuni en 2015 à La Haye pour juger symboliquement les responsables des atrocités de 1965, de se placer dans le cadre d'un génocide à base nationale, puisqu'une partie significative de la nation indonésienne avait été détruite : ces Indonésiens qui tuèrent d'autres Indonésiens ne visaient assurément pas à anéantir leur propre nation.

Pour ma part, je ne remets pas en cause la volonté de faire évoluer (prudemment) les critères d'incrimination d'une Convention marquée par la Shoah et par les débuts de l'affrontement américano-soviétique. J'ai utilisé à propos du Cambodge des Khmers Rouges la notion de génocide à base socio-politique.[53] Le problème est que, dans ce dernier cas, il y avait bien eu tentative d'extermination jusqu'au dernier de catégories entières de la population, et mise à mort d'un cinquième à un quart des Cambodgiens. Alors qu'en Indonésie la mortalité finale ne dépasse sans doute guère 0,5% des quelque cent millions d'habitants du temps. Et que les emprisonnements furent plus nombreux que les meurtres, alors qu'au Cambodge être arrêté signifiait presque toujours perdre la vie à plus ou moins brève échéance.

Beaucoup d'Indonésiens périrent certes en prison ou en camp (comme à Buru), et une trentaine de milliers furent retenus prisonniers jusqu'en 1978. La mortalité différa considérablement d'une zone à l'autre : destruction des seuls cadres communistes à Java-Ouest, massacres génocidaires (pour reprendre l'utile terminologie de Leo Kuper[54], qui ménage ainsi une zone de transition entre crime contre l'humanité et génocide) à Aceh, à Java-Centre, Java-Est, Sumatra-Nord et Bali. Et ces variations ne sont guère dues aux résistances des

52. Le point le plus précis sur ces émeutes se trouve dans Yen-ling Tsai & Douglas Kammen, "Anti-communist violence and the ethnic Chinese in Medan, North Sumatra", in Kammen & McGregor (eds.), op. cit., pp. 143-145.

53. Voir en particulier Jean-Louis Margolin, « Le "génocide" cambodgien: des particularités irréductibles? », in Katia Boustany & Daniel Dormoy (dir.), *Génocide(s)*, Bruxelles, Editions Bruylant, 1999, pp. 178-212.

54. Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, Newhaven, Yale University Press, 1981.

victimes ou de la population environnante, ou encore aux réticences d'autorités politiques indépendantes des massacreurs, mais bien à des divergences dans le camp de ces derniers. La différence avec la Shoah saute aux yeux. Ce qui se passa en Indonésie, vu par les victimes, fut tout aussi atroce, et mérite d'être condamné sans réserve, mais ce que définit le génocide se situe au niveau du groupe, pas à celui des individus. Ou, en d'autres termes, ce qui compte dans ce crime si particulier n'est pas le niveau d'atrocité, mais le niveau de destruction.

Les points d'achoppement qu'on vient de développer portent bien davantage sur les interprétations que sur les faits. Sur ces derniers, on peut considérer que la richesse des recherches récentes, que reflètent les ouvrages étudiés, permet de commencer à présenter un tableau assez complet, et donc complexe, des massacres et autres exactions qui suivirent le 1er octobre et s'étendirent bien au-delà des années 1965-1966 couramment mentionnées (qu'on songe, par exemple, au Blitar-Sud de 1968). Les témoignages de victimes, dont la parole se délie – certes trop timidement – depuis 1998, s'accompagnent désormais de multiples témoignages de bourreaux, ce qui est essentiel dans l'effort de compréhension des massacres. Beaucoup reste certes à faire : la dimension genrée des violences, par exemple, n'est encore qu'esquissée, et de nombreuses régions n'ont pas fait l'objet d'études monographiques. Mais l'heure de la maturité historiographique semble avoir sonné sur ce sujet terrible. Espérons qu'elle puisse contribuer à une prise de conscience plus profonde et plus générale en Indonésie même.

Kuncoro Hadi, dkk. *Kronik 65: Catatan Hari Per Hari G30S Sebelum Hingga Setelahnya (1963-1971)*. Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo, 2017, xxvi + 989 hlm. ISBN: 978-979-911-605-5.

More than two decades after the 1998 Reform and half a century after the events of 1965, it transpires that the New Order State's culture, which wanted to control the historical narrative and memory, has not disappeared yet. As a most straightforward example, in early August 2019, a joint force from the army, the police and attorney general's office raided books that they called "smelling of communism" in a bookstore in Padang, West Sumatra. About two weeks earlier, in mid-July, the same thing had happened in Kediri, East Java. Then it spread to Makassar, where it was carried out by local social and religious groups.

In television shows and a number of press photographs the book *Kronik 65: Catatan Hari Perhari Peristiwa 1965 Sebelum Hingga Setelahnya (1963-1971)* stands out among the exhibited books confiscated during those

raids. Due of course to its jumbo size and its thickness (almost 1000 pages), which, in addition to making the book easy to scoop up from bookstores, also shows—as the historian Asvi Warman Adam says in the introduction—"a very rich source of historical information, that will invite readers to navigate a vast ocean to understand the 1965 tragedy from the time before its eruption to its aftermath."

However, even more importantly, the thickness of the book shows a breakthrough, considering the recent development of an increasingly complex situation for efforts against forgetting the events of 1965. Indeed, there have been signs of a new openness and of courage since 1998 to revisit 1965 history, but the resistance to these efforts is even stronger. In 2009 for instance, the State forbade the distribution of historian John Roosa's book *Dalih Pembunuhan Massal* (the translation of *Pretext for Mass Murder*). Although the ban was eventually revoked, army officers, both active and retired, political leaders as well as religious figures openly attacked the National Human Rights Commission's report on gross human rights violations in 1965. They urged President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono neither to accept the report's recommendations nor apologize.

Hopes resurfaced when President Jokowi was elected. On August 14, 2015, before the House of Representatives, he promised to try and reveal the truth and implement justice about the 1965 human rights violations, so that "future generations do not have to bear the burden of history". Ironically, the promise was not even two months old when on October 1, 2015, it showed signs of being denied. Jokowi stated that he would not apologize to the PKI and the surviving families. As a climax, on June 3, 2017, Jokowi issued a statement with the common metaphor typical of Soeharto, "Show me the PKI, I'll bash it". Such a declaration is not surprising if we see how little Jokowi did when his ministers and the vice president, in accordance with official anticommunist norms and traditions that have been existing for a long while, attacked the International People's Tribunal (IPT) '65 held in The Hague on November 10-13, 2015, to demand truth and justice about the 1965 events.

Kuncoro Hadi, the main engine of *Kronik '65*, stated in an interview that the main motive of his colleagues and himself in compiling the book was indeed related to the situation after 20 years of reform. The seemingly democratic regime that replaced the New Order has used many of the same techniques and mechanisms with an equally frightening impact to keep silence on the crucial questions regarding the truth about 1965. Kuncoro and his colleagues saw that some things can be done to prevent that the attitude of the authorities make the public mute and indifferent and forget the events of 1965, because it seems that in the future the way to urge the state to provide a fair narrative will be increasingly narrow and winding.

In that situation the most appropriate choice according to Kuncoro and his colleagues was to compile a chronicle the main aim of which would be to collect all kinds of facts and events in a composition focused on what happened to the PKI during the period 1963 to 1971. Because this would allow the public at large to access a string of detailed data and a comprehensive picture of the events of 1965 based on chronological order from year to year and from month to month. The tragic moments from the end of September to the middle of October 1965 are specially described day by day. Even hour to hour and minute to minute for the days between September 30 and October 4, 1965.

The idea of making a chronicle also corresponds with the recommendation of the historian Geoffrey Robinson in his latest book, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres 1965-1966*, about what can be done so that change does not become impossible in the midst of the prolonged silencing by the state, namely urging the government to help clarify historical records by opening its archives from this period without restrictions.

The *Kronik* shows to what extent the State has opened the archives on 1965. Because in addition to books, newspapers and bulletins published at that time, among which some, such as *Harian Rakjat*, are still difficult to access until now, the book relies mainly on archives. It is heartening that more than fifty years after the incident, the National Archives have opened the archives of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI). These, combined with the archives kept at the Central Java Archives Agency, Gajah Mada University's archives (UGM) and the CIA *Daily Brief*, allow to see the actions taken by the military and anticommunist organizations against the PKI and related organizations, including the efforts to control Sukarno and his people after October 1. To these KOTI archives the authors added new data many of which were not widely known to the people.

One of them is Nusakambangan Prison, which is still little mentioned as a place of detention for 1965 political prisoners. So far, Nusakambangan has generally been signaled only as a transit point for political prisoners before being dispatched to Buru Island. Nusakambangan was overshadowed by Buru, Plantungan and Salemba. The *Kronik* gives ample room to review Nusakambangan, which at least since November, 10, 1965, has been used as a detention centre for political prisoners and was reported to be in very poor condition with an execution spot exotically called "white sand". On May 23, 1967, it was recorded that Nusakambangan was occupied by 449 political prisoners from Yogyakarta and Central Java. And this number continued to rise. In a 1969 article, Soe Hok Gie noted that 55,000 political prisoners from Central Java were detained in Nusakambangan. This information was obtained from the Nusa Kambangan Archive, Cilacap, at the Central Java Province Archive Agency, but later on this archival fund was closed again.

The *Kronik* also illustrates the damage done to the Taman Siswa institution—an important and historic educational institution inherited from the national figure Ki Hadjar Dewantara—due to large-scale screening and cleaning up of "communists" in its administration, who were replaced by people of the New Order, like Probosutedjo, Soeharto's younger brother. Nyi Hadjar Dewantara, the wife of Ki Hadjar, was forced to accept this, while her son, Bambang Sukawati Dewantara, was labelled "communist" and thrown into Wirogunan prison.

Finally, it is also important to pay attention to the team who compiled the *Kronik '65*. They are ten young historians who, on average, were still in elementary school when Soeharto was overthrown as they were born in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They had just obtained their BA and some had started their postgraduate studies at Gajah Mada University (UGM) when the book began to be written in mid-2014. Every week for eight months, the joint team routinely gathered to discuss the results of their library research. The text was completed in one and a half year. This has been a great work, requiring energy, effort and large costs.

Regarding the cost of the book, it has not been covered by a grant from a donor, but by a fund provided by a publisher managed by a group of young men, just like a business investment. And it proved quite successful because after a first printing of 2500 copies in 2017 a second printing limited to 500 copies was issued in early 2019 due to many requests after the books were raided in Padang, and in February 2020 a third printing will be released with additional data collected by Kuncoro. Interestingly the history teachers gathered in the Certified Teachers Conference (MGMP) and teaching in high schools in areas affected by the 1965 violence are among the biggest consumers of the book. In a discussion forum in South Malang, East Java, a teacher explained: "If in other places teaching historical material about 1965 is not an issue—the teacher can simply say in front of the class that the PKI was wrong—it is not the case in schools where many students are children of the survivors of 1965".

Against this background and looking at the size of the resulting book, we may consider how earnestly representatives of the Indonesian millennial generation, who is often labeled as the instant generation and totally indifferent to political issues, worked to dig out facts in order to clarify the historical record, while pondering over the 1965 events, with a lapse of half a century after it occurred.

JJ Rizal
Historian and publisher, Jakarta

COMPTES RENDUS

Préhistoire et Asie du Sud

Wolfgang Marschall und Markus Wäfler, *Felsmalereien Indonesiens*. *Band 1 : Pula Muna*. Borsdof: Winterwork, 2012, 216 p., illustrations, cartes, bibliographie, index. ISBN: 978-3-86468-312-1.
Wolfgang Marschall und Markus Wäfler, *Felsmalereien Indonesiens*. *Band 2 : Teluk Berau*. Borsdof: Winterwork, 2013, 344 p., illustrations, cartes, bibliographie, index. ISBN: 978-3-86468-541-5.
Wolfgang Marschall und Markus Wäfler, *Felsmalereien Indonesiens*. *Band 3 : Kaimana, Pulau Kei Kecil*. Borsdof: Winterwork, 2014, 217 p., illustrations, cartes, bibliographie, index. ISBN: 978-3-86468-829-4.
Markus Wäfler, *Felsmalereien Indonesiens*. *Band 4 : Motivkatalog*. Borsdof, Winterwork, 2017. 473 p. illustrations, cartes, bibliographie, index. ISBN: 978-3-96014-216-4.

Les peintures pariétales d'Indonésie (*felsmalereien*) ont été découvertes progressivement au cours des XIXe et XXe siècles ; les recherches de terrain se sont poursuivies à la fin du siècle dernier et de manière plus intense durant les deux dernières décennies. En Indonésie, et plus généralement en Asie du Sud-Est, ces peintures, connues sous l'appellation populaire de *Rock art*, remontent pour les plus anciennes au Paléolithique, *circa* 40.000-45.000 ans avant notre ère – elles seraient probablement l'œuvre de populations austro-mélanoïdes ou autres – et ensuite au Néolithique, au cours de l'expansion des populations de langue austronésienne dans l'archipel, ainsi qu'aux Philippines, à partir de *circa* 2000 ans avant notre ère (2000 *B.C.*), se poursuivant jusqu'au début de l'ère chrétienne. On distingue généralement les peintures réalisées à l'aide de pigments, de couleur rouge, brune, orangée – obtenues à partir d'hématites ou autres colorants minéraux ou végétaux – et celles dessinées au charbon de bois, donnant un trait noir, plus ou moins épais selon les sites. C'est surtout cette

dernière tradition picturale qui s'est prolongée dans certaines régions isolées de l'Indonésie orientale. Aujourd'hui, ces œuvres « d'art premier » au sens littéral, sont menacées par le changement climatique, notamment la montée des eaux sur les côtes, la déforestation, et plus généralement les activités humaines. Jusqu'à présent les peintures et dessins de la région orientale de l'archipel n'avaient pas été systématiquement étudiés.[1]

La série de quatre ouvrages conçue par Wolfgang Marschall[2] et Markus Wäfler est une contribution majeure à notre connaissance de l'art pariétal en Indonésie, incluant également les exemples du nord de Bornéo – le site de Niah, à Sarawak, Malaisie, à côté de deux sites de Kalimantan – et de Timor Leste, les sites de Baucau/Tanjung Kutcha (selon l'orthographe standard Kuca), sur l'île de Timor avec plusieurs grottes. Les courtes expéditions qui sont à l'origine des trois premiers volumes, ont été menées par les auteurs afin de documenter *in situ* les peintures et dessins attestés dans la région orientale de l'archipel, situés soit dans des grottes ou abris sous roche soit sur des falaises. Le premier volume est consacré aux sites de l'île de Muna, située au sud de Kendari et faisant administrativement partie de la province de Sulawesi Tenggara (Sulteng), puis est abordée la baie de Berau (vol. 2), au nord de Fakfak (anc. « MacCluer Golf »), en Papua Barat ; tandis que le troisième volume traite de la région de Kaimana (*propinsi* Papua Barat) et de l'île de Kei Kecil dans l'archipel de Kei (*propinsi* Maluku Tenggara). Chacun des volumes rassemble des photographies en couleurs des peintures et dessins, ainsi que des descriptions et des cartes de situation des sites. Cette somme complète les travaux antérieurs dans la région, qui sont tous cités par les auteurs.

Enfin, le quatrième volume dû à Markus Wäfler, constitue le répertoire et la classification des motifs. À ma connaissance, c'est la première publication consacrée spécifiquement aux motifs de l'art pariétal de cette région du monde. L'approche anthropologique des auteurs est explicitée par la grille d'analyse et l'appareil critique du dernier volume, qui forme un outil de travail heuristique, indispensable à ceux qui travaillent sur la préhistoire et l'anthropologie culturelle de l'Asie du Sud-Est maritime à partir de l'iconographie. D'ailleurs, ce volume est plus épais que les autres, avec plus de 450 pages. Il reprend des éléments généraux des autres volumes, en y ajoutant

1. Les auteurs des ouvrages recensés ici ont suivi de près les reconnaissances de J. Röder (1940, 1959), notamment en Papua, dans la baie de Berau et à Kaimana, ainsi que d'autres sources pour les sites qu'ils ont étudiés, à côté des données déjà publiées qu'ils ont compilées de manière comparative pour la région.

2. Le professeur émérite W. Marschall, anthropologue, spécialiste de la littérature orale de l'île de Nias, est d'abord connu pour ses études sur la culture matérielle de l'Indonésie, notamment la métallurgie (1968), les publications en langue anglaise qu'il a supervisées à l'Institut d'Ethnologie de l'Université de Berne (Studia Ethnologica Bernensia, 1978, 1979, 1986) et d'autres ouvrages à propos du monde insulindien. Dans ce projet, il est épaulé par l'archéologue M. Wäfler de Berne.

les données comparatives tirées de la littérature sur tous les sites mentionnés qui sont indexés. La bibliographie du volume 4 récapitule les sources citées dans les trois précédents (468-473).

On remarque des thèmes récurrents dans l'ensemble de ce corpus : outre les figures anthropomorphes et les mains négatives, les scènes de chasse/pêche et les embarcations sont fréquentes. A Pulau Muna, Sulawesi, vol. 1, par exemple, l'abondance de mammifères dans les peintures montre aussi une grande diversité : des bovidés, des cerfs, ainsi que des sangliers et des chiens. Des quadrupèdes avec cornes sont aussi représentés, peut-être des banteng, *Bos javanicus* ? (Lasabo 1). Il y a aussi une intéressante scène de chasse dans une composition du site de Mantanduno 3, où un homme tue un cerf aux bois imposants d'un coup de sagaie (89, 97, 146). Dans ces peintures de Muna, des figurations du globe solaire avec des rayons sont placées sur la proue des pirogues, ce qui indiquerait une orientation au soleil levant, à l'Est, ou encore à un voyage funéraire inverse à celui effectué pendant la vie, le soleil étant souvent associé à la vie future (121-122).

Je ne détaillerai pas plus avant les trois premiers volumes, très riches en descriptions, car cela dépasserait le cadre de ce compte-rendu. Juste deux remarques d'un point de vue méthodologique : tout d'abord, les auteurs indiquent judicieusement que la photographie des peintures *in situ* pose la question de l'échelle et des dimensions des œuvres qui sont souvent difficiles à appréhender en raison du relief des parois ou encore de l'accessibilité, notamment dans le cas de peintures se trouvant à différentes hauteurs, sur les parois de grottes ou des falaises, comme dans la baie de Berau ou à Kaimana (vols. 2 et 3) ; il faut donc tenir compte, dans les reproductions, de la distorsion possible des figures, ainsi que des proportions variables des figures entre elles dans une composition pariétale ; ce sont des aspects visuels que la photographie rend de manière incomplète ou vague ; souvent, le manque d'échelle ou les déformations dues à la distance posent des problèmes d'interprétation ; c'est sans doute pour cette raison que les auteurs ont écarté de leurs comparaisons, les compositions pariétales de Lumba (Kalimantan Selatan), de Sarang et de Sireh (ces deux derniers sites au Sarawak) formées de figures noires souvent de petite taille et très rapprochées ; de ce point de vue, le recours au dessin au trait ou plein (noir), déclinant la silhouette des représentations a des avantages. Deuxièmement, le critère de la sélection des sites étudiés dans les trois premiers volumes reste à poser, puisque les auteurs ont choisi de documenter les peintures (réalisées au pinceau et à l'aide de pochoirs) et les dessins au charbon de bois, à l'exclusion des gravures et pétroglyphes peints ou non, ce qui ne s'explique pas d'un point de vue méthodologique. Cependant, ce sont là des remarques mineures par rapport à l'importance de ce travail.

D'un point de vue plus général, Marschall et Wäfler repèrent dans l'ensemble des peintures et dessins qu'ils interprètent une distinction tranchée entre

« l'Ouest » et « l'Est » de l'archipel. Cette distinction s'articule par rapport à la topographie et à l'orientation des sites, en relation aux établissements humains dans la région et à l'accessibilité. Ainsi, à l'Ouest correspondent des peintures pariétales situées en hauteur sur des parois de grottes ou encore d'abris sous roches, isolés et généralement difficiles d'accès, loin des villages ; c'est le cas des sites qu'ils ont étudiés sur l'île de Muna, et d'autres à partir de la littérature (Bornéo et Sulawesi).

Tandis qu'à l'Est, à Timor, sur les îles de Misool, Batanta et Waigeo – situées dans archipel de Raja Ampat –, ailleurs en Papua Barat et à Kei Kecil, outre les grottes, les peintures se trouvent aussi à différentes hauteurs sur des falaises au-dessus de l'eau ou encore des rochers faisant face à la mer. On peut observer que les villages actuels, ceux de communautés impliquées dans des activités maritimes, ne sont pas très éloignés. Cette distinction s'accompagne aussi d'une différence iconographique : dans la région occidentale, elle semble limitée, montrant des humains dans différentes positions, des mammifères et des embarcations de tailles variées[3], les peintures dans les îles orientales présentant une diversité de thèmes (têtes anthropomorphes/masques, figures composites/dansantes, lézards, crocodiles, marsupiaux, oiseaux, faune marine, voir ci-dessous). Les parallèles établis avec certains motifs des écorces peintes dans l'Est indonésien est aussi fructueux (Kooijman, 1963 ; Greub 1992, seulement pour la Papua). En bref, les trois premiers volumes apportent une très riche documentation visuelle consacrée aux sites qui sera toujours indispensable à la recherche.

Le quatrième volume, sorti trois ans après le troisième, constitue une « synthèse », également une somme sur l'interprétation des motifs de l'ensemble des sites décrits dans la littérature, grâce aux collaborations scientifiques suscitées par M. Wäfler[4]. L'introduction au volume 4 récapitule en onze points les principales interprétations des peintures pariétales dans le monde, chaque fois avec les références bibliographiques correspondantes : l'art en tant que première expression de loisir chez l'homme ou « l'art pour l'art » ; parallèles ethnographiques ; totémisme ; magie sympathique ; magie du renouvellement [des ressources naturelles] ; rites d'initiation ; approche sémiotique ; hypothèse structurale ; perspectives neuro-psychologiques ; approche holiste ; code préhistorique.

3. Il faut mentionner quelques exceptions, par exemple les essaims d'abeilles et rayons de miel représentés à Liang Karim, à Kalimantan (Kutai Est) ; voir J.M. Chazine, L.H. Fage (et Pindi Setyawan), *Bornéo. La mémoire des grottes*. Lyon, Ed. Fage 2009**,** p. 140-143.

4. L'auteur remercie dans la préface V. Gerber (Bern) pour les identifications d'animaux terrestres (mammifères et autres), P. Bartsch (Berlin) pour celles des animaux aquatiques dont les poissons, T. Hofmeier (Bâle) pour la mise en page élaborée du volume sans oublier l'éditeur G. Grasshoff (Berlin) qui a été également très sollicité.

Les 22 sites dont les motifs ont été traités en tant que « sources » (*belege*, litt. documents) dans le volume 4 se répartissent géographiquement entre : Bornéo, Sulawesi, Lomblen, Timor, Seram, Kei Kecil, Raja Ampat (P. Misool, P. Batanta, P. Waigeo), Papua (Papua Barat et Papua).

Ainsi, à l'ouest de l'archipel, les motifs provenant de trois sites de Bornéo sont intégrés dans l'ensemble : Batu Cap (Kalimantan Barat), région de Mangkalihat (Kalimantan Timur), Niah (Sarawak). Pour Sulawesi, outre ceux relevés par les auteurs à Pulau Muna, ils ont ajouté Maros et Tomori. En ce qui concerne les deux provinces de Papua, les sites suivants – certains peu connus et dont les données sont difficilement accessibles dans la littérature – sont étudiés : Berau (baie de), Fakfak, Kaimana, Baliem, Mandala, Suaja, Cenderawasih (baie de). A Kalimantan Est, le toponyme « Mangkalihat » recouvre les sites des Mts Marang et de Sangkulirang (Kutai Est) et de Berau.

Les dimensions du volume (25,5 cm x 35,5 cm) et une mise en page très aérée permettent une bonne lecture des motifs, des index et des références. Cependant, les planches ramènent à la même échelle des séries de motifs similaires provenant des différents sites étudiés – ils sont traités en silhouettes (contour noir plein) – ce qui a tendance à uniformiser les dessins, tandis que certains motifs isolés sont présentés à une autre échelle, de taille plus importante. La classification thématique des motifs constitue l'apport le plus important du volume 4. Elle forme un outil pour l'analyse et l'interprétation des peintures et dessins au charbon dans l'archipel.

Les figures d'animaux, par exemple, sont croisées de la manière suivante : « anoa » sous *Bovidés* ; « babirusa » sous *Cochons*. Pour d'autres motifs, tels les ustensiles : « nasse à poisson » sous *Lignes ou formes orthogonales* ; « harpon à trois pointes » sous *Tridents /Proies*. Tandis que les représentations non figuratives sont classées en quatre catégories : 1. abstraites, 2. en forme de poisson, 3. géométriques, 4. indéterminées.

Enfin, la distribution des motifs, combinée à l'index géographique des sites et à celui des dessins et reportée sur un fond de cartes de l'archipel, occupe plus de cent pages (363-467). Si l'on recherche, par exemple, des représentations de danseurs (*tanzer*), les pages sont indiquées dans l'index des motifs en gras (29-43), et de même pour les pagaieurs (*paddler*, 53-55). Les motifs traités par Wäfler sont d'abord arrangés dans des tableaux à double entrée (sites/motifs) en grandes catégories, également reportées sur le même fond de cartes : motifs peu attestés ; motifs souvent attestés ; motifs fréquents ; motifs qui apparaissent presque toujours (« hommes », « animaux terrestres », « animaux aquatiques », « objets inanimés », « formes abstraites », chaque catégorie étant subdivisée en sous-sections plus fines, 337-343).

En rapport à la datation et à l'interprétation des peintures pariétales dans l'archipel, je ferai deux remarques. D'abord, la notion de « la tradition de peinture austronésienne » (dite *APT*), proposée dès 1992 par l'archéologue Chris

Ballard (Australian National University), n'est pas utilisée par les auteurs[5]. Elle s'applique pourtant à ces peintures situées en hauteur dans des grottes et sur des falaises étudiées par Marschall et Wäfler. Ballard avait noté la récurrence en association de représentations de bateaux/pirogues, d'anthropomorphes et de mains négatives dans la phase la plus ancienne de cette tradition picturale. Ces peintures seraient également postérieures à l'implantation des premiers Austronésiens dans la région orientale de l'archipel, vers 2000 ans avant le présent (2000 *BP*). Susan O'Connor a posé l'hypothèse que ces peintures haut perchées formaient une innovation culturelle des populations de langue austronésienne, reliant des communautés isolées par un même symbolisme, peut-être de pair avec des connotations rituelles (O'Conor *et al.* 2004). Mais elles pourraient aussi marquer symboliquement la « prise de possession » d'un territoire, qu'il soit côtier ou dans l'intérieur des terres, par des populations ayant développé une technologie navale sophistiquée, d'où leur mobilité. La présence de mains négatives réalisées au pochoir, rarement de mains positives au trait ou pleines (comparer Wäfler, vol. 4 : 83-96 pour les mains négatives, autres mains : 104-105), seraient l'un des thèmes illustrant l'établissement de ces populations dans l'Est indonésien, notamment en rapport aux premiers habitants « papous » et/ou austro-mélanoïdes. Il faudra attendre des datations de ces peintures pour en savoir plus. On peut ajouter que les peintures et dessins se trouvant dans des grottes, plus protégés des éléments, conviennent le mieux pour la datation[6]. A propos des motifs figuratifs, je note l'absence d'arbres ou d'éléments végétaux, de plantes, ou encore de la « maison » qui n'est pas représentée dans les peintures, et si Wäfler fait référence au chamanisme dans l'index, cela renvoie au texte, aucune illustration n'étant attestée. Par contre le « masque », plutôt anthropomorphique, est fréquent dans le corpus des motifs (213-221, 342). Certains insectes figurent dans la répertoire (millepatte, araignée), le serpent n'étant pas représenté dans le corpus.

La diffusion de la série de publications de Marschall et Wäfler soulève une question plus générale. La valeur inestimable de ce patrimoine archéologique et esthétique, actuellement menacé par les activités humaines, à Kalimantan/Sulawesi ainsi que dans l'est de l'archipel, doit être reconnue au niveau national en Indonésie. Cette série d'ouvrages bien documentée constitue

5. Ceci peut être en rapport avec un mode de funérailles dans des pirogues, voir Ballard 1992 : 98 ; Ballard *et al.*, 2004. En Papua et ailleurs, des motifs solaires apparaissent sur la proue de bateaux ; voir aussi S. Sue O'Connor, D. Bulbeck, J. Meyer (eds.) *The Archaeology of Sulawesi. Current Research on the Pleistocene to the Historic Period*. Terra Australis Series. Canberra : ANU press, Australian National University, 2018.

6. La datation à – 44 000 ans du panneau de la grotte de Leang Bulu Sipong 4, à Sulawesi, en 2019, par une équipe australienne de l'université Griffith avec la participation du Canadien Maxime Aubert, a fait sensation ; c'est la plus ancienne peinture pariétale au monde (*cf. Le Monde* du 13 décembre 2019, p. 7 « Science »). Cette découverte vient confirmer une datation à – 40 000 par la même équipe, en 2018, d'une peinture pariétale d'une grotte de la région des Monts Marang (Kalimantan Est).

donc une contribution majeure à un inventaire des peintures et dessins pariétaux dans le pays. De ce point de vue, il est surprenant que les quatre volumes, qui totalisent plus de mille pages, rédigés en langue allemande, ne contiennent pas de résumé en anglais ou en indonésien[7]. Le site internet en langue anglaise associé à la publication, – mais sans les cartes de situation – qui reprend des éléments du volume 4, est d'une navigation complexe[8]. Mais surtout, le site ne donne pas accès à la richesse visuelle du matériel publié dans la version papier : il permet seulement un agrandissement des motifs, l'impression posant également des problèmes techniques, car il est pratiquement possible d'imprimer un seul motif à la fois et sans les données concernant sa localisation. De plus, les images de nombre de sites listés dans le menu déroulant n'apparaissent pas quand on clique dessus. En bref, il serait important de rendre accessible aux chercheurs les volumes papier en traduction dans une édition condensée et plus particulièrement au public indonésien. Je pense surtout aux personnels des Balai Pelestarian Cagar Budaya (BPCB) et Balai Arkeologi des régions considérées, qui bénéficieraient de ces données afin établir un plan de conservation et de protection des sites.

Antonio Guerreiro

Michael Feener and Anne Blackburn, *Buddhist and Islamic Orders in Southern Asia. Comparative Perspectives*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019, x-220 p. ISBN: 9780824872113. (Electronic version freely available.)

Avec ce volume, M. Feener et A. Blackburn réunissent de manière inédite des chercheurs spécialistes du bouddhisme et de l'islam pour faire apparaître les lignes de force de la circulation et de la localisation des traditions religieuses en Asie méridionale, du XVIe au XXe siècle. Le cadre géographique de l'Asie méridionale, lui-même inhabituel – à l'exception de l'approche englobante des civilisations de l'Asie des moussons de Paul Mus et de celle braudélienne de la Méditerranée asiatique de Denys Lombard –, correspond à une zone où les deux traditions présentes de longue date dans les Etats en formation se sont

7. La mission archéologique franco-indonésienne menée en coopération avec le Puslit Arkenas à la fin des années 1990 et au début des années 2000 avait produit un ouvrage à partir des reconnaissances et relevés effectués dans les grottes ornées de Kalimantan Est, dans les *kabupaten* de Kutai Est et de Berau. Le volume, publié d'abord en français en 2009 (cf. réf. en note 3), l'a été en version indonésienne et anglaise l'année suivante (2010).

8. Voir http://repository.edition-topoi.org/collection/PIND. Le site est intitulé « Rock Painting in Indonesia ». Il faut ajouter que les motifs (plus de 1600), redessinés à partir des clichés des peintures et dessins par M. Wäfler, ont été ensuite numérisés par T. Hofmeier, puis les données traités par G. Grasshoff et G. Fisher afin de les charger sur le site. Ce projet a été soutenu par l'Université Humbold de Berlin en 2016, semble-t-il avant la parution du volume 4 de la série.

disséminées et imposées parallèlement. Ce cadre géographique dépassant les aires culturelles de l'Asie du Sud et de l'Asie du Sud-Est fait apparaître des périodisations et des processus comparables. Il permet de rapprocher dans le cas du bouddhisme trois sous-traditions différentes s'appuyant sur des textes en chinois classique, en tibétain classique et en pâli, et, dans le cas des traditions soufies actives dans la région, des sources arabes, tamoules, javanaises, malaises et indonésiennes.

Le volume trouve sa cohérence dans la focalisation sur la catégorie comparative des *ordres religieux*. Cette catégorie dérivée des traditions chrétiennes et centrale dans l'étude de l'islam, se révèle assez élastique pour identifier, dans les traditions et sous-traditions concernées, les formes d'association de spécialistes religieux qui ont été déterminantes dans la transmission des enseignements et qui ont permis une relative intégration de ces mondes religieux, malgré la fragmentation politique. Les chapitres de l'ouvrage offrent autant d'études de cas relevant d'éruditions étrangères les unes aux autres, mais qui toutes mettent en évidence l'importance des conceptions de lignage, ou de généalogie, liées à l'autorité religieuse de type *silsila* dans l'islam et à la tradition de l'ordination dans le bouddhisme. Elles donnent à voir les processus analogues en jeu et les reconfigurations internes des organisations religieuses. Elles permettent ainsi une compréhension nouvelle des processus de transmission, de réception et de localisation des traditions religieuses. La recherche comparative éclaire l'écologie plus large de l'organisation religieuse qui informa chacun de ces développements dans des communautés de confessions différentes.

On ne peut que saluer cette initiative de M. Feener et d'A. Blackburn de rapprocher l'étude de la diffusion de l'islam et du bouddhisme en Asie méridionale où ces deux traditions se sont déployées, et de le faire autour d'un concept aussi pertinent que celui d'ordre religieux.

Ismail Fajrie Alatas, "A Hadrami Sufi Tradition in the Indonesian Archipelago, The itineraries of Ibn Yahya (1794-1849) and the Tariqa 'Alawiyya", p. 20-47.

L'auteur apporte un éclairage nouveau sur le développement de la tariqa 'Alawiyya, un ordre soufi prônant une application plus stricte de la charia dans l'archipel indonésien. Alatas montre qu'une confrérie soufie ne se transmet pas uniquement par sa structure sociale (parenté, rituels, lieux sacrés), mais bien par d'autres mécanismes qu'il expose à travers le parcours de 'Abdallah b. 'Umar ibn Yahya (1794-1849), grand maître soufi itinérant, propagateur de cette confrérie dans l'archipel au début du XIXe s.

Il fait apparaître les interactions complexes entre le maître soufi, le colonisateur et les cours royales locales. Le rôle de la diaspora des marchands arabes et leur richesse est souligné : des actes symboliques comme les baptêmes des bateaux au nom des saints de la confrérie 'Alawiyya créent

des liens et sont l'occasion de prêches. Les messages adressés aux sultans (Pontianak, Madura, Bangkalan) les exhortent fortement à exiger une plus ferme application de la loi islamique (notamment la pratique des cinq prières) mais sans obligation d'adhésion à la confrérie elle-même.

Enfin, l'influence de cette *tariqa* sur les écoles coraniques (*pesantren*) s'exerce en glissant des conseils pédagogiques (*tadhkira*) visant à inclure discrètement les grands écrits de la *tariqa* dans les cursus traditionnels. En reconstruisant le voyage de Ibn Yahya à Java grâce à ses poèmes et ses épîtres, Alatas montre comment un ordre religieux peut fonctionner efficacement dans une écologie sociale très différente de celle du pays d'origine et dans un contexte historique en mutation : celui de la consolidation du pouvoir colonial et la fin du pouvoir politique et religieux indigène suite à la guerre de Java (1825-1830).

Alexei Kirichenko, "The itineraries of « Sîhla Monk » Sâralankâ. Buddhist interactions in Eighteenth Century Southern Asia", p. 48-74.

Fort de sa précieuse maîtrise de la littérature monastique du Myanmar, l'auteur exhume un témoignage inattendu sur l'institutionnalisation du Siyam Nikaya à Lanka, à la suite des missions siamoises à Kandy du milieu du XVIIIe siècle. Il s'agit, en effet, d'un point de vue marginal qui émerge de la relation qu'en a fait un moine Taï du Tenasserim, Sâralankâ, alors qu'il résidait en Haute Birmanie, entre 1766/67 et 1780. Sâralankâ a connu une carrière mouvementée puisqu'elle a débuté à Ayuttaya, où il est embarqué pour Kandy avec la mission siamoise. Il y a séjourné entre 1756 et 1764, puis de retour dans sa ville natale de Tenasserim, alors qu'elle tombait aux mains du royaume d'Ava, il fut réordonné et emmené à Sagaing où il passa 14 années. Il est connu dans les inventaires des bibliothèques monastiques de Haute Birmanie pour ses témoignages sur l'émergence du Siyam Nikaya au Lanka, sur laquelle on ne connaît par ailleurs aucune autre source, ni lankaise ni siamoise. Ces documents sont donc déterminés par l'« interstitialité » de ce religieux, qui était loin d'être rare à l'époque, nous dit Kirichenko. Pour lui, ces matériaux birmans documentent un cas de transfert d'ordination sans transplantation d'ordre monastique, démontrant les interactions entre le Lanka, le Siam et Ava à l'époque.

Torsten Tschacher, "Tariqas and Muslim Society in Southeastern India and Lanka, ca. 1400-1950", p. 75-98.

L'auteur constate une absence étonnante de recherche sur l'histoire sociale des ordres soufis dans l'Inde du sud-est et au Lanka, alors même qu'ils sont très souvent considérés comme centraux dans l'histoire de l'islam de cette région. Cela viendrait du fait que les sources sont en persan, arabe et ourdou, composées par les élites des États musulmans, présentant généralement une « relation d'autorité temporelle et spirituelle » (sultan–saint soufi), qui est devenue « an established trope ». En étudiant les sources en tamoul et en

arabe entre le XVIe et le XVIIIe siècles, Tschacher montre que les lignées de transmission du soufisme faisaient bien partie de la société musulmane à une période précoce mais que leur identification claire à une *tariqa* spécifique n'apparaît que tardivement.

A l'origine du soufisme dans la région, on trouve tout d'abord une participation dans une lignée d'enseignement, sans initiation des laïcs dans un lignage institutionalisé. Autour de 1600, un réseau est créé par des soufis itinérants prêtant allégeance à la Qadiriyya et la Rifa'iyya, qui devient une « communauté d'interprétation » autour d'un corpus de textes de chants. À la fin du XVIIIe s., l'ascension de certaines de ces lignées entraîne une transformation vers des « ordres de lignage » (*lineage orders*) tels qu'on se les représente aujourd'hui pour les ordres soufis. Bien que des recherches restent à faire, Tschacher conclut que les changements notés à partir de 1600 proviennent d'une compétition accrue entre groupes religieux, indépendamment des avancées européennes, qui affectent plus particulièrement les communautés côtières. A partir du XIXe s., et grâce aux nouvelles technologies, la structure particulière du réseau soufi, mettant l'accent sur la mémoire de textes partagés plutôt que sur la hiérarchie verticale d'un lignage, a pu jouer un rôle intégrateur pour une communauté musulmane dispersée qui s'est maintenue ainsi sans soutien étatique.

Kenneth Dean, "Whose Orders? Chinese Popular God Temple Networks and the Rise of Chinese Mahayana Buddhist Monasteries in Southeast Asia", p. 99-124.

L'auteur renouvelle l'étude de l'expansion des institutions rituelles et monastiques en Asie du Sud-Est par celle du bouddhisme mahayaniste chinois, encore peu traité. Dès le XVIIe siècle se forme, dans la péninsule malaise, un réseau de temples d'immigrants du Fujian, des Hokkien, chassés par l'expansion mandchoue. Ces derniers ouvrent localement des branches des temples d'origine, liées à leurs associations d'origine (*huiguan*), gérées par des spécialistes rituels (*miaozhu*) et caractérisées par des rituels de possession. Ces spécialistes contribuèrent à transformer les cultes des dieux locaux en des réseaux cultuels transnationaux déterminés par la transmission des rôles rituels par l'initiation. Plus tard, des moines itinérants y officièrent mais dans un rôle subalterne, ne recevant que les restes des offrandes en paiement des services rituels pour lesquels ils devaient se rendre constamment disponibles. Cette population monastique, flottante et suspecte, au service des leaders de temple, ne changea de statut que tardivement, au milieu du XIXe siècle, avec la politique coloniale de régulation de la religion chinoise. Cette politique imposant la séparation entre les temples et les associations d'origine dirigées par les leaders de cartel aboutit au démantèlement du système des temples chinois. À la fin du XIXe siècle, émergent les premiers monastères bouddhiques chinois, le Jilesi, fondé à Penang en 1905, et le Shuanglisi, à Singapour en

1909, qui changèrent l'« écologie religieuse » de la région en constituant la base d'un ordre mahayaniste formel et en transférant la finance des temples aux moines. Dean met en évidence le fait que les réseaux multiples liant les monastères de la région aux temples de Chine du Sud et du Sud-Est ont été des vecteurs du bouddhisme du Mahayana en Asie du Sud-Est et qu'ils peuvent être considérés comme des ordres religieux en réseau.

Martin van Bruinessen, "Sufi 'Orders' in Southeast Asia, from Private Devotions to Social Network and Corporate Action", p. 125-152.

L'auteur présente une véritable synthèse historique du développement des confréries soufies en Indonésie, depuis leurs débuts, au sein d'une élite aristocratique des sultanats soucieuse de questions mystiques (XVIe-XVIIe s.), jusqu'à la progression fulgurante qu'elles connaissent au XIXe s. dans la population. Plusieurs facteurs y participent, mais Bruinessen souligne le fait que les confréries s'accompagnent de rituels collectifs offrant l'invulnérabilité et la résistance au colonisateur, qui étend alors son emprise territoriale. C'est le cas notamment de la Sammaniyya, très active et moins aristocratique que d'autres. La perte de pouvoir des sultanats au XIXe s., les communications plus faciles, l'établissement d'écoles coraniques (*pesantren*) dans les zones rurales, mais aussi la multiplication des enseignants d'Asie du Sud-est (Jawa) à La Mecque sont autant de facteurs expliquant cette expansion des *tariqa*. L'apparition de nouvelles *tariqa* à la Mecque utilisant le malais comme medium facilite la sortie des cercles plus étroits d'une élite. Au XXe s., la conquête saoudienne de la Mecque en 1924 amène une indigénisation de tous ces réseaux.

Bruinessen souligne très justement l'importance souvent occultée des réseaux d'enseignants de textes islamiques (*kitab scholars*) liés par une chaîne d'autorité et de légitimation (*isnah*) par un maître à la Mecque auquel on doit l'*ijaza*. Bruinessen désigne ces réseaux d'enseignants comme une sorte de confrérie liée non plus par le lignage (*silsilah*) comme les ordres soufis mais par l'*isnah*. Pour lui, la *tariqa* peut être définie par trois aspects : chacune possède une généalogie spirituelle (*silsila*), un répertoire de techniques et dévotions qui constituent une « voie » spécifique et enfin un modèle d'organisation sociale particulier (un des aspects restant le plus flou), avec des institutions variables dans l'espace et le temps.

Nancy K. Florida, "Shattariyya Sufi scents, the Literary World of the Surakarta Palace in Nineteenth-Century Java », p. 153-184.

L'auteur propose une lecture fine et nuancée de textes littéraires de la tradition soufie Shattariyya, dans leur contexte historique javanais au XIXe siècle, exemple parfait d'une localisation de l'ordre à la cour. Elle présente deux *suluk* (chants soufis), un corpus de textes métaphysiques qui explore la nature du rapport entre Dieu et sa création, et spécifiquement la relation entre Dieu et l'humanité. Ces deux textes, *Suluk Acih* et *Suluk Martabat*

Sanga, sont l'œuvre de Ronggasasmita, né dans une famille de dignitaires et hommes de lettres de la cour de Surakarta, à Java central. La *tariqa*, originaire de Perse, apparue du XVe s., fut très présente au sein de l'élite politique et littéraire du palais au début du XIXe s., avant la guerre de Java, à laquelle elle participa. L'exil politique de ces élites, suite à la guerre, mais surtout l'arrivée de nouveaux ordres plus « réformistes » et plus « populaires » contribuèrent à son rapide déclin après 1830. Les textes montrent qu'il s'agit alors moins d'un ordre religieux, d'une corporation ou d'une confrérie horizontale que d'une tradition de savoirs et de pratiques transmises par des maîtres à quelques étudiants, et maintenues volontairement dans un cercle fermé et secret, loin du « *sharia folk* ».

Après une période de prédominance de la Naqshbandiyya à la cour, on voit apparaître au milieu du XIXe s. quelques manuscrits qui revendiquent un mysticisme proprement javanais (*kejawen*), mais où les influences shattari transpercent néanmoins. Florida démontre comment la tradition textuelle de la Shattariyya se maintint, quoique difficilement, dans un contexte de maintes reconfigurations politico-religieuses, face au colonisateur et à la réforme islamique.

Amy Holmes-Taghungdarpa, "Negociating Order in the Land of the Dragon and the Hidden valley of Rice. Local Motives and Regional Networks in the Transmission of New 'Tibetan' Buddhist Lineages in Bhutan and Sikkim", 185-207.

L'auteur étudie un cas d'introduction d'un nouveau lignage d'enseignement de méditation du bouddhisme tibétain au Buthan et au Sikkim, celui de Tokden Shakya Shri (1853-1919). Dans le bouddhisme tibétain, le concept de lignage de transmission (*bla brgyud*) est distinct de celui d'ordre monastique (*dge 'dun*) et permet ainsi la participation de toutes sortes de pratiquants dans les zones d'expansion de la religion. Le Bhutan et le Sikkim sont tous les deux des royaumes bouddhiques fondés au XVIIe siècle par des Tibétains qui unifièrent les populations locales en y introduisant le bouddhisme tibétain. Ils font l'expérience indirecte des changements apportés par la colonisation à la fin du XIXe siècle de manières contrastées, mais qui, dans les deux cas, favorisent l'adoption du nouveau lignage d'enseignement de la méditation qui s'appuie sur des narrations culturelles plus anciennes, celles des traditions d'un trésor caché (*terma*) et de terres cachées autour de la figure du héros culturel, introducteur du bouddhisme au VIIIe siècle, Guru Rinpoche. L'auteur démontre que ces narrations et valeurs partagées participent d'un cosmopolitisme alternatif, himalayen.

Andrée Feillard
Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière

Histoire contemporaine et Société

Tamao Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia and Cold War*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2019, 301 p. index, plates. ISBN: 97898114843331.

In this book, Tamao Zhou investigates the ethnic Chinese dimension in the making of the governmental relations between China and Indonesia, from the surrender of the Japanese in 1945 up to 1967 – year which marks the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Indonesia – with numerous flashbacks into the first half of the 20th century.

In the introduction, the author explains that she relied on the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (declassified in 2008, but reclassified in 2013), as well as on those of the Chinese Communist Party, the Guomindang, and the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (partly destroyed during the chaotic transition of power after the regime change in 1965). In order to complement these sources, she also consulted the materials kept in various libraries, especially in the PRC and Hong Kong, as well as the family archives of the journalist and writer Wang Renshu 王任叔 (pen name Baren 巴人, 1901-1972, who had spent five years in Sumatra in the late 1940s, before becoming first ambassador of the PRC to Indonesia in 1951). She also grounded her research on numerous oral history interviews with refugees, retired diplomats, members of the Chinese community in Indonesia, and Chinese from Indonesia who migrated to the PRC where they were relocated in Overseas Chinese farms.

The book follows a chronological approach and is divided into ten chapters. The first and the second compare Chinese nationalists and communists as regards their attitudes and strategies towards the Chinese in Indonesia. Chapter 2 focuses on Baren, his vision of Indonesia while in Sumatra (as reflected in his *Yindunixiya zhi ge* 印度尼西亚之歌 "Song of Indonesia" completed in 1952), and his political mobilization of the local Chinese during the Indonesian national revolution (along with other leftist intellectuals such as Hu Zhihe 胡愈之, his wife, Wang Jiyuan 王纪元, and Yu Dafu 郁达夫, whose actions are not detailed here).

Chapters three and four proceed to the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter three details the evolution of the PRC starting from 1952, in order to dissipate the Indonesian government's suspicion of the local Chinese, and the actions taken by Taipei to encourage the latter to support the Republic of China. Chapter four focuses on the rivalries between Beijing and Taipei among the Chinese of Indonesia. Worthy of note, the clashes within the Chinese community of Jakarta during the short period just after the independence of Indonesia (1949) are well described in the collection of short stories by the journalist Zhang

Youjun 张又君 (born in Medan in 1915, pen name Hei Ying 黑婴) entitled *Hongbaiqi xia* 红白旗下 "Under the Indonesia Flag" (1950), that the author does not seem to know.

Chapters 5 and 6 show how the political struggles between these two factions and their impact on the Chinese minority shaped the policy of the Indonesian government. Chapter 5 presents altogether the various perceptions of the problem by Indonesian authorities and the measures they took to control the local Chinese. Chapter 6 details the various large-scale economic actions taken in the 1950-1960, starting with the interdiction for alien Chinese to reside in rural areas, and the moderate attitude of Beijing towards Jakarta, the PRC being unwilling to sacrifice stable bilateral relations. As a result, more than 100,000 Chinese were forced to leave Indonesia, compelling the PRC to start to call back these displaced ethnic Chinese and to relocate them in Overseas Chinese Farms.

Chapters 7 to 9 show the efforts of China and Indonesia to rebel against the bipolar international order in the early 1960s. The Gerakan 30 September or Movement the 30th September 1965 announced the end of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the violence against ethnic Chinese in 1965 and 1967 during the power transition, the new waves of migrations.

The two last chapters deal with the new competition between Beijing and Taipei after the rise of Suharto, the attitude of the two Chinese regimes towards new violence against ethnic Chinese, and finally the situation of the repatriated Overseas Chinese in the PRC and their grievances.

Admittedly the book is not an easy read. The abundance of events, the continual move from political history at the national and international levels to the daily social and political level make the narrative difficult to follow. The adding of Chinese characters to the text and the bibliography, as well as various appendices might have helped the reader. For instance, a political chronology for the period under consideration, short biographical notes for Chinese activists in Indonesia, either new migrants like Wang Jiyuan 王纪元 (1910-2001), who from 1947 until he was expelled in 1951, was the editor in chief of the *Shenghuo bao* 生活报 in Jakarta, or local born journalists like Heiying (or Zhang Youjun mentioned above) who also worked for this newspaper, and Ang Jan Goan (or Yong Yuanyuan 洪渊源, born in Bandung in 1894) who was editor in chief of the leftist *Sin Po* 新报, until it ceased publication in 1959.

It remains that this research offers a rather comprehensive overview of the importance of the ethnic Chinese factor in the political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Jakarta. In the event that this book is reissued, it would be desirable to correct the legend of Figure 2.1 (p. 39), and to add in the bibliography the reference of Glen Peterson's work which is quoted in the text.

Claudine Salmon

At a Moment's Notice. Indonesian maids write on their lives abroad, collected and translated by Jafar Suryomenggolo. Copenhague : NIAS Press, 2019, 219 p. (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Voices of Asia series, n° 1). ISBN: 978-87-7694-271-7.

Les travaux universitaires sur les migrations, les études de genre et celles sur le « *care* », depuis les années 2000, ont abondamment décrit et analysé le cas des femmes migrantes employées de maison (Adams & Dickey, 2000 ; Anderson, 2000 ; Anggraeni, 2006 ; Anju, 2017 ; Huang, Yeoh & Rahman, 2005 ; Constable, 2007 ; Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003 ; Parreñas, 2001, Killias, 2018; etc). Cette volumineuse littérature fait la part belle aux Philippines et Indonésiennes parties travailler sous contrat en Malaisie, à Singapour, à Taiwan, en Corée et à Hong Kong. Ceci parce que les Philippines et l'Indonésie sont devenues en deux décennies les premiers exportateurs mondiaux de main-d'œuvre féminine sous contrat, destinée aux tâches ménagères et aux soins à la personne. Plus de 70% des milliers de travailleurs migrants officiels qui quittent l'Indonésie pour des emplois à l'étranger chaque année sont des femmes, en raison de la forte demande en matière d'emplois domestiques.

Un certain nombre de reportages journalistiques, de documentaires et de travaux universitaires se basent désormais sur la collecte de biographies et de récits de vie. « Dans le champ des études sur la mobilité, la méthode biographique, en privilégiant le micro sur le macro, s'avère bien adaptée pour retracer un déplacement et une trajectoire sociale, d'une façon à la fois diachronique et spatiale. Elle permet aussi de comprendre la logique des comportements des migrants comme de saisir la dynamique des processus en interaction » (Baffie, Husson & Anglès, 2015). En outre, ces récits de vie ont comme objectifs louables de donner la parole aux intéressées (Shi Lu, 2014 ; Constable, 2007 ; Husson, 2015). Ces femmes en position subalterne sont en effet censées être dociles, discrètes voire muettes, mais par l'entremise d'un journaliste, d'un responsable d'ONG ou d'un chercheur, elles ont le moyen de s'exprimer et de dire leur réalité.

Il va sans dire que la vie à l'étranger pour ces femmes embauchées comme employées de maison ne se résume pas à leur simple travail. Durant leur temps libre, certaines mettent tout en œuvre pour se construire une vie meilleure en se formant, se cultivant et en se découvrant elles-mêmes et en développant leurs talents. Certaines tentent l'aventure en explorant la ville, ses opportunités, ses mœurs, et cherchent à s'adapter pour y vivre pleinement leur vie. Et certaines de ces femmes écrivent, sous forme de journal intime, de poésies, de courriers épistolaires, de slams ou de nouvelles. Des écrits donc libératoires pour elles-mêmes et qui s'adressent, quand ils sont diffusés, à leurs consoeurs et à la famille, sous forme de blogs, lisibles dans des gazettes d'ONG ou encore lus lors d'ateliers ou de concours d'écriture. Et c'est là que nous en arrivons à

l'ouvrage coordonné par Jafar Suryomenggolo, dont l'intérêt principal est d'apporter un matériau inédit pour aborder ce vaste sujet aussi complexe que sensible. Ce dernier a en effet réuni et traduit de l'indonésien en anglais 23 récits, de courtes fictions autobiographiques, toutes écrites par des travailleuses migrantes domestiques actuelles ou anciennes, basées sur leur expérience personnelle, mais plus ou moins romancées. Car en effet, ces dernières années, un nouveau genre de littérature féminine indonésienne s'est développé, dans lequel les auteures réinventent leurs expériences de travailleuses domestiques à l'étranger. Cet éventail d'histoires diverses et variées dépeint des instants de vie, des moments et des situations qui éclairent la condition d'employées de maison, leur quotidien, les ambiguïtés du métier, les difficultés rencontrées, les raisons complexes et multiformes de travailler à l'étranger, leur désir d'être respectées et traitées avec humanité et leurs espoirs et leurs rêves d'une vie meilleure. Les histoires sont racontées à la première ou à la troisième personne, je ou elle, exprimant clairement le point de vue de la narratrice, ou parfois celui de l'employeur comme dans « Two Bosses in My Home » de Susie Utomo et « Jealousy » d'Ida Raihan. Le livre met en lumière ce que ces femmes considèrent comme important et se divise en quatre parties qui reflètent les centres d'intérêt ou de préoccupations de ces femmes par ordre croissant d'importance : les relations employeur-travailleur, l'amour et la sexualité, le clair de lune et la maison.

Les nouvelles sont inégales, reflétant la personnalité de leur auteur, certaines plus réussies que d'autres, plus poignantes, certaines douces amères, d'autres plus violentes. Mais derrière toutes ces histoires, le lecteur ressent la dure condition des femmes pauvres, étrangères, subalternes, non-reconnues et non-estimées.

La nouvelle « Susi » de Ratna Khaerudina relate le sentiment d'injustice face à la résiliation non fondée d'un contrat de travail et les difficultés qu'il entraîne pour la migrante. « I Love Your Daughter » de Noena Fadzila décrit les tensions émotionnelles inévitables qui surviennent lorsque la parentalité est déléguée à une nounou. A l'inverse, deux nouvelles, « The Jade Bracelet » de Mega Vristian et « A, Ne, Ge! » De Maria Bo Niok, témoignent heureusement d'une possible bonne entente entre l'employée de maison et ses patrons.

Le chapitre le plus étayé est celui des nouvelles tournant autour de l'amour. Rien de surprenant à cela, si l'on considère que ces migrantes déracinées ont en moyenne entre 18 et 35 ans et font face à une grande solitude. Certaines de ces histoires décrivent donc des femmes seules à la recherche de l'amour ou plus modestement de réconfort et de chaleur humaine dans un pays étranger. Mais au-delà de cette quête de romance, pointent souvent des questions plus fondamentales sur le mariage, la fidélité, le rôle d'épouse, celui de mère, le sens du foyer, la moralité, la religion.

La plupart de ces nouvelles brosse invariablement une image négative des hommes – y compris les éventuels maris ou fiancés restés en Indonésie, les

employeurs, les courtiers – qui se révèlent généralement profiteurs, menteurs, volages et infidèles.

Dans leur quête d'amour, ces femmes sont en effet fréquemment la proie de coureurs de jupons, de Don Juan, de playboys et d'hommes en quête de relations sexuelles bon marché. Plusieurs nouvelles révèlent que ces jeunes femmes issues de la campagne affichent leur nouvelle urbanité et cachent leur condition de Cosette ou de soubrette en modernisant radicalement leur style vestimentaire. En optant pour des talons hauts, des shorts, des mini-jupes, des vêtements moulants et du maquillage, elles s'exposent alors à la convoitise d'hommes qui les perçoivent comme des filles faciles ou des professionnelles du sexe. Plusieurs nouvelles, « Jhony the Playboy » et « Cheap love in Bukit Merah » de Maria Bo Niok, « Billy and I » de Bayu Insani, « Sasmitha » de Karin Maulana montrent les sévères désillusions amoureuses de ces femmes trahies par leurs amants pakistanais, indiens ou chinois, qui abusent et profitent d'elles sous couvert d'amour et qui ne cherchent en fait qu'à se distraire et n'hésitent pas à les abandonner lorsqu'elles tombent enceintes.

L'homosexualité féminine est aussi abordée au travers de « The Turkish Veil » de Juwanna, « Sasmitha » de Karin Maulana – qui présentent la question du port du voile musulman comme un retour à un honneur et un bonheur normatif et assuré. La nouvelle « Sandy and I » d'Ida Raihan dépeint cependant une situation tragique : la narratrice rejette son amante, une camarade de chambre, lui disant qu'elle veut « revenir à sa vraie nature de femme » en retournant auprès de son mari en Indonésie. Partie chercher un soutien moral dans une mosquée, elle s'en fait cependant chasser au motif que ce n'est pas un endroit « pour des femmes comme elle ». Il serait trop long de dévoiler le contenu de toutes les nouvelles et de priver le lecteur de la surprise de la découverte de ce recueil.

Ce dernier, pour conclure, s'adresse à différents publics. Aux intéressées elles-mêmes et pourquoi pas à leurs employeurs, aux chercheurs qui étudient les migrations de travail – ces histoires pouvant éventuellement compléter ou corroborer leurs données ethnographiques –, ainsi qu'aux littéraires puisqu'il s'agit avant tout de littérature. Cet ouvrage témoigne en effet d'une littérature féminine engagée, militante et sociale, produite par des travailleuses migrantes stigmatisées de par leur profession subalterne. Et il propose en un mot un bel exemple d' « agentivité » (traduction française de l'anglais *agency*) comprise comme la faculté ou la capacité d'une personne d'agir, d'influencer et de transformer les choses, les gens et sa propre vie.

Références :

Adams, Kathleen M. & Sara Dickey (eds), 2000. *Home and Hegemony : Domestic Service and Identity Politics in South and Southeast Asia*. Ann Arbour, Michigan, University of Michigan Press.

Anderson, Bridget, 2000. *Doing the Dirty Work ? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour*. London: Zed Books.

Anggraeni, Dewi, 2006. *Dreamseekers. Indonesian Women as Domestic Workers in Asia*. Jakarta: EquinoxPublishing – International Labour Organization (ILO).

Anju, 2017. *Multinational Maids. Stepwise Migration in a Global Labor Market*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Jean Baffie, Laurence Husson & Valérie Anglès, 2015. « Bioscape ou paysage biographique du migrant asiatique : parcours individuels et contextes sociaux », *Moussons* en ligne, n° 26 URL : http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/3336 ; DOI : 10.4000/moussons.3336

Constable, Nicole, 2007. *Maids to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Migrant Workers*. Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press. Second edition.

Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003. *Global Woman : Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. London: Grante Books.

Huang, Shirlena, Brenda S.A. Yeoh & Noor Abdul Rahman, 2005. *Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers*. Singapore : Marshall Cavendish Academic.

Husson, Laurence, 2015. « Deux domestiques javanaises à Hong Kong. Entre épreuves et désirs d'épanouissement », *Moussons*, n° 26, p. 65-91.

Killias, Olivia, 2018. *Follow the Maid. Domestic Worker Migration in and from Indonesia*. Copenhagen: Nias Press.

Parreñas, 2001. *Servants of Globalization : Women, Migration and Domestic Work*. Standford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.

Shi Lu, 2014. *Les voix de migrants. Récit de vie des migrants paysans en Chine*. Toulouse : Presses universitaires du Mirail.

Laurence Husson
IrAsia, Marseille, CNRS

Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell (eds). *Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017, 295-xxi p., ISBN: 978 981 47 6299 1.

In a televised debate between President Jokowi and his rival Prabowo Subiyanto during the 2019 electoral campaign, the previously unknown term "unicorn" took the country's millions of netizens by storm. As rare as the mythical creature it draws its name from, a unicorn is a startup company whose value passes the USD 1 billion threshold. Southeast Asia has no less than seven of such companies, and four of them are homegrown in Indonesia.

With a population of 63.4 million millennials, 100 million mobile phones, 150 million internet users and a projection of 50 million more users by 2020 with a penetration of 53%, Indonesia is Southeast Asia's largest digital economy and a fertile ground for digital technology. However, challenges such as uneven internet access, the lack of digital infrastructure investment, restrictive regulations and unarticulated policies continue to limit these potentials. Digital technology's rapid uptake also brings perils such as online propagation of religious extremism and state repression.

The fifteen chapters of the volume portray the opportunities and challenges in different aspects of Indonesia's digital era. In Chapter 1, the editors Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell define the "digital" by "the translation of various

aspects of life into digits for information and communication purposes" (p. 3) and argue that a discussion on "digital Indonesia" should begin by "putting the very idea of technological 'revolution' into critical perspective by positioning the realities of the digital world in a context of colliding socio-political, cultural and natural environments" (p. 3). The book is divided into five sections: connectivity, divergence, identity, knowledge and commerce.

Starting the first section on Connectivity, Chapter 2, written by Yanuar Nugroho and Agung Hikmat who are officials at the President's Executive Office, highlights the administration's e-governance strategy. The authors describe four policy initiatives: the creation of an official geospatial map, the integration and centralization of data, the promotion of a national complaint-handling mechanism, and the promotion of online government services. Yet these initiatives will only work with substantial public participation, funding, political will, a clear regulatory framework, a proper institutional setting and a robust monitoring and evaluation. This chapter is therefore particularly interesting for policymakers and service providers.

In Chapter 3, Emma Baulch highlights the socio-political significance of mobile phones (or handphones – *HP* in Indonesian), which was influenced by the political reforms in the 1990s and the growth of consumer capitalism. Digital-related consumer capitalism does not only perpetuate class-based distinction but also reshapes it by "the tactical use of digital technologies associated with the lower class" (p. 54), such as the usage of SMS (considered more accessible to the lower class) instead of Twitter or WhatsApp to promote local events.

Chapter 4 discusses the growing predominance of the digital media businesses. Here Ross Tapsell argues that Indonesia's mainstream media is dominated by eight Jakarta-based "digital conglomerates" born out of mergers and acquisitions of media companies over the years. According to Tapsell, these conglomerates have the same business plan, which is "to take as big a share of the mainstream Indonesian audience in as many platforms as possible, and to build an 'ecosystem' of linked media and online business and communications infrastructure" (p.61). Their centralized news production and "very few deeply investigative stories" indicate the decline of the quality of investigative journalism in Indonesia. On the other hand, their financial might and Jakarta-centric pursuit made them politically influential. Media oligarchs are a dominant political force: they either vie for political power themselves – many of them "own", and/or are leaders of, political parties –, or have actively supported one of the two presidential candidates in the 2014 election.

In Section 2 on Divergence, Onno Purbo's Chapter 5 suggests two strategies to narrow the digital divide between rural and urban areas, that is by improving digital literacy, for example by introducing information and communication technology training at school, and by creating better digital infrastructure.

Chapter 6 by Usman Hamid from Amnesty International paints a grim picture of Indonesia's online freedom of expression. Taking the examples of state crackdowns under both the draconian Information and Electronic Transaction (ITE) and the Criminal Code, the author shows that while the proliferation of social media allows citizens to express their opinions, "it has not changed the elite-centred characteristics of the political and economic decision-making processes […]" (p. 105) as the state may block websites and criminalize citizens for expressing their views.

The chapter thus flows naturally to Chapter 7, where Budi Raharjo documents Indonesia's cyber security incidents, their root causes and the government measures. These incidents, including spam emails, website defacement, malware distribution, DoS attacks, identity theft and financial fraud are caused by a lack of secure methods of identity verification. Echoing the previous chapter, Raharjo warns that government measures "should be taken with caution because [they] can lead to censorship or be perceived as an attempt to control society" (p.122).

In Section 3 on Identity, Chapter 8, written by John Postill (the author of *The Rise of Nerd Politics: Digital Activism and Political Change*, 2018) and Kurniawan Saputro, focuses on three aspects of digital activism: victims, volunteers and voices. For "victims", the authors took the examples of those who were charged under the ITE Law and the launching of SAFENET, a group of activists fighting against the ITE Law. "Volunteers" include the activists whose work revolves around the elections, such as Election Guardians (*Kawal Pemilu*) who in the 2014 election entered poling stations' results and cross-checked most of the votes so as to ensure a clean and fair election. Lastly, "voices" include those organizations who use media technology to fight against political repression.

Martin Slama's Chapter 9 sheds light on how Indonesian Muslims are using social media for religious purposes. Messaging apps such as WhatsApp, LINE, Telegram and BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) are used by members of prayer groups to interact among themselves and with their preachers, bringing online what was traditionally an offline matter. The author also highlights the usage of WhatsApp groups to compel members to read the Qur'an daily. Facebook and Instagram are also used to support proselytization (*dakwah*) activities, for example by posting prayers or photographs portraying pious lifestyles.

While the chapter portrays a few social media usages among ordinary Muslims, it unfortunately fails to include a prominent example of how platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram are used to propagate a purer Islamic lifestyle, dubbed the *hijrah* movement. While the movement itself is a spectrum: from a form of Islamic revivalism which is tolerant to various expressions of youth culture, to Salafism, which is less tolerant to

contemporary culture, its sympathizers could at times be mobilized politically, especially during election times. The young cleric Abdul Somad, who has more than 10 million followers in the above platforms, is generally considered as one of the movement's propagators.

In contrast, Nava Nuraniyah's Chapter 10 very relevantly sheds light on the role of encrypted chat groups in the proliferation of religious extremism in Indonesia. Having followed ISIS sympathizers on Telegram, a favourite mobile application among Indonesian pro-ISIS groups, she shows how social media do not only allow extremist groups to maintain or reactivate old networks, but also enlarge their recruitment pools to include diaspora students, migrant workers and highly educated individuals from non-extremist backgrounds. The Telegram community, in which these individuals find a sense of belonging and acceptance, is also a support group for those who broke away from their families due to their affiliation with ISIS.

Chapter 11 and 12 present digitalization initiatives. Kathleen Azali highlights the importance of digitizing libraries, archives, museums and other resources to preserve the knowledge amid the humid climatic conditions and uncertain political contexts. Edwin Jurriëns shows how "hacktivism" or the creation of "open laboratories for exploring and executing alternative scenarios for more sustainable, socially inclusive and environmentally friendly futures" (p. 208) is used by art communities to access and disseminate projects relating to social and environmental issues.

Economists and business practitioners would be interested to read Chapter 13 by Former Minister of Trade and later Tourism and Creative Economy Marie Pangestu and Grace Dewi. This chapter offers rich data showing the impact of digital economy on the overall economy, productivity and innovation, its modification of business models and its potentials in promoting inclusion. The authors conclude however that inclusivity has not been reached, as "levels of internet use fracture along income, locational, gender, age and educational lines". This chapter thus follows up nicely from Chapter 3 which suggests an improvement to the telecommunication infrastructure and ICT training as means to mitigate the digital divide. On the other hand, sharing economy, especially in retail and transportation industries (e.g. Gojek, Tokopedia, Bukalapak), has successfully expanded consumer bases and created more commercial opportunities compared to the traditional models. Despite these potentials, however, government faces challenges especially on regulatory and taxation aspects.

Following up, Bede Moore's Chapter 14 offers an insider view to the trajectory of Indonesia's e-commerce industry in 2011-2016. As the previous chapter, the author highlights regulatory challenges as well as a lack of guideline policies. Yet he also underscores President Jokowi's keenness to take "political ownership" (p. 267) of the technology industry, such as

aligning himself with Gojek founder Nadiem Makarim (whom in 2019 he made Minister of Education) and other homegrown large tech companies. This, however, creates ambiguity as the President's aspiration for foreign capitals is hindered by constraining regulations.

The last chapter by Michele Ford and Vivian Honan zooms in on Gojek, Indonesia's most popular app-based transport service, and presents a conundrum: on the one hand, consumers' satisfaction means that the company enjoys considerable consumer support – especially during the 2016 clash with conventional motorcycle taxi drivers and taxi drivers –, on the other, the unregulated expansion of app-based transport service is threatening the livelihood of conventional (motorcycle) taxi drivers.

This book thus covers various issues on how Indonesia deals with governance, economy and social life in the digital era. Due to such a wide range, it is understandable that some important themes that are relevant to both the Indonesian and Southeast Asia's contexts have not been adequately delved into. Among these are the intersections between national security and the freedom of information and between the freedom of information and the right to privacy. Many of the chapters mention regulatory problems, yet none touches upon, for example, the complexities of the government having to deal with viral hoaxes which poses security threats on the one hand, and its commitment to the freedom of information on the other. Another example is the recent discourse on the "right to be forgotten", or the right to have private information be removed from internet searches, and how this may impede the freedom of information.

That said, this book represents a pioneering work on Indonesia's response to the digital era. It portrays various opportunities and challenges and shows how the state and the society alike navigate through policies and implementation. I thus recommend this book to policymakers, business practitioners, students and all who study Indonesia and are interested in how disruptive technology influences its politics and economy.

Deasy Simandjuntak
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore and Academia Sinica Taipei

Alessandra Lopez y Royo. *Contemporary Indonesian Fashion: Through the Looking Glass*. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2020, ix-216 pp. ISBN: 978-1-3500-6130-9

Indonesian visual and style cultures have proliferated in the past two decades. Art historian, model and fashion critic Alessandra Lopez y Royo's new book *Contemporary Indonesian Fashion: Through the Looking Glass* offers a first-hand survey of some of the key figures in this period. Her book is a welcome resource for anyone seeking to know more about the institutions,

individuals and innovations associated with the Indonesian fashion scene, and as such joins a growing collection of analyses of Indonesian visual and political life (cf. Lee 2016; Strassler 2010, 2020). Saturating the book is genuine affection for Indonesian designers and designs. Lopez y Royo is a passionate advocate for the world and tastes she admires.

Rooted in her earlier academic training in dance iconography in Hindu and Buddhist monuments, Lopez y Royo expanded her interest in Indonesian aesthetics through two research visits to Indonesia in 2015 and 2018. She provides readers with a close account of the dramatic growth of the fashion industry, with both Indonesian designers who have gained global cachet and expatriate designers who have chosen to be based in Indonesia. Lopez y Royo argues that the fashion scene has dramatically transformed since the end of the Suharto New Order, a period that has witnessed domestic and international institutional investment in fashion design as a development strategy. Within Indonesia, the growing middle and upper-classes in major cities, especially Jakarta, have framed consumption as leisure, particularly evident in the display of clothing on shoppers and in boutique windows. The Indonesian government has also taken note and has established a new bureau BEKRAF, a wing of the Ministry of Tourism, effectively targeting fashion as a zone for global economic growth. This political and financial focus hopes to move Indonesia beyond low-wage mass garment production and to re-orient the higher-value production of fashion design beyond the wealthy capitals of London, Paris or New York.

Lopez y Royo frames her description of the magazines, fashion show organizations, and shopping venues by interrogating the binary that continues to animate much fashion analysis: the persistent dynamic of cultural borrowing and exoticism. Using the metaphor of a mirror, she invites readers to enter into the double-bind that Indonesian designers themselves experience in refracting their own aesthetic inspiration to fellow urban consumers and to the world. As she argues, "Indonesian contemporary fashion can be held up as a mirror reflecting back and allowing a scrutiny of current globalizing and hegemonizing fashion and beauty discourses" (xxv). Taking Indonesian creativity seriously could "shift the fashion discourse" (xxv) from categories such as center and periphery or rigid fashion systems. In the process, it might even challenge the enduring Orientalist fascination with non-Western fashion as ethnic or national, rather than original and avant-garde, values Western fashion saves for itself even as it appropriates other textile traditions.

In arguing that fashion should not simply be another field through which difference is reinscribed, Lopez y Royo asks readers to recognize that the phrase "Made in Indonesia" can signify world-class style. One of the most detailed and helpful aspects of the book is the description of the history and formation of the two major fashion weeks in the annual fashion cycle in Jakarta,

Jakarta Fashion Week (JFW) and ID:FW. These alternating semi-annual shows do what fashion shows elsewhere do: display product and women's bodies in spectacular performance-events that are about art, sociality and distinction as much as they are about commerce. Invitations are hard to come by, fashion magazines cover them in close detail, and social media influencers increasingly document them in real time. However, Jakarta fashion shows also take on a uniquely Indonesian festivity, becoming sites for urban consumers to delight in each other's company and reinforce their cosmopolitaneity through a shared appreciation for local designers, even as their own closets are filled with a mix of global and local brands.

Lopez y Royo introduces readers to a range of designers, from established to younger and from high-end to more affordable. Frequent visitors to Indonesia will appreciate the detailed histories and personal interviews with luxury designers Ghea Panggabean, Biyan Wanaatmadja, Sebastian Gunawan, Auguste Soesastro, Tri Handoko Joewono, and Musa Widyatmojo. Each of these designers have made conscious decisions about how to embrace, or avoid, local textile traditions such as *batik* and *ikat*. While some have chosen to use local textiles (as Ghea has with tie-dyed *jumputan*), others have chosen minimalism and eco-friendly styles. Lopez y Royo also profiles edgier designers such as Lulu Lutfi Labibi, a Yogyakarta designer with a national and international following who crafts one-of-kind, unusually shaped garments out of the comparatively humbler textile *lurik*. She also describes the integration of fashion into activist and artist projects that directly critique dominant conceptions of femininity.

Lopez y Royo offers similarly careful descriptions of the modeling system, the fashion magazine ecosystem, art galleries and the array of shopping malls in Jakarta, as intersecting sites for the production, circulation and consumption of ideas of beauty and self-expression. She traces the formation and growth of *Dewi* and *Femina* magazines, as part of the broader Femina Group of publications which have supported JFW. As she notes, in spite of the proliferation of digital commerce and online media, print magazines continue to have audiences in urban and rural communities. *Femina*, for example, maintains its popular advice columns based on real-life stories from readers in both their print and digital editions. *Magdalene*, by contrast, is entirely digital, publishes in both English and Indonesian, and openly embraces discussing feminism and politics along with health and beauty. Lopez y Royo's descriptions of the people-watching quality of Jakarta shopping malls, especially Plaza Senayan, Plaza Indonesia and Pacific Place, also capture the complex relationship urban consumers have with malls. Simultaneously loci for acquiring commodities and for air-conditioned socializing, she conveys how young people have mixed feelings about the fact that they have been raised to consider malls their primary leisure venues. Although much of consumer

culture in malls celebrates the energy and critique that urban youth express, Lopez y Royo's own modeling, blogging and fashion activism has focused on the ageism that saturates the fashion industry in the UK and Europe. This informed her concluding insights that the Indonesian fashion industry has similar biases against representations of the aging or greying female form. Her arguments also resonate with Ayu Saraswati's (2013) careful analysis of the intersection of race and beauty in Indonesia.

Lopez y Royo's personal experience and perspective shape this book most intimately. Her enthusiasm for Indonesian fashion is palpable. While the book is less an analysis than a joyful introduction to a field, Lopez y Royo deftly achieves her primary goal of inviting readers into a large, diverse scene that, as she says, merits much more intellectual and global attention.

References

Lee, Doreen. 2016. *Activist Archives: Youth Culture and the Political Past in Indonesia*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Saraswati, Ayu. 2013. *Seeing Beauty, Sensing Race in Transnational Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Strassler, Karen. 2010. *Refracted Visions: Popular Photography and National Modernity in Java.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Strassler, Karen. 2020. *Demanding Images: Democracy, Mediation, and the Image-Event in Indonesia.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Carla Jones
Department of Anthropology
University of Colorado Boulder

Études régionales

Rebecca Fanany and Ismet Fanany, *The Elderly Must Endure: Ageing in the Minangkabau Community in Modern Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018, xii + 309 p. ISBN: 978-981-4818-46-9 (paperback), 978-981-4818-47-6 (pdf).

Anyone at an advanced age certainly experiences ageing as a natural aspect of human existence. Our modern world is facing a significant increase in the number of elderly people as a result of advances in the provision of health services, food quality, and medical research. However, experiencing old age as a cultural phenomenon is highly dependent on the community or country one lives in as a result of diverse local factors, including religion, traditional custom, geographic and socio-cultural environments, and State's political policies.

Indonesia, as many other States in the world, is also facing an increasing number of old persons. In a heterogeneous and multiethnic State such as

Indonesia, the multiple ways elderly people are treated, perceived, and cared for can depend on either national or local culture. *The Elderly Must Endure* focuses on the Minangkabau elderly people in the 21th century. The book is the result of a 'long-term study' among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra and presented in a fascinating ethnographic report style. Rebecca Fanany and Ismet Fanany conducted an in-depth interview with several elderly people and numbers of their extended families, both in West Sumatra and overseas (*rantau*), to describe 'the experience of ageing in modern Minangkabau society' which constitutes the 'forefront of social change with the understanding that this will offer insight into similar forces that are being experienced all around the country by older individuals of all backgrounds and cultural origins' (p.18).

The Minangkabau ethnic group, whose principal homeland is central Sumatra's highlands (now mostly including West Sumatra Province) is one of more than 300 ethnic groups living in Indonesia and the sixth largest (around 6.5 million or around 2.7%) of the country's total population. This ethnic group has long attracted the interest of transnational scholarship mostly due to academic curiosity about the reconciliation of *matrilineal* kinship and *patriarchal* Islam. Many scholars have explored the socio-historical factors that made this 'eccentric blend' possible and what forms of socio-cultural practices are generated by this 'dichotomous' system of kinship.

Since the 1970s, as a result of the global advancement of the women's movement and feminist theory, a considerable body of works on Minangkabau has developed that focuses on matrilineal and Islamic principles which are considered the principal ingredients of Minangkabau culture. The tradition of *merantau* (voluntary migration) that is practiced by Minangkabau people is often considered as the result of this 'culture of paradox', to borrow Jeffrey Hadler's words (2008), and often referred to describe the socio-cultural dynamics of this ethnic group, which is considered to have made important contributions to the struggle for independence and postcolonial politics of Indonesia. The book under review departs from a similar type of curiosity. It explores how the Islamic but matriarchal Minangkabau society treats their elderly in modern Indonesia.

As far as my bibliographical investigation indicates, elderly have become a focus of scholarly observation recently because there is an inclination in Minangkabau society to send their elderly family members to the nursing home (*panti jompo*) which is considered not to be in accordance with its cultural and religious values which are fundamentally based on notions of respect, love, and devotion to parents, as well as a strong sense of communality. For example, Alfan Miko in his study of the treatment of elderly Minangkabau in nursing homes (2017) – an extensive study of elderly Minangkabau that is strangely not referenced in this book – shows that since the 1990s more and more Minangkabau of an advanced age have been sent by their families to nursing homes.

Using a qualitative approach, Rebecca and Ismet Fanany (an American-Minangkabau couple who became a researcher at Melbourne's Central Queensland University and a professor at Deakin University respectively) are specifically interested in issues of cultural resonance represented in the person of the elderly Minangkabau in the context of various social factors that characterize the modern Indonesian experience, such as language and religion, and also the nature of the environment and the interaction of the elderly with their own family members and communities. According to the authors, such considerations are of great importance considering the fact that the numbers of elderly people in Indonesia have increased significantly, which brings about various effects, politically, economically, demographically, and socio-culturally.

The book focuses on the ways the elderly (aged 60 years upward) with Minangkabau cultural background perceive themselves and their families in the context of modern Indonesia and to which extent their perceptions replicate the situation they observe among their own parents and grandparents (p.19). To get a more precise landscape of the experience of being elderly in the Minangkabau cultural context, the authors throughout the body of the book present case studies of some Minangkabau families with elderly members who live in the *rantau* and also in the homeland (*kampung*) to illustrate in more detail the changes and challenges faced by old individuals nowadays and the ways such changes have affected their way of life.

The Elderly Must Endure is composed of eleven chapters in which the authors describe the cultural characteristics of the Minangkabau ethnic group, Minangkabau cultural views of the elderly and the changing generational views. A comparison is made between those who live in the *rantau* and in the *kampung*, those who live in rural areas and in urban areas, and those who live with families and in modern nursing homes. Besides the influences of *adat* (custom), the authors pay special attention to two other aspects affecting the phenomenon of ageing among the Minangkabau: religion (Chapter 4) and language (Chapter 5). But the authors seem to not have extensively explored the *lapau* (coffee house) as a place of elderly male association in contemporary West Sumatra. As a Minangkabau reader, I am not surprised about the authors' explanation that 'the Minangkabau community has strong expectations that older people will be interested in and wish to participate in religious activities' (p.84). It has become a common proverb in Minangkabau to say '*Kalau lah baun tanah, bapanyaklah lai pai ka surau*' (litt: 'if you already smell of soil, you must often visit the prayer house'). Older people in Minangkabau (and Muslims in general) rarely ignore this message, even among those who lived as *parewa* (the men in Minangkabau society who are considered less pious and distanced themselves from religious groups in favour of traditional *adat*) in their younger ages.

The authors found that language use among older Minangkabau speakers shows three inclinations: those who mostly use the Minangkabau language, those who exhibit bilingualism, and those who tend to use only Indonesian. This is influenced by the level of education and occupation, place of residence (living in the homeland or in the *rantau*), and marriage configuration (marriage with another Minangkabau person or with someone from other ethnic group). The first inclination was found among the Minangkabau elderly who live in their own *kampung*, the second tends to be found among those who live in the *rantau* or an urban area, and the last is most common among those who have a spouse from another ethnicity (pp.102-4). By discussing the 'language attrition' phenomenon among elderly Minangkabau, the authors argue that 'language ability in the elderly has often been viewed in terms of language attrition, especially in the context of bilingualism' (p.101). Actually, bilingualism is a common phenomenon found among the Minangkabau people, especially among the educated people and traders. When the Minangkabau speak with foreigners, they tend to use what is called 'bahaso Malayu Tinggi' or 'bahaso gaduang' ('high Malay'), as noted by J.L. van der Toorn in the late 19th century in Fort de Kock (now Bukittinggi) (see: Suryadi 2006). That kind of language register corresponds to modern Indonesian. Therefore, language use among the Minangkabau is highly dependent on their interlocutor.

Modernity has significantly transformed views about traditional cultural concepts, institutions, and practices in many Minangkabau families, especially among the Minangkabau *perantau* (migrants) who have long left their homeland, as their emotional bonds with traditions and culture of their ancestors have waned. Today, elderly Minangkabau are deeply influenced by this wandering tradition, either in the *rantau* or the homeland, which continues and has contributed to the rise of nuclear families. This inclination has stretched the unique traditional *mamak-kamanakan* (uncle-nephew) relationships in Minangkabau culture and changing the traditional patterns of relationships between other family members, which in turn changes the structure and ideal patterns of relationships among individuals in extended families of traditional Minangkabau society. Changes of perception about the traditional cultural values and practices in the modern Indonesian society have also affected the Minangkabau people, which in turn has changed the perception and treatment of older people in many Minangkabau families.

This book provides a fruitful cultural landscape of being elderly in the Minangkabau cultural context amidst the rapid social changes of contemporary Indonesian society. In my feeling, it seems to be a self-reflection of one of its authors (Prof. Ismet Fanany), a Minangkabau intellectual *perantau* who has spent most of his life and ageing overseas, which resonates with his 'longing for home'. This ethnographic study has taken into account many aspects of Minangkabau ethnicity, tangible and intangible, to get a clear insight of the

experiences of its elderly and the problems they face in modern Indonesia today. Although the authors do not offer a clear solution to overcome these problems, this book is highly beneficial not only to scholars but also for the policy makers in Indonesia.

References:

Hadler, Jeffrey. 2008. *Muslim and Matriarchs: Cultural Resilience in Indonesia through Jihad and Colonialism.* Itacha and London: Cornell University Press.

Miko, Alfan. 2017. *Sosiologi Lansia: Pergesekan Pranata Penyantunan Lansia dalam Keluarga Minangkabau yang Berubah di Sumatera Barat*. Padang: Penerbit Erka.

Suryadi. 2006. 'Vernacular intelligence: colonial pedagogy and the language question in Minangkabau', *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 34(100): 315-344.

Suryadi
Leiden University

Richard Fox, *More than Words. Transforming Script, Agency, and Collective Life in Bali*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018, 264 p. ISBN: 9781501725357.

Writing and letters in Bali are not just ways to transmit, preserve and disseminate ideas and simple or complex messages and literature. In Bali, writing goes far beyond these more or less 'universal' simple reasons why people resort to putting things on paper, or nowadays in the mobile telephone or computer. Letters and writing assume more 'exoteric' and 'esoteric' roles in Bali which not only linger on but assume new and vibrant new roles on the island. We have little idea when exactly all this started and how or why, and it is refreshing that the author does not seem to turn this into a problem of great importance. Nor, for that matter, does the author seem very concerned about the number of people still fluent in Balinese script. The author is concerned about the multiple roles of the script in Bali rather than with abilities to read and interpret texts. Indeed, the book deals with the present. One thing becomes crystal clear from the book. On no other island in the Indonesian archipelago is the local, traditional script as vibrantly alive as on Bali and there is no reason to assume that this situation is about to change.

The question, of course, is why this is so and what the specifics are of the role or roles script and writing play in the religious, political, educational and every day life of the Balinese people. Richard Fox has written the present book to elucidate what is going on in Bali and he has managed to do so in an attractive and readable way. One of the key elements that needed to be explained and elaborated is the idea of 'religion' which, in Bali, is a question that cannot be answered in any easy way, as religion, ways of social and political life and the notion of interplay with esoteric and eschatological

matters form an intricate and indivisible aspect of life on the island. Indeed, the same holy syllable 'OM' may be found written in palm-leaf manuscripts on any matter from mantras to elaborate and long literary poems and prose texts, as tattoos on the bodies of young surfers in Kuta Beach, in offerings, as well as on little pieces of cloth that adorn buildings that have just been 'made alive' by an ordained Balinese high-priest after a colourful and intricate ceremony. In other words, the usual divisions of life and all its aspects as non-Balinese see it may not apply to Bali at all and indeed it does not. Script in Bali may assume the role of protector, of the disseminator of holy notions of the divine or for sorcery and healing apart from being used as a simple tool for writing.

Indeed, the book 'aims to unsettle received understandings of textuality and writing as they pertain to the religious traditions of Southeast Asia' (p. 2). The book aims to discuss and answer questions on three things: 1, it wants to make a contribution to 'the scholarship on religious uses of script and writing in Indonesia and the wider Malay region'; 2, to contribute to 'our more general understanding of textual practice and its assumptions regarding history and precedent'; and 3, to 'open up new avenues for thinking differently about our relationship to writing as practice and as a medium for actualizing ideals of human flourishing and collective life' (p. 2). In my view the author has succeeded in his task and the book shows expertly how complex the use of a seemingly simple writing system actually is and how, despite the onslaught of the modern world via mobile telephones, computers and social media this script is not seen as a relic from times past but as an inextricable part of every day culture.

The book is richly illustrated by photographs (made by the author) that show Balinese and their script in various contexts. The table of contents of the book is unassuming in its simple presentation but the chapter headings are intriguing and invite readers to ponder about what to expect and whether their expectations have been met. That we are dealing with a book that wishes to depart from traditional philological and anthropological practice may become clear from the main chapter headings, which are:

1. Manuscripts, Madness
2. Writing and the Idea of Ecology
3. The Meaning of Life, or How to Do Things with Letters
4. Practice and the Problem of Complexity
5. Maintaining a Houseyard as a practice
6. Tradition as Argument
7. Translational Indeterminacy
8. Wagging the Dog

Some remarks may suffice to elucidate a bit more what is at stake and some elements might have been elaborated in detail. For instance, the explanation of the Balinese script is short and some more detailed pictures of actual

Balinese handwriting might have given the general reader some more idea of what it actually looks like in Balinese palm-leaf manuscripts on healing, sorcery and in religious Old-Javanese texts. As it is, the short description with pictures of computer-made letters (*aksara*) is insufficient to understand the script and on the simple side especially since it leaves out the letters that express and contain precisely those elements that exceed the practical aspects of this script. Another aspect that may be of interest is that not every Balinese thinks of the Balinese script as something special at all and hardly knows that it has aspects beyond the, for him or her, 'obvious'. Because field work was conducted in one small southern Balinese ward the author called Batan Nangka there may be a problem of extrapolating the research findings to the whole of Bali or indeed to the whole of south Bali. Nevertheless, because of its geographical confinement, anecdotes of happenings in the ward and the author's reaction to them are amusing and add to the liveliness of the book. Another danger is that what has been observed in the ward may seem special but is actually something found on the whole island and thus is not special at all. One thing of a more serious nature is that it is in my view wrong to see Balinese written in roman script as 'transliteration' (p. 37) as most Balinese write roman script and cannot or won't write in Balinese characters. This is a perpetually confusing notion that permeates Balinese studies and in my view totally unnecessarily so.

The book is a breath of fresh air because of its admirable lucidity. It has been written in an accessible way and does not run away with theoretical language and thus does not alienate non-experts. This is crucial because it can now be read by non-specialists but also by specialists in other fields. It would be extremely useful if this book would be seen as an example of how indeed to study this kind of subject. A similar study conducted on Javanese script and its ins-and-outs would be fascinating the more as it has potentially more than 20 times as many users.

Dick van der Meij
Academic Advisor of the Digital Repository of Endangered and Affected Manuscripts in Southeast Asia (DREAMSEA) Programme

Agung Wardana, *Contemporary Bali. Constested Space and Governance*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 289 p., ISBN: 978-981-13-2477-2.

I Gusti Agung Made Wardana fait partie de ces trop rares universitaires balinais auxquels fut donnée l'opportunité de poursuivre des études de doctorat à l'étranger. Ils en ont tiré diverses compétences précieuses, l'acquisition de l'anglais, la maîtrise des codes académiques, et même parfois un esprit critique qui fait encore fréquemment défaut à leurs collègues restés dans l'île.

Agung Wardana est professeur adjoint en Droit de l'Environnement

à l'Université Gadjah Mada de Yogyakarta. Ce livre est tiré de sa thèse de doctorat en anthropologie juridique soutenue en 2017 à l'Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, sous la direction de Carol Warren. Il ambitionne de rendre compte des raisons de la crise sociale et écologique que connaît aujourd'hui Bali et de l'incapacité des pouvoirs publics à y remédier.

Le fait est que le développement du tourisme dans l'île a entraîné une aliénation massive de terres agricoles, alimentant une spéculation effrénée qui suscite des conflits au sein des familles et des villages, bouleverse les structures communautaires et dépossède les Balinais de leur propriété foncière ancestrale. L'environnement s'est dégradé à mesure que l'urbanisation sauvage bétonnait les rizières et les plages.

Cette situation inquiétante a été exacerbée par la décentralisation opérée après l'avènement de la *Reformasi*, qui a transféré une mesure d'autonomie non pas aux provinces, mais aux départements (*kabupaten*) et aux municipalités (*kota*). Désormais autorisées à gérer leurs propres ressources, les élites dirigeantes de chacun des huit départements de Bali et de la municipalité de Denpasar ont cherché à maximiser leurs revenus en surenchérissant pour attirer les investissements touristiques sur leur territoire. Ce qui a intensifié la compétition interrégionale et propagé la corruption, tout en endommageant encore davantage l'environnement. Les autorités provinciales ont réagi en cherchant à obtenir qu'une « autonomie spéciale » (*otonomi khusus*) soit dévolue à la province de Bali. Faute de succès, elles ont promulgué en 2009 une Réglementation provinciale relative à la planification spatiale de Bali (*Perda RTRW Bali No. 16/2009*), en utilisant cet instrument légal pour tenter de rétablir leurs prérogatives sur l'aménagement du territoire de l'île dans son ensemble.

Wardana, qui faisait partie de l'équipe de juristes chargés d'élaborer cette réglementation, a tiré de son expérience trois séries de questions : comment les autorités balinaises utilisent l'aménagement du territoire comme stratégie de développement pour faire face aux transformations environnementales, socio-économiques, politiques et culturelles en cours à Bali ; comment le pluralisme légal et institutionnel balinais, accentué par la gouvernance décentralisée, interfère avec la planification spatiale en permettant de promouvoir certains intérêts particuliers et d'en contrecarrer d'autres ; et enfin, comment les forces sociales en présence réagissent à la réorganisation de l'espace et aux dispositions institutionnelles mises en œuvre par cette réglementation.

Après une introduction présentant sa problématique, Wardana décrit brièvement les bouleversements qu'a connus la société balinaise depuis la période coloniale, en mettant l'accent sur le mouvement de globalisation provoqué par le développement du tourisme. Il s'attarde sur les relations complexes entre les institutions locales – en particulier le village coutumier (*desa adat/pakraman*), le village administratif (*desa dinas*) et la coopérative

d'irrigation (*subak*) – et les structures gouvernementales dans lesquelles elles sont insérées. À partir de quoi, il expose la manière dont la planification spatiale tente de faire face à la crise qui affecte Bali en établissant des zones provinciales stratégiques. Il développe son propos en l'illustrant par trois études de cas : la contestation de l'espace sacré autour du temple d'Uluwatu, l'inscription du *subak* de Catur Angga Batukaru au patrimoine mondial de l'Unesco, et le projet de poldérisation de la baie de Benoa.

Le temple d'Uluwatu est placé sous la tutelle conjointe du village de Pecatu, chargé de son entretien et de ses cérémonies, et de la maison royale de Badung, qui l'administre. En tant qu'il est l'un des temples majeurs de Bali (*sad kahyangan*), le Pura Uluwatu est régi par le *Bhisama Kesucian Pura* édicté par le Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia en 1994, qui interdit toute infrastructure de caractère profane dans un rayon de cinq kilomètres. Le développement massif du tourisme dans la péninsule de Bukit a suscité des conflits entre les structures villageoises coutumière et administrative d'une part, et entre les villageois et les familles royales d'autre part. Dans la mesure où il les empêchait de développer des activités touristiques lucratives, les villageois ont rejeté le *Bhisama*, en se fondant à la fois sur leur droit coutumier et sur un décret du Bupati de Badung. Le différend a été porté devant la Cour Suprême à Jakarta, qui a reconnu la compétence du droit religieux en validant le *Bhisama*. Ce qui n'a nullement entravé le développement continu des infrastructures touristiques autour du temple.

Le système d'irrigation traditionnel balinais a été sérieusement érodé par l'emprise croissante des infrastructures touristiques sur les terres agricoles. Dans le but d'assurer sa préservation, le gouvernement indonésien a obtenu l'inscription au patrimoine mondial de l'Unesco de quatre « paysages culturels », au nombre desquels le *subak* de Catur Angga Batukaru, célèbre pour la beauté des rizières en terrasses de Jatiluwih. Les décideurs balinais ont considéré que les revenus tirés des touristes visitant le site du *subak* devaient convaincre les habitants de la région de la valeur économique de leur patrimoine et, partant, d'en préserver la pérennité. Mais faute d'avoir tenu compte de la complexité légale et institutionnelle sur le terrain, les décisions prises par les autorités provinciales ont été rapidement contestées par les détenteurs du pouvoir au niveau local. Et la distribution inégale des revenus du tourisme qui en est résulté a incité certains acteurs défavorisés à développer des activités touristiques sur leurs terres, ce qui n'a fait qu'aggraver la situation initiale.

La baie de Benoa et ses environs est l'une des régions les plus polluées de Bali, une condition qui a servi de prétexte aux autorités provinciales pour transférer la responsabilité de sa conservation et de son développement à des intérêts privés. Depuis des années, une compagnie internationale dirigée par un influent magnat de Jakarta cherche à développer un gigantesque projet touristique en créant une dizaine d'îlots artificiels dans la baie de Benoa. Ce

projet a déclenché un vaste mouvement de protestation rassemblant des ONG, des politiciens, des journalistes, des universitaires et l'ensemble des villages coutumiers alentour. Mais il a également envenimé l'opposition entre une minorité de partisans influents du projet et ses opposants. C'est ainsi que le Parisada s'est trouvé paralysé par les divisions en son sein ; et ce n'est qu'après avoir longuement tergiversé que sa direction a finalement décrété que la baie de Benoa était sacrée (*kawasan suci*) et devait en conséquence être préservée, ce qui implique qu'elle ne saurait être livrée à un usage commercial. À ce jour, la décision finale du gouvernement indonésien est toujours en suspens.

Ces études de cas montrent comment l'instrumentalisation de l'espace opérée par les autorités indonésiennes à des fins de développement touristique, combinée au pluralisme légal et institutionnel propre à la société balinaise, contribue à accentuer plutôt qu'à réduire les conflits d'intérêts entre les acteurs en présence au niveau local. Faute de parvenir à mobiliser le droit étatique en leur faveur, ces derniers cherchent à légitimer leurs intérêts particuliers en faisant appel au droit coutumier ou encore au droit religieux.

Nous avons ici affaire à un travail de qualité et très bien informé. Le diagnostic établi par Wardana des multiples crises qui affectent aujourd'hui Bali et des conflits qu'elles génèrent dans la population locale est tout à fait pertinent, même si l'on aurait pu attendre de sa part des pistes de réflexion qui permettraient d'y porter remède.

Michel Picard
Centre Asie du Sud-Est, CNRS-EHESS

Hans Hägerdaal, *Held's History of Sumbawa*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017, 212 p. ISBN: 978 94 6289 161 4.

Gerrit Jan Held (1906-1955) est un anthropologue néerlandais peu connu parce que décédé à un âge relativement jeune. Après des études d'histoire et d'anthropologie à Leyde, il soutint, en 1936, une thèse au sujet original : *The Mahabharata: An Ethnological Study*. Une année auparavant, il avait déjà été employé par la Société biblique néerlandaise pour conduire des recherches linguistiques et ethnographiques et fournir des avis sur les possibilités de traduction de la Bible et d'activité missionnaire, tout d'abord en Nouvelle Guinée, puis à Bali, Java et Sulawesi. À partir de 1940, il travailla comme linguiste (*taalambtenaar*) pour le gouvernement de Bandung. En 1942, il joignit l'armée coloniale néerlandaise comme officier de réserve, mais, rapidement fait prisonnier, il passa le reste de la guerre dans un camp. Pendant la Révolution indonésienne, il enseigna un temps à la Nood-Universiteit de Batavia (la future Universitas Indonesia) et publia une monographie ethnographique sur la Nouvelle Guinée (*Papoea's van Waropen*, 1947), puis regagna les Pays-Bas et enseigna un an ou deux à Yale (US), pour retourner

en Indonésie, sur invitation des autorités indonésiennes à mener une enquête anthropologique ; il décida d'étudier l'île de Sumbawa, où il passa quelque neuf mois en 1953-55, principalement à Dompu et Bima. Il ne publia rien de ces travaux, cependant, car il mourut à Batavia, d'une crise cardiaque, alors qu'il se préparait à rentrer aux Pays-Bas, en septembre 1955.

Ses archives, conservées aujourd'hui à Leyde, comprennent un texte manuscrit de 1955 intitulé *Sumbawa, geschiedenis*. C'est ce texte qui est édité et annoté dans l'ouvrage de Hans Hägerdal.

Le choix de Sumbawa était judicieux. Neuvième île d'Indonésie par la taille (env. 15 000 km2), située au centre géographique de l'Archipel, à l'est de la Ligne Wallace, sorte d'isolat musulman entre Bali et Flores, elle est divisée en deux moitiés appartenant à des groupes ethno-linguistiques différents (les habitants de Sumbawa Besar sont proches des Sasak, ceux de Bima sont proches des habitants de Flores et Sumba) et effectivement, au cours de l'histoire, tournées l'une vers l'ouest, l'autre vers l'est, les deux États principaux (Bima et Sumbawa) ayant avec les îles avoisinantes des rapports plus prégnants qu'entre eux, avec même une tendance expansioniste à l'Est (Manggarai et Sumba), tandis qu'à l'Ouest, les attaques balinaises sont un facteur récurrent. La population locale ne perçoit pas l'île comme une entité (pour laquelle elle n'a pas de nom) et n'a jamais tenté de l'unifier sous une couronne unique ou comme une fédération. Au contraire, l'île fut longtemps éclatée en six royaumes distincts, dont l'un, Sumbawa proprement dit, était la fédération de trois principautés. Avec un excellent port sur la côte nord (Bima, au fond d'une baie profonde), l'île constitue une escale naturelle de choix sur la route commerciale qui traverse l'Archipel d'ouest en est, d'autant plus qu'elle fournit quantité de bois de *sapang*, d'esclaves (pour la plupart en provenance de Manggarai), de chevaux, riz, sel, miel, coton et tissus.

Sumbawa a participé très tôt à l'histoire régionale, comme le montrent les tambours de bronze de Pulau Sangeang, quelques vestiges hindouistes et deux inscriptions en sanskrit et vieux javanais. Elle fut la cible d'une expédition javanaise en 1357 (le *Desavarnana* cite sept toponymes de l'île), puis islamisée par les armes par Makassar au début du 17e siècle. Les trois États majeurs (Bima, Sumbawa Besar et Dompu) ont produit, à la suite de l'islamisation, des choniques locales en malais. C'est de cette époque également, sans doute, que date, dans ces mêmes royaumes, une organisation administrative qui descend du palais jusqu'au niveau du village, en s'appuyant sur une structure sociale complexe, qui régit la place de chacun dans la société, et en intégrant le droit musulman.

Il y avait donc matière, en effet, à une étude anthropologique et historique de grande envergure. Held, malheureusement, se limite à une histoire strictement politique et militaire, au détriment de toute histoire sociale et même économique. Or, il s'agit d'une vie politique extrêmement troublée,

en l'absence de toute idéologie et toute éducation : intrigues, guerres, trèves, alliances, trahisons, assassinats, complots, pillages se succèdent indéfiniment. En ces temps de peuplement très réduit, un chef à la tête de mille hommes, ce qui n'était pas rarissime, pouvait attaquer n'importe quelle « capitale » de l'île. La vie des États est en outre constamment troublée par des princes makassarais que la domination hollandaise, après 1669, a transformés en pirates, tandis que les jacqueries récurrentes reflètent l'arbitraire et la fragilité du pouvoir.

On voit, au sein de cette turbulence, infininiment peu d'hommes d'État compétents, responsables et qui se préoccupent de gouverner leur pays pour le bien de la population. Au sein de ces familles royales qui échangent constamment des épouses pour préserver leurs relations diplomatiques, mais qui ne cessent également de rompre ces liens par des infidélités, divorces, remariages et assassinats, quelques femmes émergent au centre de l'histoire, telle Siti Aminah alias Ratu Dompu (1653-1693), qui, à l'âge de 12 ans, était déjà mère et deux fois divorcée, qui conclut par la suite d'autres mariages stratégiques et finit assassinée à 41 ans.

Held traite la période antérieure à l'arrivée de l'islam de façon très superficielle. Il considère (c'est son premier paragraphe, p. 29) que l'histoire de Sumbawa se divise en deux périodes : avant et après 1667, l'année du Traité de Bongaya, qui libéra les États de l'île de la tutelle de Makassar et les soumit aux diktats de la VOC. C'est un point de vue gravement européocentriste, qui ignore le bouleversement de l'islamisation et les siècles d'histoire qui l'ont précédée, comprenant une activité commerciale intense, une forte influence de l'hindouisme et de la culture javanaise et des contacts beaucoup plus anciens avec certains pays de la région.

Held croit, à tort, qu'aucun royaume n'existait sur l'île avant le 17e siècle. Il exploite les sources néerlandaises et le Journal du palais de Goa, mais rarement les sources vernaculaires locales, en particulier le *Bo' Sangaji Kae*, dont il avait pourtant une copie (conservée aujourd'hui dans les collections de Leyde et dont une partie a été publiée). Held ignore également Pires, il tire peu parti des quelques découvertes archéologiques, et il mentionne en passant l'éruption du Tambora, alors qu'elle causa un bouleversement majeur dans l'histoire de l'île. Le récit issu de ces partis pris et de ces sources est morcellé et lacunaire ; l'information est atomisée, incomplète et parfois inexacte.

L'éditeur annote tout ceci abondamment, au point que son commentaire, consigné dans des notes imprimées en petits caractères, est sans doute aussi long que le texte principal. Par endroits, le discours des notes est plus important, historiquement parlant, que celui du texte principal. H. Hägerdal a consulté toutes les sources publiées, ainsi que quelques archives et accompli un travail de recherche considérable pour commenter Held. Il vient sans cesse développer, expliciter, corriger ou contredire ce dernier. On a, en somme, deux

discours complémentaires et en partie contradictoires, dont la combinaison ne constitue pas un ouvrage cohérent ni même complet, mais offre plutôt un instrument de travail, précieux certes, mais qu'il faudra de nouvelles recherches, dans les mêmes sources et dans les archives, pour en faire une véritable « Histoire de Sumbawa ».

Un tel texte hybride pose la singulière question d'en désigner l'auteur. Ce volume est le deuxième présentant des éditions savantes de textes relatifs à l'histoire de Sumbawa dûs à des auteurs néerlandais. Le premier contenait des textes de A. Ligtvoet et G.P. Rouffaer édités par J. Noorduyn en 1987 (voir un compte rendu dans le *BEFEO* 77, 1988). Dans les deux cas, le nom des éditeurs s'est surimposé à celui des auteurs originaux : les textes de base sont ceux de Ligtvoet, Rouffaer et Held, mais les livres sont signés Noorduyn et Hägerdal. Ces deux éditeurs ne sont certes pas à blâmer : l'habitude est prise depuis très longtemps de référencer des textes d'auteurs connus sous le nom de leurs éditeurs, voire leur traducteur. La *Sejarah Melayu* est référencée sous le nom de Shellabear, le *Desavarnana* sous celui de Robson, la *Suma Oriental* sous celui de Cortesão. Il n'en reste pas moins que tous ces ouvrages sont des travaux remarquables, et tel est certes le cas de cette *Histoire de Sumbawa*.

Henri Chambert-Loir
EFEO, Paris

Geneviève Duggan and Hans Hägerdal, *Savu: History and Oral Tradition on an Island of Indonesia*. Singapore: NUS Press. 2018, 720 p. ISBN: 978-981-4722-75-9.

This lengthy, well-produced, and richly illustrated book concerns the small, geographically remote, ethno-linguistically homogeneous, and relatively impoverished island of Savu, located in eastern Indonesia between the islands of Timor and Sumba. This in itself is a distinctive feature, especially nowadays when such comprehensive works on small-scale non-Western societies are a rarity. But the volume is positively unusual in other respects as well. It is co-written by an anthropologist and a historian. The anthropologist (Duggan) has been conducting ethnographic fieldwork on Savu for the last two decades. The historian (Hägerdal) is a senior scholar with a long record of research mostly concerning eastern Indonesia.

Partly because of its geographical isolation, Savu has received less attention from ethnographers than surrounding, mostly larger islands, and one value of the book is a wealth of ethnographic description and analysis of indigenous institutions and traditions. Nevertheless, the book's primary focus is the history of Savu. The cooperation of an anthropologist and a historian in this historiographic endeavour is made possible by a feature of Savunese

society itself—the creation of long clan and lineage genealogies and oral histories, recited on major occasions and related to such matters as claims to political and ritual offices and land rights. Remarking on the "incredible depth of [Savunese] genealogical memory", the authors note that "for reasons that are not entirely clear, such genealogical identity is much more precise than in the surrounding island societies" where people are "[s]eldom…able to state the connection [of far shallower lineages] to their ancestors" (p. 425). With the obvious exception of the island of Roti (or Rote), it would therefore be difficult to compose a book of this sort for many other parts of eastern Indonesia.

At the same time, this detailed history of Savu is facilitated by the island's geographical position, which has allowed the Savunese to play a disproportionate role in the history of European activity in the Timor region and has resulted in the Savunese receiving fairly regular mention in Portuguese and Dutch commercial and colonial reports (including in the second case, the records of the Dutch East India Company). As is revealed throughout, the European sources and Savunese narrative traditions complement, confirm, or correct one another to quite a remarkable degree. Thus the book provides ample testimony to the value of oral history for the study of history in general.

One product of this approach is a demonstration that the Savunese were by no means passive recipients of European influence but were in several respects active agents in commercial and colonial enterprises—taking advantage of opportunities for trade, serving political roles, and providing the Dutch with military services. Relative to other eastern Indonesians, they were also early adopters of literacy, Western-style education, and Christianity. Indeed, Savunese were able to do some "colonizing" of their own, notably in parts of the larger islands of Sumba, Flores, and Timor. This history of Savu thus contributes significantly to an understanding of the wider history, during the last five centuries, of a far larger part of Indonesia. To cite just one specific example, the last three chapters (8 to 10), concerning changes on Savu from the late 19th century to the present, provide an insightful discussion of the process and effects of Christianization in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries that bears useful comparison with what was occurring in other parts of the archipelago during the same period.

It may therefore go without saying that the authors have produced a very substantial book that should appeal to a wider audience than students of Savu or the Timor region. On the other hand, detailed accounts, drawn mostly from indigenous narratives concerning clan histories, local disputes, rivalries, marriages between prominent families, and the like, might prove hard going for all but very specialized readers. Such perhaps is the trade-off with informed and thorough scholarship, and these materials certainly play their part within the whole. By the same token, it is rare nowadays to find a single, sizeable volume comprising such copious literary and ethnographic evidence, and the

National University of Singapore Press is to be congratulated for publishing a work of this kind. Speaking only as an anthropologist, it is additionally pleasing to have a book that performs its advertised task without resort to extraneous "theory" or contrived linkage with trendy paradigms or epistemologies that typically results in slimmer volumes very light on empirical substance.

Perhaps especially for anthropologists, one merit of the book (evidently mainly attributable to Duggan) is its attention to the relatively prominent place of women in Savunese society, including the importance of female genealogical ties in the constitution of descent groups. Savu has long been known for its system of "double unilineal descent", whereby patrilineal clans and lineages coexist with matrilineal moieties further divided into matrilineal sub-groups. But Savu is by no means unique in this regard. For example, the importance of lineal connection through women, often in the context of otherwise "patrilineal" organization, has been shown in ethnographic accounts dealing with the neighbouring islands of Flores, Sumba, and Timor. Yet none of these other cases is mentioned, so no broader point is made. In the same vein, the statement that "There are no other known cases of female land ownership in the islands surrounding the Savu sea" (p. 366) ignores instances from Flores Island, including the matrilineal Tana 'Ai (Lewis 1988) and other institutionally more limited uses of matrilineal relationship from central Flores (Forth 2001). This is curious, since Lewis's book is cited in another connection, as also is my own (p. 211), though it is not listed in the Bibliography.

Possibly connected with this apparent lack of attention to the constitution of neighbouring societies, there are some surprising linguistic inaccuracies. For example, Sumbanese place names are not rendered in their more accurate modern transcriptions, a shortcoming that sometimes reduces clarity (for example, where "Melolo" evidently refers to the eastern Sumbanese domain of Umalulu rather than the nearby Savunese settlement of the first name). There are other inaccuracies, such as when "sea cows" are referred to as "manatees", whereas for this part of the world the correct reference is necessarily to dugongs (*Dugong dugon*). Still these are relatively minor flaws that do not significantly detract from an otherwise impressive work.

References:

Forth, G. 2001. *Dualism and Hierarchy: Processes of Binary Combination in Keo Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Lewis, E.D. 1988. *The People of the Source: The Social and Ceremonial Order of Tana Wai Brama of Flores*. Dordrecht: Foris.

Gregory Forth
University of Alberta

Leontine Visser, *Sejarah Pertanian dan Kebudayaan Sahu di Halmahera* (History of Sahu Agriculture and Culture in Halmahera). Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2019, xii-324p. ISBN: 978-602-258-516-9.

The Sahu people lives in Halmahera, an island in eastern Indonesia which is not commonly considered as important, in terms of culture, politics or economy. Accepting a request from the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW-WOTRO) to study Halmahera, Leontine Visser lived two years with the Sahu in the northwestern part of the island from 1979 to early 1981. After her retirement she was able to visit the same villages again several times since 2015. Such an opportunity has given her the rare chance to cover forty years of agricultural and cultural development, resulting in a very rich story about the culture of shifting cultivation – a topic little explored – that she observed and experienced in the everyday life of the Sahu during a period of modernisation in New Order Indonesia, and two decades after *Reformasi*. In more than 300 pages, she describes in detail the practices of Sahu farming along with its social organisation, land relations, rituals and myths.

Visser divides her story into seven chapters according to a logical sequence. For instance, the exposition of land ownership can only be understood after reading about social organisation in the preceding chapter.

The book begins with an introduction about the initial PhD research that represents the main part of the book. Visser evoques her experience as a foreign female researcher staying in a patrilineal society, where the word 'researcher' is unknown, and 'woman' means farming and taking care of children. In order to gain Sahu people's trust, she chose to adapt herself to such notions: she got 'married' to Sahu people by means of a land relation and by taking care of someone else's grandchild, who became her adopted son. The chapter describes the work of the ethnographer and shows how a thorough understanding can be gained by letting oneself merge into the everyday life of others. Visser's empirical strategy demonstrates how knowledge comes from the ability to understand and speak the language, but also to understand the unsaid.

The following chapters describe Sahu settlement history, land use, food and eating as well as social system and land tenure. The third chapter, more than 100 pages or one-third of the book, comprises a fascinating story about dry land rice cultivation as an integral relation between material and spiritual life. It produces not only food but also a balance in the life of Sahu families. The Sahu believe that people do not own the land, but it is the land that owns the people. Humans and earth are bound by the mythology of King Baikole. The myth guides the organisation of relations between people and land, and among people through marriage and descent. Rice farming closely ties all

cultural aspects, from the distinct tasks of men and women and their mutual relation to communal land that specifies the relation between father, children and in-laws. The farming process, from planting preparation until harvest season, takes five phases and nine steps. Rice farming requires rituals based on a metaphor of care between humans as parents and rice as daughter. Every move in the lading rice farming process follows a certain direction, either toward the sea side or the landside, which symbolises wanted or unwanted materials that need to be thrown away or to be kept to cool down the earth and fertilise the soil.

A disconnection from the old past happened when copra economy started to dominate. As witnessed by Visser, 1983-1993 marked a pivotal decade for the lading rice culture. Coconut plantations, already introduced by the Dutch government and now added with cocoa and nutmeg trees, became the economically dominant forms of land use. These tree crops became a major source of income. They buy motorcycles and TVs, and ultimately pay for school fees. Land as bride-wealth has been replaced by money. Selling and leasing become a normal way to access a land, as well as to alienate someone from it. Consequently, from nine types of land-based social relations in 1980, Visser only found four remaining in 2017.

Change and continuity often go hand in hand, as clearly described in chapters about social organisation and land-based social relations. Sahu has a complex patrilineal kinship system. Patrilineal descent groups, called *rera*, consist of members of several descent lines (*fam*). Members of *rera*, who are connected by one ancestor, own a collective right to grow food and eat from the land they cultivate, but they do not own the land individually. Several *rera* create a socio-territorial unit called *garana*, where they share the same rituals and customary law and which is organised according to a genealogical hierarchy based on the myth of King Baikole.

At the time of Ternate's sovereignty, Sahu's *garana* comprised one territorial unit of tribute collection, called *co'ong*. For Sahu people, *co'ong* is seen as their father and mother, or their state of origin. And the materiality of *co'ong* as a social unit manifests itself in the Big Eating feast, which is a communal event to celebrate harvest and fertility. Since Indonesia's decentralisation, *co'ong* does not exist anymore, because the myth of King Baikole has lost its central place in Sahu's life. However, Visser witnessed that today the Big Eating adapts and survives. Indeed, a very long continuation from a pre-colonial time.

Chapter VI describes the Big Eating which takes place in the *sa'sadu*, the ceremonial house of each permanent village that still exists since the 1930s. It is designed to serve as a display and exposure of genealogical hierarchy of the *garana*. Senior and junior positions within genealogical hierarchy are displayed through sitting arrangement, as well as different tasks. Senior men

determine the place of their wives and children. Junior men and women are the ones who serve the seniors during the feasts. This is also a moment for a newly married woman to gain an official social position in her husband's family, along with access to use the land and eat from her husband's *rera*.

Visser often participated in these ceremonies between 1979 and 2017, and she observed that some elements of the ritual performance were unable to endure change. One of the important rituals is the *legu* dance or *ciawa*, a performance about the mythical figure of princess Moa ma Jum. *Ciawa* symbolises social fertility through the figure of Moa ma Jum, who becomes the bride of King Baikole, and thus represents the role of women to provide posterity. Unfortunately, after the social conflict that sat ablaze the Moluccas, including Halmahera, at the turn of this century, many people lost their ceremonial clothes. The dancers are ashamed to perform the *ciawa* ritual without the proper clothes, so it is not performed anymore. But, the Big Eating ceremony itself still exists, and its cultural meaning even increases as a representation of Sahu identity.

It is interesting to observe that, as it appears in many chapters, women and land within this patrilineal society are essential elements in connecting and preserving the system of patrilineal inheritance. Women (wife and daughters) are the key that connects bride-giver and bride-receiver descent groups and they move along the same lines as the land that is being transferred between affinals. Women connect land and inheritance across *rera* and *garana* through marriage and adoption. These two constitute a thread that knitted Sahu social system. Therefore, Visser suggests that Sahu kinship system is created by these two fundamental elements: land and blood. She indicates that many anthropologists often miss the fact that the transfer of land rights constructs kinship relations and vice versa.

Many fascinating observations about change and uniqueness are described in this book, which give rise to all sorts of questions. Why for instance Sahu people are still clinging to the Big Eating feast, while important elements are already missing today, and even the social organisation itself has changed? What makes the Big Eating so important? And why, among the nine types of land relations, four are still in practice today?

Overall, this book does an excellent work to describe in detail Sahu agriculture and culture over the past four decades. It provides the opportunity to dig and understand deeper about change. As the last chapter of the book mentions that Sahu people is now part of the indigenous people movement in Indonesia, it may also be important to understand how the Sahu can navigate the change rather than become "victims of modernity". Certainly, no one will be able to do so without the wealth of knowledge that Leontine Visser has brilliantly described and analyzed throughout this book.

Laksmi Adriani Savitri

Christopher J. Shepherd, *Haunted Houses and Ghostly Encounters. Ethnography and Animism in East Timor, 1860-1975*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, Southeast Asia Publication Series, 2019, xxiii-326 p. ISBN: 978-8-776942-67-0.

Cet ouvrage sur l'animisme au Timor Oriental assume d'emblée la notion de *subjectivité*, dans la mesure où l'auteur a pris le parti de présenter dix visions liées à ce sujet, à travers dix témoignages écrits couvrant la période de l'amorce de l'emprise coloniale en 1860 à la veille de l'invasion indonésienne en 1975.

On en profitera à ce titre pour souligner une erreur encore trop fréquente dans nombre d'ouvrages sur Timor-Est, avec l'affirmation en introduction selon laquelle « *No sooner had the Portuguese completed their withdrawal from Timor in 1975 than the Indonesian army invaded from West Timor* ». Cette déclaration erronée, dans un ouvrage pourtant publié par une maison d'édition prestigieuse spécialisée sur l'Asie du Sud-Est, montre à quel point il est nécessaire de redire que, même si la période d'août-septembre 1975 a été pour le moins troublée et mal gérée par les autorités portugaises, le gouverneur de l'époque n'a quitté le territoire (plus exactement l'île d'Ataúro) que le 8 décembre 1975, lendemain de l'invasion « officielle » par l'armée indonésienne. En outre, l'armée indonésienne avait mené des attaques contre la colonie à partir du mois de juin 1975. Même si cette question sort du propos et même du cadre chronologique de l'ouvrage, de telles erreurs historiques lourdes de conséquences ne devraient pas être commises.

Le propos de l'ouvrage *Haunted Houses and Ghostly Encounters. Ethnography and Animism in East Timor, 1860-1975* est avant tout centré sur l'animisme et même sur l'évolution de l'animisme à travers le temps. C'est certainement un des apports significatifs du livre, car cette perspective diachronique permet de sortir d'une vision figée des « traditions » – ou pratiques et croyances dites « traditionnelles » – pour montrer qu'elles ont évolué au fil des ans et notamment, à Timor-Est, en fonction du renforcement de l'autorité portugaise dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle. Ainsi le livre montre comment les administrateurs coloniaux – perçus par les populations locales comme des détenteurs de pouvoir – ont pu être insérés et intégrés dans des pratiques animistes, ou influer sur le respect dont elles faisaient l'objet.

À ce titre, on pourra néanmoins regretter que l'ouvrage aborde peu la question de la situation avant les années 1860 et se focalise uniquement sur Timor-Est, même si cette borne temporelle et l'option de ne pas prendre en compte la situation dans la moitié occidentale de l'île, s'expliquent en partie par le manque de sources écrites antérieures sur lesquelles se fonde la méthodologie.

De fait, Christopher J. Sheperd a décidé d'explorer certains des aspects cachés de l'ethnographie coloniale à travers la surprise, le choc et parfois

même le « désarroi » de dix Occidentaux confrontés à des croyances ou pratiques magiques ou « sacrées » – généralement rassemblées dans (ou qualifiées par) le vocable complexe de *lulik* – qui n'entraient pas dans leur champ de référence cartésien ou chrétien.

L'ouvrage est divisé en deux parties : « Ethnographie coloniale » et « Ethnographie professionnelle ».

La première compte six chapitres qualifiés par des fonctions plus ou moins symbolisées de leur auteur : le « gouverneur » (à savoir Afonso de Castro, ex-gouverneur et surtout auteur du premier ouvrage un peu documenté sur le territoire en 1863) ; le « naturaliste » (le Britannique Henry Forbes qui traversa une partie de Timor-Est en 1883) ; le « magistrat » (Alberto Osório de Castro, juge à Timor mais aussi poète arrivé à Timor en 1908) ; le « capitaine » (José Simões Martinho, officier dans le territoire de 1909 à 1935) ; l'« administrateur » (Armando Pinto Correia, responsable du district militaire de Baucau de 1928 à 1934) ; le « missionnaire » (Abílio José Fernandes, prêtre à Timor-Est de 1914 à 1938).

S'inscrivant dans un déroulement relativement chronologique, ces six premiers chapitres se concentrent sur des extraits de textes de ces auteurs, qui témoignent de la difficulté des Occidentaux à prendre en compte ce qui leur est surtout apparu comme des « superstitions ». On pourra signaler à ce sujet une petite entorse méthodologique avec l'introduction de Henry Forbes parmi les auteurs de cette première partie sur l'ethnographie « coloniale », mais cela permet sans doute de mieux caler ses observations de la fin du XIXe siècle dans le panorama de celles des fonctionnaires portugais, sachant que même s'il a procédé à quelques observations ethnologiques, il était avant tout « naturaliste ».

À l'exception des textes de Forbes – assez facilement accessibles à la communauté internationale de par la langue de son auteur – cette première partie a également le mérite de fournir des traductions en anglais de fragments d'ouvrages anciens en portugais (même si plusieurs sont désormais disponibles en numérique ou en réédition). Cette succession d'impressions est intéressante, car beaucoup d'anecdotes sont révélatrices de conceptions non-occidentales originales. Il s'avère toutefois au final que le nombre d'observations est relativement limité et qu'elles sont souvent assez superficielles et très partielles. Ce constat fait donc surtout regretter le manque d'attention accordée à la compréhension du fonctionnement des sociétés est-timoraises et de leurs approches du monde par l'administration coloniale, mais aussi par les ethnologues de l'époque. La notion d'*hyper-animisme* est à ce titre à relever dans l'analyse de Christopher J. Sheperd, car il en vient à émettre l'hypothèse que les Timorais en seraient venus à pousser à l'extrême la logique de l'animisme – voire à briser les « tabous » ou contraintes imposée par le caractère « sacré » (*lulik*) d'objets ou de lieux – afin de confronter leur force à celle des étrangers.

La deuxième partie intitulée « Ethnographie professionnelle » se compose de quatre chapitres illustrant les impressions d'autant d'ethnologues anglo-saxons. D'un point de vue strictement historique, elles continuent de s'inscrire dans le cadre « colonial » de la première partie, même si ces quatre expériences se déroulent dans l'après Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Les quatre chapitres sont respectivement sous-titrés, afin d'essayer de caractériser les protagonistes : la « Sentimentaliste » (l'ethnomusicologue australienne Margaret King, qui a travaillé à Timor en 1960) ; le « Théologien » (David Hicks, chercheur Britannique arrivé à Timor en 1966), l'« Apprenti » (l'anthropologue américain Shepard Forman, qui a commencé à travailler à Timor en 1966), et enfin la « Détective » (la spécialiste des *Mambai*, Elizabeth Traube, venue pour la première fois à Timor en 1972).

Le choix de ne retenir que des ethnologues ayant exprimé leur subjectivité et leur ressenti face aux pratiques animistes a amené Christopher J. Sheperd à écarter du corpus un certain nombre d'ethnologues. Cela se comprend assez bien pour la majeure partie des travaux d'anthropologie physique portugaise du XIXe et du XXe siècles, dans lesquels les chercheurs se concentraient principalement sur l'étude des « types physiques », sur la forme des crânes, ou sur la comparaison des groupes sanguins des populations locales. En revanche, c'est plus regrettable pour les auteurs français (Louis Berthes, Henri Campagnolo, Brigitte Clamagirand, Claudine Friedberg…), ainsi que certains auteurs anglophones ou lusophones importants sur les questions du religieux ou du symbolique à Timor comme James J. Fox et Schulte Nordholt, ou Ruy Cinati et Jorge Barros Duarte.

Pour qui ne connaît pas la littérature anthropologique sur le Timor Oriental, le résultat de cette deuxième partie n'en est vraisemblablement que plus surprenant. En effet, les extraits de publications des quatre ethnologues retenus ne sont souvent pas les plus étudiés ou les plus mis en valeur, dans la mesure où ils concernent moins les mécanismes de fonctionnement ou de relation au sein de ces sociétés, que la pensée ou les représentations magico-religieuses est-timoraises – notamment liées à l'esprit des défunts – dans leur interaction avec un monde de plus en plus marqué par des attentes matérialistes et rationnelles ou rationalisatrices occidentales.

Le lecteur en vient aussi à regretter que la partie d'analyse transversale de l'ensemble du corpus – et plus globalement du rapport des ethnologues à leur terrain – se limite à une conclusion de quelques pages. Celle-ci permet néanmoins de souligner le caractère en partie évolutif de ce qui est – ou fait le – « sacré » (*lulik*), tout en pointant en même temps du doigt l'importance des non-dits, de la subjectivité, ou des biais des relations entre les chercheurs et leurs informateurs, ou dans le cadre de l'acquisition d'objets considérés comme porteurs de « pouvoir ». Cela amène en tout cas Christopher J. Sheperd à réfléchir d'un point de vue méthodologique à la réflexivité du travail

d'observation anthropologique, voire à une méta-ethnologie de l'animisme, qui montre qu'il peut être intéressant d'assumer la personnalisation du récit ou du vécu sur le terrain, afin de sortir de l'illusion d'une science absolument neutre, et de mieux rendre la complexité de l'animisme ou de la notion de « sacré ».

Frédéric Durand

Oman Fathurahman, Kawashima Midori, and Labi Sarip Riwarung (eds.), *The Library of an Islamic Scholar of Mindanao: The Collection of Sheik Muhammad Said bin Imam sa Bayang at the Al-Imam As-Sadiq (A.S.) Library, Marawi City, Philippines: An Annotated Catalogue with Essays*. Tokyo: Institute of Asian, African, and Middle Eastern Studies, Sophia University, 2019 (Occasional Papers No. 27), 460 pp. ISSN: 2189-5058.

The book is an impressive achievement, both for the depth and diligence of the scholarship presented within its pages, and for the long-term fieldwork and profound engagement with local stakeholders that brought it into being. Kawashima only briefly recounts how the groundwork for this research was laid, beginning in 2000 (v-viii), and hardly mentions the armed conflict that has broken out in the region between Islamist militants and the forces of the Philippine government, the most tumultuous eruption of which was the five-month siege of Marawi City in 2017. This political context means that the research presented in this volume, an attempt to uncover the Islamic intellectual history of Mindanao and Sulu in the 19th century, is all the more valuable.

The attention to the library as the unit of analysis is also both innovative and timely in the context of Islamic Southeast Asia, where scholarship to date has often proceeded on the basis of the individual codex, usually divorced from any geographical or social context. It is precisely by considering the manuscripts discussed here as the "library of an Islamic scholar of Mindanao"—a collection of books traceable to a particular person, in a specific place and time—that this volume promises to advance our understanding of Southeast Asian Islamic intellectual history and manuscript culture. The case of the southern Philippines is particularly intriguing, since this was the latest region of insular Southeast Asia to embrace Islam. Though this gives it additional interest as a comparator for the earlier but better studied centres such as Aceh or Riau, it has been rather neglected in scholarship to date (apart from earlier work by Kawashima, 2002, 2003, 2014, 2016, and Fathurahman, 2019).

The volume consists of three parts: an introduction and history of the collection by Kawashima and Fathurahman; a series of five essays by various authors on selected aspects of the manuscripts; and the catalogue proper. The

two chapters in Part 1 set out the background, including the rationale for the catalogue, and the history of the collection once owned by Sheikh Muhammad Said bin Imam sa Bayang (1902-1974) of Lanao del Sur, Mindanao. In Part 2, Kawashima's essay explicates one of the particularly interesting manuscripts in the collection, recounting the hajj voyage and return to the Philippines of Sheik Muhammad Said's ancestor and eponym, Sayyidna Tuan Muhammad Said, in 1803. Nurtawab's essay examines a Malay *tafsīr*, or Qur'anic exegesis, from the collection, showing that its main source is the well known Jalālayn exegesis. Riwarung's fascinating but all too brief contribution documents writing materials used in the Maranao region, including palm spathes and bamboo sheaths, as well as paper made out of bamboo shoots and cassava, and sources of pigments. A second article by Kawashima discusses papers and covers used in the manuscripts. As well as expected materials such as leather covers, European rag paper, Chinese paper and *dluwang* bark paper, Kawashima also notes intriguing examples of material used for repairs, such as repurposed periodicals, notebooks, packaging and fabric, suggesting the flow of commodities as well as ideas into the southern Philippines. Gallop's substantial article on illumination found in these manuscripts also explores the theme of cultural interaction, focusing on decorated frames, technical illustrations, the motifs of the "three fish with one head" and of the ring of Solomon, and, finally, paratextual elements such as marginal inscriptions. This analysis—ranging, in the case of the fish motif, from ancient Egypt to 1960s American counterculture—is a masterful demonstration of precise and painstaking tracing of visual elements to reveal "the genesis and peregrinations of the text itself" (p. 242).

The catalogue offers detailed information about the 65 manuscripts in the collection, providing much more information about such matters as codicology and the contents of the texts than are available in most comparable catalogues. Particularly welcome are the references to existing scholarship on a given text, which often serve to highlight just how much of the Southeast Asian *kitab* tradition remains to be seriously explored. Following the catalogue are extensive appendices, reproducing transcriptions and translations of key texts taken largely from the manuscripts, as well as thorough indexes, including of personal names. The numerous images of pages from the manuscripts, some in colour, will also be appreciated by students of Islamic manuscripts generally.

There is some repetition in the exposition (for example, of the location of Bayang, or the identity of Sheik Muhammad Said), suggesting that the work is less a unified volume than an amalgamation of the catalogue with several originally independent articles. This, together with occasional varying usages (i.e. the Sheik's name is used in different versions), might have been ironed out. Another desideratum would be further information about access to the manuscripts: do digital copies exist? Is it possible to consult the originals at the Al-Imam As-Sadiq Library?

If the contents of Sheikh Muhammad Said's library do not turn up any great surprises—most of the titles also appear in existing inventories of manuscript and printed *kitab*—this suggests the uniformity of Islamic learning across insular Southeast Asia and westward across the Indian Ocean, in spite of still prevalent claims of syncretism and divergence. There are, in addition, some works in Maranao and Magindanao that are unique to the collection. All these, together with the rich description of texts, illumination and codicology, mean that this volume provide much material for an enhanced understanding of the localisation of Islam in Sulu and Mindanao.

Mulaika Hijjas
SOAS, University of London

Littératures

Andi Muhammad Akhmar, *Islamisasi Bugis: Kajian Sastra atas La Galigo Versi Bottinna I La Déwata Sibawa I Wé Attaweq*. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Jakarta, 2018, xvi-566 p., ISBN: 978-602-433-642-4.

Islamisation has been generally understood as a series of processes by which a society turns to Islam in various ways. These processes range from formal conversion to Islam to colouring aspects of life with Islamic values. This wide understanding covers a number of specific issues including the wearing of the *hijab*, the promulgation of religious education, the enforcement of Shari'a law, the production of halal food, and many more. The process of Islamisation will differ from one society and one country to another.

Scholars have offered a number of explanations for the patterns of Islamisation in Muslim societies. Eaton (1993), for example, has explored four theories of Islamisation in India in his discussion of military conquest, patronage, social liberation, and immigration. In different contexts, Wahid (1989) employs indigenisation, Saenong (2016) makes use of Redfield's great and little traditions, and Marriot's parochialisation and universalisation, or Asad (1986) uses discursive tradition. Each of these explanations has been useful in understanding the processes of Islamisation in different contexts and times.

This book is concerned with one aspect of Islamisation, namely the literary context of South Sulawesi. A literary approach was also been used elsewhere across the archipelago. *Hikayat Iskandar Zulkarnain, Hikayat Meukuta Alam, Hikayat Amir Hamzah* for Sumatra and the Malay world, *Serat Menak* for Java, or *Hikayat Ternate* for Maluku, are examples of literary works which have been discussed in relation to Islamisation. A text from the Bugis La Galigo tradition invites similar discussion.

This book is a thorough literary study of an episode in the La Galigo cycle dealing with the wedding of I La Déwata and I Wé Attaweq (the BDA text). It provides a literary analysis of many aspects of the text such as poetic formulas, narrative structure, the scope of space and time covered, the depiction of individual characters, and moral issues in the narrative. The author discovers interesting characteristics of the oral style of rhetoric including repetition, parallelism, enumeration, pleonasm, and concatenation.

In addition to literary concerns, the author is concerned to demonstrate the process of Bugis Islamisation through the BDA text, that is to convert non-Muslims to Islam and to enhance the quality of the faith of those who are already Muslim. Specifically, the author means by Islamisation all Islamic ideas incorporated and described in the text. He identifies three kinds of Islamic elements in the BDA text. First, it clearly demonstrates knowledge of Qur'anic texts, the names of Allah, and a number of prayers. Second, the BDA text mentions individuals, names, and places that are related to Islam. Third, the text tries to establish genealogical relations between the main figures of the La Galigo and Muslim figures.

Thus, Akhmar describes how the author of the BDA text inserted the names of Allah to introduce the concept of oneness of God in order to replace ancient Bugis beliefs and how mythological Bugis figures are linked to Muslim ones to smooth the process of Islamisation. This Bugis text differs from similar ones in Java, Sumatra and the Malay world, however, in that the author of the BDA text does not clearly acknowledge the conversion to Islam.

In his analysis of the link between Bugis figures and Muslim ones, Akhmar compares the normal genealogy of Sawérigading by Friedericy, with that in the BDA text. The key figure is Patoto'é. In the former, the genealogy starts with Patoto'é, while in the BDA text, Patoto'é is described as the son of Datu Hindi, son of La Temmu Page', son of the Prophet Sulaiman (Solomon). From Patoto'é, both genealogies share the same line: Patoto'é to Batara Guru, to Batara Lattu', and to Sawérigading who married Wé Tenriabeng. Regardless of discontinuities and anachronisms, the link is intended to allow Islam to be more easily welcomed by the Bugis.

There are many interesting issues arising from the transliteration of words and phrases from Arabic to Bugis and their translation into Indonesian. Akhmar, with the assistance of other Muslim scholars has dealt with this. For example, the Bugis clause 'Aseabidu abedillahi ya kubong lahong' is understood as a rendering of 'As'adu bi abdillahi Ya'kubun lahum' and then translated as 'I witness as the servant of God, Ya'qub for them'. (The verb 'as'adu' should actually be rendered as 'ashhadu' to be translated as 'I witness'.)

In addition to the Islamisation of the Bugis, Akhmar also demonstrates a sort of Bugis form of Islam in this BDA text. As an example, he shows how an Arabic prayer in the text is freely translated into the Bugis realm and context. The author of the BDA text maintains the use of Bugis figures and names as if

they had accepted Islam. When contextualising an Arabic prayer 'sadaqakum Allāh 'alayh tawakkalnā astaghfir Allāh rabbah' which literally means 'may Allah correct you, we submit everything to Allah, I ask forgiveness to Allah the God', the BDA text renders it as 'worship Wé Mappanyiwi' in Heaven while holding up both hands on earth'. In this example, Akhmar identifies three patterns of Bugis influence in the representation of Islam: linguistic influence, contextual translation, and ritual practices. Following Marriot's analysis, Akhmar recognises a sort of universalisation and parochialisation at the same time.

Readers looking for a fuller and more complex treatment of the processes of Islamisation need to adjust their expectations to the particular concerns of this book. Indeed, out of a total 566 pages, the explicit discussion of Islamisation only occupies about 26 pages. The study remains, however, an important and timely one. It successfully demonstrates some elements of Islam in this BDA text. This is a possibility which has not previously been sufficiently acknowledged by scholars working with La Galigo texts.

References:

Asad, Talal.1986. *The Idea of the Anthropology of Islam*. Washington: The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (Georgetown University).

Eaton, R.M. 1993. *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760.* Barkeley: University of California Press.

Saenong, Faried F. 2016. *Making Sense of Muslim Societies: Belief and Praxis in Bantaeng*. PhD Thesis. Dept. of Anthropology. Australian National University.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1989. Pribumisasi Islam. In M. Azhari and AM Saleh (eds.). *Gus Dur Menjawab Kegelisahan Rakyat.* Jakarta: P3M.

Faried F. Saenong

Asahan Alham, *Dendam Sejarah* (Everlasting fostering of Revenge). Bandung: Ultimus, 2019, lvi-627 p. ISBN: 978-602-8331-76-0.

This fist-thick volume with largely literary work of Asahan Aidit (born 1938) was compiled by the editor, Bilven, of the publishing house Ultimus in Bandung, West Java. This publisher specializes in so-called *samizdat* (underground) Indonesian literature. With this volume the editor intended to commemorate the 80th birthday of Asahan, who, therefore, had no say himself in its content, neither in the choice of the title of this compilation. Even his name, Asahan *Alham,* instead of his family name, Asahan *Aidit*, was chosen by the editor/publisher. While, in the very short autobiography added to this volume, Asahan signed as: Asahan *Aidit*!

As a younger brother of D.N. Aidit, the last Chairperson of the Indonesian Communist Party (*PKI*), the greatest communist party outside China and the Soviet Republic till 1965, Asahan had to carry the heavy burden his family experienced. Already for 55 years.

On September 30th, 1965, one of the bloodiest massacres in human history erupted in the Indonesian Archipelago. An estimated half a million till one million members, or alleged members of *PKI,* were brutally killed. Amongst others, Asahan's brother D.N. Aidit. And hundreds of thousands persons, sometimes only just relatives of members, or just alleged members, were imprisoned for many years. In most cases without any form of prosecution.

Fortunately, Asahan Aidit escaped such a fate due to the fact he happened to study linguistics since 1962 in Moscow. As an exile, his fate was inseparably intertwined with the tragic fate of his family, and to that of the communist party in Indonesia in general. From Russia he fled to Vietnam, where he accomplished successfully his PhD in linguistics in the Vietnamese language. And, since 1984, he lives and writes in a small village near Amsterdam.

As relative of the Chairperson of *PKI*, his work as an author was regarded as communist literature. An ideology strictly forbidden during Suharto's New Order regime, and, notwithstanding the *Reformasi* in the years after Suharto was forced to step-aside in 1998, till today.

Therefore, it is a token of civil courage that Bilven dared to publish Asahan's work to honour one of Indonesia well-known writers who has been forced to live in exile for so many decades.

This volume, published in 2019, consists of a wide range of literary works: eighty-one (!) poems, of which 11 are added with its Dutch or English translation, and 8 are either in Dutch or English only; approximately 350 *haiku,* and 37 short stories or articles. In addition to this work by Asahan the editor invited several persons, who are very much familiar with Asahan and his work, to write a kind of introduction. The one Dr. Henri Chambert-Loir wrote is in particular illuminating to this volume. Amongst others, he aptly situates Asahan's literary work as belonging to a specific genre of autobiography that can best be described as "fictionalization of real facts" or "self-fictionalization" (pp. xviii-xx).

Next to all of this, this volume has three appendices by which Asahan's literary work is even more enlightened. One contains an interview with him in the well-known Indonesian magazine *Tempo*, December 2007. The other two are re-prints of articles in English, respectively on his life as an author in exile, by David T. Hill, and the other one about Asahan's four novels reviewed by Henri Chambert-Loir. This last article, earlier published in English in *Archipel* (2016) is followed by its Indonesian version.

Allegedly, a large part of his late work compiled in this volume Asahan himself had lost due to frequently being hacked by radical Islamic groups who severely oppose so-called communist publications. It was, therefore, a great surprise and relief to the author that by the occasion of his 80th birthday, so many of his own lost 'literary children' were revived to him again. And with him, the reader of this voluminous compilation can be relieved and surprised

as well that, due to the efforts of the editor, this 'lost' part of Asahan's literary work is now available again, in print!

Amongst the Indonesian exile literature Asahan's work is unique. It covers novels, short stories and poems, and also articles mostly dealing with rather controversial items. But the author is in particular unique amongst his fellow authors since, except for his good friend, the late poet Agam Wispi, hardly any other Indonesian writer has ever composed *haiku* in this language.

As stated above, not less than 350 *haiku* (!) are presented in this volume. Although in Indonesian literature, and even more so in the oral tradition, the *pantun* is a well-known genre, it differs essentially from the *haiku*. Not only in form, the *pantun* consisting of four verses while the *haiku* has three always, but foremost in content. The *pantun*, being an epigram, often spontaneously erupts during festivities in the form of a competition between several poets or even laymen, the *haiku*, mostly, expresses emotions that are structured according to strict rules and rhythm. Therefore, for composing a *haiku* an author needs special skills. In one of his articles in this volume, however, Asahan dealt with these problems of composing *haiku* in a complete different language and culture than the original Japanese structure stipulates. It turns out that – as in many more spheres of life and views – he has freed himself from the formal strait-jacket of the classical Japanese *haiku*, and instead of the 5-7-5 rule as number of syllables in each verse, he prefers the flexibility of modern *haiku*. So, he often switches to other formats. Nevertheless, he nearly always keeps in mind the genuine spirit of *haiku*, *i.e.* to "broadly widen the possibility of interpretation to the reader" (p. 417). Hence, for a reader who is sensitive to the rhythm of the syllables of the three verses a *haiku* consists of, and who is open-minded to its content – as the reviewer is – he will admire many of Asahan's *haiku* which contain a strong flavour of humour, although there are also several ones expressing deep bitterness and sorrow.

Both emotions are, given Asahans trajectory as a writer, also often revealed in his poems and short stories. However, the overarching emotion in his literary work is "revenge".

Only after I had read the poem with the same title in this volume (p. 3), could I see how aptly the title for this volume was chosen. Literally, *Dendam Sejarah* could be translated as: *Historic Revenge***.** However, in my view, this translation does not properly reflect the specific position Asahan Aidit, or for that matter Asahan Alham, claims to possess in his life-journey and amidst his fellow authors in exile. In my reading of Asahan's literary work "revenge" is not a negative form of energy but a strength to "carry on" (p. 3). Moreover, for Asahan, revenge is a source of inspiration to counter the people's enemies, as he stated in his very short autobiography (p. v).

After reading this poem, I prefer to translate *Dendam Sejarah* as: "Everlasting fostering of revenge". To illustrate my stand I refer to two

strophes (p. 3), and in particular to the last verse of the first strophe, and the last two verses at the end of this poem he wrote in 2008 (English version by the reviewer):

Dendam Sejarah

Tak usah kaubelah hatiku
Karena telah kukatakan sendiri
Ini dendam yang belum terbalas
Aku bahagia dan tenang bersamanya
Kan kubawa hingga jasad ini menjadi tanah.
(…..)
Dendam adalah kekuatan dan cinta
Dendam adalah solidaritas dan masa depan
Dendam adalah naluri persaudaraan yang berbinar
Dendam adalah mahkamah pengadilan dosa

Aku merasa hidup
Karena aku mengemban dendam.

Everlasting fostering of revenge

No need to scrutinize my heart
Because I told myself already
This revenge is not yet repaid
I am pleased and restful
To carry it on till my body will be dust
(……)
Revenge is strength and love
Revenge is solidarity and future
Revenge is the instinct of sparkling brotherhood
Revenge is the last judgment of sin

I feel alive
Because I foster revenge.

Nico Schulte Nordholt
Indonesianist

Ajip Rosidi, *Surat-surat ti Jepang* (Letters from Japan, volumes 1-4), chosen by Usep Romli. Bandung: Kiblat, 2017, 577 p. ISBN: 978-979-8004-04-9, 978-979-8004-08-7, 978-979-8004-09-4, 978-979-8004-10-9.

Over the course of his brilliant career Ajip Rosidi (b. 1938) has worn many hats: poet, playwright, novelist, researcher, translator, journalist, ethnomusicologist, biographer, publisher, editor and cultural bureaucrat. If I were to reduce these many activities to a single, over-arching program, his contribution might best be summarised as follows: quite early in his career he

realised that contemporary nations rely for their distinctiveness on – amongst other things – patrimonies that materialise in writing and publication. In order to gain recognition as 'authentic nations', it is important that populations be able to point to national writing traditions, and this requires documentation of genres (not only written ones, but also oral ones) as well as related activities such as criticism and translation. He also realised that the political and material conditions of Indonesian modernity would not greatly assist subjects of regional cultures to undertake such processes. Ajip's career has been dedicated obsessively to these activities. He has created a massive body of *meta*-culture about Sundanese writing and tradition. His work has not only revealed the richness and diversity of Sundanese lifeways: it has also materialised them in forms that have enabled the Sundanese patrimony to stand distinct beside those of Indonesia and those of other ethnic groups.

The letters collected here, all of them written in Sundanese between 1980 and 1983 while Rosidi was teaching Indonesian in Japan, enable us to see the enormous task of brokerage involved in this achievement. This task is obscured when one reads individual works from his *oeuvre*, but the 180 letters collected here reveal him as an inveterate broker:[9] he contacts Sundanese authors in order to urge them to write their memoirs; he advises publishers about their publication lists; he arranges the financing of publication projects; he asks colleagues to send him photocopies of articles and books needed for his own work; he advocates for the publication of his own works and the works of others; he provides critiques and evaluations of other people's work; he edits the works of favourite authors; he sources Japanese funding for Sundanese cultural groups to visit Japan; he advocates ideas for new formats for publication and performance based on Japanese models, and so on. So intense is his devotion to these things that very few of these letters can be regarded as purely personal. Most of them are related to the business of cultural production.

And of the authors he promotes in these letters, none receives more attention than Ajip Rosidi. Rosidi's strategies for having his own writing published might be good examples for all writers: do not avoid self-promotion, and do not overlook the potential of *all* your writing to be published… and then republished! The circumstances behind the publication of these letters illustrate these dictums: we should not think Rosidi wrote these letters while thinking solely about communicating with his addressee, for he typed every letter with a page of carbon paper underneath, producing a copy that could be kept for later publication. No wonder that he has become – by far – the most prolific Indonesian writer.

9. In fact, before writing these letters, Rosidi held a formal role as cultural broker through his membership of the Jakarta Arts Council (DKJ). Rosidi left Indonesia for Japan after a painful power struggle led to his resignation from the Council (see Hill 2010).

This strategy might be a good example for writers, but it also has a less than positive result: Rosidi wrote every letter in this collection – how much more beneficial would this volume be if correspondence *from* his interlocutors were included? His correspondents include many of the key figures of the Sundanese patrimony: the writers Caraka and Ki Umbara; politicians Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ali Sadikin and Enkin Muttaqien; Sundanese nationalist scholars and journalists such as Abdullah Mustapa and Edi Ekadjati; Islamic creatives such as Yosef C.D. and Endang Saefuddin Anshary. All these figures appear here only as second person addressees of Ajip Rosidi. No doubt it would be a difficult task to obtain permission for publication of the 'incoming' correspondence, but this is common practice in publication projects of this kind.

None of what I have just written means that Rosidi's sole concern has been self-promotion. His promotion of and assistance for other authors are legendary, and many examples of these are revealed in these letters. The greatest example of his bigheartedness emerged after these letters were written: the prizes he has established for writers publishing in the regional languages of Indonesia. In 1989 he began to offer – at his own expense – an annual prize for a literary work in Sundanese. The prize was labelled the *Rancagé* (Sundanese: creative) prize. Following his lead, a donor provided funds for an annual prize for services to Sundanese literature. In 1994 the same two awards commenced to be offered for writers in Javanese, and in 1998, Balinese was added. In 2008, a prize for writers in the language of Lampung was added, then Batak, then Banjar. These prizes, with their flow-on effects in public discourse beyond the benefits for the writers who receive them, are clear examples of Rosidi's independent vision, his 'can-do' attitude, and his concern for the public good.

The letters, beautifully edited by Usep Romli, provide a window into a regional cultural network that is not well understood outside its immediate setting. The contemporary cultural sphere in Indonesia is badly polarised between liberal and Islamic conservative poles. Rosidi and a number of his colleagues have resisted this simplified dichotomy. He was dedicated to literary genres such as the novel and lyric, and for this reason he comes across in many of these letters as a bona fide liberal in the modernist mould. He reveals a conviction that these genres were the products of individual, critical minds, and were vehicles for 'substantial content' (*anu eusian*) that could attain the status of 'great works' (*karya badag*). But at the same time, his liberalism is also characterised by the Islamic outlook that is common in Sundanese intellectuals: Islam provides a buffer or middle way that enables Muslims to avoid the spectres of communism and unbridled capitalism. In his choice of subjects for biographies, Rosidi chose figures that represented this Islamic outlook. He has written two biographies of Islamic figures, Moh. Natsir (1908-1993) and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1989). Both

these figures were committed to Islam as a normative basis for a modernist Indonesian politics and social life. Rosidi invested heavily in these figures as exemplary leaders for a modern Indonesia.

This particular strand of liberalism reminds us of the political project of the Masjumi party, which attained great popularity in West Java, particularly in the 1955 elections. In fact, there might be good reasons for categorising Rosidi as a cultural producer in the Masjumi mould, after all, the peak success of that party coincided with the early part of his career, and he has been the most important biographer of the movement (the two figures just mentioned were key Masjumi figures).

In reality, however, it is inaccurate to categorise Rosidi as an Islamic writer, for two reasons. The first is his faith in the public value of the 'higher genres' of writing, which puts him at a distance from Masjumi's political template. His high evaluation of the novel, the lyric, modern theatre and other genres is rooted in the belief that these genres enable capable individuals to express themselves in a way that enables critical perspectives on life and society. One could conclude that in Rosidi's worldview, a good society is one in which these genres enable citizens to engage in processes of reflection and critique.

This strong conviction about the public value of the 'higher' genres has been instrumental in Rosidi's work. The production of the Prawiranegara biography is a striking example. Rosidi had become attracted to 'Pak Sjaf' for the latter's determination to interpret Islam in the light of contemporary intellectual developments, and started to act as broker for the production of his biography around 1980 (it was eventually published – after two writers had commenced the task – under Rosidi's authorship in 1986). At the beginning of the process, Rosidi identified a 'deficiency' in Pak Sjaf's public profile: he had not produced a major written work. In the early 1980s, Prawiranegara was actively involved in face-to-face preaching, yet Rosidi wanted to make Prawiranegara into a figure who had *written* a monumental work on Islam in contemporary Indonesia. In one of his letters to Prawiranegara, he gives the veteran politician some extraordinary advice:

> …up to now all your writings have been like pamphlets, and now is the time to write a major work that will be a legacy for the generations to come after you… It is important that all your thoughts and ideas should be brought together, and not remain lying here and there for eternity…you could produce a treatise like those written by Mazzini or Gandhi. For that reason, I would strongly approve if you would stop all your organisational activities, and concentrate your attention on putting into writing the essence of your activities up to the present, which in my opinion would have greater benefit than the organisational activities in which you are currently engaged… (vol. 4, 144)

That letter was written in 1981. Prawiranegara was evidently not interested in creating the legacy anticipated by Rosidi, yet by 1986, Rosidi had not only produced the biography, he had also produced and edited two volumes of

the collected writings of Prawiranegara, as well as a volume of tributes and reflections.

A second reason to distinguish Rosidi from the main current of Islamic politics and culture in West Java emerges in the brokerage work mentioned above. These letters reveal Rosidi as an intellectual reluctant to remain within the confines of any single intellectual formation. In a number of letters he unequivocally presents himself as a supporter of the Islamic solidarity that is so important to Sundanese politics and cultural production, and during the tense years leading up to 1965, although he was friendly with writers affiliated with Lekra, he advocated strongly against the PKI through the magazine *Majalah Sunda*. Nevertheless, he has been a dedicated and enthusiastic public supporter of writers commonly associated with leftism, such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) and Utuy Tatang Sontani (1920-1979). And further, his own reading interests reveal a varied and even radical palate: in a letter in which he provides advice about publishing choices to the publisher I. Martalogawa (Penerbit Grimukti Pusaka), he recommends that Grimukti publish translations of works by and about Alvin Toffler and Noam Chomsky (vol. 4, 59). He recommends to the poet and editor Dodong Djiwapradja that he read Georg Lukacs, George Steiner, Roland Barthes, Jonathan Culler and Roman Ingarden (vol. 4, 90). The addressees of the letters published here belong to many different circles and networks, and Rosidi is unique for his ability to communicate in the language and symbolic repertoires of all of them.

Rosidi continues to publish prolifically in (at least) two currents. In one of these currents, he produces works about Sundanese genres, giving service to the Sundanese nation. The other consists of his own writings. As Henri Chambert-Loir has noted recently in this journal (*Archipel* 97), he is currently publishing his diaries in six-month blocs, a project anticipated to require forty volumes. These volumes will add to the thousands of pages of correspondence and recollections already published by this great scholar and intellect. These two currents are reflections of his two great preoccupations – the preservation of the Sundanese patrimony, and the continuation of his own public project of self-expression.

Reference:

Hill , David T., 2010, *Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A critical biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as editor and author.* London and New York: Routledge.

Julian Millie

Luís Cardoso, *L'année où Pigafetta boucla son tour du monde*. Roman traduit du portugais (Timor Oriental) par Catherine Dumas. Paris : Éditions Arkuiris et Association France / Timor Leste, 2019. ISBN : 978-2-919090-23-5.

Voici qu'au bout de 47 ans d'enseignement et de recherches historiques, je suis pour la première fois invité à faire le compte-rendu d'un roman. Je ne peux amorcer en ce moment une nouvelle carrière, cette fois de critique littéraire ; je me permets donc d'écrire en historien. Il faut noter qu'en dépit de son titre, le livre n'est pas un roman historique, quoique l'histoire, du moins l'histoire récente, y soit toujours présente, soit comme environnement de l'action, soit sous forme de souvenirs des personnages, qui en général ne plongent pas au-delà des années quarante du XXe siècle. Comme les protagonistes des romans picaresques d'autrefois, le narrateur garde une remarquable neutralité entre les colonisateurs, les différentes factions de la résistance, les maoïstes, les unionistes et les forces occupantes.

Le titre du livre provient d'une petite fantaisie, à laquelle le lecteur n'est prié de croire qu'à moitié : Antonio Pigafetta, l'auteur de la célèbre relation de la première circumnavigation du globe par Magellan et Elcano, n'aurait pas bouclé son tour du monde, mais, à l'invitation du roi de Balibó, serait resté à Timor, tandis que quelqu'un d'autre, resté à bord, complétait son récit. À Timor, il aurait procréé une descendance, parmi laquelle figurerait peut-être l'un des personnages principaux du roman, qui porte aussi le nom de son hypothétique aïeul.

Quoiqu'à l'époque où se passe l'histoire, l'auteur fût au Portugal et n'en ai, donc, pas fait l'expérience directe, le roman dépeint bien l'atmosphère d'inquiétude, de suspicion, d'ambiguïté et de duplicité qui régnait alors à Timor – dont j'ai moi-même fait un peu l'expérience, ayant été l'un des rares Portugais autorisés à visiter le territoire. Il y a les gens qui se déguisent sous une fausse identité, les gens qui s'enfuient à l'*ai-laran*, c'est-à-dire au maquis, ceux qui se présentent aux autorités indonésiennes, dont on ne peut évaluer la sincérité, ceux qui font le double jeu et, en sus, les espérances messianiques qui se réveillent et les fantômes du passé qui reviennent.

Le Pigafetta du roman est un Timorais albinos, qui se présente en métis, laissé en souvenir par un soldat portugais chez sa maîtresse au temps de l'occupation japonaise (1942-45). Il s'en sert pour être admis au collège de Lahane, faubourg de Dili, où seraient soit-disant éduqués les métis abandonnés par les soldats portugais rentrés au Portugal, tués par les Japonais, ou morts de faim suite à la disette qui s'était installée. Ceci est une petite license poétique de l'auteur, car en fait, il n'y a jamais eu à Timor d'institutions réservées aux métis, les écoles catholiques, dont la « mission centrale » avait en fait son siège à Lahane, ayant toujours, depuis la fondation de la première en 1595, été ouvertes à tout le monde – comme on peut facilement le constater, depuis l'invention de la photographie, grâce aux nombreux clichés qui subsistent. Peut-on néanmoins imaginer que le stratagème, inventé par un curé métis, permettait au personnage d'avoir ses études payées par le gouvernement ? De toute façon, dans l'économie du récit, ce détail ne joue aucun rôle, et il nous semble que c'est à tort que les éditeurs l'on mis en vedette sur la couverture du livre, ce qui peut amener le lecteur en puissance à imaginer que le thème

du roman est un problème racial, quand en fait il n'en est rien. Le détail le plus significatif est, en revanche, le fait que Pigafetta ne parle plus depuis le milieu du récit, car il a désormais la langue coupée par un collaborationniste du régime, qui veut éviter à tout prix qu'il parle, car il en savait trop sur les mouvements de la résistance, l'identité véritable de maints clandestins et les convictions cachées de nombre d'intervenants.

Parmi les souvenirs des personnages, il y a quelques détails historiques qui ne peuvent être corrects, ce qui, d'ailleurs, n'a guère d'importance pour l'économie du récit, celui-ci n'étant pas un roman historique. Notamment, il n'est pas possible que quelqu'un se rappelle du siège de Cailaco par les forces des royaumes alliés aux Portugais, qui força maints défenseurs de la forteresse à se suicider en se précipitant au bas des rochers, ou à périr de faim et de soif ; ceci pour la simple raison que l'épisode n'eut pas lieu pendant les campagnes militaires de la fin du XIXe siècle, dominées par la figure du sous-lieutenant Francisco Duarte (1864-99), dénommé l'Arbiru, mais plutôt en 1725, lors d'une rébellion provoquée par la perception des *fintas*, ou tributs versés par les *liurais* (roitelets) à l'administration portugaise qui venait de s'installer (1702).

Un épisode curieux du point de vue ethnographique et somme toute vraisemblable est la scène où grand-mère Aurora (dont on ignore l'âge, mais qui pourrait être née dans les années 30 du XXe siècle) est vivement perturbée en constatant que l'on a trouvé une photo d'elle, où elle était torse nu, mais que son mari, major de la Seconde Ligne de l'armée portugaise, avait su arracher au gouverneur. L'épisode nous renvoie à c. 1939, quand le gouverneur Álvaro da Fontoura, à un moment où l'on s'intéressait beaucoup à l'anthropologie physique, a fait venir un bon photographe professionnel pour préparer un album de photos de différents types de Timor. À l'époque, de nombreuses femmes portaient encore le *sabulu* ou *tais-feto*, pagne en général grossier de fabrication locale, ressemblant à un sac sans fond, que l'on portait à la hauteur des seins ou à la ceinture et qui couvrait la moitié inférieure du corps, laissant les seins nus – comme d'ailleurs c'était fréquent à Bali et dans d'autres régions non islamisées. On le voit sur maintes photographies de l'époque, prises à la campagne, aux bazars ou marchés, etc. Entretemps, le costume javanais, qui comporte un *faru* ou blouse, prôné par les moralistes hollandais, avait commencé à pénétrer par la frontière et à se diffuser surtout parmi l'aristocratie. Dans l'*Album Fontoura* l'on voit, par le différent degré de bronzage des épaules des femmes photographiées, que plusieurs avaient été priées de revêtir pour l'occasion le costume traditionnel, quoique habituellement elles ne portassent plus le *sabulu*, mais plutôt le *faru* et le *cambatic* (c'est-à-dire le *kain batik* indonésien). À l'époque où je vécus à Timor (1970-72), le *sabulu* avait pratiquement disparu à l'est de Manatuto, mais subsistait dans la partie orientale de l'île, comme on peut voir sur beaucoup de photographies que j'ai prises moi-même. Revenant à notre roman, la pudeur et les scrupules de grand-mère Aurora, qui appartenait à l'aristocratie et, d'après son prénom, était chrétienne, n'étaient pas aussi invraisemblables qu'on l'a insinué.

Une note finalement quant à la traduction : on parle à plusieurs reprises des forces des « loyaux habitants », ce qui traduit à peu près l'expression portugaise *Leais Moradores* [*de Manatuto*]; on devrait l'écrire avec une majuscule, car c'est le nom d'un corps de volontaires recrutés dans la région de Manatuto, la première à être christianisée en masse, qui a joué un rôle décisif dans les « campagnes de pacification » de la fin du XIXe et du commencement du XXe siècle. Selon le recensement de 1970, tandis que le pourcentage de catholiques dans l'ensemble du territoire était d'environ 30%, à Manatuto, comme en Oé-Cussi (les régions travaillées plus tôt par les missionnaires dominicains) elle atteignait 80%, ce qui explique leur relations très spéciales avec l'administration portugaise.

Quant au glossaire qui figure à la fin du roman, il rend sans doute d'excellents services, car il permet au lecteur de comprendre de nombreux termes en langue locale, qui sont difficilement traduisibles et permettent au texte de garder une certaine couleur locale. On pourrait néanmoins distinguer les mots tétuns des mots portugais, comme *barlaque,* « dot à verser à la famille de la fiancée » (du malais *berlaki*, « avoir un mari », le mot tétun étant *folin*). Il y a aussi quelques incorrections d'orthographe : « pousser des cris de guerre » se dit *haklala* et non pas *aklala* ; l'*Erythrina spp*. s'appelle *ai-diik* et non pas *ai-dick*, etc. Mais, bien entendu, un roman n'est pas un traité de linguistique, et le principal est que le lecteur puisse comprendre de quoi il s'agit en chaque cas.

Quant à la chronologie qui clôt le volume, elle est copiée telle quelle de l'atlas de Frédéric Durand, et contient quelques erreurs que nous avons déjà corrigées dans notre article « La chronologie historique de Timor Oriental », paru dans le nº 93 d'*Archipel* (2017), pp. 199-217: les marchands portugais n'ont pas commencé à fréquenter Timor en 1520, car Jorge Fogaça y est arrivé avec trois jonques en 1516 ; la campagne de 1642 fut une simple expédition punitive contre l'empereur de Bé-háli ou Waihale, qui menaçait de se convertir à l'islam, organisée par un dominicain et quelques aventuriers portugais et, surtout, des forces des royaumes déjà christianisés ; elle ne marque nullement « le début d'une conquête territoriale de l'île », ni saurait jamais l'être, à un moment où il n'y avait pas encore d'autorité permanente ni d'administration portugaise à Timor, le premier gouverneur y ayant débarqué, avec une garde de 83 hommes, seulement en 1702, et le premier contingent de forces régulières portugaises n'y étant arrivé qu'en 1818 ; la guerre de Manufahi n'a pas duré de 1908 à 1912, car elle ne commença que par le « massacre de Same », la nuit de Noël de 1911; etc. Quoique le livre ne soit pas un manuel d'histoire, la présence de ces erreurs, que l'on aurait pu très facilement corriger d'après un article d'*Archipel*, est un tantinet fâcheuse !

Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz

Résumés – Abstracts

Elsa Clavé (ed.)

Dossier 1965 and Cinema, II
Ce dossier fait suite à celui paru dans *Archipel* 98. Sont rassemblés ici quatre courts essais sur des films récents (2009–2019) traitant des événements de 1965-1966 et de leurs conséquences. *The Women and the Generals: Unraveling a Myth of Sexual Perversion* de Saskia Wieringa aborde les mensonges entourant l'implication du Gerwani (Mouvement des femmes indonésiennes) dans l'assassinat des généraux. *Pulau Buru: Still Much More to Reveal* de Vannessa Hearman suit un ancien prisonnier de retour sur l'île-bagne de Buru avec sa famille, *Forty Years of Silence: the Insanity of Society* de Soe Tjen Marching montre l'effet des événements sur la santé mentale des victimes et de leur famille, tandis que *A Daughter's Memory: 1965 in Animation* de Grace Leksana présente les souvenirs personnels de la fille de Njoto, un des leaders du parti communiste de l'époque.

Focus on 1965 and Cinema, II
This section is a follow up to the one published in *Archipel* 98. It contains four short essays on recent films (2009–2019) dealing with the events of 1965-1966 and their consequences. *The Women and the Generals: Unraveling a Myth of Sexual Perversion* by Saskia Wieringa focuses on the lies surrounding the involvement of the Gerwani (Indonesian women's movement) in the murder of the generals. *Pulau Buru: Still Much More to Reveal* by Vannessa Hearman follows a former prisoner returning to the penal island of Buru with his family, *Forty Years of Silence: the Insanity of Society* by Soe Tjen Marching shows the impact of the events on the mental health of the victims and their family, while *A Daughter's Memory: 1965 in Animation* by Grace Leksana presents the personal memories of Njoto's daughter, one of the leaders of the Communist Party at that time.

Gilang Desti Parahita and Vissia Ita Yulianto

The Treachery *on YouTube: The Politics of Memory on New Media in Indonesia*
This article discusses the problematic process of the remediation of social memory on and through YouTube, focusing on the 1965/66 massacre in Indonesia. Despite being a new media and an arena for contesting vernacular memories of the 1965/66 massacre, YouTube is also often used to advance the State narrative, as seen in how YouTube users replicate the film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (The Treachery of G30S/PKI) annually to promote anti-

communist agendas, as well as how Indonesian filmmakers title their works that deal with the 1965/66 massacre. More broadly, the monumental memory of 1965/66 on YouTube involves three actors: state actors, film communities, and vigilantes.

La Trahison *sur YouTube: politique de la mémoire dans les nouveaux médias indonésiens*
Cet article traite du processus problématique de remédiation de la mémoire sociale sur et via YouTube, à propos du massacre de 1965/66 en Indonésie. Bien que ce soit un nouveau média et un lieu de contestation pour la mémoire vernaculaire du massacre de 1965/66, YouTube est aussi souvent utilisé pour promouvoir le récit Étatique, comme le montre la façon dont les utilisateurs de YouTube reproduisent chaque année le film *Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (La trahison de G30S/PKI) pour faire valoir des visées anticommunistes, ainsi que la façon dont les cinéastes indonésiens intitulent leurs œuvres traitant du massacre de 1965/66. Plus largement, la mémoire monumentale de 1965/66 sur YouTube implique trois acteurs: les agents de l'État, les communautés cinématographiques et les milices.

Robert Wessing

The Maiden in the Forest: Reflections on Some Southeast Asian Tales
This article is an exploration of various Southeast Asian stories with a focus on Central and East Java and Sunda (West Java). Although on the face of it these tales concern things as different as the origin of rice agriculture and the rise of princely lines and kingdoms, the paper highlights common though not-emphasized elements in them, especially the forest, raising the question why these elements are so persistently there-but-not-emphasized, and what their significance is. By looking at especially the actions of the protagonists of the stories, an understanding of these 'silent' factors becomes clear. This speaks of the people's position vis-à-vis the forest and the supernatural world, a deep understanding of which the people themselves may not always be fully aware and which cannot therefore always be depicted explicitly. These silences also leave room for a considerable degree of flexibility in the tales, allowing them to be adapted to changed circumstances, including changes in religious conviction and in scientific knowledge of the world.

La jeune fille dans la forêt: réflexions sur quelques contes d'Asie du Sud-Est
Cet article est une exploration de diverses histoires d'Asie du Sud-Est, plus particulièrement de Java Centre, Java Est et Sunda (Java Ouest). Bien qu'à première vue, ces récits concernent des choses aussi différentes que l'origine de la riziculture et la montée des lignées et des royaumes princiers, l'article met en évidence des éléments communs, bien que non mis en avant, de ces récits, notamment la forêt, soulevant la question de savoir pourquoi ces éléments sont si constamment présents, mais non soulignés, et quelle est leur signification. En examinant plus particulièrement les actions des protagonistes des histoires, on comprend mieux ces facteurs «silencieux». Il s'agit de la position des humains vis-à-vis de la forêt et du monde surnaturel, une compréhension profonde dont les humains eux-mêmes ne sont pas toujours pleinement conscients et qui ne peut donc pas toujours être représentée explicitement. Ces silences laissent également place à une grande flexibilité dans les récits, leur permettant de s'adapter à des circonstances variables, notamment aux changements de conviction religieuse et de connaissance scientifique du monde.

Arlo Griffiths

Rediscovering an Old Javanese Inscription: Mpu Mano's Donation in Favor of a Buddhist Dignitary in 888 Śaka
This paper furnishes a detailed philological analysis of an Old Javanese copper-plate inscription, dated 888 Śaka (966 CE), that was long considered lost but has been rediscovered during a

survey of inscriptions kept in Dutch collections. The inscription, of which only the beginning is preserved, and that too only in the form of the first of a set of plates onto which it was copied in the 14th century CE, records a certain Mpu Mano's donation in favor of a Buddhist dignitary named Mpu Buddhivāla. Among issues that receive special attention are (1) the disctinction between toponyms and common nouns in descriptions of the landscape; (2) the problem of textual manipulation and redating of earlier grants on the occasion of their Majapahit-period reissue; (3) the terminology of pawning expressed by the word *saṇḍa*; (4) the lexicographical progress that can be made by paying attention to specifically Buddhist technical terminology.

Redécouverte d'une inscription en vieux javanais : la donation de Mpu Mano en faveur d'un dignitaire bouddhiste en 888 Śaka

Cet article fournit une analyse philologique détaillée d'une inscription sur plaque de cuivre en vieux-javanais datée de 888 Śaka (966 CE), longtemps considérée perdue, mais qui a été redécouverte lors d'une enquête sur les inscriptions conservées dans les collections néerlandaises. L'inscription, dont seul est conservé le début, et ce uniquement sous la forme de la première d'une série de plaques sur lesquellles elle fut copiée au XIVe siècle CE, enregistre la donation d'un certain Mpu Mano en faveur d'un dignitaire bouddhiste nommé Mpu Buddhivāla. Parmi les questions qui font l'objet d'une attention particulière figurent (1) la distinction entre toponymes et noms communs dans les descriptions du paysage ; (2) le problème de la manipulation textuelle et de la révision de donations antérieures à l'occasion de leur réémission à l'époque de Majapahit ; (3) la terminologie de la mise en gage exprimée par le mot *saṇḍa* ; (4) les progrès lexicographiques qui peuvent être réalisés en prêtant attention à la terminologie technique spécifiquement bouddhiste.

M.C. Ricklefs

Music and Dance Go to War in Java

The kingdoms of pre-colonial Java were martial states, as well as supporters of a wide range of cultural activities. Artistic performances and war were intertwined. Martial skills and bloody accounts of battle are prominent in Javanese literature and the wayang theatre. Music and dance also played crucial roles in the real world of Javanese warfare. They were used in training: what Europeans called drill, Javanese called dance. And they were deployed on campaign and in battle itself. This short note examines 18th-century sources to shed light on how music and dance went to war in Java.

Musique et dance vont en guerre à Java

Les royaumes de la Java pré-coloniale étaient des États martiaux, ainsi que les protecteurs d'un large éventail d'activités culturelles. Les représentations artistiques et la guerre étaient étroitement liées. L'art de la guerre et les récits sanglants de batailles sont omniprésents dans la littérature javanaise et le théâtre de wayang. La musique et la danse ont également joué des rôles cruciaux dans le monde réel de la guerre javanaise. Elles étaient utilisées lors de l'entraînement: ce que les Européens appelaient exercice militaire, les Javanais l'appelaient danse. Et elles étaient déployées en campagne et dans la bataille elle-même. Cette courte note examine des sources du XVIIIe siècle, afin d'éclairer la façon dont la musique et la danse allaient à la guerre à Java.

G. Roger Knight

An 'Indies' Couple: Colonial Communities and Issues Surrounding Identity in the Dutch East Indies, ca. 1890-1930s

The life-stories of two individuals – the married couple Johanna Bezoet de Bie and Alexander

MacNeill – provide the context for discussion of segments of the upper strata of the Dutch creole communities in the Dutch East Indies/Colonial Indonesia around the turn of the twentieth century. In particular, it focuses on the characteristic pervasiveness of regular family formation and sociability among people established there, in some cases, over several generations. In addition to its exploitation of recently digitalised materials relating to family history, the reconstruction attempted here also makes extensive use of the visual record, in a context in which the agency of the photograph is much to the fore. The argument turns, however, on the extent to which the couple in question sought to differentiate – even distance – themselves from the extensively referenced Indisch environment in which they were located, and in so doing underscores the complexity and fluidity of diasporic identities.

Un couple « des Indes » : les communautés coloniales et les questions d'identité dans les Indes orientales néerlandaises, de c.1890 aux années 1930

L'histoire des vies de deux individus – le couple marié Johanna Bezoet de Bie et Alexander MacNeill – fournissent le contexte d'une réflexion sur des segments des couches supérieures des communautés créoles néerlandaises aux Indes orientales néerlandaises (l'Indonésie coloniale) au tournant du XXe siècle. L'article souligne en particulier l'omniprésence caractéristique de la formation régulière de la famille et de la sociabilité des personnes établies aux Indes, dans certains cas sur plusieurs générations. Outre l'exploitation de matériaux récemment numérisés relatifs à l'histoire de la famille, la reconstruction tentée ici fait également largement appel aux archives visuelles, dans un contexte où l'agence de la photographie est très présente. L'argument porte cependant sur la mesure dans laquelle le couple en question a cherché à se différencier – voire à se distancier – de l'environnement « indien » largement référencé dans lequel il se trouvait, et souligne ainsi la complexité et la fluidité des identités diasporiques.

Syamsul Rijal

Performing Arab Saints and Marketing the Prophet: Habaib and Islamic Markets in Contemporary Indonesia

Post-Soeharto Indonesia has witnessed the proliferation of young Arab preachers along with their sermon groups (*majelis ta'lim* and *zikr*) in urban areas. The preachers who claim descent from the Prophet are popularly called *habib* (sing.) or *habaib* (pl.) Their sermon groups are highly mobile in various public spaces and have attracted thousands of followers predominantly from among Muslim youths. This essay locates the proliferation of *habaib* sermon groups in the context of burgeoning Islamic commodification in Indonesia. It considers *habaib* as religious entrepreneurs who promote their religious products in an expanding religious market. Focusing on Habib Hasan's *da'wa* and his marketing strategies it argues that, unlike other celebrity preachers who largely capitalize on their public speaking skills, the *habaib* preachers gain their religious authority and popularity through commodification of their *habib* status (as descendants of the Prophet) and their Arabness through adept use of new media and popular culture that accommodates the aspirations of Muslim youth.

Mise en scène de saints arabes et commercialisation du Prophète: Habaib et marchés islamiques dans l'Indonésie contemporaine

L'Indonésie de l'après-Soeharto a vu la prolifération de jeunes prédicateurs arabes et de leurs groupes de sermons (*majelis ta'lim* et *zikr*) dans les zones urbaines. Ces prédicateurs, qui se disent descendre du Prophète, sont communément appelés *habib* (sing.) ou *habaib* (pl.) Leurs groupes de sermons sont très mobiles dans divers espaces publics et ont attiré des milliers de fidèles, principalement au sein de la jeunesse musulmane. Cet essai situe la prolifération des groupes de sermons *habaib* dans le contexte de la marchandisation islamique florissante en Indonésie. Il considère les *habaib* comme des entrepreneurs religieux qui font la promotion

de leurs produits sur un marché religieux en expansion. En se concentrant sur la *da'wa* de Habib Hasan et ses stratégies de marketing, il soutient que, à la différence d'autres prédicateurs célèbres qui capitalisent largement sur leurs talents d'orateurs, les prédicateurs *habaib* gagnent leur autorité religieuse et leur popularité grâce à la marchandisation de leur statut de *habib* (comme descendants du Prophète) et de leur arabité grâce à une utilisation habile des nouveaux médias et de la culture populaire qui répond aux aspirations de la jeunesse musulmane.

Jean-Louis Margolin

1965 : l'heure de l'histoire ?

Des publications de qualité en nombre important, sur lesquelles cet article fait d'abord le point, ont très largement étendu et renouvelé notre connaissance des événements tragiques de 1965-66, en Indonésie. A côté du constat d'une grande diversité de situations suivant les provinces, quelques tendances générales se dégagent : place partout centrale de l'armée comme incitateur et organisateur des violences et massacres, le plus souvent en partenariat étroit avec les activistes musulmans ; participation populaire importante aux pires atrocités ; fréquence des crimes sexuels ; poids des vols, pillages et prévarications ; effroyables conditions de détention ; extension des violences bien au-delà de 1966. Une seconde partie tente de fournir quelques clés de compréhension : éléments de continuité du dernier Sukarno à Suharto ; effectivité de la tentative de prise de pouvoir par le PKI ; faiblesse et sentiment d'insécurité des deux camps, conduisant au meurtre des généraux aussi bien qu'aux tueries de communistes ; monstrueuse et inexcusable étendue de ces dernières, qui ne constituent cependant pas un génocide ; rôle limité des interventions extérieures.

1965: Time for History?

A large number of quality publications, which this article first reviews, have greatly expanded and renewed our knowledge of the tragic events of 1965-66 in Indonesia. Besides the observation of a great diversity of situations according to the provinces, a few general trends emerge: the ubiquitous central place of the Army as the instigator and organizer of violence and massacres, most often in close partnership with Muslim activists; a significant popular participation in the worst atrocities; the frequency of sex crimes; the weight of thefts, lootings and abuses; the appalling conditions of detention; the extension of violences well beyond 1966. A second part strives to provide some keys to understanding: elements of continuity from post-1959 Sukarno's regime to Suharto; actuality of the PKI's attempted bid for power; weakness and insecurity feeling on both sides, leading to the murder of the generals as well as to the killing of communists; monstrous and inexcusable extent of these, which do not, however, qualify as genocide; limited role of external interventions.



Paris : EFEO, Études thématiques 31, 2019, 448 p., 18.5 x 27.5 cm. ISBN : 9782855392691.



Jakarta : KPG –EFEO, 2019, 380 p. 16 x 24 cm. ISBN : 978-6024812829.

Série : Cahiers d'Archipel

N° 1 D. Lombard
Introduction à l'indonésien (3e édition révisée), 1991 — 27,45

N ° 2 R. Jones
Arabic Loan Words in Indonesian, 1978 — épuisé

N° 3 P. Labrousse
Méthode d›indonésien, volume n° 1 (2e édition révisée), 1994 — (voir série : Autres publications)

N° 4 P. Labrousse
Méthode d'indonésien, volume n° 2, 1978 — (voir série : Autres publications)

N° 5 F. Soemargono
Exercices structuraux d'indonésien, 1978 — épuisé

N° 6 Cl. Salmon & D. Lombard
Les Chinois de Jakarta, temples et vie collective, 1977 — (voir série : études insulindiennes n° 1)

N° 7 F. Pecoraro
Essai de dictionnaire taroko-français, 1977 — épuisé

N° 8 G. Hooykaass
Introduction à la littérature balinaise, 1979 — 7,60

N° 9 F. Soemargono
Le « groupe de Yogya » (1945-1960) – Les voies javanaises d'une littérature indonésienne, 1979 — épuisé

N° 10 U. Sirk
La langue bugis (Célèbes-Sud), 1979 — épuisé

N° 11 H. Chambert-Loir
Sastra : introduction à la littérature indonésienne contemporaine, 1980 — épuisé

N° 12 Pramoedya Ananta Toer
Corruption, 1981 — épuisé

N° 13 N. Phillips & Khaidir Anwar (eds.)
Papers on Indonesian Languages and Literatures, 1981 — épuisé

N° 14 G. Moussay
La langue minangkabau, 1981 — épuisé

N° 15 P. Labrousse
Dictionnaire général indonésien-français, 1984 — 59,45

N° 16 P. Labrousse
Dictionnaire de poche indonésien-français, 1985 — 9,15

N° 17 P. Carey (ed.)
Voyage à Djocja-Karta en 1825 de A.A.J. Payen, 1988 — 14,50

N° 18 F. Soemargono & W. Arifin
Dictionnaire général français-indonésien, 1991 — 59,45

N° 19 Cl. Salmon (ed.)
Le Moment « sino malais » de la littérature indonésienne, 1992 — 18,30

N° 20 Chanatip Kesavadhana (ed.)
Chulalongkorn, Roi de Siam. Itinéraire d'un voyage à Java en 1896, 1993 — 22,55

N° 21 M. Bonneff (ed.)
L'Indonésie contemporaine. Un choix d'articles de la revue Prisma (1971-1991), 1994 — 24,40

N° 22 H. Chambert-Loir (ed.)
La littérature indonésienne. Une introduction, 1994 — 18,30

N° 23 M. Abaza
Islamic Education. Perception and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo, 1994 — 25,60

N° 24 M. Zaini-Lajoubert
L'image de la femme dans les littératures modernes indonésienne et malaise, 1994 25,60

N° 25 Phan Huy Lê, Cl. Salmon & Ta Trong Hiêp
Un émissaire viêtnamien à Batavia. Phan Huy Chú. « Récit sommaire d'un voyage en mer » (1833), 1994 25,60

N° 26 L. Husson
La migration maduraise vers l'Est de Java, 1995 36,60

N° 27 G. Moussay
Dictionnaire minangkabau-indonésien-français, 2 volumes, 1995 94,50

N° 28 A. Feillard
Islam et armée dans l'Indonésie contemporaine, 1995 33,55

N° 29 N. Lancret
La maison balinaise en secteur urbain, 1997 28,20

N° 30 C. Guillot (sous la direction de)
Histoire de Barus. Le site de Lobu Tua, volume n° 1, 1998 30,50
Histoire de Barus. Le site de Lobu Tua, volume n° 2, 2003 30,50
Histoire de Barus. volumes n° 1 & 2, prix spécial 50,00

N° 31 J. Cuisinier
Journal de voyage, Malaisie (1933), Indonésie (1952-55), Extraits Édités par Daniel Perret, *1999* épuisé

N° 32 S. Vignato
Au nom de l'hindouisme. Reconfiguration ethnique chez les Tamouls et les Karo en Indonésie, 2000 38,10

N° 33 J.-M. de Grave
Initiation rituelle et arts martiaux. Trois écoles de kanuragan javanais, 2001 29,70

N° 34 J.-B. Pelon
Description de Timor occidental et des iles sous domination hollandaise (1771-1778)
Texte établi, présenté et annoté par Anne Lombard-Jourdan, 2002 17,00

N° 35 J.-L. Maurer
Les javanais du caillou, 2006 30,00

N° 36 M.-F. Dupoizat
Catalogue of Chinese Style Ceramics of Majapahit. Tentative Inventory, 2007 29,00

N° 37 C. Guillot & L. Kalus
Les monuments funéraires et l'histoire du Sultanat de Pasai à Sumatra, 2008 38,00

N° 38 D. Perret & H. Surachman (ed.)
Histoire de Barus III : Regards sur une place marchande de l'océan Indien (xiie - mi-xviie s.), 2009 38,00

N° 39 Christian Pelras
Explorations dans l'univers des bugis. Un choix de trente-trois rencontres, 2010 35,00

N° 40 Ludvik Kalus & Claude Guillot (traduit du tchèque et annoté par)
Pavel Durdik. Un médecin militaire à Sumatra. Récits de la guerre d'Atjeh, 2010 19,00

N° 41 Paul Wormser
Le Bustan al-Salatin de Nuruddin ar-Raniri, 2011 35,00

N° 42 D. Perret & H. Surachman (ed.)
History of Padang Lawas I. The site of Si Pamutung (9th century – 13th century AD), 2014 40,00

N° 43 D. Perret (ed.)
History of Padang Lawas II. Societies of Padang Lawas (mid-9th – 13th century CE), 2014 35,00

N° 44 M. Picard
Kebalian, la construction dialogique de l'identité balinaise, 2017 25,00

Série : Études insulindiennes / Archipel

N° 1 Cl. Salmon et D. Lombard
Les Chinois de Jakarta. Temples et vie collective épuisé

N° 2 M. Bonneff et al.
Pancasila. Trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie 16,75

N° 3 Cl. Salmon
Literature in malay by the chinese of indonesia. A provisional annotated bibliography épuisé

N° 4 C. Guillot
L'Affaire Sadrach. Étude sur le Christianisme à Java au xixe siècle épuisé

N° 5 M. Charras
De la forêt Maléfique à l'Herbe Divine 16,75

N ° 6 F. Raillon
Les Étudiants indonésiens et l'Ordre Nouveau 25,15

N° 7 M. Bonneff
Pérégrinations javanaises. Les voyages de R.M.A. Purwa Lelana 25,15

N° 8 Ch. Vuldy
Pekalongan : Batik et Islam dans une ville du Nord de Java 21,35

N° 9 B. Sellato
Nomades et sédentarisation à Bornéo 27,45

N° 10 M. Franck
Quand la rizière rencontre l'asphalte... 29,00

Série : Autres publications

. D. Lombard
Le Carrefour javanais (3 volumes) 79,00

. C. Guillot
The Sultanate of Banten 14,50

. Ouvrage collectif
Babouin et autres nouvelles de malaisie 14,95

. F. Soemargono et W. Arifin
Dictionnaire de Poche français-indonésien 19,05

. P. Labrousse
Méthode d'Indonésien (Nouvelle édition) 28,20

. Cl. Salmon, W. Franke & A.K. Siu
Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Indonesia (Java) Vol. 2 – Part n° 1 & n° 2 (2 volumes) 57,95

. M.O. Scalliet
Antoine Payen : Peintre des Indes orientales – Vie et écrits d'un artiste du xixe s. 44,20

Prix établis en euros, Frais de poste en plus
Envoi par poste, paiement à réception de la facture

Association Archipel
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
54 boulevard raspail – 75006 Paris – France
e-mail : archipel@ehess.fr